Dış Politika – Foreign Policy Vol: XXXVI/I
NATO’s New Strategic Concept
Conference June 2010, Ankara
Table of Contents

Words of Welcome ........................................................................................................... 7
  Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute

Keynote Speech ................................................................................................................ 9
  H.E. Ta’an İldem, Director General of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Presentations ..................................................................................................................... 19
  “A review of NATO’s changing security environment” ............................................ 20
    Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, International Relations Dept., Bilkent University

  Recomm. of NATO Expert Group on the New Strategic Concept ....................... 23
    Mr. Antonio Ortiz, Policy Adviser, Policy Planning, Off. of the NATO Sec. General.

  A German Perspective: ............................................................................................... 26
    Wolfgang Richter, Colonel GS, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP, Berlin

  An Italian Perspective on NATO’s new Strategic Concept: ................................. 35
    Dr. Ricardo Alcaro, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Italy (Oral intervention)

EU-NATO Relations ....................................................................................................... 40
  Assoc. Prof. Tarık Oğuzlu, International Relations Department, Bilkent University

Turkish Foreign Policy in the current era ................................................................. 48
  Ünal Çeviköz

“US Perspectives for Security in Eastern Mediterranean” .................................... 56
  Stephen Larrabee, RAND, Corporate Chair for European Security

NATO-Russia Relations ............................................................................................... 61
  Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University

Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey ................................. 77
  Mustafa Kibaroğlu

Other Issues .................................................................................................................... 86
The International System still evolving ......................................................... 87
Reşat Arım, Rtd. Ambassador

Nuclear Swap Agreement with Iran ................................................................ 91
Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

Options of Solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict .......................... 97
Dr. Ercan Özer

Euro-Atlantic Relations in the Obama Period ............................................. 122
Gökhan Akşemsettinoğlu

The Changes in Images of Women in Turkey .............................................. 138
Professor Emel Doğramaci (PhD)

The Arctic and the Dilemma of Climate Change ........................................ 149
Onur Erpul

35th Anniversary Conference ..................................................................... 158
Speech by Seyfi Taşhan at the 35th Anniversary Conference ............... 159
Words of Welcome

Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute

Seyfi Taşhan:

I would like to welcome you for our meeting on NATO’s New Security Concept. This Conference is part of our study on Turkey’s security in the 21st century and this is an ongoing study at the institute. It was an opportunity for us as suggested by Ambassador Ildem to have NATO as the primary factor. Of course, NATO has been Turkey’s primary pillar for security in the world and in our region. Many things have changed in the new world, and we would like to take this opportunity to look at what has changed and what would be the chance, new tasks, new risks, new policies. The conference as you see in the programme that is in your folders will cover many areas. Of course, we will cover also the thorny of areas that impact the future of NATO. But before proceeding, I would like to invite professor Metin Heper, Vice Rector and Dean of Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, on behalf of Bilkent University.

Metin Heper:

Thank you Mr Taşhan. Your Excellencies, colleagues and guests, on behalf of my university, I would like to extend to you my warm welcome to this Conference. At Bilkent, we think that Bilkent University is a research-oriented university. We think, in terms of some scholarly achievements, Bilkent’s ranking is very high in Turkey’s university system. And consequently, I am very pleased that Bilkent University has been chosen for this very timely, what promises to be high powered meeting. It is timely, of course, given the issues that will be taken up at this meeting. And also perhaps because of the fact that the Republic of Turkey called upon NATO three days ago concerning the unfortunate developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also promises to be very high powered conference in my opinion given the calibre of the participants to this conference. With these considerations in mind, I would like to thank Foreign Policy Institute of Turkey which is based, as you probably know, on the campus of Bilkent University. Mr Seyfi Taşhan and his colleagues at that Institute are convening this meeting at Bilkent Hotel. I also would like to thank his Excellency Mr Ünal Çeviköz at this point in his absence, Deputy under Secretary of Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as his Excellency Tacan Ildem, Director General of International Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And I also would like to express my gratitude to all distinguished participants to this conference from NATO, from Germany, from Italy, as well as from the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University and Doğuş University in Istanbul. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Professor Heper. Now the time is for our Keynote speaker, ambassador Tacan Ildem who is Director General of International Security Affairs in Foreign Ministry. He has been the spirit behind this conference when we consulted and we said pick this NATO up. So, we were talking about other issues of security, but he led us direct way and I am very
much grateful to him like my colleagues for having helped us. Without him, we could not have secured and arranged this conference. I would like to thank him and would like to ask him for his Keynote speech.
Keynote Speech

H.E. Tacan İldem, Director General of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

H. E. Tacan İldem:

Thank you Mr. President,

Excellencies distinguished guests to very important event and I would like to express my thanks and appreciations to President Seyfi Tashan of the Foreign Policy Institute in bringing about this meeting today. It is a timely one when the experts group at NATO has presented its Report on the Strategic Concept and when in all allied countries and also in partner countries the topic is being discussed publicly. I think for us to have such a debate is relevant and important. I would like to express my thanks to the Vice Rector as well. I know that Bilkent University is not only the venue for the institute but also contributing intellectually to the work undertaken. I had previously prepared some written remarks. But since this is a much closed society, dealing with such an important issue I thought that it would be better to express my thoughts on this topic dealing with certain items relevant to the strategic concept. If I make stride with the process at NATO during the Strasbourg- Kehl Summit Meeting of 2009, the Heads of State and Government decided to establish an expert group to make its contribution for the preparation of the Strategic Concept. The present Strategic Concept dates back to 1999 and I think time has come to reflect upon the developments that have taken place since then and to give a vision statement for the future. The Experts Group had already presented its report on 17th on May and when I talked with my successor our Permanent Representative to NATO yesterday he told me that they already had a way day being an informal discussion of any issue outside the headquarters with an informal environment provided by the Secretary General. So, they had very useful discussion yesterday and I am sure that they will continue to do so because what the Expert Group had done so far is to bring together all ideas, some of them perhaps out of the box ideas to be thought of in preparing the New Strategic Concept. And we would like to see the permanent Council to be fully involved in the process. On the half of, the capitals to feel sense of ownership if such an opportunity is given now. The text should be of course not too long for the public also to understand what such a vision will be for the future. But I think we should not exaggerate the brevity of the Strategic Concept by making certain analogy that it should be understood by Omaha Milkman because I don’t think that no matter how brief, concise it would be there won’t be an interest by certain segments of the society. But in any case public perceptions are extremely important and we have to eliminate the perceptions of the Cold War. The international scene has changed so has NATO and NATO is in a constant process of adaptation, adapting itself to the new security environment and of course such a Strategic Concept should set a clear guidance to the NATO military authorities. It is essential that there is no ambiguity in that sense. When we talk about NATO and its success so far we can claim that it has been a primary forum of consultation, transatlantic forum for consultation, it is a
political organization with military means and Article four which enables any given ally to bring matters directly affecting its security defense and also the security interest of its allies. Article 4 is very crucial in that sense it enables allies to consult among themselves. The core function of alliance is still important and relevant. Article 5 is the bedrock of the alliance and I don’t think that the passage of time will erode its importance and meaning. When we look at the discussions that took place in 1980s and even the beginning of 1990s out of area was some sort of a sinful expression and everybody feared the consequences of embarking upon an endeavor which might be considered as out of area activity. When we look what NATO is doing right now most of its activities can be qualified as out of area. The ongoing operation, ISAF Operation in Afghanistan is a case a point and I must say that in the years to come NATO will continue to be active in such expeditionary operations. For us, the important thing is to have a balance between the core function of the alliance and the expeditionary operations. If we have maintained a success of NATO so far, it is thanks to our ability, capability, capacity to deal with the issues, contingencies related to the core functions to the alliance. Therefore, we can not neglect such areas which we qualified them to be in that category of activity. Such a balance can be struck not only rhetorically but also in practice, it should encompass planning activities and also allocation of resources.

Now, in this new strategic concept and when I say new strategic concept one should not expect a document to be prepared from the scratch. The existing Strategic Document will continue to be valid what we are going to do is to update the present text. And in updating the present strategic concept of course we need to take into account the developments. There have been changes in the international scene, that unknown phenomenon that we have to reflect in the new document, areas like energy security cyber defense or counter piracy, these were perhaps areas that we started to think about in the past but now more and more we have to focus on them. Terrorism will definitely be something that the strategic concept should reflect. If we remember that in 2001 after the terrorist attack in New York, Article 5 was evoked because of such terrorist activities, this will be one important area that we should be united to fight against it. Partnership is another important point that we need to enlarge our capacity. So far we have created a web of relationships with a number of countries and group of countries, EAPS, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will continue to be a forum of political dialogue, discussion. In the coming months, what we may do in the light of the new strategic concept is to give some substance to do work of the EAPS with tailored arrangements, thematic cooperation models with flexible structures like 28+n. But, in any case we should not give up the existence of such a forum of discussion. Mediterranean dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative these are all very important tools for political dialogue and practical cooperation. When talking about partnerships there is one important player in the Euro-Atlantic scene, it is Russia and I think the alliance should engage with Russian Federation in a meaningful manner. I must say that NATO- Russia Council provides a very important forum for our engagement; it is not 28+ n forum it is a council compose a of 29 nations and we need to engage with Russia in all weather conditions. I recall that after Georgia crisis
NATO-Russia council suspended its meetings at Ambassadorial level. At that time, I always found that to be a great mistake. We should have engaged with Russia even more often at Ambassadorial level if it had been once a month we should have met four times a month, to deliver our messages at appropriate levels and to make them see what the sensitivities are and I think there is now a better understanding about the utility of the NRC. There are areas of mutual interest from counter terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, cooperation in Afghanistan; so we need to build on these areas so that our engagement will be mutually reinforcing and to the satisfaction of all.

What we have seen in the recent year is that in all operational theatres we can not achieve results only through military means. This brings me to the notion of comprehensive approach which will need to be reflected in the Strategic Concept. What I meant is that if we take Afghanistan as an example, we have the ISAF Operation and military operation there. But, in order to achieve success we need to bring different components; civilian military, good governance, reconstruction and development so that we see the ownership of the Afghan people and to see state structures functioning properly. And that is why we need to bring together the capabilities and capacities of different international organizations. When NATO has claimed to contribute to comprehensive approach we are sincere about that and we wish to engage with other international actors and organizations in a proper and profitable manner. We are genuine in our offer to have such cooperation with other organizations and that's why in every operational theatre we can see NATO being engaged with the United Nations with the European Union and with all concerned organizations there. Now usually Turkey is being criticized that it is sort of an obstacle for making a progress in furthering cooperation between NATO and the European Union. I must say that such a statement will not be with the knowledge of what Turkey is trying to do and what Turkey has been contributing in operational field. First of all, Turkey since the inception of European Security and Defense Policy has been contributing to almost all operations and actions of the European Union. We are in Bosnia under the mandate of the Althea Operation and it is a EU-led Berlin plus military operation and we would soon be the first leading nation within Althea. In Kosovo Eulex mission we have 64 policemen and we wish to increase the number up to 150. And we, at the same time, wish to be properly involved in the planning decision shaping and execution phases of each and every mission and operation. If you ask me what we are satisfying with the level of involvement, my answer would not be positive unfortunately. NATO has been very open minded forward leaning towards its partners in involving them, in planning, decision shaping and execution of any operation- ISAF- KFOR. I must say that our allies who have been very vocal during the NATO discussions, were silent when it comes to the deliberations of to EU with respect to a better and proper involvement of the Non- EU allies within the CFDP of EU.

Lisbon Treaty, according to what I hear from my interlocutors in EU, will hopefully bring some possibilities in that direction. But when I read certain stipulations within the Lisbon Treaty and also the instruments provided by the union, I get more skeptical;
because no matter what accumulated we have in our relationship with EU and one clear example is this implementation of the document, we see that according to Lisbon Treaty we are qualified to be a third country, a third state together with Russia, India, China or whichever country you may remember. And I think that there should be a difference between other partners of EU and Non-EU European allies. So, no matter what our membership process how it will continue and let us for the sake of assumption think that Turkey will remain out of the European Union forever, still Turkey will have the rights to be properly involved in ESDP because we are Non-EU European ally. Now, one critical question in the Strategic Concept would be the nuclear component of the alliance deterrents, as long as nuclear weapons do exist in the world and we very much support the vision of Obama, one day to have a world free of nuclear weapons. Still it will take time and until such time NATO will need to maintain its nuclear deterrence. I am sure that the debate on the finalization of Strategic Concept would require a focus on the nuclear dimension of the deterrence and I presume a balancing language will be added by incorporation of certain language with respect to arms control and disarmament. Missile defense will be another issue which will have to be with in the Strategic Concept. For nuclear weapons stationed in Europe sub strategic systems, I must say that the maintenance of Trans-Atlantic links, display of solidarity and also the principle of fair burden and risk sharing would be something we should not lose sight of. The missile defense is an important issue and on that I have to highlight the principle of indivisibility of security and solidarity yet another principle in that context and we need to see all alliance territory to be fully covered with any missile defense architecture to be developed in the years ahead. Few points on Headquarters Reform because when I read the report and I think it is in front of you, the report of the Experts on Strategic Concept, there are two fundamental issues, one is military transformation and second is the reform of the headquarters and decision making process and of course one other issue is expanding our capacity in the partnership field. On Headquarters Reform all I can say is that we very much support various ideas to strengthen the ability of alliance to deliver things in a timely fashion and streamlining the Committees is one very good idea. But, we have to be very careful about it and we always have to review the process with lessons learned. As to the decision making process, consensus has always been in the heart of our work in the alliance. Sometimes, we may come across certain suggestions with the expectation that NATO can also follow the European Union by incorporating qualified majority rule to its working methodology. But, first of all, every organization has distinct future as it is not EU and second when people make such suggestions they fail to recognize the fact that even within the EU security and defense is one domain of activity that qualified majority voting rule is not applicable. So, at NATO, we may also come across suggestions that perhaps we should restrict the consensus rule only with the Council, Committees will discuss briefly what is before them and bringing it to the Council table. I do not think that it would be practical since we will be over, burdening the work of the Council and at the same time we will be losing expertise accumulated in the Committees. A few words on allocation of resources, because it is one particular area that we are facing more and more difficulty at NATO and the circumstances is not proper to increase the level
of spending due to financial crisis that we are undergoing. But if the level of ambition of the alliance is determined by financial constrains then we will be losing one important and successful organization, like NATO because we will be focusing only in areas that financial capability could permit. So, the level of ambition has to be determined by the Strategic Concept but not by financial constrains. Strategic concept may eventually lead a discussion on command structure and I caution the audience that frequent change of command structure will lead to question mark as to the credibility of our system. These are some thoughts that I offer again I would like to thank you for organizing this meeting and I hope that it will produce very good exchange of views that will help us in having our ownership in the process.

Questions

Prof. Duygu Sezer: Thank you very much, first perhaps I should thank the organizers of the conference, this is a unique organization. This is a rare occasion for us from many perspectives especially because we all time are used to attend such conferences take part and we are active such conferences because they are used to be more of them during the Cold War years and in the early days of the passing away of the Cold War. But, it is quite rare that you are taking part in a conference which is exclusively dedicated to NATO issues which I believe it is very timely. Mr. Ambassador, you have given us a very informative overview, but I had not seen the report, I haven’t had a chance to look at in fact I am just seeing report today, this morning. And you touched on some critical points; I would not take up more of your time because it is very satisfactorily explained by you. There is one area which you may have talked about it but I may have missed it that is the enlargement process. I’ve read the small short paragraph on that report just now it. What do you say about this? Is this a repetition of the old because the 1991 again? This seems to be open-ended approach; it is a continuation of the open-ended approach. What do you think about it? Where do you stand? Where does Turkey stand on that question? Thank you very much.

H. E. Tacan İldem: Thank you Professor, enlargement will continue to be an item in our agenda in the years to come, and Open Door policy will be the guiding principle for us. There is an unfinished business in the Balkans as you now, one country Macedonia was aspiring and still aspires to join NATO as a member. And in 2008 in Bucharest Summit meeting we were expected Macedonia to join NATO together with Albania and Croatia but it could not be possible. And we hope that the main issue will be resolved soon and we could welcome them without further delay. It would be a strategic mistake on the part of NATO, if we can not deal with this unfinished business properly. We were happy last April in Talen when the Ministers decided to invite Bosnia Herzegovina to Membership Action Plan. And we hope that in the fall of this year, their MAP cycle can start together with Montenegro without any delay. You are right we have to be open-minded and it is up to the nations who wish to join the alliance to strengthen its ties with NATO. We have certain procedures, there are countries that are in the partnerships for peace program, and there are countries which have cycles. Before membership is actual to prepare them we have the
The Ambassador of Netherlands: Thank you, I have two questions—one is very short. The short will be: what is your primary assessment of the Report? Second one is, you talked about Russia, I came from Moscow last year and what you mean is that it is very important to one way is trying to engage with Russia. Do you think there is special work of the achievement, because you are much nearer with Russia not only geographically but also with other issues as well?

H. E. Tacan Ildem: Thank you Ambassador, yes indeed I had the privilege to work with both Secretary Generals and you are right to be proud to produce Secretary Generals from both countries. It is an important position guiding the work of the alliance, Shaffer and Rasmussen. It will be a guiding force in the period ahead of us and so far what he has done is a testament of this ability to guide us in that direction. We had read the Report and I must say that it is a very useful contribution to the deliberations that we are going to have. As we know, when the Strategic Concept work was embarked upon, the first was reflection period. We had seminars organized in different allied countries and even in one partner country as I remember one seminar I went in Helsinki so it shows again the forward leaning attitude of alliance towards the partners. We welcome the Report, it contains very useful ideas and we are happy to see the contributions of Ambassador Ümit Pamir who was among the experts and another qualification we give to individual in the group is Wiseman he contributed enormously to the work of group, of course without national affiliation. We endorse all these ideas but of course it is a huge document and I don’t think that it is concise with the aim of clarity and to be concise for the publics to read it. But nevertheless, the ideas that they have shared with us through this report will need to be taken into account discussed properly at all levels. And firstly, at the Permanent Council by our Ambassador, later on 14th of October the Secretary General intends to bring together Foreign and Defense ministers prior to the Lisbon Summit on 19th of November where our Heads of State and Government will endorse the Strategic Concept. So it is a welcome paper and we very much appreciate the work of the Experts Group. For Russia and I know how knowledgeable and experienced you are given your ten year as an Ambassador in Moscow. It is no doubt very important country and an important player in Euro-Atlantic security environment and we can not just ignore Russia but rather we need to engage them in a wise strategic manner. Turkey perhaps has certain experience to share with its allies; we respect and understand the sentiment of certain allied nations. It is not easy to deal with recent past when it comes to relations with Russia. So, we respect those sentiments but not necessarily agree with the course of action that we should take and Turkey together with some other allies try to have a vision for the engagement of Russia with a proper manner because at the end of the day we can not go for lowest common
denominator, we should go beyond that and I am quite happy to see that almost all allies now are in full agreement in engaging with Russia. So there is no division among us and like any other allied country Turkey is also trying to influence the discussion with the experience that it had accumulated through its bilateral relations with Russia. I believe that we need to coordinate our views, but NATO-Russia Council should also reflect the structure being a forum of 29 nations not 28+1. Then the discussions will not be reflected of that spirit it, will be subjective to criticisms by our Russian partner so we have to avoid that. But on critical issues like the CFE I think we should have a uniform, united alliance position. It is fundamental that we not only coordinate but reach a decision, a position corresponding to all of our requirements.

Mustafa Kibaroglu: Mr. Ambassador, it is always a pleasure to listen to your remarks, just like today you set the stage in a very eloquent way. Especially with respect some research I am doing, it is about US nuclear weapons in Europe, as you also mentioned there is a paragraph in the document, I just want to refresh the minds of participants here, as long as the nuclear weapons exist, we should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces with widely shared responsibility for the deployment and operational support. Any change in this policy including in the geographical distribution of NATO nuclear deployments in Europe should be made as with other major decisions by the allies as a whole. But we all know that there is this letter dated February 2008 earlier this year Foreign Minister of Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherland and Norway stated that they will come the initiative taken by President Obama to strive force substantial production of strategic arms and to move towards producing the role of the nuclear weapon and to seek peace and security in the world without nuclear weapons. We need to emphasize that there should be discussions towards the allies can do more closer to this political objective ensured three countries that are known to have US weapons in their territory, Belgium, The Netherland, and Germany want to sent this weapons back. So, what is NATO’s reaction to this terror, if these countries somehow or NATO as a whole takes a decision or approve their desire to sent them back? What is Turkey’s reaction to this, could you please explain?

H. E. Tacan Ildem: Thank you very much, Professor Kibaroglu is always very much focused on this particular issue and I very much appreciate his work, he will definitely contribute this meeting. If I may respond to your question, it is true that these five nations express their expectations to see reductions in the number of nuclear weapons; they are for arms control and disarmament which we will fully support. We share as I mentioned earlier, the vision of President Obama to have a world free of nuclear weapons. And as the Report says until such time we need to preserve nuclear deterrence with safe and secure system. I have to remind that in Talen during the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, NATO for the first time has discussed this issue in deep. And one clear message came out of that meeting and it is also reflected in this Report that not a single nation will be implement unilaterally; this is a very powerful statement in itself. So, there may be a genuine interest and desire to see some those sub strategic systems withdrawal to individual nations like Belgium, The Netherland and Germany. In fact, German coalition government had incorporated in the coalition
protocol clear stipulations with respect to the withdrawal of these systems. Nevertheless, after Talen we see that there is a unity among allies and we have to remember that Nuclear Posture Review of the US is another element in this point that with all decisions to be made together. There is a clear reference to the fact that even the US will not make decisions unilaterally. I can not of course speak on the behalf of the Netherlands, since we have there, the ambassador of that country. Nevertheless, I can only give as an idea how this statement is reflective in the policies and rhetoric of individual states. For instance, during the NPT review conference that I attended in New York, there was a paragraph with respect to the elimination of the sub strategic systems in Europe and that reference was deleted with the very forceful intervention of the Dutch delegation. So, it shows that even if there is a desire as a long term objective to see this system eliminated from our inventories until such time all allies are united to stick to the nuclear deterrence that it provides. A speculative question that you put Turkey's reaction would be. The only thing I can refer to that is my earlier statement that among the guiding principles there is one which fair risk and burden sharing, so if three allies say no then I will put the question to you whether it will be fair risk a burden sharing to keep those systems in a nation's soil.

Question: Thank you, I have just one remark and 2 questions. The remark is that I am really impressed by the level of bopa between parties position with varied aspect Strategic Concept will touch upon in Italy's position, I will be talking about further but it is really impressive. My two questions regard initial briefly mentioned with CFE treaty that NATO members should follow common position. I would like to know of Turkey would be ready to support ratification of the amended treaty regardless of the fact that Russian troops in Chechnya. Second question regards that NATO's role outside the Euro-Atlantic in particular in the Middle East I would just wonder whether Turkey would be ready in NATO for a role in the Middle East for instance as a peace-keeping capacity in the Middle East conflict?

Question: My question is about Russia- NATO relationship. When I looked at the Report, there is one thing that I personally share and I think the Europeans people share of the sentiments, I would be critical of is this over emphasis on finding a balance between Article 4 and 5 without being clear on how to implement them. I am sure everybody agrees that assurance of the allies in area in dynamic engagement outside is a good thing but how Europe actually go around doing it, I don't think even NATO as I talked to them including Jamie have an idea perhaps pushing some more troops in area. But we are talking about fundamental disagreement as to what constitutes an Article 5 operation. In terms to engage Russia, Report actually says the Medvedev Treaty on European security should not be as a basis of engagement because it undermines NATO. But moderate Russian views actually tell us the opposite view; the Treaty could be a basis of dialogue and engagement although it does not provide all the answers. It could be a basis for seriously engaging with Russia beyond NATO-Russia council structure which at the moment only deals with rather massive, boring technical issues; it does not really look at the wider strategic issues. On that basis, I think there is a European and American disagreement and I
would really like to know where Turkey stands on that, how do you view the Treaty as a basis of engagement that Medvedev has proposed.

Reşat Anım: You mentioned the adaptation of NATO to the international developments. We know that the international developments affect the international system. We see that international system is still evolving. So, do you think that we can say the same thing for NATO, which it is evolving according to the situation in the international system?

H. E. Taycan Ildem: Thank you very much, these are very important questions and the time constraints make my job rather difficult more than a challenging one. First on CFE, we have to remember that we have decided not to go to our parliaments for the ratification of CFE because we were waiting Istanbul Commitments to be fulfilled and now we have yet another difficulty with developments in Georgia, the political implication that it brought about. We accepted the Parallel Action Plan developed within the alliance at this crucial juncture we would like to see allies to agree on a unified alliance position in how to proceed from now on in engaging Russia, because Russians as you know more than 12 half years ago they have suspended implementing the CFE Treaty and now we should not feel the necessity to rush in a hasty decision just for the sake of engaging Russia, if we are not united on a position in how to deal with CFE. We very much appreciate the work undertaken by Ambassador Newland the new Special Representative for CFE but we have to be realistic and we have to see that CFE Treaty is a legally binding document and it would be difficult for us to bring together legally binding and political commitments in a meaningful manner to accommodate the Russian side. So, going for the ratification of the adapted CFE will not be something realistic given the fact that the United States insists that it is not possible to see this adapted CFE ratified by the Congress given the situation in Georgia. So, putting this aside we have to reflect upon new ways how to proceed but we should not lose the instruments that we had created, the CFE is something vital to maintain as an instrument. And I don’t think that we can reach something better than CFE and legally binding that nature of it is quite important not to lose. Now regarding your question on a possible role of NATO to have a peace keeping mission in the Middle East, first of course there has to be a peace there, so that we have a peace keeping role. But, in reaching that point we need to intensify our political dialogue and practical cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries in such a way not only in the political and practical cooperation terms but also in public diplomacy dimension. There are still misperceptions as to what NATO stands for and we have to eliminate certain concerns or certain cliché ideas about NATO on the minds of those countries in the region. And I can remember one interesting development when I was sitting on the Council at NATO we had Ambassador Amro Musa the Secretary General of Arab League. He came to meet with the Council and his remarks were quite an eye opener, he told us that he would never have thought of coming to NATO to speak with NATO ambassadors on the Council. The reason he came was that he saw that NATO had changed it did not represent what NATO used to be during the Cold War years. So, if the Secretary General of Arab League could engage with NATO in such a
fashion; it can give us hope that with the proper public diplomacy efforts we can eliminate an important segment of concerns and NATO can well participate in any peace keeping effort. And we may at the same time recall that the NATO training mission in Iraq is one clear example that in such geographies NATO can deliver, and it is quite possible that when we finally see Middle East peace established NATO can be one organization to contribute.

Now, with respect to the portions of the Report pertaining to Article 4 and Article 5 again as I said earlier Article 4 provides allied countries to have a consultation on issues related to their security and defense. It is a very important mechanism that we can engage in a dialogue among ourselves. For Article 5, I don’t think that we should prescribe which situations warrant the evoking of Article 5. There has always been flexibility we should not introduce a rigid system of what is applicable, what is not applicable, this requires the discussion among allies and Article 4 will provide that. But, at the end of the day take for instance 2001 and for the first time in its history NATO evoked Article 5 because of the attacks in New York. So, if NATO embarks upon an exercise from now on what will fall into the category of the Article 5 then we will be losing the beauty of its flexibility and I rather find it difficult for us to go through that part. With respect to Medvedev proposals, it is not only the Medvedev proposals which to me were containing very important ideas but the formulation of what we called Medvedev proposals in the form of two agreement treaties: one for European security, the other for NATO-Russia Council, to me is not as sophisticated as the ideas formulated under the title of Medvedev proposals and we may even qualify them to be less than what it was and not too sophisticated in nature those instruments. And I have to emphasis that Russia is insisting on legally binding commitments when it comes to its own concerns but when it comes to concerns of some allied nations then it can easily go for political statements or commitments. And I think we need to be very careful about that careful process is progressing, NATO-Russia Council will of course discuss the agreement that Russia has proposed. But we don’t have Medvedev proposals as such imply because what we have seen in the wordings of these two treaties are not reflected of what Medvedev proposals intended to have initially.

For your question Ambassador, I can in all fairness say that NATO is transforming itself constantly. In early 1990s after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union fall of the communism and Warsaw Pact it was the first major transformation. Transformation is a key word guiding the work of the alliance and it will continue, we can not sustain the success of NATO without transformation and even for the fact that there is allied comment transformation in Norfolk is a clear indication that we are focusing in a very pragmatic manner and the ACT in Norfolk is instrumental to generate ideas like a think tank if I may qualify that way giving us perspectives for the future and it is extremely useful to see a number of possible contingencies and how the alliance can react to such evolving situations. So our motive is transformation and we will continue to do that and this Report in fact highlights the importance of transformation in that sense.
Presentations
“A review of NATO’s changing security environment”

Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, International Relations Dept., Bilkent University

Ali Karaosmanoğlu

Ambassador Ildem explained clearly the position and problems of Turkey. I would like to make a few generalities because my job is to describe, and analyze the present international system, the present environment of NATO the environment in which the strategic concept is elaborated. Let me say something about the clarity of the strategic concept. As far as I can see, since the end of Cold War no strategic concept was clear enough to address the public. This was not because of the inability of the authors of strategic concepts but it was due to the fluidity of the international system. I would like to make three general points. First I would like to begin with an optimistic note. On the occasion of the Washington summit of April 1999, Secretary General Xavier Solana said “The explanation of NATO longevity lies in the unique and enduring political nature of the alliance and its flexibility to respond to changes in the security environment. Solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance depended not only on the threat of military adversary but also on the democratic principles shared by its members. The decision procedure of the alliance depended upon debate and consensus. These characteristics have led NATO to shape not only its immediate security environment but also contribute to security and stability in the broader Euro-Atlantic region. In the Cold War, NATO adopted two dimensional strategy which was defined in terms of deterrence and defense on the one hand and a continual dialog and cooperation with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. A consequent example of this valuable effort was arms control negotiations and arms control treaties. This strategy was successful and resulted the termination of Cold War. This dual approach to security remains relevant to deal with present security challenges. Despite the disappearance of the common threat by the end of Cold War, NATO was remarkably successful in adapting to the transformation of the international system. It has grown geographically and functionally, it adjusted its Article 5 to the new threat of terrorism. It is fighting against piracy. It has undertaken peace support operations and crisis management in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Moreover NATO continues to link North America and Europe.

There are however lingering doubts about the future of NATO. These were experienced in Iraq, that policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic who named the mission in Afghanistan as text case for the Alliance. This implies that NATO might not survive after a failure in Afghanistan. This expression of uncertainty is probably misleading because NATO’s future cannot be judged according to the outcome of a single case. Beyond Afghanistan however, there are deeper structural forces that are already beginning to affect the old Transatlantic bargain on what NATO still stands for. The old Transatlantic bargain is particularly effected by two
major developments. First, the flexibility of international system is increasing. Regional security concerns and interests are increasingly becoming independent of the global ones. Regional security complexes are being considered in their own terms by the regional states. Policy choices of regional states are being diversified. The United States as the strongest power and the leader of the alliance often find other states, including allies, moving away from it. The smaller powers have chances to dealing with their problems in their own ways and demand tolerance and for bearance from America. This development has already considerably weakened the alliance solidarity. The alliance can no longer be taken for granted. This is more than a question of the lack of political will or of the lack of a vision. This is a structural challenge which occurred after the collapse of Soviet Union and it can hardly be remedied by greater effort on the part of the allies. This of course does not necessarily meant the end of NATO but it may suggest a substantially diminished alliance solidarity.

The second major development is the diminished importance of Europe in America’s geopolitical outlook. The shift in economic activity from Europe to Asia will inevitably lead the United States policymakers to devote more energy and attention to the latter. In the ongoing financial crises we observed with certain astonishment that the United States is more dependant on China than the European Allies. From the perspective of security, Europe seems to be a challenging security geography. Washington’s focus has long shifted to the Caucasus, Middle East, Asia-Pacific and the subcontinent. This trend is being strengthened by a radical change in the ethnic and cultural composition in the policy elite in Washington. The European oriented policymakers and the intellectuals of the statecraft of the Cold War are not anymore so influential as in the Cold War years in Washington. Policies are shaped either by extremely local elites, such as Mr. Bush or in terms of Stephen Walt by a highly cosmopolitan elite with different technical characteristics, geographic points of references and personal experiences. This development will not provide Europe a place of priority in the new foreign security policy agenda. I am not going to elaborate a very similar development in Europe. As a matter of fact certain scholars foresaw this kind of developments which was going to weaken alliance solidarity in Europe and published books and i remember one of them, Christopher Coker’s “The Twilight of The West”. Actually according to many Europeans the Obama administration is going to a major improvement or even a renaissance in Transatlantic relations. American foreign policy, however; is shifting from unilateralism to bilateralism in the Obama years. There will be more consultations with Washington and in the European Allies at least. Another point the report made was that 69% of the Europeans supported Obama during the presidential election. American’s image in Europe is rapidly improving. They liked Obama’s ideas and policies based on international law and human rights and diplomacy rather than force. The third point the report makes, they also agree with Obama’s priorities such as fight against terrorism and economic crises. The same report also notes that expectations in Europe clearly overblown. The first disappointment came with the Gaza crises when the president elect chose not to comment on this issue. Within the same framework another point may be pertinent
the United States administration may attempt to establish special strategic relations. When President Obama came to Turkey just after his election. He made a reference to ‘Model Strategic Partnership’. Model Strategic Partnership may be made by NATO Alliance and by members of NATO. This implies that a global NATO will be or may be strengthened by special partnership arrangements and these arrangements will be used as an instrument of regional stability but at the same time this arrangements would be viewed by many allies as divisive and a moderate instrument of American domination. For instance Egon Bar, a German Social Democratic Party’s foreign policy thinker underlined that with such an expanding NATO through such kind of arrangements the United States could paint a casual view of multilateralism and Europe’s autonomy can be abandoned even further. I would like to come to third pessimistic point. This is probably easier to overcome. This is about the conceptual penetrations mainly as a result of increasing fluidity in international system. What I mean by this can be explained in three dimensions. First of all interpenetration of allies and non-allies. I can give you many examples. One of them actually is non-allies participation in NATO’s Article 5 arrangements such as the arrangements in military naval arrangements against terrorism in the Mediterranean.(Operation Active Endeavour) The second interpenetration is the mixture of Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 operations. Article 5 operations may include non-Article 5 operations and it makes the distinction extremely blurred or vice versa. The third interpenetration is the military and non-military operations in peace operations such as ISAF. All these mixtures probably through the new strategic analysis can be overcome and NATO can reach a certain clarity on these but as long as the flexibility of the international system continues, the new interpretation will continue to complicate NATO’s job.
Recommendations of NATO Expert Group on the New Strategic Concept

Mr. Antonio Ortiz, Policy Adviser, Policy Planning, Office of the NATO Secretary General

In terms of the political environment, the report reflects a threefold crisis or rather three basic limitations, which also act as opportunities. First, the crisis or limitations of multilateralism. One of the key messages of the report is that no single international organization can resolve complex crises and let alone major global challenges on its own. It will have to act in cooperation with other international organizations. The report also sends the message that sometimes NATO will simply be absent from a crisis scenario. Sometimes, it will be up to national governments to react. In other circumstances other international organizations will be better placed than NATO to provide a response to a specific contingency. In this regard, we have moved from an ideologically charged approach to multilateralism, with ideas such as that of competitive multilateralism, to a much more pragmatic approach based on efficiency and effectiveness of international organizations and much greater emphasis on partnerships.

Second, are the limits of solidarity, which reflect an underlying crisis of confidence. There are three elements within this crisis of confidence. First is Afghanistan, which raises issues of burden and risk sharing. There is a certain sense of operational fatigue; a feeling that burden is not well shared at NATO. Hence, the call in the report for a renewal of vows in NATO. The message is that every ally should shoulder its part of responsibility. A second element is Russia, the internal debate about reassurance and reengagement, which is very much reflected in the report. A third element is what could be described as a clusterization of security into specific issues, a process of regionalization of security – security of the North Caucasus, Black Sea, High North, etc. There is sometimes a sense that the alliance may not pay sufficient attention or respond properly to more specific regional security concerns of Allies. These allies would like to see more of a response to certain regional crises, but then the risk here is that we may end up splitting the concept of indivisibility of security, that we end up regionalizing or clusterizing security.

The third major crisis that is reflected in the report is obviously the current economic and financial crisis. Here, the report is maybe not as ruthlessly honest as it could have been. First because the worst is to come in terms of budget cuts. It is as if the Group of Experts say there is a risk of tsunami, but they do not give the alert yet. And the wave has not yet crashed against defence budgets. And, second, there is a different position between the US and European Union in terms of defence spending and
affordability of expensive capabilities. So, there is a serious risk of a damaging imbalance.

Overall, NATO 2020 is a balanced report. It may seem conservative to some, as it supports the current status quo on several issues. It is certainly not over-ambitious, although it does contain some new elements. The report offers a realistic and solid perspective on the future of NATO. One open question is whether we should be explicit about the limits of NATO. What is clear, however, is that we should avoid a level of ambition that is driven by the availability of resources rather than by a sober assessment of the strategic environment.

As to the recommendations of the report, there are two basic points: an Alliance to guarantee the security and safety of its members; and an alliance that engages dynamically with organizations outside its traditional area of activity, outside its boundaries.

The report does not reinvent the wheel, where it is not necessary to do so. There are many elements in the report that are drawn from the present strategic concept. It also reaffirms many policies and positions, such as the fundamental tasks of NATO with some changes in Chapter 2, the centrality of Article 5. Some of NATO’s long standing policies, like ‘open door’, are reaffirmed and others are reformulated in a novel way. There are several interesting conceptual proposals.

First, is the primacy of Article 5, but with a mix of old and new. On the traditional side, there is an emphasis on the need for a flexible mix of military capabilities, conventional, nuclear; also the need for contingency planning for military exercises in order to give confidence to new allies. On the other hand, there are new elements in our approach to Article 5, there is a new generation of dangers from sources that are geographically and technologically very diverse. NATO needs to reflect how Article 5 applies to these threats from terrorism, violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber, etc.

Second, is the need for increased versatility. The idea of accelerated transformation, of improving the capacity for rapid response, the protection against cyber threats and wiser defence spending. It is also about political versatility and the emphasis on Article 4 and more political consultations. Everyone agrees on the need for more political consultations, but the real question is what is the scope of consultations. We understand that we need to consult more for crisis prevention and management. But, for example, are European allies ready to do foreign policy through NATO, and if so, what future for the EU CFSP? So, one of the key debates in the coming months will be about redefining the scope of Article 4.

Third, strengthening partnerships. Much has been said about this, including some specific questions about a new partnership framework. On comprehensive approach, the report fails to provide a definition of the concept. The report re-introduces the idea of cooperative security, which is not new and goes back to Helsinki ’75. This may help to assuage some of the concerns of other international organizations about the comprehensive approach.
Fourth, are relations with Russia. This has been one of the most difficult debates in this process. The report of the experts attempts to provide a delicate balance between reassurance and reengagement. But, it also says that the door should remain open for Moscow at all levels.

Fifth, are lessons learned and organizational reform. One interesting contribution from the report is the guidelines for missions outside the Alliance. These are not criteria for NATO operations, but guidelines. The reaction has so far been mixed. It has been more positively received by the military than by civilians.

One final question is how the experts report can contribute to building consensus in the next phase of the process. The experts report tries to offer a balance in many areas which have been difficult at NATO: between the core mission of Article 5 collective defence on one side, and expeditionary operations and the need to respond to threats from wherever they arise on the other. This is a codification of an existing understanding, that goes back to 2001, but still is an open debate. Second is the balance between strategic reassurance to new allies and openness and engagement with Russia. Third, a balance between a continued commitment to a mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, and references to arms control and counter-proliferation and disarmament activities. Fourth, a balance between what the Alliance will do by itself and what is best done by other international organizations and actors. Finally, a balance between an ambitious forward looking agenda for the Alliance which would make it more relevant in the 21st century and being mindful of the economic circumstances we are now in. Finding the right balance between these competing priorities is going to be the key debate now as we approach Lisbon. The question for allies is whether they find these balances proposed acceptable and a good basis for achieving consensus or whether they find them too ambitious or not sufficiently ambitious.
A German Perspective:

Wolfgang Richter, Colonel GS, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP, Berlin

The new Strategic Concept will outline the perspectives, role and core functions of the Alliance in the security environment of the 21st century. It will specify its risk perceptions, a comprehensive and cooperative approach towards shaping peace and security as well as handling crisis management, and the conclusions for NATO’s political action and military contingencies for the next ten to fifteen years. I expect the document to deal with all issues related to these areas in a comprehensive but focused manner following the examples given in previous NATO’s documents such as the Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1999. In my short presentation, I cannot touch upon all issues under consideration in detail but select just a few that are subject to a sometimes controversial debate.

The nature of the Alliance

NATO will continue to be an organization which is based on a common vision, shared values and security interests and on strategic consensus. Thus, maintaining strategic unity, solidarity and a strong transatlantic link must remain the Alliance’s highest priority. The indivisibility of the security of all Member States and the political will and military ability to support each other will remain the basis for the Alliance and the precondition of collective defence. Consultation, common action regarding deterrence and defence as well as appropriate contributions to crisis management also beyond the geographical area defined by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will remain its core functions. However, the notions of indivisibility of security of its member states, the requirement for global cooperation, the definition of security risks and challenges of the 21st century as well as the subsequent role of military operations and the design of appropriate force postures deserve further discussion:

Security risks and challenges in the 21st century

NATO does neither find itself nor define itself to be in confrontation with or an adversary of any state, group of states or multinational organization in Europe or worldwide; however, it faces risks and challenges which it must be prepared to counter if, when and as far as necessary. In this respect one should keep in mind the difference between risk and threat:

- A threat exists if there are military capabilities and political intentions to use them in order to apply a coercive policy or to launch a direct aggression against NATO Member States or the Alliance as a whole.

- Risks can stem from political uncertainties that eventually might or might not lead to the acquisition of such capabilities in combination with a hostile or aggressive policy.
A direct military aggression against NATO member States or the Alliance as a whole is the least likely option that NATO currently and in the foreseeable future faces. Most likely risks and dangers emanate from

(1) that sort of terrorism which is targeting the West as an ideological adversary operating internationally from safe havens in or supported by instable or failing states,

(2) by spill-over effects of regional instabilities and remaining inter-State conflicts and

(3) particularly, by the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means.

Adding additional dangers and threats for national societies and, partially, for the international community as a whole such as piracy, organized crime, drug trafficking, possible interruption of energy supply, cyber attacks etc. is not wrong per se but must be seen in the context of appropriate counter-measures involving, inter alia, economical, financial, customs and police action with their national responsibilities and international cooperation mechanisms. They demand consultation and coordination but only in rare cases military action in a subsidiary role. In no way should these dangers blur the priorities for the security of the Alliance the strength of which lies in its unique military capabilities apart from the political consultation mechanisms.

NATO cannot cope with the scourge of international terrorism as well as the dangers of global proliferation of WMD alone; given the global nature of risks and possible threats it needs global cooperation. Therefore, it should also take into account global perceptions of its own action and force posture to prevent misperceptions and potentially destabilizing counteraction and block-building.

**Global responsibilities but no global organization**

Despite the need for global cooperation and, where appropriate, global action – in support of the United Nations or regional organizations – NATO should not and will not develop towards a global organization with an ambition of policing the world. Multiplying national security interests and dragging more potential conflict scenarios into the Alliance would not only undermine its cohesion and consensus building ability; it would also carry the risk to be regarded as an attempt of the Western Group of nations to undermine the authority of the United Nations and to confront non-aligned countries in a perceived North-South conflict. Alienating important strategic partners might prompt a new divisive block-building process.

Instead, the cohesion of the Alliance rests with the reaffirmation of its core functions emanating from the Washington Treaty. They require a clear focus on the unity and security of its territory with its transatlantic links. NATO’s political and, if necessary, military out of area action will continue to be based on consultation and counselling, respect for different views and perceptions and on consensus building. The Alliance is not a toolbox from which to form coalitions of the willing for global action. In the same
vein, bilateralism within the Alliance which involves common security interests of all Member States would undermine its common purpose and cohesion.

**Accession policies**

With this understanding and within clear geographical limitations, NATO will continue to apply an open door policy. However, the criteria for accession should be specified by drawing on the principles defined in the 1999 strategic concept and on recent experiences. Accession policies are neither a means to create a global security organization nor should they be triggered only to serve special national ambitions or geostrategic interest of particular applicant or member states; instead, they should be based on an unambiguous unanimity within the Alliance, be confined to the transatlantic space and potentially include OSCE Member States; they must be subject to progress on internal political, legal, economic and military reforms of the applicant states, to their practical contribution to NATO’s security and to the overall peace and stability in the region. In this context, an unequivocal commitment to NATO’s political acquis and comprehensive security concept is indispensable which includes all arms control obligations and the commitment to peaceful conflict settlement. Accession processes should not be initiated if they bear a risk to encourage military action in territorial disputes, to draw NATO into conflict or to split the societies of the applicant countries which could lead to national and regional instability and new confrontation.

**A comprehensive approach towards peace, stability and crisis management**

NATO has fully recognized that in the new international environment military means can be necessary assets to support stability processes and, if necessary, enforce peace but that they alone are not suited to solve political crisis and conflicts or maintain long term political stability. Particularly, the lessons learned in Afghanistan should be enshrined in the new Strategic Concept: Defining criteria for security and political stability and subsequent exit strategies should be based on realistic approaches; they must focus on the primary goal to eliminate threats to the security of the Alliance; a support to nation building should take into account the regional political culture and avoid interfering in traditional inner-societal balances and consensus building mechanisms; attempting to enforce an idealist regime change based on a mere transfer of Western standards carries high risks where these attempts lack local support or meet wide-spread resistance; such attempts in themselves might cause renewed instability.

With this understanding, a well-devised comprehensive approach should and will continue to be the basis for NATO’s action in support of conflict management which includes all necessary political and civil means towards promoting security, conflict settlement, institution building and socio-economic recovery which eventually might lead to local and regional stability. This concept necessitates cooperation with states and non-states partners globally and in the national civil societies.
Global and regional cooperation

In this context, NATO has experienced and should fully recommit itself to cooperation with partners, i.e. other regional and international organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations respectively civil societies:

- Among the international and regional organizations the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) play a unique role, but also partnership with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the states participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Black Sea Cooperation, the Istanbul Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization among others deserve due attention.

- The genuine partnership with states participating in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative as well as in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was successful in the past but now needs a new impetus to avoid largely empty bureaucratic proceedings: Making use of synergies by combining the two initiatives as well as a clearer focus on crisis management might help to revive their importance and relevance for NATO’s crisis management efforts.

- Among the countries in Europe the cooperation with Russia needs to be strengthened in order to keep European and global strategic stability with far reaching implications; continued special cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia is necessary to promote inner reform processes and regional stability.

- Global and regional action against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instability also demand strategic cooperation with important state actors outside Europe such as China, India and Pakistan.

Legal framework for Non-Article 5 operations

NATO’s action in support of global and regional crisis management efforts outside the criteria and geographical areas as defined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty shall be carried out if security interests of the Alliance are involved. They must be based on an appropriate mandate by the UN Security Council and be implemented in line with international law. This remains also true with respect to the fight against terrorism. Expectations in regard of national contributions must respect national constitutional requirements.

Crisis management operations will apply a comprehensive approach which includes appropriate political, civil and military capacities in conformity with regional necessities. The distribution of particular operational responsibilities among participating nations should take into account and make full use of special national capabilities and experiences. In regard to joint military operations cooperation partners should be more involved in decision making.
Cooperation with the European Union (EU)

The European Union and NATO share the same values and security interests and a large proportion of their respective memberships. While NATO keeps strong transatlantic links the EU strengthens the European security identity, contributes to a Pan-European security order and develops a viable European pillar in the common transatlantic security space. The development of own military capabilities enables the EU to act in support of international crisis management in which NATO as a whole is not able to act. Both organizations should support each other with appropriate assets taking into account their particular capabilities without duplicating command and force structures. In this context, NATO should envisage to seek the support of the EU when and where required, with an emphasis on its civil capabilities ("Berlin reverse"). In EU operations which make use of NATO assets and to which Non-EU allies contribute, full transparency and careful coordination as well as their due information and participation in decision making should be ensured.

Cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

In Europe and the Transatlantic-Eurasian OSCE area ("from Vancouver to Vladivostok") the goal of creating a common security space without dividing lines must be maintained and supported as agreed in OSCE key documents such as the Charta of Paris for a New Europe (1990), the Budapest Summit Document (1994), the Lisbon Summit Document (1996) and the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999). New confrontational approaches must be averted. They would contravene and endanger the agreed concept of cooperative security in Europe and the ability to focus on the 21st century security risks and challenges. For building a common and inclusive European Security Order the preservation and further development of the agreed OSCE acquis and its related cornerstone agreements on arms control and confidence building must be secured.

Cooperation with Russia

In this context, and despite remaining areas of controversy, cooperative NATO-Russia relations remain crucial. Without Russia neither a settlement of remaining territorial conflicts in Europe nor a common effort to fight the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and globally operating terrorism is possible. Therefore, the importance of a functioning NATO-Russia council should be reaffirmed as well as the significance of renewing and, where appropriate, adapting the strategic acquis achieved in 1990 and modified from 1992 to 1999. It is enshrined in the above mentioned OSCE key documents as well as in NATO-Russia cooperation commitments such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997), the mutual declarations on restraint with respect to the stationing of forces (1996, 1997, 1998), the Adaptation Agreement to the CFE Treaty and the Istanbul CFE Final Act (1999).
A coherent concept of deterrence, defence and cooperation

Defining and designing politico-military strategies and, particularly, military options and contingencies should be based on a sober threat and risk assessment and focus on the challenges of the 21st century rather than returning to reassurances against overcome and obsolete Cold War threat perceptions. They should also take into account the risk perceptions of cooperation partners and strike a reasonable balance between deterrence, defence and cooperation requirements; they should keep in mind overarching security goals and concepts in Europe and worldwide and avoid potentially negative perceptions and repercussions on NATO’s security priorities.

In this context, rebuilding a defence shield against Russia through forward stationing of substantial combat forces or regular major exercises to reassure a number of Eastern European allies would contravene the agreed security acquis in Europe and the goal of a cooperative and inclusive European security space without dividing lines as defined in OSCE and NATO-Russia key documents. Such a policy most certainly would prompt negative reactions by Russia and not only endanger the concept of a cooperative security in Europe but also worsen the security situation in sensitive geographic areas at the outer borders of NATO. Instead, NATO should focus on the continued validity of conventional arms control and mutual restraint agreements which ensure generally low levels of armaments, the absence of major military offensive capabilities in Europe, a geographical distance of NATO’s and Russia’s major combat forces and a general restraint in stationing policies close to common borders. NATO’s vast conventional superiority in Europe and a generally flexible contingency planning are quite sufficient to ensure the security of all allies against remaining or unexpectedly emerging risks from inside or outside Europe including the protection of NATO’s outer borders in emergency cases.

NATO’s security concept and military doctrine must be adapted to cope with the main risk in the coming years which is a global spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, also in context with their potential use by terrorists. Thereby, the linkage between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and the international efforts led by the President of the United States to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and, at the same time, reduce the operational role of nuclear weapons should be duly reflected in NATO’s strategic concept and force posture. The new strategic concept which envisages a timeframe of up to fifteen years should not shy away to take measured steps in order to support the way towards a future global nuclear order the security of which shall less and less rely on nuclear weapons.

Conventional force posture

NATO must dispose at fully operational, interoperable, reactive and long-term deployable forces to intervene and counter any emerging military threat be it at the borders of member states, at the periphery of the Alliance’s territory or in support of crisis management outside the territory of the Alliance. Common force and contingency planning and realistic but reliable national force contributions lie at the
heart of indispensable reassurances to maintain the integrity of the Alliance territory and the cohesion of the Alliance for all common purposes.

Traditional means of integration such as integrated command, control and communication structures, air surveillance and transport, infrastructure and logistical support will remain operational assets and political symbols to ensure reactivity, cohesion and common purpose. Given the uncertainties of an unpredictable future utmost flexibility in NATO’s ongoing transformation process will be required to further adapt its capabilities to future needs. An essential part of it will be a more tailored headquarters structure focusing on and adapted to efficient command and control of the likely operations in the foreseeable future.

**Nuclear Force posture**

In recognition of Article 6 obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the United States have initiated an international campaign to strengthen both the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their progressive disarmament. Part of the new strategy is the acknowledgement that both obligations are closely linked and that nuclear non-proliferation will only be kept alive if nuclear disarmament is seriously pursued by Nuclear Weapon States to start with the two largest possessor states. In this context, the diminishing conceptual role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines had been stressed already in the NPT conferences of 1995 and 2000 and has been reaffirmed in the latest review conference in May 2010 and in the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review document of April this year. Although the document stresses that extended deterrence would still be based on nuclear contingencies as long as nuclear weapons exist it envisages – as a logic conclusion from the disarmament concept – further diminishing the operational role of nuclear weapons and, as an interim goal, confining it to a mere counter-deterrent against remaining nuclear arsenals of other Nuclear Weapon States or potential proliferators.

In this context, negative security assurances against a first use have been given by the U.S. administration in order to avoid potential risk perceptions by Non-Aligned States and to keep the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. It can hardly be envisaged that in this new situation stressing the role of nuclear weapons for the security of the Alliance such as first use options outside the said context, forward basing of sub-strategic (“tactical”) nuclear weapons on the territory of Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT and their nuclear sharing programmes could be conducive to convincing the rest of the NPT community that the role of nuclear arms for the security of states is diminishing and that NATO credibly acts in conformity with the NPT spirit and the outlined goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Consequently, and notwithstanding the preservation of extended deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO’s new strategic concept could and should consider an interim step in which extended nuclear deterrence options would not rely on forward-deployed land-based nuclear weapons. Examples in the Far East and Pacific show that also seabased systems can fulfill this purpose all the more such systems
dispose at more operational flexibility than landbased aircraft with their limited range and penetration capabilities.

**Missile defence and conventional strike options**

At the same time, NATO has to consider countering the development of potential threats emerging from the proliferation of advanced ballistic missile systems through conventional strike options and an integrated regional missile defence shield. Both should deny realistic strike options and potentially advantageous risk calculations to any adversary and dissuade from attempting a coercive policy against allies by threatening the use of ballistic missiles. Missile defence should cover the geographical areas potentially at risk by the delivery of short and medium range ballistic missiles from regions outside the OSCE area. A cooperative approach towards Russia should ensure that such a shield is not intended to undermine the strategic balance but to counter potential threats in a regional context. Common threat assessments, transparency, mutual data exchanges and inspections, efforts to secure interoperability and, possibly in future, common operation of such systems seem to be best suited to achieve a non-confrontational regional missile defence system as a common and cooperative project of the Alliance.

**Subsidiary tasks**

Although all security concerns of member states are a matter for consultation in the Alliance, the strategic concept should also make clear that not all remaining risks to allies are subject to military responses in accordance with Art 5. This applies particularly on questions of cyber and energy security which are predominantly national issues or issues of specialized organizations or better dealt with in the framework of the European Union. Also the fight against terrorism is predominantly a national task involving international cooperation of intelligence and police agencies as well as judiciary. Military action can be necessary if failing states harbour internationally operating terrorists or if the interdiction of illegal trade of weapons of mass destruction or the protection of the freedom of the seas and the international trade against piracy require armed maritime operations as subsidiary tasks. The need of prioritizing tasks and focusing on NATO’s core functions will also emanate from budgetary shortage and the requirements to cope with the consequences of the global financial crisis.

**Final Remark on the Report of the NATO Group of Experts**

The Expert Report gives a comprehensive overview on the most important issues in regard of NATO’s strategic concept currently under discussion within the Alliance and presents recommendations which seem to be generally acceptable to allies. However, in an obvious attempt to strike a balance and present a compromise between sometimes diverging views on critical issues the report takes a rather conservative approach.

This is particularly true in regard of assessing the relevance of potential threats and risks and the subsequent design and priorities of NATO’s responses. E.g., risks with
respect to cyber and energy security do not have the same quality as nuclear proliferation, internationally operating terrorism or regional instabilities and, generally, do not meet Article 5 criteria.

Remaining risks for the territorial integrity of NATO member states should be assessed in a measured and realistic way which is not based on historical experiences but on a sober assessment of current policies and capabilities and foreseeable future developments.

Thus, a better distinction between more and less likely risks and potential threats and a clear prioritization of tasks would help to focus on the security challenges of the 21st century, leave the path of traditional fortress thinking and avoid inconsistencies between conservative defence and progressive cooperation requirements.

NATO must avoid uncertainties whether it wants to alienate Russia by a new confrontative defence posture or to win Russia as a partner for cooperation by further pursuing the agreed OSCE concept of creating a common security space without dividing lines and by revitalizing mutual restraint and arms control commitments.

NATO should draw the consequences from the most pressing risk, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and adapt its strategic thinking to the new nuclear disarmament policy of the U.S. President which is designed to keep nuclear proliferation at bay. NATO’s strategic concept which also gives a political signal to non-aligned states should attach high priority to this issue and be more clear in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, inter alia, by adapting its nuclear and conventional force posture to the new requirements. Reducing the operational role of nuclear weapons, envisaging the elimination of forward-deployed landbased substrategic nuclear weapons and appropriate changes of NATO’s nuclear force posture on the one hand and installing a regional missile defence shield in cooperation with Russia and preserving conventional strike options on the other are the two sides of the same coin.
An Italian Perspective on NATO’s new Strategic Concept:

Dr. Ricardo Alcaro, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Italy (Oral intervention)

I have been asked to give you an Italian perspective on NATO’s new strategic concept. I’ll try to limit myself to highlighting Italy’s point of view and leave aside my personal views. In fact, Italy’s position does not always coincide with my convictions on the matter.

It is – I believe - a good idea to start by giving you a basic insight into the key Italian interests at stake in Italy’s participation and membership in NATO. So: why does NATO still matter, and greatly matter, for Italy’s security and security interests? There are several reasons. The first and also the most obvious one is that NATO is able to provide Italy with a much stronger guarantee of territorial integrity than the Italian armed forces alone would ever be able to do. The second reason is that participation in NATO implies the standardization of armed forces and serves as a steady and constant incentive for Italy to upgrade its military capabilities. The third reason is that NATO is the key guarantor of stability in an area which is absolutely strategic for Italian security: the Balkans. A further reason is that NATO continues to provide privileged access to the US for midsize countries such as Italy. The last reason is that membership in NATO is a strong asset in Italy’s relations with two key partners, Russia and Turkey.

There is another reason, a more sectorial one, which is related to the standardization of armed forces implied by membership in NATO. The standardization of armed forces is a prerequisite for upholding the competitiveness of Italian defense products in the allied market. The Italian defense sector is characterized by a deep imbalance between the supply side and the demand side. We have defense companies that are clearly oversized with regard to the resources the state regularly devotes to defense. Thus, in order to maintain or expand their size, these companies need to access much bigger markets, the European market in the first place, and the US market in the second place.

These are, in my opinion, the primary reasons why NATO still matters for Italy’s security interests. Of course, NATO also provides a layer of protection from such threats as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, cybersecurity breaches, maritime security threats, regional crises and so on. And yet I don’t see this element, for all its importance, as being as vital as the ones I have just mentioned. This was more the case in the 1990s when the crises NATO mostly focused on were in the Balkans, that is in Italy’s immediate vicinity, but it is less so nowadays. In light of this, how does Italy see the new Strategic Concept? What is Italy’s position on the various issues which NATO leaders will need to delve deep into next November, when they convene in Lisbon to endorse the new document? We cannot know, of course, what the new Strategic Concept will exactly look like. But my
assumption – confirmed by the debate held this morning – is that the Albright report provides a credible preview of the next document. My impression is that the group of experts deliberately opted for providing Secretary-General Rasmussen with a text which could be deemed acceptable by most, if not all, allies. Of course I cannot go through the whole document, as this would take too much time. Further, Italy does not have a specific position on each aspect covered by the report. I will then refer to those parts of the report that are most relevant to Italian interests. I will then refer to those parts of the report that are most relevant to Italian interests. I will then refer to those parts of the report that are most relevant to Italian interests.

Let’s start with the dilemma: A regional or a global NATO? I summarize it this way, although under ‘global’ NATO I do not mean a NATO whose membership extends globally, but rather a NATO that operates across the globe as a sort of international security agency. Italy, by instinct, is definitely a supporter of a Europe-centred NATO. Italy has a strong interest in keeping NATO anchored to Europe. On the other hand, both political leadership and security and defense planners clearly and explicitly acknowledge the need for NATO to continue to develop its crisis management profile, including by envisaging a potential military role for NATO far away from the Euro-Atlantic area. There are several reasons for that.

First, to a certain extent Italy feels exposed to threats such as terrorism, illicit trafficking, or the spread of weapons of mass destruction, which tend to proliferate where state control is very weak or absent. So, Italy does see the need to manage crises even though they are not taking place in the immediate vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic zone.

The second and most important reason behind Italy’s support for ‘NATO crisis manager/responder’ is that the US wants NATO to evolve this way. And Italy attaches great importance to how it is considered in the US. Italy knows that remaining a relevant interlocutor for the US also implies meeting its demands halfway. This is why Italy was the first country to respond positively to the Obama administration’s call for sending additional troops to Afghanistan last winter. Italy agreed to send in one thousand more soldiers, a considerable increase of its military presence there. The need to develop expeditionary force capability for Italy also hinges on its concern about being left behind other NATO countries and consequently losing influence and prestige within the Alliance.

To conclude my point on this first issue, I’d say that Italy is mid-way between those NATO member states that think of NATO as basically a Europe-centered military organization and those other members who would like to see it ever more active across the globe. By instinct, Italy is a supporter of NATO as a regional, territorial defender; by strategic calculations, Italy recognises the vital importance of sharpening NATO’s crisis management/response capacity. Italy does see the intrinsic tension between these two drives, but still it retains that this tension must be constructively
managed, because this is the only way for NATO to continue to have some relevance in the future. Thorough NATO, Italy also might have relevance.

The second point in the report I'd like to touch upon concerns NATO's relations with the European Union. This morning Mr. Ortiz said that the language on EU-NATO relations in the report is quite minimalistic and I think the Italian leadership would agree with such an assessment. My prediction is that Italy will push for putting some more substance into the new strategic document’s section dedicated to EU-NATO relations. In Italy's eyes, ensuring smooth EU-NATO cooperation is the only way by which the two organizations might reach a greater degree of coherence in the foreign and security policy platforms of their member states. Precisely because of this, Italy would like to see NATO's European membership as close as possible to the European Union's membership. It is consequently strongly in favor of integrating the Balkan countries into both bodies and equally supportive of the integration of Turkey into the European Union. Again for the same reason, Italy is sceptical of further expanding NATO eastwards. In fact, it opposes the idea of accepting Georgia and Ukraine into NATO.

In the last years Italy, like other countries in Europe, has struggled to maintain its support for NATO-, EU-, and UN-led peace-support operations. Given its unwillingness to raise the defence budget (which is indeed declining) the government in Rome knows that in order to contain the rising costs of military equipment and personnel, integration of EU defence markets and integration of EU member states’ security and defence policies is an obligatory path. But this would be absurd if it weren’t carried out in line with NATO's broader strategic orientation. Italy thinks that its role as a security actor is structurally linked to EU integration and this should happen in a way consistent with the way NATO is developing. Italy's leadership is firmly convinced that NATO and the EU can indeed develop useful synergies and be complementary.

The third and last point of the Albright report I would like to draw your attention to is the relationship between NATO and Russia. This is probably the section of the report that the Italian leadership feels most uncomfortable with. It perpetuates an ambiguity which has characterized NATO’s stance towards Russia since 1991. In Italy's eyes, NATO's ambivalent approach to Russia risks producing less, rather than more, security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Italy agrees with the report when it states that Moscow should be seen as a partner and NATO should make double efforts to build a constructive partnership with it. Italy also agrees with the idea of reviving the NATO-Russia Council, and certainly welcomes the call for reactivating key arms control and other confidence-building measures such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But it is reluctant to give its consent to the upgrading of military infrastructures in Eastern Europe, it is opposed to reactivating full contingency planning for a conflict in Europe, and does not look upon exercises simulating a war in Europe favourably, since all these measures would likely be seen in Moscow as implicitly hostile and would feed Russian leadership’s zero-sum game mentality.
It has a strong national interest in good relations with Russia, in particular due to the flourishing energy relationship between the two. But Italy’s strategic thinking concerning Russia goes beyond energy. Italy sees Russia as a fundamental component of the European security architecture and part of NATO’s process of self definition. NATO and the EU, according to Italy, would be better off if they adopted an engagement-oriented approach towards Moscow because this at the end of the day, is the best option for ensuring Europe’s long-term security by far.

However, describing Italy as an ‘appeaser’ vis-à-vis Russia would probably be unfair. In fact, that Italy favours engagement over confrontation with Russia does not mean that it has aligned with Russia on all issues. This is the message generally conveyed by the media because of the strong and highly publicised personal connection between Prime Minister Putin and Prime Minister Berlusconi.

This way of ‘personalizing’ an interstate relationship has probably done more harm than good to Italy, not because Russia is not important to Italy, but rather because it dents Italy’s reputation as a reliable NATO ally. But Italy would seek good relations with Russia irrespective of who sits in the office of the president (or prime minister, for that matter) in Moscow and Rome. While championing a policy of dialogue with Russia, Italy is convinced that it needs some leverage in order to have Russia cooperate constructively and this leverage is provided by the European Union in the first place, and NATO’s security assets in the second place. This is why Italy strongly supports the Obama administration’s reformulation of Bush’s missile defence scheme. Italy likes Obama’s plan and did not like Bush’s not only because the former seems to be less contentious for the Russians.

The main reason is that Obama’s missile defence plan, in contrast with Bush’s, is apparently designed to protect NATO allies, and not mainly the continental US. Italy supports the idea, put forward by Rasmussen, of possibly cooperating with Russia in the development of a missile defence capacity. But it would continue to support it even if Russia were to drop its so far rather moderate stance and shift towards a confrontational attitude the way it did during the last two years of Putin’s presidency.

Italy is against any significant change, at least in the short term, in the deployment of US tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, not least because it still thinks that they continue to provide some leverage with Russia. Italy is a bit concerned about Germany and the Benelux countries’ intentions on this issue. What the government in Rome fears is not that Germany decides that the bombs must be removed from its territory at once, as it trusts that Berlin would not act unilaterally.

The Italian leadership is worried that the German government could fail to take a decision on the upgrading of the delivery systems (the US tactical nuclear weapons are gravity bombs carried by host countries’ aircraft) which would extend their life beyond 2020. If such a decision is not taken in a couple of years, the weapons deployed in Germany would become completely useless. This might produce pressure to move the arms to other NATO members. Even though there is an understanding that NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons should not be transferred to
other countries, this might change. Since the only countries possibly willing to accept those weapons are in Eastern Europe, a development of this sort would risk provoking a serious escalation with Russia. Italy is very conservative on this specific issue and as such is in line with the report, with the exception of the line which hints at the possibility of the geographical redistribution of tactical nuclear weapons.

With this, I hope I have given you an insight into the Italian view on some of the most salient points which the next Strategic Concept of the Alliance will deal with.
EU-NATO Relations

Assoc. Prof. Tank Oğuzlu, International Relations Department, Bilkent University

NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Cooperation with the European Union

As the Alliance has been in the process of contemplating its mission and priorities in the post 9/11 era, relations with other international organizations and partner countries occupy a critical place on the transformation agenda. If there is one point around which there seems to exist an intra-alliance consensus, it is the need to strengthen the institutional cooperation between the European Union and NATO, the key organizations of the transatlantic community. Various think tank reports, high level politicians and officers and lately the expert group chaired by the former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright have underlined the point that as the Alliance re-defines its security rationale in a cooperative and comprehensive manner, it needs to improve the level and nature of its cooperation with the European Union. The key challenge ahead seems to figure out appropriate institutional mechanisms through which NATO could benefit from the resources and capabilities of the European Union in crisis-management operations, mainly in out-of-Europe contingencies.

The changing dynamics of the security relations in the post 9/11 era appear to have increasingly led many observers of transatlantic relations to argue that cooperation between the EU and NATO is no longer an issue of choice but necessity. Given that these organizations share 21 members in common; that they adhere to common liberal democratic norms; that developments in non-European geographies do now impact their security at home; that dealing with non-conventional security challenges increasingly require a successful combination of military and civilian capabilities, the improvement of institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU seems to be vital for both the legitimacy and sustainability of the transatlantic alliance.

In the past the question that concerned the allies most was under what conditions the European Union would be able to have access to NATO’s planning, command and military capabilities. As the 1990s came to a close, the member states of the European Union resolved to endow the EU with military crisis-management capabilities independent of NATO. The goal was to enable the EU to get involved in crisis situations in which NATO as whole would not take part. At stake was the EU’s access to NATO’s military capabilities. However, the question that is becoming more and more relevant today is under what conditions and through which mechanisms NATO could benefit from EU’s civilian-crisis management capabilities.

As the traditional differences between Article-5 and non-Article-5 missions get blurred, the need to forge a strong functional cooperation between NATO and the European
Union has increased. Sending troops abroad as part of expeditionary forces and engaging in peace/nation-building activities in war torn countries are now considered as important as defending territorial borders against conventional attacks. Operation Active Endeavor in the Eastern Mediterranean is an Article 5 mission whereas the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is a non-Article 5 mission. In fact the reverse might have equally been true. Future operations will likely have all three characteristics in common, namely territorial defense, expeditionary forces and military/civilian crisis-management functions.

The Old Game

The existing relationship between NATO and the European Union dates back to the deal struck at the end of 2002. Accordingly, the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements foresee the possibility of EU's automatic access to NATO's planning, command and military capabilities in case such assets are not strategic and NATO as a whole does not get involved in the crisis. In case of EU's demand to have access to NATO's strategic assets, decisions would have to be taken within NATO by unanimity. Because Turkey is not an EU member she would not be entitled to join CFSP's decision making process. In return, the EU would do its best to incorporate Turkey into the decision-shaping and implementation processes. In case the EU deployed a mission by using NATO's assets, Turkey would have a right to join if she wanted. In case the EU deployed a mission by relying on its own capabilities, Turkey's participation would be subjected to EU's prior invitation. With Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU promised not to deploy any mission in and around the Aegean Sea concerning any dispute between EU and NATO members. Cyprus would not be a part of these arrangements because she neither signed a security agreement with NATO nor joined NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative.

Though struck at the end of 2003, the compromise solution between the four the members of the Teruven group, namely Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg and the United Kingdom can also be seen as a part of the Berlin Plus arrangements. Due to strong British and American opposition, the Teruven group had to give up the idea of establishing independent EU planning and command facilities. Instead, it was agreed that a small EU military presence would be located within NATO's headquarters.

The main obstacle inhibiting functional EU-NATO cooperation thus far has emanated from different Turkish and European interpretations of the substance and spirit of the Berlin Plus understanding. From Turkey's perspective all issues between these organizations should be handled through Berlin-Plus arrangements, whereas the European Union has long argued that some issues are within the remit of Berlin-Plus arrangements while some others should be subjected to new arrangements.

This is the main reason why EU-NATO cooperation officially concerns only the current EU operation in Bosnia, the EU Althea, and the capabilities of allies. Europeans argue that new institutional arrangements should be established so that EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan continue smoothly. As of today, the EU has
rule of law missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and the European staffs in these operations are formally outside the military protection of NATO.

The EU argues that Cyprus, as a member of the EU, should be entitled to participate in official EU-NATO meetings that do not directly concern Berlin Plus arrangements. The EU worries about the lack of institutional cooperation with NATO in places where both organizations deploy forces and the EU performs civilian tasks whereas NATO does military tasks. Turkey argues that Cyprus cannot participate in such official meetings because it was excluded at the very beginning from the Berlin Plus arrangements. The continuation of the Cyprus disputes impedes the sharing of intelligence between these organizations. Cyprus blocks the signing of a security agreement between EU and Turkey. Cyprus also vetoes Turkey’s membership in the European Defense Agency. Since 2005 unofficial meetings have been held among EU and NATO representatives in an effort to break this impasse.

Turkey feels uneasy that the EU has so far not consulted Ankara before organizing some missions around Turkey and has rejected Turkey’s calls for participation in EU only missions. Georgia is a case in point. The EU law mission in Iraq is another example.

Turkey promised to contribute to EU’s Headline goal 2010 but refused to do this so long as Turkey’s contributions were listed as reserve forces. Turkey promised to join forces with Italy and Romania to form a Battle Group in the second half of 2010.

The European Union has so far organized two military operations within the framework of Berlin Plus arrangements, the Operation Concordia in Macedonia and the EU Althea in Bosnia. The latter does still exist. It is worth noting that this operation was not initially deployed by the EU. The EU took over it from NATO in December 2004. It is clear that the European Union is reluctant to rely on NATO’s assets in organizing peace operations. Out of 23 operations the EU has for deployed only 6 are military crisis management operations and of which only 2 are typical Berlin Plus operations.

**Challenges and Dilemmas**

Three particular challenges merit attention in the context of NATO-EU relationship. The first is about the level of commitment on the part of the United States to the vitality of NATO and cooperation with European allies in the materialization of key American security interests. The fundamental concerns on the part of the United States are that both the European allies increase their capabilities and the EU does not part its way with NATO. The only way to achieve these goals appears to improve the institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO. The nightmare scenario from the perspective of the United States would be that the European Union developed its operational and planning capabilities outside NATO and became a full security institution on its own.

The US appears to suffer from two dilemmas. The first is that while the US one the hand wants the allies to discuss security issues within the framework of NATO, it does
not on the other want to see that strengthening alliance cooperation within NATO constrains its maneuvering capability in crisis regions. Put it another way while the US on the one hand argues for NATO to have the ‘right of first refusal’, it on the other continues to cling to the idea that missions should determine coalitions rather than the coalitions the missions.

The second American dilemma is that while the US on the one hand asks the allies to increase their spending on defense and armament, it on the other doubts if this process takes place within ESDP/CSDP. The Americans seem to be reluctant to grasp that for NATO to survive as a credible security actor it needs to be owned by the Europeans. The risk ahead is that so long as institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU continue to remain on shaky grounds, the institutional rivalry between both organizations will increase and the eagerness of the EU members to develop their own operational capabilities independent of NATO will strengthen. Duplication of resources and capabilities is the greatest risk here. It is now clear that the United States is looking for ways to escape such dilemmas.

The second challenge concerns the degree of value the European allies put on NATO. The nightmare scenario from the perspective of the European allies would take place if NATO transformed into the global policemen helping the US achieve its global interests. NATO should not become a tool-kit at the hands of the Americans to form coalitions of the willing and Europeans should not feel themselves discriminated against within NATO. In this context, the European allies face two particular dilemmas. The first is that while the European allies on the one hand want the United States to take into account their priorities and sensitivities, they on the other remain reluctant to improve their military capabilities. The second is that while the European allies on the one hand dispute the primacy of the American leadership within NATO, they on the other do not hesitate to turn away from NATO and try to develop their independent capabilities. The risk here is that the further away the European allies turn away from NATO, the more ‘Americanized’ NATO will become and the less attention the US will pay to European concerns.

The third challenge concerns Turkey’s relations with the European Union and NATO. Turkey will either agree to the further Europeanization of the Alliance for the sake of keeping the Alliance as a credible institution in the years to come or continue to block the institutional cooperation between the EU and NATO at the risk of deteriorating relations with the both the United States and the European Union.

Therefore, for the smooth functioning of EU-NATO cooperation the allies need to soon find a magic formula so that the Cyprus dispute does no longer poison Turkey’s relationship with the European Union and Turkey feels itself as a legitimate member of EU’s security structures.

**Escaping these dilemmas is now urgent**

In the 1990s the United States was the sole superpower. It was at the peak of its global power. It wanted to preserve the right of first refusal. Yet, it is now a global
power in relative decline. In the late 1990s, the US administrations viewed ESDP as a potential challenge to the primacy of NATO in Europe and beyond. The three Ds formula summarizes this thinking neatly. As long as the EU's efforts to develop military capabilities did not result in duplication of already existing capabilities within NATO, decoupling of the two shores of the Atlantic from each other and discrimination against the non-EU members of the Alliance, the United States would not object to this process.

At that time the United States was still viewing the Alliance mainly as a European security institution and therefore considered the emergence of ESDP as a challenge in this regard. Proliferation of mass destruction, transnational terrorism and lack of well governance in non-European locations had not become core security challenges yet. The possibility of intrastate conflict in the Balkans and the enlargement towards eastern Europe used to occupy NATO's agenda. At that time the US was not concerned with transnational terrorism and rising powers of Asia to the extent it is now. Therefore, the attempts on the part of the European allies were interpreted as aiming at gnawing away US' primacy in Europe.

As of today, particularly following the coming to power of Obama, the United States does no longer define ESDP as a rival of NATO. Obama has made it undoubtedly clear that the US would simply feel happy if the European allies strengthened ESDP and increased their defense capabilities within EU.

The United States now sees the EU as a capable security institution that can take charge of Europe and its peripheries. This would help relieve the US of the burden of financing European defense. The Americans see the ongoing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq more urgent than potential European challenges. In addition, the rise of China is another significant challenge to deal with.

The increasing need on the part of the US administration to deal with domestic problems at home constitutes another rationale for relegating security in Europe and its peripheries to Europeans.

The most important factor that appears to have caused this about-turn in the United States is that the Americans have finally come to the conclusion that winning peace has proved to be more difficult than winning war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need to combine military and civilian crisis management capabilities as part of a comprehensive security understanding seems to have increased in recent years. Emerging crises and conflicts do now have both military and non-military dimensions. Therefore, the adoption of military and civilian tools has become a strategic necessity. The change of US/NATO counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan is a case in point. The United States now sees the European allies valuable for their potential contributions to meeting civilian challenges.

The emerging American consensus is that NATO is primarily a military defense organization and there is no need for it to invest in civilian capabilities which are already possessed by other international organizations. Partnership with other international organizations makes sense because NATO cannot deal with global
security challenges successfully on its own. It is neither a global security organization nor the prime source of international legitimacy.

The fact that the European Union has so far organized civilian crisis management operations and the military operations were small in size might have also convinced the Americans that the ESDP would never become a serious challenge.

European allies appear now to be of the view that ESDP/CSDP offers a more legitimate platform/ground than NATO in terms of improving their defense capabilities. Therefore, forcing the European allies to improve their defense capabilities within NATO would be a daunting task for the United States. Many public opinion polls undertaken recently also reveal that the majority of Europeans want the EU to play a more credible global role and become a strong security and defense policy actor. The common feeling among Europeans is that NATO will become either an irrelevant security actor or a tool kit in the hands of the United States unless the European allies embrace NATO. Many Europeans do now concur that the EU is a more capable actor than NATO in dealing with transnational terrorism and lack of well governance.

In addition, the Lisbon Treaty offers some new regulations that might potentially transform the EU into a credible foreign and security policy actor. These are European Council Presidency, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EU’s External Action Service.

The United States has also observed that public support in Europe to NATO’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan has been declining. The majority of Europeans think that a counterterrorism strategy that mainly relies on combat capabilities will not yield success. The collapse of the government in the Netherlands is a case in point. The Europeans want their troops to come home as soon as possible.

France’s reintegration into NATO’s military structure offers another rationale for the American thinking that ESDP/CSDP would unlikely evolve into an anti-American/NATO entity. The French leadership seems to be of the view that cooperation with the United States within NATO is the only way through which the EU in general and France in particular would be able to shape US policies. Refusal to cooperate with the US within NATO carries the risk of growing internal schisms within the EU. The more the US leadership concludes that the EU is an ineffective security institution and defines its international identity in opposition to the US, the more likely the US would resort to ‘divide and rule’ tactics in its relations with EU members. This will certainly impair the EU’s federal integration process in the post-Lisbon era.

The ongoing trends suggest that the EU will not turn out to become a traditional collective defense organization in the image of NATO. The Lisbon Treaty does not define the solidarity clause in the traditional sense. Solidarity would be required if and only if any EU member were exposed to any transnational terrorist challenge or man-made crisis. Territorial defense is not mentioned within the Treaty as one of the core functions of the EU. This also contributes to the American thinking that ESDP would not be a challenge to NATO. ESDP will continue to be mainly about non-Article 5 type of missions.
Another point that is worth mentioning in this regard is that the amount of military spending has been declining in Europe. It seems that if the current trends continue, the European allies will never bring into existence the capabilities required for expeditionary operations. Future operations will likely rely on American capabilities.

Permanent Structured Cooperation is a novel arrangement brought to the fore by the Lisbon Treaty. This is about the possibility of some EU members cooperating among each other more intensely than others in the realm of security and defense. This arrangement might contribute to the rise of EU’s military capabilities.

On the other hand, the European allies have in recent years come closer to the idea that NATO should continue to remain as a prime security institution in Europe. Two factors seem to have accelerated such an outcome. The first concerns the fact that internal differences among member states prevented the EU from becoming a credible security actor on its own. Different security cultures and priorities need to be mentioned in this regard. Besides, the US-led war in Iraq and the American response to transnational terrorism proved to be a dividing issue among members. The second pertains to the rise of Russian revisionism in the territories of the former Soviet Union. As the central and eastern European countries have increasingly begun to perceive Russia as a serious challenge to their security in traditional sense, they put too great a premium on their NATO membership and bilateral relationship with the United States. This seems to explain why many of these countries have recently grown suspicious of the latest rapprochement between the US and Russia following the ascendency of Obama to presidency. Both the soft stance the Obama administration adopted on the Russian use of force in Georgia and the abrogation of the missile defense shield initiative of the Bush administration caused alarm bells ring across central and eastern European countries. It is now the case that these countries pay so much value to their NATO membership that they do not hesitate to send troops to far away regions such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Conclusions

The lack of functional cooperation between NATO and the EU seems to have resulted in waste of resources, institutional rivalry and transatlantic rift. The allies do no longer have the luxury of living with two rival security institutions on the ground, which have more or less similar geographical considerations and threat definitions.

It has now become clear on the part of the United States that closer institutional cooperation with the European Union is required to meet other challenges on NATO’s transformation agenda, such as investing NATO with international legitimacy, developing institutional/permanent relations with other democratic countries, defining transnational terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and expeditionary undertakings as key tasks. That is to say that the United States would have to acquiesce in further Europeanization of the Alliance if she wants to see NATO to remain as a credible security actor in the age of globalization. The more the United States sees the EU as a partner in meeting global challenges; the more the current US administration tries to control the relative decline in US global power; and the
more NATO defines security in a comprehensive manner, the more important cooperation with the EU will become.

This change in US’ perception of cooperation with the European Union will pose challenges to Turkey because the more the United States values institutional cooperation with the EU in the name of maintaining NATO’s relevance, the more Turkey will be exposed to American pressures not to obstruct this process. In an environment where NATO and the EU come closer to each other in terms of defining threats and the means to deal with them, Turkey might lose its ability of shaping the limits of the institutional cooperation between these organizations.

Another risk is that the weakening of EU-NATO institutional relations might result in the redefinition of the transatlantic relationship as the EU-US relationship. In case this happens, NATO might soon fade away as a transatlantic security institution and Turkey’s ability to help register its western identity through NATO might diminish.

Turkey seems to have two options. It will either have a bilateral security relationship with the United States outside the transatlantic context or agree to the gradual Europeanization of the Alliance in the name of keeping the Alliance as a relevant security actor in the years to come. If Turkey chose the first option, this would likely militate against the prospects of her accession to the EU. If Turkey chose the second option, the pressure to come to a modus vivendi with the European Union would likely intensify. This would also increase the need on the part of US, EU and Turkey to finally get rid of the Cyprus stalemate. The sooner the Cyprus dispute ceases to exist as a stumbling block in EU-NATO cooperation and Turkey’s membership process, the brighter the future will look.
Turkish Foreign Policy in the current era

Ünal Çeviköz

First of all let me make one thing clear at the outset. I will try to use this half an hour’s time to address you and leave some time for questions as well. I am not going to be very provocative. You have heard from my Minister on different occasions and several instances that we are now building Turkish Foreign Policy on a theoretical framework. I do not think most of the people are unfamiliar with the main elements of the Turkish foreign policy.

The international system is going through a time of radical changes. We have seen the end of the bipolar world order and are witnessing the emergence of a system of multi-polarity. This in turn creates a more volatile international environment and complex processes.

While there is no shortage of pressing issues requiring day-to-day attention such as terrorism, extremism, nuclear proliferation, cross-border crime, energy and food security, epidemics and frozen or active conflicts; we are also realizing that solutions to questions like global warming, poverty, North-South disparities and fixing the global financial architecture can no longer be delayed.

The fast pace of globalization of the last two decades has transformed our world into such an integrated place that now we cannot assess our national interests in isolation from the collective interest of the international community.

By way of its historical and cultural background, its geographical position, its membership of, and active contributions to diverse multilateral organizations, Turkey is actively involved in the efforts to establish order at both global and regional levels. In this regard, we believe that working our way from the regional to global level is as important as the other way around.

Developing a sense of ownership of regional problems, promoting dialogue and mutual confidence, and giving everyone a stake in cooperating with each other, are essential to forging solid regional building blocks.

We are all increasingly aware of the fact that managing change and instability and beyond that, bringing peace and stability requires a coherent use of our tools in the most effective way. More than before, we talk about security and not only defence anymore. This change in phrasing reflects the variety of tolls we have at hand for more peace, security and stability.

Let me tell in very general terms the main tools Turkey makes use of for a better future in its region and beyond:

Turkish foreign policy has three main characteristics: it is vision-oriented, proactive, and integrated and systematic beyond just a single axis.
Primary objective of the Turkish foreign policy is to help secure and nurture a peaceful, prosperous, stable and cooperative environment that is conducive to human development at home and its neighborhood.

In pursuing this objective, six principles are currently shaping Turkish foreign policy. The first principle is to strike a balance between freedom and security. If security is good for one nation, for one country, for an individual it is so for others as well. We believe in the merit of ensuring a comprehensive security barring none and building lasting dialogue mechanisms in our region. We should not maintain security to the detriment of freedoms and vice-versa. We need to find an appropriate balance between them.

The second principle envisages the integration of Turkey with countries in its vicinity in order to implement more efficiently far reaching policies. In this framework, the "zero problems approach" in our neighborhood is essential in demonstrating that Turkey is a major player in its region and beyond.

The third principle that I would like to underline is our fundamental foreign policy priority and foresees an effective diplomacy towards neighboring regions. Our goal is to achieve maximum integration and full cooperation with all of our neighbors. In order to achieve that, we base our relations with them on the principles of "security for all", "political dialogue", "economic interdependence" as well as "cultural harmony and mutual respect". We mobilize our resources to help them overcome their problems.

As a member of the UNSC and a major regional power which has to deal with wide raging issues, the fourth principle of our foreign policy is complementarity with global actors. We can cite here the EU, the United States and the Russian Federation among them.

The fifth principle is the effective use of international forums and mechanisms and new initiatives in order to galvanize our foreign policy priorities. Our increasing influence in international organizations such as the UN, NATO and the OIC and the newly established relations with many other organizations has to be evaluated from this perspective. With regard to other organizations, we would like to mention that Turkey has acquired an observer status in the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and the Organization of the American States (OAS).

Based on all these five principles the sixth and final one is to create a "new perception of Turkey" through an increased focus on public diplomacy.

In essence, our approach aims to end disputes and increase stability in the region by seeking innovative mechanisms and channels to resolve conflicts, by encouraging positive change and by building cross-cultural bridges of dialogue and understanding. In this regard, in recent years, we have pioneered many initiatives and set up new platforms, which have attracted both regional and international acclaim and support. To name few of them, we have initiated the "Neighbors of Iraq Process" in support of internationally emphasized principles such as the territorial integrity and political unity
of Iraq. Following the outbreak of the conflict in the South Caucasus in August 2008, we have kicked off the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” initiative to serve as a unique, regionally owned forum where regional problems could also be addressed through dialogue.

Thanks to its unique historical and cultural ties extending through a broad swath of Eurasia, Turkey is capable of playing a constructive role in matters of international importance beyond its immediate neighborhood as well. The situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a good example.

Another key factor for a stable and prosperous environment is economic interdependence. On a bilateral basis, Turkey’s trade with its neighbors has recorded significant leaps over the last couple of years. Free Trade Agreements which were concluded with countries in our region will undoubtedly make serious impact on the welfare of our region. In the future, the links of cooperation that evolve into economic integration will ensure regional stability and prosperity.

At a larger scale, as a G-20 member, we join the endeavors to reform the structure of international finance and adopt new global standards that would ensure a more stable economic development. On the other hand, as an emerging donor country and a responsible member of the international community, Turkey is extending a helping hand to developing nations. Turkey’s international aid budget has been steadily expanding over the recent years.

Intercultural dialogue is another area that Turkey considers to have a pivotal role in the quest to shape the new world order. Efforts in the political and economic sphere to bring peace and stability will be incomplete if not supported by steps in the cultural field, especially at a time when we are witnessing a global rise in the tide of extremism, xenophobia and intolerance. Turkey is actively contributing to efforts to prevent the emergence of new cultural fault-lines and frictions in the world and to bring about greater mutual understanding and harmony between nations. The “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative which Turkey co-sponsored with Spain, aims at promoting dialogue among countries from different cultural backgrounds and countering extremism through collective efforts.

All the items I have enumerated until now have direct links with the Turkish security policy.

Owing to her geo-strategic location straddled on the three continents and in the center of a spectrum of states with different political systems, socio-cultural backgrounds and varying levels of development, Turkey is a country which has been and continues to be directly affected by the changes in the security environment.

With some ease of political jargon, let us characterize Turkey’s environment as volatile, one that has hosted many conflicts in the recent past and continues to house several of the current ones. Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf war, the ethnic conflicts that erupted during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the war against Iraq, the latest armed conflict
between Georgia and Russia and the ongoing dispute between Israeli and Palestine, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the invasion of parts of Azerbaijan by Armenia; all have a direct bearing on Turkey's security. That three of the four so-called frozen conflicts in the OSCE region are within the immediate neighborhood of Turkey must reveal a telling story of what volatility and unpredictability are about.

Apart from these more conventional forms of intra and inter-state challenges, Turkey has also been deeply affected by many of the asymmetric threats that have become more prominent in the post-Cold War era. The long list with terrorism at the top comprises organized crime, drugs, arms and human trafficking, as well as proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

In this unstable and unpredictable security environment, NATO is the backbone of Turkey's security policy and defence arrangements and will continue to play an irreplaceable role in this regard. Mutual assurance as well as confidence and solidarity among allies continue to rest on a binding respect for and endorsement of the universal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Our respect for these values is enduring as they are the founding tenets of the Republic of Turkey.

Turkey's role in energy supply security has become increasingly important. Turkey forms a natural energy hub between the resource-rich countries of the Caspian basin, Central Asia and the Middle East and the European consumer markets. Many actual or planned pipelines passing through Turkey will enhance Europe's energy supply security through source and route diversification.

On the other hand, with a promising young and educated population at an average age of 28, Turkey is well placed to resume high economic growth rates in the years to come. Turkey attracted 60 billion dollars of foreign investments in the last five years. All these figures speak for themselves and show clearly how much ground we have covered in our quest for development. Yet, we know that we still have not realized our full potential. In 2023, Turkey aims to rank among the ten largest economies in the world. As of 2009, Turkey has already become one of the ten leading countries in the tourism sector, both in terms of the number of foreign visitors and tourism revenues received.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the new order requires solid regional building blocks. Our approach aims to end disputes and increase stability in our region and beyond by seeking innovative mechanisms and channels to resolve conflicts, by encouraging positive change and by building cross-cultural bridges of dialogue and understanding. In such an international environment, we deploy our efforts with a view to reconciling and harmonizing diverse backgrounds. This is the role that Turkey aspires to fulfill with its active involvement in regional and global affairs.

Thank you all very much.

Question: In recent polls it is noticeable that popular support for EU is declining in the Turkish public opinion. How can you reconcile this with Turkey's membership in NATO?
Answer: I think Turkey's membership in NATO is indisputable and the popular support to Turkish membership in NATO is probably irrelevant because this will never change the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO and nothing would affect Turkey's decision to continue its membership in NATO. If you had formulated the question in terms of European Union of which we are not a member then we perhaps have a more viable discussion. In Turkey public opinion support for membership in the European Union is decreasing but I think the international setting is very pertinent and the question should look for an answer not in the Turkish popular support, but in the behaviour of the European Union against Turkey. So, from that point of view I think, the security policy that I have tried to explain and the importance of NATO in Turkey's security policy will never be challenged but I think the Turkish membership in the European Union is becoming a very important dispute in the Turkish public opinion nowadays. I just tried to reformulate your question in a way that the answer will be given by yourself.

Question: Turkey has a zero problem policy with its neighbours and what it seems true in some cases, as with Syria and Iraq. But with Israel it has more problems. How do you assess this?

Answer: The zero problem with neighbours policy is one of the major elements of Turkish foreign policy implementation for the last couple of years and if you look at the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey we have more or less achieved to diminish our problems with the immediate neighbours. You gave the example of Syria, I can even give the examples of Armenia and Greece. For example the fact that we have signed two important protocols last year with Armenia is a very significant development in the history of Turkish-Armenian relations. But it is also a fact that there are certain other tensions raising elsewhere and that is not the immediate neighbourhood or the land borders of Turkey. It is a neighbourhood and a region where there are already unfolding developments. We should look at the developments of Turkish-IIsraeli relations not simply from bilateral point of view. I think Israel is having problems with international community and it is not only Turkey who is criticizing Israel. The situation in Gazza or the attacks or the anti-humanitarian activities, those provoking behavior of Israel is being criticized by several other countries, not only by Turkey alone. If these kinds of developments are taking place in those regions, I think the answer should be looked from the other's point of view and from the other perspective. Always there is the otherside of the coin. I think it is the responsibility of Israel to respond to these developments.

Question: I have two questions. First, has there been any discussion between Turkey and Syria with respect to the nature of the alleged nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea. The second question is about Turkey's reaction to US nuclear posture review. Is this confidential, does it change anything from Turkish standpoint with respect to its position vis a vis to US policies?

Answer: For the first question, you know that we have established a high level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Syria and this allows us to address a number of issues on a bilateral level and we are coordinating now several 52
policies starting from health, education, agriculture, environment, irrigation and many more. This also gives us the opportunity to address several international problems but I am not informed that the issue you refer to has been on our agenda in our discussions with Syria. About the second question, I think the nuclear posture review and the new declared policy of the United States is very much in line with the expectations of the international community. Turkish position about nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and the Nuclear Review Conference has been very clear and I don't think that there is contradiction between Turkish and US policies in that respect. We believe that disarmament is absolutely important all over the world but it is also important to have nuclear disarmament in our immediate neighbourhood and in our region and I think this is also a policy which has been pursued and supported by the United States. The nuclear posture review is not bringing any changes to this basic understanding. So, from this point of view we don't have a major conflict between Turkey and United States.

Question: What about relations with Iran? Is Turkey without any problem with Iran?

Answer: First of all, I did not mention Iran because all the other countries in our neighbourhood that I mentioned were of course the countries that we simply have some problems and the explanation I tried to give is to diminish those problems and I don't think that we can consider Iran as a country with which we have problems. We have a long history of relations between Turkey and Iran. It has one of the oldest borders which has been established in 1639. Of course we have some differences of opinion, the regimes are different but we have learnt to live in peaceful coexistence with our Iranian neighbours. So, when I mentioned the countries with which we have tried to diminish our problems and when I mentioned some countries in the context of “zero problems with neighbours” policy, that was the reason why I did not need to mention Iran by name. About the difficulties that Iran and the international community are having, I think it is absolutely clear that Turkey has a different position in the sense that Turkey wants to resolve the dispute between Iran and the international community through peaceful means. And that is the reason why we always emphasize importance of diplomatic efforts. Not only emphasize, but we have also become a part of a process and we have been actively involved in bringing the opinions and views of the two sides closer to each other. The result was, as you are very well aware, on the 17th of May the Tehran Declaration has been signed by Iran, which is a very significant development because Iran for the first time has committed itself to a certain process to resolve this nuclear proliferation problem by signing the document and I think Turkey's effort has been quite significant in achieving this result. So, basically our view is this: nuclear issue should be addressed through diplomatic means, through diplomatic efforts and through peaceful efforts. That is the main difference with some of the countries and some of the other approaches that we observe today. When it comes to the voting at the UNSC on US sanctions proposal, I think we are not there yet. When the moment comes, I think our foreign policy implementation so far and our emphasis on the diplomatic efforts will bear significant results on our voting behaviour.
Question: Turkey has been more assertive in the security issues. What is the Turkish perspective of NATO and its significance in Turkey’s foreign policy?

Answer: I think Turkish membership in NATO and the role of NATO in Turkish security policy is a guarantee of enlarging and widening the security and stability in our immediate neighbourhood. I have just mentioned the six principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and one of them was the relation between freedom and security and I think if you do not give importance to the human values and the human rights and those principles that we all value in our world are not extended to the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey then it would not be very helpful and very significant in implementing the foreign policy. So, NATO’s open door policy has to be maintained and it has to be continued and NATO has to play a role of stability in the world. And as a staunch ally and supporter of this policy and as a member of NATO, I think Turkey is significantly implementing the basic principles that we all share in our Alliance.

Question: Mentioning the principles, do you foresee any prioritization among them?

Answer: No, not at all. It is just mentioning of the six principles and it is simply by coincidence that they have taken this order but there is no contradiction as far as I can see between these principles. They are all adding to a general foreign policy implementation and they are the main elements of the implementation of Turkish foreign policy.

Question: Don’t you see contradiction with Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy?

Answer: Why do you think that there is a contradiction there. Zero problems with neighbours and membership in NATO do not contradict at all. I think this is exactly what is happening today and you cannot make a uniform and harmonious world to have no contradictions with neighbours at all and when I said that we are trying to diminish problems with neighbours, of course I fully understand that you can perhaps not achieve zero problem situation with your neighbours but what I am telling here is not a zero sum game but it is a non-zero sum game that I am emphasizing and that is exactly the philosophy of having zero problems with neighbours, diminishing the existing problems. You may never achieve zero problems situation. This does not contradict with the Turkish membership in NATO or Turkish orientation to the West. I think if this policy is successful and if the stability and prosperity in our region expands, this will simply be a victory for the Alliance and for the Western World.

I think the main principle here is Turkey is trying to provide security, stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood and by doing so Turkey is willing to become an important actor in this region and by becoming an important and active actor in this region Turkey is willing to increase its stance to become a globally important actor. These are the main principles and the main philosophy of Turkish foreign policy implementation and I think if you look at the results that we have achieved so far, several trilateral processes that we have been able to launch, I think now Turkish role in all the Middle East processes are very much appreciated and this
is also increasing the charm of Turkey in other parts of the World. We are receiving
calls from different countries and we have been accused why we are ignoring other
geographies. That is the increasing the role of Turkey and I think this is making
Turkey an increasingly important actor in the international system.
Colonel Richter, everything you said is correct but this is not simply a military issue. Militarily you are right but there are other political issues too. The real issue I think here is, given the fact that the rationale for these weapons no longer really exist. How do we deal with it? How do we manage to debate within the alliance? And here I would say that there is a danger and quite frankly I think some Germans and some politicians including your Foreign Minister jump the gun by suggesting that the weapons should be withdrawn from German soil. Not that I disagree with that but the fact was that this debate is in danger of getting out of control, the way that missile debate without better management internally.

Here I would say there is this issue because you have in this Strategic Concept reassurance or two and I can’t say it exactly but it does say that nuclear weapons represent the political link between the North American security and European security. If that is true, what do you do? What happens to the link if you withdraw the weapons? Now I think there is an answer to that. But NATO has to make clear that answer and adjust its strategy accordingly, because if you just withdraw the weapons and don’t deal with the political consequences then there are the issues that Ricardo also raised about reassurance. You got several thousand Russian nuclear weapons which were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, do we want to just simply withdraw our tactical nuclear weapons from NATO unilaterally or do we want to try to do this in a way that perhaps we can get some constraints on the Russian short range nuclear weapons as well. Thirdly now you have the question of Iran now, one can, question, whether tactical nuclear weapons as they exist now on the soil of Turkey or any of the other countries, do they very much of any military use against Iran but the fact no matter is that there are until you address this there are countries that are somewhat skeptical about withdrawing the weapons simply because they think that they can’t say we have no threat from Russia but now we have a different threat.

So all I’m suggesting is that this issue is one that could be a divisive debate, that debate has to be managed and I agree with the military rationale, the original rationale no longer stands, but I would caution about moving too quickly, one has to get a consensus within the alliance on these issues internally so it doesn’t spread, so that the major debate doesn’t get out of control and becomes harder to manage. In my remarks really I’m going to focus on US-Turkish relations not just US relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The reason I do this is because there are differences between the United States and Turkey some of them rather serious and they can have an important impact on NATO and on general European Security. I also believe that there is a lot of misperception about what really are the origins and reasons for
some changes in Turkish Policy. I don’t think they have much to do with so-called Islamisation of Turkish foreign policy and so therefore I would like to address some of these. And lastly if we don’t do it here in Turkey, at this point, when are we going to do it. This seems to be an opportunity so with that I would like to just focus my remarks on US Turkish relations. What I have to say is an American view it’s not the view of RAND, it’s my personal view for US government.

The differences in US-Turkish relations that emerged over the last few years were not to remember and nothing new, you had to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in early 60’s which caused a lot of contention and let to a lot of differences. You had the Cyprus conflict in 1963 and in 64 the so called Johnson letter which let to diversification and the reduction of dependence on United States. You had the 1974 Cyprus crisis which ended up with the US embargo and then retaliatory members’ measures by the Turkish Government but the difference is a difference because during that period the Cold War still tended to mitigate against a really serious break, in the end both sides always returned to co-operation. The current differences I would argue are more serious because they are rather important structural changes in Turkey’s security environment and that is an important difference. And the first structural change I would say obviously is the disappearance of the Soviet threat. This removed the main rationale behind US-Turkish security partnership and it did reduce Turkey’s dependence on the United States for its security. At the same time it opened up new opportunities for Turkey that is previously been out of bonds the Turkish policy particularly in areas such as the Middle East, Caucasus and central Asia. And Turkey has sought to essentially to exploit these new opportunities and to diversify its foreign policy. In addition for Turkey the locus of threats and challenges or risks and challenges if you want has shifted.

During the Cold War obviously the main threat challenge to Turkish security came from the north from the Soviet Union. Today Turkey faces much more diverse set of security threats and challenges and risks ranging from rising nationalism increasing violence in Iraq in comparison to years ago, Iran, possibility a nuclear run emerging on its borders, weakened pragmatic Lebanon dominated by radical groups. Most of these threats and challenges are in the south, in other words what you’ve seen in a way is a shift in the threats and challenges of Turkey and it’s only logical and natural the Turkey would spend more of its energy and the tension on Middle East and in some cases let’s say the Caucasus I would argue that yes the fact that you have a government party in power which has Islamic roots has influenced the policy but it’s not the driving force, the driving force is the change in the Turkey’s security environment. Second factor is the Gulf War. Many American officials tend to look back at the Gulf War some sort of golden age in US-Turkish cooperation. And there is some truth in that. But the Turkish perception I would argue is quite different; for many Turks the Gulf War is the place where the problem has really began, the trouble started. The war had a number of consequences it marked a major escalation in Turkey’s Kurdish problem. I don’t want to go into detail and the establishment of the Kurdish state in northern Iraq and the western protection gave new impetus in lots of ways to Kurdish nationalism. It also provided a logistical base for attacks on Turkish
territory by subsidies in the PKK. Secondly the Gulf War reinforced Turkish sensitivity regarding national sovereignty. Ozal’s willingness to allow the United States to use Turkish facilities, conduct sorties against Iraq during the war has really been an exception not the rule although again the American officials look back to that time as some sort of golden age and this was the way it should be.

Generally speaking Turkey's been very wary of allowing the United States use your facilities for non NATO contingencies. Turkey refused to allow the United States to launch offensive strikes against Baghdad and the Saddam both during the 1996 crisis and later as well. The overall impact of the Gulf War than was the hiding the US Turkish discord. On one hand Turkey felt that had not been sufficiently compensated economically for many of the economic losses which they have suffered because of the war, on the other hand the war exacerbated the security challenges on Turkey’s southern border especially the Kurdish problem. Thirdly then you have the Iraq invasion I won't go into details but let me just say that exacerbated many of the latent strains and tensions that had been bubbling had been there that were not new beneath the surface since the end of the old war and gave them new impetus. At the same time it brought out the different regional security perceptions and interest of the two sides in a much sharper way. The invasion had from the Turkish perspective four consequences.

First invasion led to increase of violence and fragmentation of Iraq and they get a consequence for Turkey’s security. Secondly the invasion resulted increasing Iranian influence both in Iraq and the region it brought. Third obviously extremely important for Turkish point of view, as a result of the invasion the Iraqi Kurds drive for autonomy and some worried eventual independence gained greater momentum. And fourth in the aftermath of the invasion Turkey was confined with an upsurge of the violence by the PKK. The failure of the United States to understand sufficiently the Turkish concerns about the PKK and the struggle against terrorism exacerbated many of the tensions in the relationship. Now US policy changed in November 2007, but by the time US policy changed, president Bush agreed to provide active intelligence against the PKK but that time much of the damage had been done to perceptions in Turkey particularly among the population had grown rather negative. The change really came in my view too late to do that. Obama came to power seeking to repair that damage, he gave high priority to relations with Turkey, and visit in April 2009 was a very strong signal. He thought relations with Turkey were a first real visit to Europe within three months after coming to power. And the visit really set a new tone in relations, it didn’t change the relations but it did set a new tone, it did set a new direction. And it also initiated a series of policy changes that were important in general. The Obama administration’s emphasis on multilateralism and respect to international law, contrasts quite sharply with Bush policy of unilateralism. The emphasis also on diplomacy rather than first and foremost military measures. Thirdly the administration is more open to dialogue with Iran and Syria which had been a major concern major difference and major concern here in Ankara. And also the Obama Administration gave actively try to kick start the Middle East peace process.
And all four of these issues had divided Turkey particularly at the end of Bush administration, besides the Iraq invasion. So therefore it looked as if after all US policy was moving in directions in which Turkish policy had advocated and was much more congruent with Turkish Policy. The strange thing is that they have little visible impact on US Turkish relations and little impact at all on popular public animosity in United States. The so called famous Obama bounce which was quite strong in Germany quite strong in France up to close to 70-80 percent from being down to 30 had basically was invisible in Turkey. If you look at the pure findings from there, surveys and if you look at the transatlantic trends support for the US policy among the Turkish population grows minuscule just a few points. Major differences continue to exist on number of issues, I won’t go into the detail because of time, but Iran is one. And here I would say I suspect that Turkey will abstain from voting for sanctions in the UN. If that happens I think that you will see, quite a serious impact on the perceptions in United States and Turkey. Recent problems with Israel even though I am personally sympathetic very much with Turkish position. It puts the United States in a very difficult position not simply the most recent things but the whole deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey and I am not at all putting the blame on Turkey. Nonetheless they have important strategic consequences for stability in region.

The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, the United States has, the Obama administration has supported this very strongly, for very good strategic reasons. But at the same time there are differences with Turkey because the administration wants to decouple this rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue because they are afraid that’s more or less what’s happened. If you keep the link then the whole process will grind in to a halt and more or less to a certain extend that’s what you think. Finally missile defense, Turkey has made very clear that has reservations about missile defense which worried about both the impact on the relationships with Iran and Russia. So in other words, despite the fact that Obama shifted the basis of American policy in very fundamental and important ways and moved in directions in which should have had more congruent with Turkish policy. The benefits of that have not really been that great which is a problem for him at home. In other words the differences that we’re seeing now that I would argue are much more structural, they go back to the impact of the Cold War and the Gulf War. They are not a transitory crisis. United States faces a very different Turkey than the one they faced during the cold war. As I said the disappearance of Soviet threat reduced Turkey’s dependence on United States. At the same time at the end of the cold war, Turkey’s geographical role and interest have changed and expanded. Turkey now has interests and stakes it did not have two decades ago especially stakes and interests in Middle East and Caucasus. Turkey is to play a larger regional role and is playing a larger regional role with the aim as was emphasized at the luncheon speech, they tried to provide more stability in its immediate neighborhood. But in the process it’s also less ready to automatically follow the US lead in many issues, especially when these US policy conflicts with Turkish national interest.

So what you’re seeing today I would argue is not something that’s going to be these differences and not something that they’re going to be overcome because they are
not simply differences on individual issues. They reflect the change in the structure of
the relationship between the United States and Turkey and the change in Turkey's
own security environment. At the same time you have the important changes in the
United States and I would end with this. Here again internationally the locus of
security threats and challenges has changed from the US point of view. The key
threats today are not challenges in Europe. They come from beyond Europe's
borders. Europe, I refer to the discussions this morning, is quite frankly still very
important to the United States but the functional role has changed. It’s important as a
partner in order to help manage many of these security threats which come from
beyond Europe. It’s no longer important as an area to be protected but rather as an
ally that can help manage these things. The nature of the security challenges from the
US point of view has also changed. The threats come first of all today much more
from non state actors than the state actors. They’re transnational rather than national.
In many ways weak states are maybe more dangerous than strong states. They can
become havens for terrorism as you seen in Somalia and Afghanistan.

So this has a certain implication obviously for NATO. NATO needs to adapt to these
changes in which the threats are more global doesn’t mean as Ricardo has pointed
out this morning that NATO becomes the global policeman. But the origin of these
threats and their nature is changing and that has implications. It means the alliance
has to be in my view if it’s going to be relevant in the security issues that are
confronting the transatlantic alliance and US and Europe, it has to be less
Eurocentric. Now this is very, I understand contentious Ricardo mentioned in the
Italian perspective but I think it’s inevitable. Combating these threats requires
changes in NATO’s core structure. It’s got to be able to deploy forces that are more
deployable and better more sustainable far from the homeland of individual members.
They have to be able today to conduct different type of security and defense policy in
particularly to be able to conduct counterinsurgency more and more
counterinsurgency operations and here you see this in Afghanistan and most your
opinions went in simply to help United States if you’re getting involved in peace
keeping and peace organizations. They soon found themselves by
counterinsurgency. And it must be able to engage not in only peace keeping and
peace building, now in peace keeping but peace building and reconstruction.

This requires different types of forces some of which are not even force but different
types of capabilities. Several which don’t resign NATO they resigned quite frankly in
the EU which is all and more reason why the need to have a better interaction and
cooperation between the EU and NATO is necessary because either NATO has to
create this capabilities itself which is duplicating and which is going to be more
expensive or it’s got to be able to rely on the EU. All of this means a very difficult
adjustment that requires not only change in military forces but also I would argue a
change in our psychology and our basic philosophical approach to how the NATO and
the alliance operate. And finally it requires much better public outreach. We will need
to explain the differences and how the security environment has changed much better
to our publics and you can see this related to Afghanistan it’s only one of the issues.
So with that I will conclude.
NATO-Russia Relations

Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University
June 2010

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the nature of relations between NATO and the Russian Federation (RF) nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War – a period which was short but which put human civilization at imminent risk during those brief four decades because the East, headed by the Soviet Union, and the West, headed by the United States, were locked in a potentially suicidal confrontation throughout those decades.

In this confrontation the United States-led North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, both in possession of the most advanced weapons, headed by nuclear weapons, that mankind proved itself capable of inventing and developing until then, faced each other “eye-ball-to-eye-ball” in the heart of Europe along the East-West dividing line. The Cold War reached its terminal state precisely because the division of Europe, the root cause of the Cold War, was first terminated by President Mikhail Gorbachev. It was this fundamental development that since has complicated life for NATO by depriving it of a readily identifiable, robust adversary and thus of a strategic-military rationale.

The reunification of Europe in 1989 was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the country’s strategic retreat further deepened. This largely unanticipated development forced NATO, the second time in two years, to face a profound dilemma: whether to celebrate the adversary’s voluntary departure from the fight, or whether to mourn its loss, depriving NATO of its military-strategic rationale. In any event, NATO in the early 1990s survived the crisis basically because there was no consensus among the major stake-holders that it should not be allowed to outlive its original usefulness to European security.

Post-Cold War NATO-Russia relations began in the 1990s in the context of most challenging international and domestic circumstances for Russia. The future seemed both to promise success in mutual cooperation and to bode ill as well. Success seemed attainable because both sides had already declared that they no longer viewed each other as a threat. The skeptics argued, on the other hand, that both players were poised to be, at least potentially, critical players in large, geopolitically significant parts of the world, first and foremost in Eurasia, where both have, or claim to have, important interests. Would these interest converge or diverge? How would they behave if these interests clashed? were questions that seemed to anticipate more tension than cooperation in the future.

Developments in the last two decades have demonstrated that more often than not their interests have followed a collision course, making suspect the optimists’ hope.
that the former adversaries would find a way to develop a stable and mutually satisfactory working relationship, if not a partnership, now that they no longer viewed each other as adversaries.

The study will begin, in Section I, by offering a summary of the main points that appear in current official Russian assessments of NATO in two major policy documents, namely, the National Security Strategy, adopted in May 2009, and the Military Doctrine adopted in February 2010. Section II attempts to address the core analytical question of why and how “Russia was lost” to NATO/the West. In this section it is suggested that the West, but more specifically the United States played the major part in Russia’s estrangement from NATO by policies which reinforced fear and mistrust of the West, at a time when Russia was engulfed in one of most difficult stages in its history when its territorial integrity seemed frequently to be threatened and the health and stability of the Russian society seemed to be uncertain. Section III will focus on the next logical question: What kind of a role did Russia play in all of this? Did it play a significant part in the steady deterioration of relations to a point where it can neither be labeled ‘confrontation’ nor ‘true partnership’. Section IV will offer a brief survey of areas of cooperation and the institutional framework within which some of them take place. The study will end with Concluding Remarks.

A point of conceptual clarification may be useful at this point. In Russian political mind, NATO, the West and the United States operate interchangeably. They are often treated as synonyms when the reference is to the collective identity of NATO and the West. Admittedly, this mental image and its linguistic expression is not too mark off the true state of affairs. This article will use the three concepts interchangeably where appropriate.

I. ASSESSMENTS OF NATO/WEST IN POLICY DOCUMENTS

The last two decades have witnessed an abundance of official declarations and policy documents issued by the RF on the subject of the country’s foreign and security policies and relations. In order to grasp the most up-to-date mind-set in Moscow, two of the ‘troika’ of documents will form the basis of the present study. Endorsed by President Dimitri Medvedev since 2008, the year he assumed the office of the Presidency, they constitute the authoritative expressions of how Russia views the international security situation in general and Russia’s place in it in particular with regard to real and potential dangers and threats to the security of the RF as the first decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close. The three pillars of the ‘troika’ are (in reverse chronological order of ratification): ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation up to 2020,’ signed on February 10, 2010; the ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020,’ endorsed on May 13, 2009; and, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept,’ signed on July 12, 2008. This study will focus on the two later documents, the Security Strategy (SS) and the Military Doctrine (MD).

The Security Strategy (SS)
The drafting of the SS began in 2004 but it was the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 that pressured the process towards completion in early summer of 2008. It replaced the previous National Security Conception drafted in 1997 and updated in 2000. The general approach and the tone of the Security Strategy (SS) sounds more moderate than was generally anticipated. This is because the SS basically adopted a comprehensive view of security, repeatedly emphasizing the fundamental role of domestic development and stability for national security instead of concentrating primarily or exclusively on the military component. The basic premise that underpinned the whole text was that real security was not exclusively a function of forces emanating from the external world but also of the country’s aggregate human, economic, social and technological strengths. To give one example of where this premise is clearly articulated, let us look at Article 3: ‘Conceptual assumptions in the area of ensuring national security are based on the fundamental interconnectedness and interdependence of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 and the Concept for Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation to 2020.’ The same theme not only runs through the text but is further expanded by the inclusion of ‘science and technology, innovation’, ‘education’, ‘culture’, ‘rational use of nature, and other such non-military elements as prerequisites for achieving national security. Based on this overall approach, one may be tempted to go along with the suggestion by one commentator on the subject that, “...examining the document for signs or indications of Moscow’s future intentions may be overestimating its significance.”

Having said this, however, one should not conclude that the SS refrained from identifying military threats in strong terminology, that it was impervious to the unfolding stages of transformation taking place within NATO and its operational manifestations in Europe and Asia, and to the global military-security engagements of the United States, both in regions in the immediate neighborhood of Russia. NATO was unequivocally chided for its plans to extend the alliance’s military infrastructure to Russia’s borders, and attempts to assume global functions that, according to Russia, contravened international law. American plans to deploy, ‘elements of the global missile defense system’ in Europe were criticized as harmful to global and regional stability. Though not mentioned by name, the United States also became the target of special accusations for the presumed goal of pursuing strategic nuclear and conventional superiority. The dominant role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic region was described as a threat to international security. Instead, Russia proposed ‘an open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear legal and treaty basis.’

It is important to remember that the SS was adopted at a time when Russia had steadily gained a strong sense of self-confidence during President Putin’s two presidential tenures as several domestic conditions –i.e. the consolidation of the Russian state, some basic reforms, and improved living conditions- and international circumstances –i.e. soaring energy prices in world markets which eventually allowed Russia to build some of the world’s largest gold and foreign currency reserves and to
create a stabilization fund that allowed it room for dealing with the global financial
crisis. The new self-confidence was reflected in Russia’s designation of itself as a
‘resurgent global power’ which anticipated joining the ‘Club of Top Five’ economies in
the medium term.

*The Military Doctrine (MD)*

Coming less than a year later, the MD sent shock waves among many in western
strategic circles by its public designation of NATO as the biggest security threat.
According to this document, NATO tops the list of twelve ‘external military dangers.’
Article 8 in the MD entitled, ‘the main external military dangers,’ announced that ‘the
desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to
move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of
the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc,’ constituted the most
serious international military danger to Russia’s security. Not surprisingly, the United
States also persistently figured out as a source of military danger as well as threat in
numerous provisions of the document—though more so by implication rather than
explicit references to it. What worries the RF most about NATO and the United States
—which in any case are impossible to treat separately as autonomous actors in most
situations concerning international security, a point referred to in the Introduction—
are their actions on the periphery of Russia.

A closer look at the last MD reveals, however, that threat perceptions elucidated in
the new MD regarding NATO are ‘neither new nor as direct as often presented in
Western commentaries.’ This view is supported by a notable conceptual distinction
in what is a critical terminology in the new document from the perspective of threat
perception. It introduces an important nuance between the following two terms:
military danger’ and ‘military threat’. The first term refers to a situation wherein under
certain international circumstances a military threat emerges. The second term,
military threat’ refers to an international situation in which military conflict seems
possible. The Military Doctrine in 2000, the predecessor to the new MD, had implicitly
pointed at NATO enlargement as a threat. Some argue, therefore, that NATO
enlargement has actually been demoted from a threat to a danger in the latest
document.

The MD also offers a clarification of critical importance with regard to the role of the
use of nuclear weapons in Russian strategy. The ultimate objective being the
enforcement of strategic deterrence, the RF will resort to the use of nuclear weapons
in response to, 1) nuclear weapon use against it or its allies, 2) other WMD use, and,
3) conventional aggression against the RF ‘when the very existence of the state is
under threat,’ (Art. 22). It is noteworthy that contrary to expectations a doctrine of
preemptive attack is not explicitly addressed. Among factors that had fueled such
speculation was a newspaper article on February 5, 2010, by Security Council
Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in which he emphasized that the MD would focus on the
role of nuclear weapons in defense of Russia.
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the national security perception entertained by Russian political elite presently concentrates on the West in general and the United States and NATO in particular as the primary potential threat while at the same time seeming to be prepared for dialogue and cooperation on a number of international security issues such as international terrorism and WMD proliferation. The model of ‘soft cooperation’ that seems to be the preferred alternative in Moscow’s heart has been aptly dubbed “conditional partnership” by one Russian commentator.¹⁰

Such a heavy dose of mistrust of and frustration with NATO/the West leads one to ask the next logical question of whether Russia is looking for other partners and allies to help bolster its security needs? The answer, briefly is, yes. Russia looks forward to the reinvigoration, through integration and coordination, of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and even the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the most promising channel to securing itself against possible future threats. The revitalized emphasis on regional organizations in Asia is in perfect accord with the foremost importance assigned to the ‘near abroad’ in most foreign policy documents.

II. ‘WHO LOST RUSSIA’?

Why this powerful sense of distrust, to put it mildly, of the West?

The answer to this question is both simple and complicated. Simple because a series of policy decisions and actions by NATO/the West can be listed as forces which, in the aggregate have reinforced Russia’s sense of insecurity, vulnerability and resentment. This contemporary state of mind is generously nourished not only by an already-present, deep-rooted layer of historically driven mistrust but also by Russia’s own sense of weakness and vulnerability during an era of most painful systemic transition. The following are among the outstanding issues on which Russia has more or less persistently voiced vehement opposition to NATO and Western/American policies: the NATO policy of open-ended enlargement; NATO’s Kosovo war and the subsequent recognition by major western countries of Kosovo’s independence; the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty by the United States; the Bush Administration’s decision to place missile defense systems in eastern Europe, a policy revised by the Obama Administration which aims to deploy sea-based systems in the Black Sea, and; the refusal of the West to ratify the adopted CFT.

At a more complicated level, however, one needs to try to penetrate the mindset of the Russian political class with the aim of uncovering the deeper meaning and implications of these particular incidents for Russia’s long-term national interests, existential security needs, and the ordinary quest of any self-respecting nation to be treated with dignity. In the section below a brief summary will be offered concerning what have unfolded since the early 1990s as constant elements in the mental world and policy behavior of Russian leaders as they endeavored to define Russia’s current and long-term foreign and security policy priorities under post-Cold war and post-Soviet circumstances. Next attention will be turned to the question of if and how those
priorities have been facilitated and/or hampered by NATO/Western policies and actions.

‘The Constants’ in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities

Russian foreign and security policies since the early 1990s have undergone numerous shifts. The early years of both the Yeltsin-Kozyrev era and Putin’s presidency represent two outstanding examples. The former demonstrated a strong pro-Western, pro-Atlanticist orientation, often to the deliberate neglect of the newly independent states in the former Soviet space. Andrei Kozyrev, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RF, often outlined his country’s future vision in clear statements like the following:

“...the United States and other Western democracies are as natural friends and eventual allies of the democratic Russia as they are foes of a totalitarian U.S.S.R. Indeed, partnership is the best strategic choice for Russia and the United States. Rejection of it would mean the loss of a historic opportunity to facilitate the formation of a democratic, open Russian state and the transformation of an unstable, post-confrontational world into a stable and democratic one. Achieving these goals is of vital importance to Russia and the United States, which now share common democratic values. The national and state interests of both countries no longer conflict but complement each other on most international issues. The stage is set, then, for Russia and the United States to influence positively the course of world affairs—not through a condominium or imposed superpower priorities, but catalytically through a constructive partnership.”

While not as directly and emphatically as Kozyrev, Putin also made bold moves in the early years of his presidency towards the United States, signaling his intention to engage with the United States in constructive cooperation, if not partnership. The most generous offer for cooperation came in the immediate aftermath of the horrendous terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 -- a moment in the history of the United States when it seemed most insecure and vulnerable.

These shifts lead to the question of whether those episodes, neither of which lasted long, represent aberrations or perhaps wishful thinking in Russian views of the fundamental priorities and objectives of Russia’s relations with the outside world? Or did they merely mask a continuity in priorities and objectives even if the mechanisms, i.e. constructive engagement with the West, chosen to reach those objectives, have been employed as flexible instruments amenable to adjustment to respond to changing external circumstances of the times. I argue that the latter argument has greater explanatory power concerning the question of why and how Russia, which approached the West more or less with an open mind and heart during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin-Kozyrev tenure, has become so strongly anti-Western and anti-NATO. For this we need to look deeper into what have emerged as the unchanging priorities in Russian thinking and policy.

Russian foreign and security policies have pursued four mutually interactive and reinforcing fundamental priorities since the country was reborn in 1991. Despite major
shifts in policy orientation, these priorities have been stated, defended and reiterated over and over again. These are:

1. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the RF must be preserved intact;
2. Russia must not be threatened by encirclement;
3. European security should be constructed anew and Russia must have an equal role in the process and the resultant mechanism;
4. Multilateralism, not unilateralism, should be the dominant feature of the international system.

A careful reading of modern Russian history informs us that many of the ideas behind these priorities date back not only to the Soviet but to the Tsarist period as well.

The centrality of sovereignty and territorial integrity for any state is a matter of conventional wisdom, of course. For the RF it was of imminent significance in the 1990s due to the challenge posed to the federation especially by ethnic separatist movements, led most powerfully by the Chechen revolt until Putin assumed power in 1999.

The second priority, namely the fear of encirclement especially by non-regional powers found its most direct articulation in the Soviet era. Ever since the victory of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Soviets strongly feared a capitalist encirclement. Soviet leaders were convinced that the capitalist world would not tolerate the challenge to the world capitalist system represented by the architects of 'socialism in one country', and hence would unite forces to strike back. The western intervention in the three-four year long Civil War in the early 1920s on the side of domestic enemies of Bolshevism validated these fears.

As to the third priority: Russia’s desire to be an equal stake-holder in the process of rebuilding European security also has sound historical and geopolitical justifications. Russia was one of the architects of the Concert of Europe—hence one of the Powers who collectively determined the European order of the day. In fact it was an inevitable and indispensable component in the European balance of power for several centuries.

The fourth priority, that is the emphasis on multilateralism emerged later with the changing of guard at the Foreign Ministry when Andrei Kozyrev turned over his post to Yevgenii Primakov in 1996. America’s demonstrated tendency to exploit the ‘unipolar moment’ to its advantage caused Moscow much apprehension—hence the emphasis on multipolarity.

Russia’s current designation of NATO as the number one security threat is a direct function of Russian perception that its utmost foreign and security policy priorities have been at best ignored and at worst violated by basic NATO policies and practices since the end of the Cold War. The following pages will form an elaboration of this thesis.
III. HAVE RUSSIAN PRIORITIES BEEN HAMPERED OR FACILITATED BY NATO/ the WEST?

We shall focus on two developments of pivotal significance in the search for an answer to this question.

NATO Transformation

Two features of the transformation are of critical significance for Russia: first, enlargement in terms of membership and, second, expansion in the boundaries of the geographical area of responsibility, that is, NATO’s post-9/11 mandate to go out-of-area/ global.

NATO’s full-speed transformation in the first part of the 1990s was accompanied by an intense public debate in the West about the relevance in the post-Cold War era of NATO, an entity that was basically a Cold War formation. The origins of this debate went back to the dramatic years of the late 1980s, when two pivotal events formally pronounced the termination of the Cold War: when, on July 6, 1990, NATO declared at the London Summit of July 6, 1990, the end of the East-West adversarial relationship, and two, when the two Germanies -the Federal Republic of Germany (‘West Germany’) and the Democratic Republic of Germany (‘East Germany’)- were formally reunited on October 3, 1990, following difficult negotiations basically between the United States and the Soviet Union on one hand and East and West Germanies on the other.\textsuperscript{11}\textsuperscript{11} The most profound question in the debate in the 1990s had two prongs: how to secure Europe in the absence of a major external threat, and two, the place of new Russia henceforth in European security.

One of the more interesting ideas that circulated in the debate was represented by the proposal apparently floated by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then Foreign Minister of recently reunited Germany, to create a European security council or a collective security system organized under the CSCE (then Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe).\textsuperscript{12}\textsuperscript{12}

Ultimately Washington’s vision prevailed, quite unsurprisingly. Beginning in 1994 it began to offer partnerships. It was only a few years later, at NATO Madrid Summit in 1997, when the Visegrad countries –Poland, Hungary and the Check Republic- were invited to enter into accession negotiations with the Alliance. They were admitted in Spring 1999, the year the Atlantic Alliance celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. Thus the initial phase of the construction of a new dividing line in Europe was potentially inaugurated.

At the declaratory level, the rationale of enlargement was presented by Western officials as a project designed to enhance security and stability and to reinforce democracy in east-central Europe. \textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{13} Critics argued, however, that it would be perceived by Russia as threatening its security. A prominent voice in the American academia, John Lewis Gaddis, who has written extensively on Cold War history, wrote in 1998 that NATO enlargement managed to violate every one of the six principles that he listed as basic to strategy. And, he continued, that that was perhaps
why historians –normally so contentious - were in uncharacteristic agreement, with few exceptions, that NATO enlargement was ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all ill-suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world.\textsuperscript{4v}

NATO transformation constitutes the central element among the reasons for Russia’s alienation from the West, as previously argued. Why? Because it contradicts the list of four constant elements in Russia’s priorities persistently advocated since the 1990s. Early in the post-Cold War era, Russia hoped, as some in the West did as well, for NATO to transform itself into a political organization, shedding its military structure. In fact, Putin reiterated the same wish in 2001, in the context of NATO’s impending expansion to the Baltics. However, the exact opposite has happened. By spreading its mandate throughout most of Europe through enlargement, NATO has acquired nearly a continent-wide reach, added fresh real and potential military muscle, and simultaneously inched closer to Russia’s borders. This process is not a simple, innocent transformation; it is tantamount to a robust resurgence, a reinvigoration of strategic significance. What is more, as it has moved to become the single most potent and universal security structure in Europe coupled with increased military and political clout, it has at the same time been tasked to assume global tasks in global theaters. In practice this has meant NATO deployments and operations in the vicinity of Russia’s border in Eurasia, as in the case of Afghanistan where NATO has deployed forces since 2003.

Hence, Russia sees itself as the victim of western policies effectively depriving it of its right to be an equal partner in the construction of a new security order in Europe. Sergei Karaganov, a reputed Russian analyst, conveyed this mood clearly in a recent article:

‘Russia’s elite have never felt their country was defeated in the Cold War, but the West has treated Russia like a defeated adversary ever since an internal anti-communist revolution brought about the end of the Soviet Union. NATO expansion stands as a symbol of this attitude. For some time, Moscow tolerated such treatment, but when NATO declared its intention to expand to Ukraine, which a large part of Russian ruling class took as a threat to Russia’s vital interests and, moreover, as a threat of war, Moscow finally said no. It was only after the West encountered an armed rebuff in South Ossetia that it stopped its expansion. Yet it has not given up its expansion plans.’\textsuperscript{xvi}

Russia’s opposition to the enlargement is driven by another logic as well: that it violates the post-Cold War settlement between the United States and the former Soviet Union. According to some circles this may be a valid argument more in a moral or spiritual sense than the technical: ‘Whatever the ‘assurances’ Western political leaders may have given Gorbachev in private talks, the question of a possible eastern enlargement of NATO never formed the subject of negotiations on German unification.’\textsuperscript{xvii} While this dissenting view is likely to represent the mainstream opinion in the West, the Russian position is not without supporters either. For example, in an article in 2009, Professors Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have persuasively argued that,
“Much of this (Russia’s) souring is the result of American policies. American foreign policy, so successful at the moment of settlement, has pursued goals contrary to the settlement’s principles. This occurred through the administrations of both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as the United States pursued short-term and secondary aims at the expense of more fundamental interests...One reason is that domestic interest groups have excessively shaped American grand strategy. The United States has also undermined the settlement by exploiting its advantages without considering Russian interests. An inflated sense of American unipolar prerogatives, combined with the ascent of an aggressive neo-conservative ideology, has generated an American foreign policy that has lost its sense of restraint and sensitivity to the interest of others.”

Nevertheless President Medvedev has persistently tabled his proposal for a new security structure for Europe based on legally binding treaty commitments. With this in mind, Moscow has floated the idea to hold a pan-European discussion on political-military aspects of security, an initiative which has aroused serious interest among some in the Euro-Atlantic community. It is important to note that this proposal is only one element of Russia’s broader vision which stresses the need to review and reform the international system more comprehensively, including the financial and energy sectors alongside security. Known as the Corfu process, Russia’s proposal for a continent-wide debate on political-military aspects of security has been the subject of deliberations within the OSCE roof since June 2009.

Operation Allied Force (OAF)

NATO intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in Spring 1999 under the code name of Operation Allied Force (OAF) appears to have made the second most powerful impact on Moscow leadership not to trust the West. The enormity of the negativism generated by the event is reflected in the views of a moderate Russian commentator who argued that NATO had bombed not only Milosevic but also the UN and post-Cold War Europe as an idea, as a political and civilizational project. Gorbachev’s crystal dream of a ‘common European home’ (has been) left in pieces.’

Russians in general viewed the Kosovo operation as the harbinger of future NATO interventions under the pretext of ‘crisis-management’ in unstable regions in Russia’s periphery. Almost a decade later, Russia found self-serving inspiration in the case of Kosovar independence when it extended diplomatic recognition to the self-declared independence of South Ossetia and Abkhasia shortly after the Russo-Georgian war in early August 2008.

OAF also worked as a wake-up call to Russia to begin to put its own house in order. Vladimir Putin was elected to the presidency in Spring 2000, nearly one year after the NATO intervention in Kosovo began. His two terms in office were marked by a resolve to bring an end to the pattern established during the transitional decade of the 1990s of policy failures on both fronts, domestic and foreign. It was this
mindset which prompted President Putin to try, once again, to pursue a more conciliatory and cooperative approach to the West.

IV. HAS RUSSIA NOT PLAYED ANY PART IN THE SLIDE TO ‘COLD PEACE’?

In fact this question is another way of asking the following question: Why have NATO/the West adopted those policies that have frustrated Russia to the detriment of a post-Cold War entente between the two?

In answering this question it may be helpful to remind ourselves that state policies, which find their way into alliance policies, are made, first and foremost, under the influence of two major forces which are in constant interaction with each other: 1) the balance of power in domestic political, ideological and economic forces, and, 2) the structure of the international system. Both forces define the constraints and opportunities under which national decision-makers operate. In practical terms, they define the domestic and international constraints and opportunities that are perceived by the decision-making bodies. It is with this qualification that I try to answer the question. The answer basically has two parts:

1) Russian behavior concerning the former Soviet space were not perceived by the West as unequivocally convincing evidence that Moscow would honor the post-Soviet geopolitical status quo in Eurasia. On the contrary, it was suspected of harboring intentions to restore the Tsarist/Soviet Empire.

Outstanding examples of Russian behavior in the first part of the 1990s that reinforced in the West the traditional sense of uncertainty and mistrust were the so-called ‘Russian Monroe Doctrine’; Moscow’s heavy-handed role in the separatist conflicts in Moldova and Georgia—issues that continue to destabilize European security to this day- and; Moscow’s claim over the Crimea where the majority of the population overwhelmingly are of ethnic Russian origin.

These were acts that signaled that Russia intended to treat the post-Soviet space, Russia’s ‘near abroad’, as its sphere of influence, expecting its recognition as such by the West. A contemporary formulation of this mind-set is represented by the term ‘privileged interests,’ listed by President Medvedev in an interview on August 31, 2009, that is soon after the Russo-Georgian war, as he elaborated the principles that would henceforth guide Russian foreign and security policy.

A further source of mistrust on the part of the West in the 1990s was connected to the question of access to the fossil fuel sources in the newly independent countries. Moscow’s monopolizing and patronizing approach on this issue in general reinforced anxieties in the West that the new political order in Eurasia might not be sustainable.

2) The negative sentiments that prevailed among large sections of the populations in countries in central and eastern Europe and the Baltics towards Russia also operated
as a major stumbling block to an easy and full Western-Russian embrace. Powerful pressures were created on the West to do something to respond to the appeals by the leaderships in these countries to include them within the Alliance’s fold for enhanced democracy, stability and security.

At least an important part of western attitudes and policies towards Russia evolved against the background of these developments. As noted above, ideology, politics, established belief systems, and the great disparity in their relative power positions certainly created predispositions towards each other as they groped to find new rules of behavior for what was to become a new kind of relationship between the West and Russia. However, specific contemporary developments that stood in stark opposition to the other side’s interests both reinforced old predispositions and offered convenient justification for the policy-makers to take the risk of alienating the other side.

V. SOME HOPE STILL: INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND COOPERATION

Because a thorough deconstruction of the Cold War security architecture of Europe by phasing out NATO and its replacement by an altogether new structure, as Russia had demanded, did not seem to be achievable in the short term, Moscow agreed, at least for the time-being, to the second-best option offered by the West: to create a formal framework within which NATO and Russia would cooperate and collaborate.

The initiative passed through two phases. The first phase began in 1997 with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations between RF and NATO. It included two parts, the first part consisting of negative commitments by NATO, the so-called ‘three Nos,’ which declared that NATO Allies ‘have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. The Allies also pledged not to deploy ‘substantial’ combat forces in politically sensitive areas. The second part elaborated several areas of practical cooperation. A Joint Permanent Council (JPC) was established to serve the purposes of the Founding Act.

NATO’s Kosovo operation brought to a halt what was already a precarious relationship. Moscow recalled its chief military representative to NATO, suspended participation in the Partnership for Peace program and postponed talks on opening a NATO military liaison mission in Moscow. It was President Putin who took the initiative to reset the relations. The result was the Rome Declaration in December 2001, establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), and changing the ‘Nineteen Plus One’ construct with which Russia was strongly dissatisfied to ‘NATO at Twenty.’ The changes were generally interpreted as a move designed to upgrade Russia’s position to one of equality whereby Russia would have the right to participate in decision-making, though not in the vote.

On balance there seems to be a general agreement that NATO-Russia cooperation has achieved important progress on specific military-related issues such as the struggle to fight international terrorism and to prevent WMD proliferation. Exercises have been held in Russia, Britain, France and the United States to improve the
capacity of these countries to deal effectively with nuclear accidents. In contrast, relations have floundered on broader political-military issues, as the earlier discussion suggests. Tensions escalated once again with the Russo-Georgia war in early August 2008. Following Moscow’s military intervention in South Ossetia and the occupation of strategic points in Georgia, NATO decided to temporarily suspend meetings of the NRS. It fell on Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s new Secretary General, to renew the relations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I shall conclude with a question? ‘Was a full-blown partnership, or perhaps even an alliance between NATO/the West and Russia truly possible or even conceivable?’ For a host of weighty reasons, the most important one being the lack of mutual trust, the answer, briefly, is, ‘No.’

However, relations need neither have taken the direction nor the intensity that they have. Having been in the more powerful position, the West has overplayed its hand with Russia, disregarding many of its vital interests. The most obvious example is the way NATO enlargement has been carried out. The overall approach has been highly threatening and provocative, which in turn has given Moscow an excuse to legitimize interventionism in the ‘near-abroad’.

This brings us to what I believe to have been a grave mistake in how plans for NATO enlargement took shape and was or was not communicated to Russia. It was done without a serious and sincere attempt to co-opt Russia. Needless to say Moscow would most likely have strenuously rejected the idea at first had it been invited for an intense exchange of views. Nor would such communication have been seen by Russia as giving it the right of veto. There are sound reasons in support of the argument that Russia ultimately might have been persuaded to see mutual advantages in the project. How? By clearly communicating to Russia the enormous, long-term security advantages of two interrelated situations:

1. The advantages, first, of retaining NATO in Europe: As aptly argued by Karl Kaiser in an article in *Foreign Policy* in 1996, “NATO has been more than Europe’s security stabilizer. Almost fifty years of cooperation have changed the nature of interstate relations among alliance members. The old rivalries of Europe, which caused earlier wars, have lost their sharp edge, due in part to the involvement of the United States, diminishing the impact of these rivalries among the alliance members—with the exception of Greece and Turkey—war has been reliably eliminated as an instrument of policy.”

In short, then, Russia should have been offered the opportunity to comprehend the true virtue of NATO in the Cold War era by clearly and strongly explaining its broader role in Europe which went above and beyond the military. Russians for decades had had been conditioned to viewing NATO exclusively in Cold War terms. This was the moment to help Russians to break away from the haunting images of the past,
however reluctantly, and see NATO's other, brighter face: the face of an agent of European peace.

2. Playing up NATO as an agent of democracy: Similarly as the previous point, the Russian political class should have been approached in ways that could convince them that NATO's promised democracy mission would be making an immense contribution to Russia's long-term security as well by moving the borders of peace and democracy close to the Russian border. Ultimately NATO enlargement, if carried out with honesty and sincerity, would mean the creation of a zone of security throughout Europe which would relieve Russia of most of its historical and contemporary fears and suspicions from the East.

As events unfolded, however, it has become too obvious that the opportunity to communicate this message to Russians and to convince them of the West's sincerity have utterly failed.

What is to be done?

I believe that NATO-Russia relations can be transformed for the better only if Russia's relations with the West are transformed in that direction. I suggest that most importantly both the West and Russia need to be truly open and sincere with each other simply because they need each other's cooperation to be prepared to face the evolving challenges of the twenty-first century with efficacy and success—the kind of success which has eluded them both so far. They are in a privileged position to move forward in facing the future together through cooperation simply because they share, in one degree or another, a basic loyalty to democracy and the rule of law as well as a long history of cultural, intellectual, political and military interaction in modern times, marked by adversity as well as high levels of institutional cooperation.

Second, I suggest that both sides need to firmly agree, once and for all, on a set of organizing principles which will guide their future behavior towards each other. The one principle of utmost importance should be the commitment by both sides to truly and fully abide by one of the fundamental international law principles: to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all independent states whose independence have been recognized internationally through in publicly accountable ways rather than as a unilateral act. The repeated violation or threat of violation of this principle by both sides bears the primary responsibility for why Russia-NATO/Western relations have been deeply strained through most of the post-Cold War era.

END NOTES


Ibid.


For one of the most authentic brief analysis of how American-Soviet negotiations in 1990 produced Gorbachev’s consent to unified Germany’s membership in NATO, see, Hannes Adomeit, Gorbachev’s Consent to Unified Germany’s Membership in NATO, (Stiftung Wissen. und Politik:Working paper FG 5 2006/11, December 2006.)


For a game theoretical analysis of the problematic position that NATO has dragged itself into by triggering the sense of insecurity Russia while offering security to east-central Europe, see, Andrew Kydd, “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement,” International Organization, 55:4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 801-828.


Andrew Monaghan (ed.), *The Indivisibility of Security: Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security* (Rome: NATO Defense College, January 2010), pp. 5-6. Monighan’s Introduction (pp. 5-25) is a useful summary of Russian-Western interaction on Russia’s recent initiatives.

Ibid.


Karl Kaiser, “
Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey*

Mustafa Kibaroğlu

NATO is revising its Strategic Concept; the alliance is due to complete work on the document in November. A key issue in the revision is the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the alliance’s policy of extended nuclear deterrence. Although Turkey has long been in agreement with its allies on the value of these forward deployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate position on the question of how to continue the policy effectively.

With other NATO countries such as Luxembourg and Norway supporting them, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have indicated a desire to reassess the case for continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories. Should these countries advocate withdrawal of U.S. weapons from Europe, Turkish decision-makers might conclude that two fundamental principles of the alliance, namely solidarity and burden sharing, have been seriously weakened. Those principles have been the basis for Turkey’s agreement, since the early 1960s, to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.

The issue is contentious within NATO, and the alliance makes its decisions by consensus—an approach that was reaffirmed by NATO foreign ministers at an April meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, and by an Experts Group report released in May.

Although final decisions on the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons probably are not imminent, the debate has already been joined, and Turkey should be an active participant. If Turkey continues to sit on the sidelines of that debate, as it has done until now, it could find itself in an uncomfortable spot: A decision to remove the U.S. weapons from Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands would likely leave Turkey and Italy as the only NATO members with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil. Such a situation would put pressure on Turkey to reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory—even more so if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from Italy as well. Turkey’s calculus must include an additional element because it has Middle Eastern neighbors that are a source of concern to some allies but with whom Turkey is developing increasingly close diplomatic ties after a long period of animosity that extended beyond the end of Cold War rivalry.

This article will argue that the most sensible course for Turkey is to support the efforts of other host nations to create a consensus within the alliance that would lead to a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. That step would help Ankara to continue cultivating relationships with its non-European neighbors and could be achieved without undermining extended nuclear deterrence.
NATO’s New Strategic Concept

Since 1999, when NATO last revised its Strategic Concept, the world has undergone dramatic changes and witnessed tragic events, such as the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, followed by others in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and Amman. Since the September 11 attacks, NATO, while maintaining its identity as a collective security organization, has accelerated the pace at which it is transforming itself from one focused on defending a particular geographical area against a well-known enemy to one that would be capable of dealing with emerging threats such as international terrorism, which may manifest itself in different forms and almost anywhere in the world.

This process of transformation within NATO has called into question the relevance of the 1999 Strategic Concept to the challenges and threats that the allied countries are facing now and are likely to confront in the future.

The Strategic Concept has therefore been under revision since the alliance summit convened in Strasbourg/Kehl, on April 3-4, 2009. At the summit meeting, NATO heads of state and government tasked the secretary-general with assembling and leading a broad-based group of qualified experts who would lay the groundwork for the new Strategic Concept with the active involvement of NATO’s highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council. The report, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” was released May 17.

The details of the new Strategic Concept are not yet entirely clear, but the Experts Group report and media accounts of the ongoing deliberations give an idea of the general principles that are likely to govern the new document. For instance, during their April 22-23 meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, NATO foreign ministers discussed ways to modernize the organization and held talks on the new Strategic Concept. In those discussions, they shared the view that “the new concept must reaffirm NATO’s essential and enduring foundations: the political bond between Europe and North America, and the commitment to defend each other against attack,” according to a NATO press release.

More specifically, concerning the nuclear strategy of the alliance, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said that, “in a world where nuclear weapons exist, NATO needs a credible, effective and safely managed deterrent.”

That statement suggests that nuclear weapons are likely to retain their central role in NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. That would satisfy Turkey’s expectations; Ankara is looking for the continuation of extended deterrence, which now relies heavily on U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

Nevertheless, the positions of the European allies are not fully compatible with that of Turkey. Some western European allies expressed strong reservations about the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories, while some central and eastern European allies strongly support the deployment of these weapons in Europe as a visible sign of U.S. security guarantees for Europe.
The foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway stated in a February 26 letter to Rasmussen that they “welcome the initiative taken by President Obama to strive toward substantial reductions in strategic armaments, and to move towards reducing the role of nuclear weapons and seek peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons.” The letter emphasized that there should be discussions in NATO as to what the allies “can do to move closer to this overall political objective.”

The United States and the allies that host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons reportedly have an agreement that these weapons will not be withdrawn by a unilateral act of the United States unless the host countries individually or collectively make such a decision or the North Atlantic Council as a whole decides to do so. This principle may have come out of the Cuban missile crisis, during which President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey without consulting the Turkish government. This decision had a devastating impact on relations within the alliance.

Some central and eastern European allies of NATO attach great importance to the continuation of the extended nuclear deterrence strategy of the alliance and the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons, which they consider to provide credible assurances against the potential threat that they perceive from Russia. There is unanimous support for including tactical nuclear weapons in the next round of nuclear arms control, and there are also views suggesting concomitant withdrawal of all Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

However, even the central and eastern European countries that enthusiastically support the continuation of nuclear sharing do not want to commit themselves to any obligation to host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories. This was, in fact, an agreed-on principle within the alliance at the time of their admission so as not to provoke Russia, which was adamantly opposing the eastward expansion of the alliance throughout the 1990s and beyond.

According to the terms of agreement of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which was negotiated prior to the admittance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO, the alliance declared it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy.” Hence, it would be fair to assume that if nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, there are no new candidates to take them.

Should this be the case, Turkey might have to revise its stance vis-à-vis the U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.

**U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey**

Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were deployed there in 1961 as a result of decisions made at the alliance’s 1957 Paris summit. Those missiles were withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban
missile crisis. Since then, only U.S. nuclear weapons under U.S. Air Force custody that could be delivered by F-100, F-104, and F-4 Phantom aircraft were deployed in air bases in Eskişehir, Malatya (Erhaç), Ankara (Akını/Mürted), and Balıkesir.xiv

Turkey still hosts U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much smaller numbers. They are limited to one location, the İncirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.xv All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above. Moreover, the Turkish air force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed at İncirlik.xvi F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 “Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish air force participate in NATO’s nuclear strike exercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” during which crews are trained in loading, unloading, and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons. The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort rather than a nuclear strike force.xvii

There were two main reasons for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons. First and foremost has been the deterrent value of these weapons against the threat posed by the nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities of its enormous neighbor, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. Similarly, after the Cold War, these weapons were believed by Turkish military commanders to constitute a credible deterrent against rival neighbors in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which used to have unconventional weapons capabilities as well as delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles.xviii

A second reason for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons has been the burden-sharing principle within the alliance. Turkey has strongly subscribed to this principle since it joined NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed unequivocally its willingness to share the burden of defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a significant number of troops to the Korean War in 1950, even before NATO membership was in sight.

Yet, if Turkey is likely to be left as the only country, or one of only two countries, where U.S. nuclear weapons will still be deployed after a possible withdrawal of these weapons from other allies and no other NATO country will be willing to assume the burden of hosting nuclear weapons, Turkey may very well insist that the weapons be sent back to the United States. From Turkey’s current standpoint, this would not be the desired outcome of the current deliberations within the alliance.

According to a Turkish official, the principle of burden sharing should not be diluted. To live up to their commitment to solidarity, which was reaffirmed in Tallinn, the five countries that currently host these weapons should continue to do so for the foreseeable future, the official said.xix
Extended Deterrence Against Whom?

Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more effective with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among several allies, as has been the case over the last several decades.

Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations.

Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Last year, Turkey held joint ministerial cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey had treated both countries as foes rather than friends. These meetings have produced a significant number of protocols, memoranda of understanding, and other documents on a wide array of issue areas including the thorniest subjects, such as ways and means of dealing with terrorism effectively and using the region’s scarce water resources more equitably.

Moreover, these high-level meetings resulted in the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria and vice versa. That action has paved the way to an opening of the borders between the two countries; the borders had stayed closed for decades due to the presence of large numbers of heavy land mines on both sides. The mines will soon be cleaned up with a view to opening huge land areas to agriculture.

In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on
hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.xx

Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them. Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism.

Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens.

There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies.xxi Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory.xxii

The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon state.”xxiii There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A key question for NATO’s new Strategic Concept is whether burden sharing will continue to be construed as it has had for many decades, as suggested by Turkey, or whether it will be altered in response to the combined negative stance of some western European allies regarding the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

This situation could lead to a divisive and unnecessary controversy between Turkey and its long-standing allies in the West. By insisting that the weapons remain on European territory, Turkey would not only alienate some of its Western allies that truly want to move the weapons out of their territories, but also create tension in its relations with its neighbors and newly emerging partners in the Middle East.

On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return
for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor. This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result.

Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East.

Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated.

One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed in Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies.

One cannot argue that once U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkish territory are sent back, the nuclear deterrent of the alliance extended to Turkey will be lost forever.

Currently, three NATO members are nuclear-weapon states. Of the NATO non-nuclear-weapon states, only five, as mentioned above, are known to host U.S. nuclear weapons. The remaining 20 members presumably have no nuclear weapons on their territories. Yet, these members enjoy the credible nuclear deterrent of NATO, which remains the most powerful military organization in the world. Hence, the simple outcome of this analysis is that, for NATO members to feel confident against the threats posed to their national security, they do not have to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory. Turkey need not be an exception to this rule.

∗ This article originally appeared in the June 2010 issue of Arms Control Today, and has been reprinted with the permission of the Arms Control Association.
Italy is believed to host U.S. nuclear weapons, but it is not clear whether it wants to get rid of them. For an account of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Italy, see Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005, p. 9.


Jean Asselborn et al. to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, February 26, 2010. For the full text of the letter, see www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Letter %20to%20Secretary %20General%20NATO.pdf.

Ibid.


Kulesa, “Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Central Europe.”

Retired Turkish ambassador, personal communication with author, Ankara, March 31, 2010.


Retired Turkish air force commander, e-mail communication with author, April 23, 2010.

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability was destroyed following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iran and Syria still have such weapons in their military arsenals. Hence, the Turkish security elite still consider extended nuclear deterrence to be significant for Turkey’s security.

Turkish diplomat, personal communication with author, Ankara, January 29, 2010.


These comments were made by Turkish security experts and analysts in response to a presentation by Mustafa Kibaroglu entitled “US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey and the Evolution of NATO’s New Strategic Concept” at the Strategy Group Meeting of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara on March 31, 2010.


Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Iran and Brazil, May 17, 2010.

The credibility of NATO’s deterrent has been questioned by security analysts both inside and outside of Turkey in various discussion platforms, and some have expressed their concerns about whether NATO countries would really use nuclear weapons against Iran to defend Turkey. There can be no clear answer for such a question, which relates to a dilemma that is inherent in the concept of deterrence.

Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen also suggested there are other means for maintaining alliance cohesion: “A more modest option would be for NATO to retain a nuclear task without U.S. nuclear weapons being stationed in Europe.” Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thielmann, “Obama’s NPR: Transitional, Not Transformational,” *Arms Control Today*, May 2010.
Other Issues
The International System still evolving

Reşat Arım, Rtd. Ambassador

At the beginning of 2010 events lead us to believe that the International System did not complete its evolution. We are in the midst of the most profound flux in world affairs since the creation of the Western alliance system in the late 1940s. The collapse of the Cold War order, the rise of China and India as global powers and new transnational challenges have all combined to introduce new uncertainties into the global system.

Several concepts are emerging: multilateralism, multipolarity, non-polarity. It can be said that developments in the international system will ultimately adapt to one or the other of these concepts. Multilateralism is a concept still to be precisely defined; but we observe that EU presents itself as the champion of multilateralism. Multipolarity is a concept dear to the hearts of the Chinese. Non-polarity was advanced recently by an American scholar. The US is struggling in Iraq. The elections of 7 March still have to work out a government to govern the country. It is not possible to say whether President Obama would succeed when he initiates talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Iranian nuclear issue continues to be a major problem in the region. US is bogged down in Afghanistan. The future of NATO is seriously debated in many member countries. China emerges as a major economic power. China, India and Brazil form the nucleus of a powerful new grouping. European Union gives all the negative signals. Whether the EU will be in a position to play a global role hand in hand with the US is very much in doubt.

Iraq: The 7th of March elections in Iraq have taken place after two months postponement because of wrangling on the electoral law. Major coalitions competed for the votes of Iraqis. But, it seems that the formation of the government might take many months. Also the uncertainty does not end there. The hydrocarbon law has yet to be adopted. So, the question remains whether the results of the elections would permit the US to withdraw as scheduled.

Israel-Palestine: 2009 was the year when all efforts to initiate talks between the Palestinians and Israelis failed. Netanyahu government is adamant not to freeze the settlement activity in the East Bank. Mahmud Abbas is fearful that talks carried out without this precondition is bound to fail. Senator Mitchell tried to find a formula that could be acceptable to both sides. It is announced that the proximity talks commenced. But, the new settlements around Jerusalem created problems. There erupted a crisis when Vice-President Biden was visiting Israel in conjunction of the peace talks. Israeli government announced that 1.600 houses would be built in the Eastern part of Jerusalem. The US reacted to that and demanded that the project be suspended. Israeli Prime Minister said that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel and that the project could not be suspended. Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Washington, but the problem persisted.
We should also take into consideration the linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and Iraq. If there is progress on the peace talks, the Iraqi situation may improve; otherwise the negative effects will be felt in Iraq.

Iran: Iranian nuclear activity is the main issue both for the Western and Eastern Powers. Iran says it is developing nuclear capability for peaceful purposes. The US has shown its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear bomb by sanctions adopted in the Security Council. In 2010 the situation is as confuse as ever: Turkey is trying hard to convince both Iranians and those willing to take measures against it to solve the problem peacefully. It was hoped that the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement in May could help diffuse the situation. Still the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 9 June about new set of sanctions.

Afghanistan: Following the September 11 attacks, NATO countries solidly stood behind the US; the US single-handedly took the military action in Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban. After nine years of endeavor during which NATO took unto itself the war against the Taliban, we observe that the countries participating into the campaign are one by one deserting the area. The US said it would begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in 2011, but this also looks doubtful.

In 2010 NATO’s Strategic Concept was also revived. A Group of Experts headed by Madeleine Albright has been working on it and they submitted their recommendations on 17 of May. There has been four seminars organized by NATO. The New Strategic Concept will be adopted at the NATO Summit by the end of the year. The US Atlantic Council has published a study on the subject in which it is said that, “the new Strategic Concept is the vehicle to advance the modernization of the Alliance in the face of unclear yet systemic change”. “The Strategic Concept 2010 must consider the identity of the Alliance in a multipolar world.”

The Group of Experts in their report submitted to the NATO Secretary General on May 17 have in fact referred to the “uncertain and unpredictable world”, to the “increasing complexity of the global political environment”. They say that NATO has created a zone of security, peace and relative prosperity in a world that is more tumultuous and uncertain than in 1999. It was difficult to offer detailed predictions about the next ten years. The uncertainty was magnified by such factors as the Proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the competition for petroleum and other strategic resources, the ambitions of international terrorist groups etc. Events in one part of the World were far more likely than in the past to have repercussions elsewhere. NATO must find its place within a less centralized and more complicated international order.

We can see from this analysis that the NATO experts Group is also of the opinion that the international system is still evolving.

The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute was engaged this year in the study of “security” and gave priority to taking up the subject of the Strategic Concept. The Turkish academics have studied the main elements of the subject and on 4 June an
international Conference was held in Ankara by the Foreign Policy Institute with the support of the NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.

Another development was the following. On April 12-13, 2010, President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. President Obama invited over 40 nations to participate, representing a diverse set of regions and various levels of nuclear materials, energy, and expertise. The idea was to come to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, leaving other broad topics such as nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy to different forums. At the Summit, leaders committed to safeguard nuclear materials under their control. And they agreed to work toward signing key international treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism.

We should, on this occasion, have a closer look at the “security” concept. As far as the concept in general is concerned, there too we observe a paradigm change. The challenges that now affect global security are new ones: resource scarcity, climate change, mass migration, failed states. Also it is observed that US-Europe condominium can not manage the new global order.

Changes also occurred in the perception of security in major countries. In China, the 30 years of reform and opening up has brought about this change. In Russia, hard security issues are still a major concern, especially in relations with the West, but a broader post-modern understanding of security is also taking place.

European Union: The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to give the EU the instruments to play a global role. To play such a role EU should cooperate closely with the US. However, we see that the EU is mostly concerned with its relations with Russia. The cutting of oil supply through Ukraine in the last couple of years probably had an impact on EU countries; so, EU and Russia are negotiating a new agreement with Russia, particularly having in mind the oil and gas supply potential of that country. The Partners of EU such as Brazil, China, India and Russia do not regard it as a fully fledged international actor and stress the complexity of its institutional structure as an impediment to more straightforward relations.

The New Power Centers: While the Western countries can not show a unified front, we observe the emergence of new power centers, especially in Asia. It could be argued that the continent that has changed mostly in the 21st century is Asia. With rising growth, populations and burgeoning economies, it was never going to be long before these rose up the security agenda. Here we look at just a sample of what these could be - from China's role in tackling climate change to Central Asia's importance to regional security. China is a power house thanks to its export oriented economy. This socialist market country has benefited from investments coming from many Western countries as well as from Japan and Taiwan. The economic crisis has
shown that China is the biggest creditor for US; the title of the G-7 is almost altered to make room for the new situation (G-2, i.e. US and China). The position of China certainly is bound to affect the balance of power in Asia and in the World. We should not forget that China and Russia would not easily relinquish their dominance in Asia.

End Notes

i “The United States and the Emerging Global Security Agenda” Robert Hutchings, Chaillot Paper No. 118, EU Institute for Security Studies


iii The Economist, March 4 2010, Iraq’s election. No Promised Land at the end of all this.


v Feng Zhongping, China’s New Security Perceptions and Practice, EU Institute for Security Studies.


vii “Europe in the New Global Order, Secondary Actor or the G-3”.


x NATO Review Magazine, “The Coming Role of Asia”
Nuclear Swap Agreement with Iran

Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

It’s a great pleasure to be able to address such a distinguished audience. I do not have a prepared statement but I think I am prepared to make a statement on the recent nuclear swap agreement made with Iran. This is a topic that I am covering almost on a full-time basis. My first interest in Iran’s nuclear program was back in 1995 when I was a research fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research UNIDIR. My article titled “Is Iran Going Nuclear?”, was published in the Foreign Policy Institute’s quarterly “Dış Politika – Foreign Policy” journal in its Vol. 20, Nos. 3-4 issue of 1996. It was a coincidence because at the very same time Russia and Iran had signed a deal, an agreement for cooperation in the nuclear field, on 8th of January 1995. My fellowship began on the 1st of February 1995 and it took only several days for me to see the text of the agreement between Russia and Iran. Actually, the text of the agreement was no different than any other bilateral or multilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. But one item which attracted my attention more than others was Iran’s request, which was also approved by the Russian side, to send every year 20-30 graduate, mostly PhD students, to Russian institutions. That actually triggered in my mind that Iran might have other desires than simply generating nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But that was of course an immature thinking at the time.

Many of the things I mentioned in my article are actually quite relevant today because my point was, the technological capabilities and scientific accumulation that Iran would acquire from its cooperation with Russia, would possibly enable Iran, if it decided to do so, to divert from peaceful to military purposes and then Iran might become a nuclear power, of course, with a margin of caution. Because we are talking about states and states always make statements about their future plans, but they never acknowledge or they never make a statement that they are going to build the bomb and they always declare that their engagement in nuclear technology is simply for peaceful purposes. However, we have seen in the past, several examples including France for instance, whose ministers have always made statements that France’s nuclear program had no ambition whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons, but that was before 1960. Therefore, I studied, in this paper, back in 1995, as to whether Iran could become a nuclear power and eventually, especially after 9/11 when Iran felt more threatened, the adverse implications of nuclear technology become more intensified. Everybody knows what happened with the revelation of Iran’s secret Natanz facility, which was a secret for 18 years. While, on the one hand, there is this other question, as to how the Iranians managed to keep it secret, but on the other hand, there is the question of how the world’s most sensitive technologies and all these satellites orbiting around the world, how they have failed to detect this
huge facility in Natanz, which is an enrichment facility which can host up to 55,000 centrifuges, which might be quite sufficient to produce enough highly enriched uranium for one or two bombs per year, if necessary of course.

Ninety plus percent enriched uranium could be produced in the future in case of diversion from peaceful to military purposes. So this is a significant facility. Of course as of today there are only approximately 8,000 centrifuges which have been installed and figures vary from day to day but, on the average, 5,000 of them are used to enrich uranium. Over the last couple of months, as far as I can tell, enrichment has been suspended or slowed down. The United States asked for at least 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium to be taken out the Iran because US had concerns, especially when the amount of low-enriched uranium, which was enriched up to 3.5%, reached 1,500-1,600 kg back in last Autumn, because the US had concerns that if Iran further enriched that amount of low-enriched uranium, possibly in secret facilities, one of which was uncovered in Qom most recently and the IAEA as you know, indicated in its report that it cannot ascertain that there are no other secret nuclear facilities in Iranian territory. So, given this background, the US is concerned that the amount of low-enriched uranium might be sufficient for Iran to further enrich and get enough highly enriched uranium sufficient to produce a Hiroshima-type bomb. Therefore, all these developments have brought to the fore a debate: because, from the rights perspective, every single country which is a member of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, they are committed to remain non-nuclear, except for the nuclear weapon states, in return states are allowed to make cooperative arrangements with other nations to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology and science. This is from a rights perspective. On the other side, states also have obligations and liabilities not only towards the Treaty but also towards the entire international community.

In this respect, Iran’s problem has become even more complex with this request of Iran to acquire enough 20% enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor, which is used mostly for isotope production which is used in the treatment of diseases, such as cancer. This is indeed an inalienable right of Iran to get from the free market or from countries that may provide them, but because of some of the restrictions imposed upon Iran either through the United Nations Security Council resolutions or through the unilateral recommendations of some of the countries in the West, especially with sanctions, the United Nations impose upon Iran and make a condition for Iranians to take certain steps before getting some benefits or before they expect the West to fulfill some of their expectations. So, when this issue was becoming more complex, that was last winter, when Muhammed al Baradei, former Director General of IAEA, has made a proposal that Turkey could play a significant role in the resolution of the conflict in terms of becoming some sort of mediator between the West and Iran, because both sides have trust in the Turkish government. In that proposal, in return for Iran’s fuel to be stored in facilities in Turkey, the West would be ready to provide the fuel. When that issue was first put on the table - and by coincidence the Iranian President Ahmedinejad was in Istanbul to meet with President
Gül under an OIC meeting –no clear cut answer was given to the IAEA or to Muhammed al Baradei’s proposal at the time. And time has passed, but as far as I could follow the Turkish government’s and the Ministry Foreign Affair’s involvement in the project was not exhausted; I mean the Turkish side continued its efforts to find a solution and this has brought us first to the Nuclear Security Summit which was held in Washington, D.C. on 12-13th of April when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had a meeting with US President Obama and as far as I understand, they also had a trilateral meeting with the participation of the Brazilian President Lula Da Silva. As far as I can follow from various sources, the US President expressed his expectations from Turkey and Brazil, who all appeared to make a contribution to the resolution of the conflict in a peaceful manner. Then this has brought us to the May 17th deal, which was accepted as a diplomatic success because Iran had not previously given its signature to any document, powerful or weak, and always dragged its feet. They had intensive negotiations with the Russians during the last summer and autumn; at the last stages the Iranians changed their minds and this made the Russians very angry. Thus, they changed their attitude towards Iran’s position, at least at the rhetorical level. Other countries have made statements threatening Iran to step back.

Finally, Turkey and Brazil have somehow managed to persuade Iran that it would be in its best interest, at least to give half of the amount that they have, I mean 1,200 kg. This was mentioned in President Obama’s letter to Brazil’s President.

This agreement, which I again underline, I find it quite successful and also hopeful. The whole proliferation concerns were respected. Whereas it was not seen the same in the West, especially in United States and more so by Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State. It is difficult to understand why this was not found successful by the US. I cannot paraphrase but I can tell that Clinton said something like this agreement even threatens peace and stability in the region. I am not a diplomat. I am an academic and I have a very simple approach to diplomacy. However, I do not see how this agreement threatens peace and stability in the region. We hear from the Americans, which is also something that I have in mind from time to time: whether Iran wants to gain time for accomplishing certain things that they may not have yet accomplished and therefore this agreement plays a role in their "one step forward two steps backward" type of diplomacy.

Iran has a long history of statehood and a very deep civilization as you all know. But if one just takes a quick look at the agreement, nowhere in the text does someone say something like “Now we just wrapped up everything and we have solved every problem.” The text says especially in Paragraph 4 that it’s a start. Iran has put its signature, which is something she has not done for many years.

Iranians expect the West to treat Iran properly; not only in terms of giving the fuel that they need. But also the statements, they do not want to be blamed for or accused of doing things they claim that they do not do. These are some harsh statements that Iranians do not necessarily like to hear. So, since then, of course, Turkey’s position has become a little difficult. On the one hand, there is this effort which was backed up
by the international community, by media in US and by US President Obama in particular during the meeting of the Nuclear Summit.

There is a clear statement in Obama's letter dated April 20th – I can read the text of the letter - I believe many of you have seen that and you, as diplomats, have a better chance to interpret what is meant in sentences. But, in my view it says, Obama is looking for Iran to make a commitment. What is fundamentally important for the US is that 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium must be taken out of Iran.

What has changed from April 20th to May 17th in 27 days? What can Iran do, in 27 days that would invalidate this swap deal? I was asked questions by the Iranian News Agency as to whether the ball was now in the court of the West. I said no, the ball is on both sides. I said making statements like “Iran will still enrich uranium” would not help.

There is no point in continuing to enrich uranium which would jeopardize the credibility of the agreement, and that would put Turkey in a more difficult position because Turkey has done this for the sake of helping to find a solution. I receive many questions about why Turkey did this. Why did Turkey get involved? Is it because of its Islamic character? No! Turkey does not pursue a religious foreign policy, or religion does not have any impact at least on such things. Brazil's involvement was a good thing. Brazil has nothing to do with Islam or doesn’t even have a Muslim minority. Turkey is a secular state by Constitution as you know very well. Why all these accusations?

There are basically three reasons as to why Turkey got involved in this Iranian nuclear swap agreement:

First and foremost is Turkey's UN Security Council membership. Even if Turkey was in a far-a-way geography like the subcontinent or Latin America, or in the Asia-Pacific region or, in Greenland or wherever, Turkey would have to pay attention to the preservation of peace and stability in this region.

Secondly, for Turkey it is more of a strategic importance. Turkey does not want the US to have the pretext or the justification for anything that would lead to severing the sanctions or maybe a military action, we do not know. Turkey's economy would be negatively affected. So Turkey does not want the US to have this pretext in resolving this issue beyond diplomacy.

Third, Turkey does not want either Iran to enhance its nuclear capabilities even further. Iran said, “alright, you don't give me 20 percent enriched uranium, I have my facilities and I will do the twenty percent enrichment myself.” Next time, Iran might take it a step further, to have an excuse or justification for further technological capabilities, elevating Iran to a more strategically important point. Because of all this, Turkey has continued to find a solution.

We are waiting for this agreement to be given a chance for the resolution of this problem. For this reasons, Turkey says it used its “No” vote at the UN Security
Council, which was expected, or unexpected, depending on which perspective you look at the issue.

Why did Turkey vote “No”? In the Turkish text of the Turkish Permanent Representative’s statement explaining the vote at the UN Security Council - there is no English translation of that but you may have received from your own channels - there he says “It is quite strange that the Vienna Group has made a declaration on the day of voting of the resolution, and that the substance was negative, and this had an impact on our decision”.

In the following paragraphs Turkey also says “I don’t ignore Iran’s nuclear capabilities”. Turkey does not want to be concerned about Iran’s nuclear weapons.

I know that the Turkish Foreign Minister was in touch with his American counterpart, so was the Prime Minister who was in touch with President Obama, and at lower levels, as you do this all the time, as diplomats and people in the diplomatic missions, and delegations are in touch with their counterparts. I do not think the US was totally unaware of what was going on about the deal between Turkey, Brazil, and Iran. I would not believe that United States was caught by surprise. No, that was not the situation. If they had some misgivings about the deal they would have let the Turkish diplomats or the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister know that these things even if signed, they would not be welcomed by US. Sincerely, alliance relationship would require this. I mean they must have done this before. So I don’t think the Turkish side is the one which should be blamed.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey will be the country which will be most negatively affected. It’s not a matter of belief, we aren’t talking about two individuals whom you can believe, whom you can trust his or her personality. We are talking about states here and that’s why there are some treaties; binding some countries, giving them some rights and also expecting some steps to be taken in return for entertaining these rights. Ertuğrul Apakan, Turkey’s Permanent Representative to the UN, says “We keep persuading our Iranian colleagues to be more transparent and to get in relation with the IAEA and the international community. In the next paragraph; Turkey also expects Iran to do certain other things. I was invited by couple of TV channels and one was quite early in the morning and only half an hour before I had the text of the draft resolution. I went through it quickly of course it’s not something that you can’t easily read but since I follow from the beginning and also read previous sanctions etc. I said after having skimmed through the text, I can tell that with some margin of caution that this text isn’t putting more sanctions on Iran with couple of exceptions, I mean interdiction on high seas and maybe even seizing some material but provided that there is strong evidence that can be substantiated. Beyond that I said there is no big difference between the previous sanctions to which Turkey possibly did say yes. I wouldn’t be surprised if Turkey said yes to this one too but here in the text as Apakan explains:’We are really concerned about why this letter of the Vienna Group came on the day of resolution with a negative content and this has had an impact on our decision” meaning that “we have changed our decision from, maybe abstain, to no.”. Therefore Vienna Group’s statement which came on the day of
resolution is something that you guys have to say something. I mean why did Vienna Group declare its statement on the day of resolution morning maybe you could explain it to me and to other people in Turkey because we don’t understand it. Is this something that would help diplomatic initiatives? I don’t think so. So if everybody wants a peaceful resolution, we all know that Iran is a powerful country, it’s not a country which can be manipulated or treated easily. You have to be careful. Turkey doesn’t want Iran to exploit this situation for further advancing its nuclear capabilities because we don’t want Iran to have nuclear weapons, nobody in Turkey wants Iran to have nuclear weapons. And Erdoğan said ‘Ahmedinejad told me that they don’t have such intentions and I believe him’. Well he is a statesman, he has to say that. He can’t say ‘well Ahmedinejad told me that but I don’t believe him’. How can he make such a public statement? Turkey is concerned about what kind of intentions they may have. So it’s not a matter of belief, it’s a matter of making it transparent and that’s why Turkey itself signed the Additional Protocol and ratified it a decade ago. That’s why Turkey tries to persuade Iranian side to do the same or that’s why there is a series of diplomatic initiatives to find a diplomatic solution. We all have seen what happened back in 2003 in Iraq. We don’t expect same type of confrontation. So why Turkey does not want the US to exploit the situation for its own policies, or Iran to exploit the situation for its purposes. So Turkey wants to keep the tension at this level and even to lower it down, may be to find a solution.

Will Turkey abide by the Security Council’s resolution? Turkey always abides by the UN Security Council’s Resolutions. There is no question about that. I just follow from outside and I think Turkish side quite powerfully persuaded Iranian side not to back down and if they backed down, they would not only lose Turkey but also things would get really worse. Because Turkey has put its reputation, prestige on the line by having involved already. So therefore I think this deal is still valid and Turkey still keeps Iran on the table and I don’t think Iran has another chance. If they just walked away, Turkey wouldn’t be there anymore, I don’t think they can take this risk. I think Iran will not like to lose Turkey which is now for the time being only country that can be of any good for Iran with its relations with the West. They will like to keep this channel open. So I think this file is not dead, Turkey will push Iran to act as if there was no such voting or new sanctions.
Options of Solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Dr. Ercan Özer

Palestine is a sui generis case. As far as political solutions are concerned, "one size fits all" does not always apply in sui generis cases. The use of analogy in politics is not always conclusive if not perilous. There are no magic formulae or "master key" solutions to complex phenomena of intractable and prolonged conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli one. Yet there may be lessons to be drawn from each example to determine the unique requirements of the case in question. For different solutions dictate corresponding strategies and tactics.

The failure of the Oslo process of the 1990s was followed by the second intifada, the building of the "security barrier" in the West Bank, the disengagement from Gaza, HAMAS's victory in the 2006 elections leading to the internal split with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with no signs of national reconciliation as yet, the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by a Palestinian militant group and the entailing events leading to a war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, evanescence of a flicker of hope that was pinned on the Annapolis international conference/meeting organized by George W. Bush administration in 2007-2008, continuation of salvo of Qassam rockets from Gaza to Israel inducing Israeli counterattacks leading to Operation Cast Lead of 2009 albeit a disproportional response, HAMAS's takeover of Gaza Strip in June 2007 usurping executive power therein and throwing the future of a viable Palestinian state in doubt thereby and the two-state solution into jeopardy thereof.

Invariably, the deteriorating regional outlook is not promising for peace and stability. The United States has warned Syria that transferring ballistic missiles to Lebanon's Hezbollah militia could lead to war in the region followed by the admonition of the Israeli officials of the grave consequences of Scud transfers to Hezbollah threatening to "return Syria back to the Stone Age" while speculations are afloat about contemplated US sanctions and Israeli military actions against Iran which has been accused to proceed with its nuclear program despite the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil to enrich certain portion of Iranian uranium in Turkey. Israel claims that it will not allow Iran to acquire the bomb yet it is not clear whether Israel can afford to pay the consequential price of a military attack with or without consulting the United States. Nonetheless the threat of war exists.

The Middle East faces an uncertain destiny that needs an extraordinary fortune teller of Turkish coffee cup to read the “road map of the future”. In light of the foregoing and the new tryout of the indirect “proximity talks” mediated by the US Middle East envoy George Mitchell as well as the exigencies of the situation, it has become timely and important to analyze the possible options of solutions to surmise the best possible choice for cutting the "Gordian Knot" of the Palestinian-Israeli puzzle.
1. ONE STATE SOLUTION

This default option is based on the following arguments that the other options are neither realistic nor sustainable.

The conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis has been waged between two antithetical and belligerent options, with an Israeli occupation regime on one side, and an independent Palestinian state on the other. The option of Israeli control over Palestinian territories already exists on the ground, but how long would it endure. The Palestinians are resisting Israeli occupation and are willing to pay a high price for their independence. Therefore, an apartheid like regime will not be stable and will endanger the future of Israelis as much as the Palestinians.

Separation is not relevant, because Israel is not actually willing to withdraw to the 1967 borders and implement United Nations Resolution 242. Even if the Israeli “left” were to return to power in the foreseeable future, it would be unwilling to risk a “civil war”.

Some argue that the Israeli government is working towards a total victory in the conflict-ridden land and unilateral domination of the entire country, perhaps tempered by a willingness to permit the Palestinians to live with some sort of autonomy (quasi-state) under overall Israeli supervision and control.

The radical Islamic movements like HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad are pushing for the establishment of an Islamic state. An Islamic state has no prospects, either due to the current balance of power in the country, or to its sure rejection by the Jews and a large segment of the secular Palestinian population.

As Palestinian support for a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel is declining, another option is put on the table: A bi-national state or one state solution.

The arrangement would be predicated on five main elements of consolidation:

- A broad coalition between the Jewish and Palestinian political representatives;
- Mutual veto rights to the representatives of the two groups on questions vital to them;
- Proportional distribution of power in political and public institutions, and of resources for social good;
- A high level of autonomy for each group in the management of its internal affairs and collective rights to each group; and
- Mutual agreement on matters of immigration and repatriation of both Palestinian refugees and Jewish immigrants.

The idea could be implemented through various configurations like the following with varying levels of cooperation and autonomy.
- Shared rule/self-rule arrangements through the establishment of joint institutions such as a parliament, a government, security services and a judicial system, with equal representation for the two groups;

- A single, decentralized administrative entity; or

- Control of the territory could be divided into federal units, managing their internal affairs autonomously;

- Central government, whose seat would be in Jerusalem, could have different designs and relevancies, while every national group would be recognized as autonomous in dealing with its specific concerns.

- The implementation of this solution calls for a fundamental change in the relationship between the two nations and in their relationship with their diaspora.

- The Jewish side should give up its dominant position and the resources would be re-divided in a proportional and equitable way. While the Palestinians should internalize their distance from the Arab world and develop unique elements as part of their nationalism that meet the need to live in a bi-national state, rather than an Arab one.

- To reach these goals, both communities would need to undergo fundamental changes in their educational, social and political aims.

PROS

For the pros of one state solution, the idea of separation between Israel and Palestine and the partition of the country into two independent states is not feasible. Such an option is unlikely to lead to a just and comprehensive end to the century-old conflict for the following reasons:

- Any line drawn to divide the country would be artificial and would leave militant elements on both sides dissatisfied and willing to continue the struggle. Such an outcome may jeopardize signed agreements.

- Partition would also leave over a million Palestinians under Israeli sovereignty and citizenship, correspondingly hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens in Palestinian territories.

- Security requirements and restrictions, Israeli settlements and widespread opposition from both sides would prevent the creation of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity. The result would be a non-viable state divided into "cantons" with no geographical link between them.

- Dealing with the essential issues such as water, ecology, environment, economy, transportation, communication and many others in an efficient and effective way requires centralization and coordination.
The majority of both peoples regard the whole country as their sole respective homeland. Both believe in their natural right to rule over the entire territory be it Eretz Israel or Filastin.

Is it good for the Palestinians? Yes

The first benefit the Palestinians will enjoy out of one state solution is that they will no longer be under military rule. The moment the Israeli government grants them full Israeli citizenship, the state of military occupation effectively ends. The entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea will be one geographical, political entity without need for internal security fences or borders of any type: One state of two peoples.

Is it good for Israel? Yes

The typical assumption of "demographic threat" is simplistic. Israel is a secular and democratic state with an overwhelming Jewish population. As Israeli Arabs have enjoyed the benefits of Israeli citizenship so too can the West Bank Arabs and express their political will via a local, West Bank parliamentary legislature with elected representatives responsible for various aspects of West Bank society. Eventually, after consecutive years of political stability and economic prosperity institutions of political autonomy could evolve. Once the military rule is over, Israel could no longer be criticized for depriving the Palestinians of their rights. If these new Israeli citizens do engage in anti-Israel activities they will be charged with treason and tried by Israel's civilian judicial system just like any Israeli citizen who engages in actions harmful against the state.

There would be no reason to dismantle Jewish settlements at an estimated high cost in one political entity. Before the law, the Palestinians would enjoy the same rights as the Jewish residents of the West Bank. No longer would the Arabs who live near the settlements view them as their enemy but as their neighbors and fellow citizens.

The West Bankers are more valuable to Israel's long term interest as productive workers and active consumers in the national economy rather than remaining poor under Israeli military occupation. Israel's national economy would grow by more than 2 million consumers and workers in addition to the future economic growth that would come from the new wealth and higher living standards that the West Bankers will experience. The West Bank economy would be integrated into the Israeli economy providing huge economic gains as for both Jews and Palestinians.

Is it win-win option for both sides? Yes

As things stand today, an "independent Palestinian state" is unlikely. Even if it would be likely, it would be unstable, poor and dependent. The options before the Palestinians are higher living standards and regional stability with a confederation with Israel and the right to rule over their own affairs. The choice for the Palestinians is between military occupation, political instability and economic stagnation or a
future of double digit growth rates. Therefore, the bi-national state/one state solution will create a common political setup and economy for both peoples.

There are Palestinians who believe that the possibility of one state, as a tactic, will compel the Israelis into agreeing to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

CONS

Cons of this option argue that one-state solution is a fruit of desperation and one should not turn despair into a strategy. They give the following answers to the corresponding questions.

Is a one-state solution possible? No

One state option from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, bi-national or non-national, in practice means the dismantling of the State of Israel, its historical narrative and its definition as a "Jewish" state. A non-national strategy will not work because it is impossible to ignore the basic ethos of the overwhelming majority of the citizens. A state with a Jewish majority where the Jews are masters of their own fate, trumps all other aims.

Will outside pressure compel the Jewish public to give up their state? No

Jewish people would not give up their state through external pressure.

The majority of the Palestinian people too want their own state. The Palestinians will not give up their struggle for liberation and their aspiration for their own state, and choose to live in a joint set-up with the Israelis.

Will such a state function in practice? No

It would not be realistic for the inhabitants of an Israeli district to pay the same taxes as those of Palestine. It would be misleading to assume that the Palestinians of Hebron and the Jewish settlers will serve in the same army and police force. It may be argued that this situation already exists as Israel already governs the land from the sea to the river as an occupying state. However, it is easier to dismantle settlements than to compel 5.5 million Jewish Israelis to dismantle the existing state.

Would a one-state solution bring a just peace? No

One state solution could be a battlefield, as each side would try to take over as much land as possible and bring in as many people as possible. The Jews could fight with every means to prevent the Arabs from becoming the majority and rising to power. If the Arabs were to attain majority and try to assume power, it could lead to a civil war.

Even if it is possible, is it feasible? No
In such a state, the Israelis will be dominant as they currently enjoy superiority in practically all spheres of life. So it will be an occupation by other means. It will not end the conflict, but open another phase.

2. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFEDERATION

One other possible solution is the Israeli-Palestinian Confederation: An elected confederation government comprised of Israelis (both Jewish and Arab) and Palestinians.

The confederation is not a one-state solution. The Israeli and Palestinian governments would remain sovereign and independent of each other. The division of land between the Israeli and Palestinian states would be subject to negotiations between the two governments.

An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation would pass legislation on many issues that are unlikely to be enacted by each government independently. A common legislation could enhance the area’s natural resources, tourism and security. A confederation government would act as a mediator between the Palestinian and Israeli governments. According to the distribution of population of Palestinians and Israelis in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, the entire region would be divided into a number of districts apportioned by population divided between Israelis and Palestinians by a ratio of approximately 60/40. The 300 representatives would only be able to pass legislation that is acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. In order to pass any legislation, the following requirements must be met: To encourage consensus and to prevent the majority from riding roughshod over the minority, any confederation legislation would require the approval of 55% of the Palestinian representatives; and 55% of the Israeli representatives. Both governments would have veto power each.

PROS

The confederation would not be tied to the ultimate outcome of bilateral negotiations. Such an arrangement would be necessary whether the Israelis and Palestinians agree on the division of land or not. A confederation would be a third government designed to enhance the lives of the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis has been viewed mainly in terms of land. All peace negotiations so far have focused primarily on the division of land between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Whereas a confederation government approach would utilize a second dimension of the conflict and would approach the issues on the basis of people, not strictly on the division of land. It would manage the daily and economic lives of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and would create a mechanism to deal with each other's lives. Each representative to the confederation
would focus primarily on benefiting his constituents from his own district and not the national aspirations of his country.

The requirement for a majority vote in each group, coupled with veto power for both governments, should ensure that only legislation that is reasonable to both sides could pass. This system would foster cooperation, since any legislation promoting that is the national aspirations of one side at the expense of the other would easily be blocked. As a consequence, the representatives would concentrate instead on initiatives that improve their constituents' lives. Such a confederation legislation reached by consensus would discourage both governments from exercising their veto powers. If a legislation has wide popular support among the two peoples, it may be untenable for one government to veto the legislation without undermining its own legitimacy. In this sense, a confederation would serve as a bridge between the Palestinian and Israeli governments.

If the relative birth rate of Palestinians to that of Israelis would maintain its current trend, Palestinians will outnumber Israelis in the not-too-distant future. Would a confederation pose a threat to the existence of the future Jewish state if the Palestinian population were to gain the majority? If in the future the Israelis were to become a minority, they would be protected under the confederation. Confederation legislation would require 55% of both the Israeli and the Palestinian representatives to vote in favor of the legislation, and the Israeli government would maintain its veto power. At the same time, as long as the Israelis retain the majority, they must give the same veto power to the Palestinians. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the Palestinians would reciprocate with the same recognition of veto power when the Israelis become the minority.

This new mechanism of passing legislation is likely to encourage cooperation between representatives based on the interest of their constituents. Israeli and Palestinian representatives would find themselves on the same side of an issue. The Palestinian and Israeli governments, which would possess veto power, would watch over the national interests of their people. They would be justified in exercising their veto power if significant national interests were threatened, whereas they would face national and international pressure if they attempted to veto reasonable legislation. Once the process begins, more areas of common interest will be discovered, and the benefits to both sides will be obvious.

The legislature would tackle issues that the Israeli and Palestinian governments for internal political reasons find difficult to address. It would also deal with the day-to-day quality-of-life issues where cooperation is required, including, but not limited to, establishing public facilities such as water lines, highways, schools and hospitals.

A confederation could provide considerable advantages to the region in two major categories: The reduction of tension and violence; and the cultivation of economic prosperity for the future.

The confederation could create a joint emergency task force to establish emergency procedures in the event of natural disasters.
It could create joint economic zones on the borders between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza (half in Israel and half in Palestine). The zones would be controlled by joint police force and would allow easy access to Palestinians and Israelis, as well as other citizens.

The representatives would not be targeted for attacks by extreme groups, because members of such groups are motivated by antagonism against their own or the other government. These elements believe that they can derail the peace process by forcing their respective governments to act aggressively toward the other. A confederation legislature would not be considered a threat.

Whereas there is currently no mechanism for the Palestinians and Israelis to solve day-to-day and long-term issues for the benefits of both sides, and there are no rules to resolve conflicts when they erupt, the confederation, once effective in become the demonstrating that Israelis and Palestinians can govern together, would become the de facto authority to establish rules to settle issues, solve problems and enhance working and living relations.

A "loose confederation", based on the kind that now exists in parts of Europe is worthy of consideration, as long as it does not mean a one-state solution. The idea of a confederation is widely accepted around the world. It is designed to achieve a mechanism of cooperation while preserving the identity and special needs of its states.

**CONS**

The counter arguments raised for one state option is relevant in general for the Israeli-Palestinian Confederation. Moreover, neither the Israeli governments nor the Palestinian National Authority is likely to relinquish its monopoly on governance willingly.

**3. SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL**

The example of South Africa is also on the agenda as an option. It is fashionable in South Africa to offer their case as a model for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

**PROS**

This option is based on the argument that blacks were oppressed under apartheid regime in South Africa and Palestinians are oppressed by Israel, so the same solution applies to both situations.

**CONS**

The cons of this option claim that there is hardly any similarity between the two situations. In South Africa, neither the whites nor the blacks wanted a separate state of their own, nor did they ever live in two separate entities. The one state had already long existed, and the struggle was over power in this one state. Moreover the
differences outweigh the similarities. A more informed and informative look at the issue conclude that the South Africa = Israel and Palestine assertion does not offer a realistic way forward.

- Blacks and whites in South Africa were economically interdependent. The growth of politicized trade unions enabled the blacks to counter the white rule through industrial action such as strikes and consumer boycotts. In contrast, Palestinians do not have this power because Israel benefits from but is not necessarily dependent on Palestinian labor. Israel uses closure as a collective punitive measure, whereas South Africa's whites were too dependent on black labor to be able to do the same.

- Christianity in South Africa was a "common bond to assail and de-legitimize" apartheid. In contrast, the divide between Judaism and Islam has grown sharper and wider through the rise of HAMAS and its Islamist policies. On the Jewish side, religiously motivated settlers and ultra-Orthodox believers cannot be as easily marginalized as were extremists among white Afrikaners.

- Both the main players in South Africa, the ANC and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, avoided third-party intervention in their negotiations. In contrast, an Israeli-Palestinian agreement "depends heavily" on U.S. policy that strongly supports Israel. Actions against Israel by the West is implausible at present. Israelis also have the benefit of a supportive diaspora, whereas Afrikaners faced a hostile world.

- Much more personal interaction in a vertical-status hierarchy shaped South African race relations, compared with the more horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians. Moral erosion of the apartheid stance among the ruling elite in South Africa contrasts with moral myopia in Israel.

- Suicide was never used as a weapon, and martyrdom was never celebrated during the South African anti-apartheid struggle. In contrast, the second intifada have been "counter-productive". The attacks on civilians also unified Israeli public opinion on security.

- Negotiations in South Africa were facilitated by the existence of cohesive and credible leaders. They could obtain popular mandates and sell a controversial compromise to their peoples. In contrast, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are fragmented.

This analysis concludes that on most counts, the differences between apartheid South Africa and Israel outweigh the similarities that could facilitate transferable conditions for a negotiated compromise. Such a different trajectory suggests itself because South Africa, arguably, constitutes merely a multiethnic society with many cross-cutting bonds between the legislated artificial racial groups. In Israel/Palestine, on the other hand, a truly divided society exists. They are divided by religion, language, and above all, by history and the mythologies that the "burden of history" imprints on the self-concept and collective identity of the two groups. Jews and Palestinians constitute groups competing for meaning, security, and scarce resources in a limited space.
It is tempting to go along with the option of a single state on a South African model. However, it did not work in India-Pakistan, Bangladesh-Pakistan, Soviet Union after the collapse of communism, former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Ethiopia, or other places with variable levels of discontent, division, strife and suffering among people who wanted to be apart from one another. Despite the differences, South Africa does offer valuable lessons in the efforts to resolve the Israel and Palestine conflict.

Given the history of the Middle East, a single Jewish/Arab state of South African style does not seem plausible. The mistrust and rejection which separate Palestinians and Israelis notwithstanding, at the root of it all, Israelis will not forgo their Jewish state and submerge themselves in a single state in which demography will lose them their majority and control. To most of them it would be national suicide. Consequently, Israel and Palestine will not go along the South African road.

4. NORTHERN IRELAND SOLUTION

The appointment of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the official Middle East envoy of the Quartet signaled a change in the substance of the Quartet’s approach introducing a “Northern Ireland solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an option.

A key factor in sustaining faith in diplomacy and discouraging a return to violence in Northern Ireland was the creation of public, multi-party, representative negotiating institutions that excluded violent groups. In March 2007, the leaders of Northern Ireland’s largest Catholic and Protestant parties reached an agreement on power-sharing that went into effect in May. Under the laws of Britain’s Home Rule system, which provides for the devolution of power to “nations” within the United Kingdom, the two historic adversaries were to be jointly responsible for the welfare of the divided province’s 1.7 million residents. The power-sharing arrangement effectively ended a conflict that had claimed well over 3,000 lives since the late 1960s. It also established Blair’s political legacy as a peacemaker, despite the criticisms emanating from his association with the Iraq war.

By contrast, the Northern Ireland peace process took place against the backdrop of ongoing European integration and joint Anglo-Irish efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the “troubles.” The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S., which heralded a new era of conflict in the Middle East, may have indirectly prompted republican forces in Northern Ireland to suspend their armed struggle. The different geopolitical contexts surrounding each conflict must therefore warn against facile comparisons. It is equally important, however, not to overlook signs of progress in the Middle East, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers full normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for a return to the 1967 status quo ante.

A "Northern Ireland solution" would establish a representative institution for part or all of the West Bank, elected on a constituency basis and including representatives from Israeli settlements as well as Palestinian towns and districts.
Now that the Quartet's Middle East Road Map is on hold and two-state paradigm is on suspension for the foreseeable future while a single-state solution is a "non-starter" and renewed speculations about "Jordanian option" has been dismissed by the Hashemite monarchy, alternative models may, therefore, be relevant. Northern Ireland alternative could be one of them for analysis.

**PROS**

The proposed "West Bank Forum" could provide the structure of a new and reconstituted Palestinian Legislative Council. Alternatively, it could adopt a "weak" form and simply be a consultative body to the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Either way, the Forum would surpass earlier "autonomy" proposals by explicitly including Jewish settlers as participants just as Arab citizens of Israel are included in the Knesset.

An objection to this idea might be that settlers, unlike Arab Israelis, arrived in the Palestinian territories under the banner of foreign military occupation. The legitimacy of a future Palestinian state would partly depend on its treatment of minorities, including Jews. Reciprocal respect for minority rights would also promote the stability of an eventual two-state solution.

Palestinian recognition of minority rights would direct more serious attention to the legal and political substance of the nascent independent Palestinian state, particularly regarding human rights. Such recognition would also bring forth possibilities like Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank by offering settlers a choice, return to Israel proper, or become citizens of a Palestinian state.

So long as outstanding Palestinian land claims against Israel can be addressed, Jewish settlers could stay where they are. Israeli settlements represent a significant source of investment and a potential tax base that a future Palestinian state could benefit from retaining.

The Northern Ireland option would also bring Jews and Arabs in the territory together for the first time to address issues of common interest. It might facilitate broader peace negotiations, or serve as a catalyst for Palestinian institution-building. It could encourage the substitution of civilian for military law as the governing legal apparatus of the West Bank.

The "Northern Ireland model" has parallels in earlier federal models proposed by Zionist leaders. It also reiterates the fond hopes of Theodore Herzl, among other early Zionist leaders, that Jewish settlements would prove an economic boon for the region's Arab population. These ideas were spurned; however, the Arab Peace Initiative suggests Israel's neighbors might be more receptive now. Following are the reasons that a West Bank Forum could succeed:

- A "Northern Ireland solution" in the West Bank would go beyond its namesake in explicitly envisioning a Palestinian state as the outcome of the process. Whether forming the basis of a new Palestinian legislature, or simply providing support for
ongoing negotiations and institutions, the West Bank Forum would be an important intermediate step, a bridge from the present impasse to the future resolution.

- West Bank Forum, by placing the Israeli settlements within a new institutional framework, might effectively set limits to Israeli sovereignty at or near the 1967 border, while protecting the interests of Israel and Israeli citizens. That, in turn, would signal the viability of the Arab Peace Initiative, and might awaken regional support for normalized relations with Israel.

- While Israeli settlers would be reluctant to participate in Palestinian institutions, they might do so if it meant that their presence in the West Bank would be recognized and protected. Likewise, Palestinians might accept the presence of Israeli settlements more readily if they were no longer seen as a threat to sovereignty and nation-building but a potential building block of government and development.

- Even if the West Bank Forum were to be nothing more than a debating chamber, it would encourage the kind of mutual contact between those whose absence has frustrated past negotiations and prolonged the conflict. The very idea that the protection of national minorities is as much a responsibility of Palestine as of Israel would calm existential fears on both sides and encourage true mutual recognition.

- By dispensing with the implicit notion that a future Palestinian state must be emptied of Jews, Palestinians might mount a more successful bid for territorial integrity, and might also free Israel from anxiety about the so-called "demographic threat." Israel and Palestine need not be mirror images of social democracy, but they can uphold their unique political visions while sharing respect for minority rights.

- As in Northern Ireland, the creation of a public assembly of representatives from all groups that agreed to suspend violence, even though that assembly failed several times and was suspended for years, created legitimacy for negotiation and removed legitimacy from violence. In the West Bank, a similar forum might encourage public support for new talks and cooperation, despite the obstacles to reconciliation.

**CONS**

In case of armed conflict between Israel and Syria or Israel and Iran, the political will to participate in joint representative institutions is doubtful on both sides.

Israel feels little urgent need to adopt new proposals. The so-called "demographic threat" to Israel has been forestalled by the exclusion of Gaza, and the "security barrier" provides Israel with an alternative to negotiation, however unattractive to both sides.

The legal and constitutional framework that would make possible a version of the West Bank Forum does not yet exist within Israel, much less in the PNA. Creating a new representative institution for the area might require the approval of majorities on both sides which, in turn, presumes a degree of commitment to negotiation and
reform that may not yet exist. Moreover, it would remain necessary for Israel to continue to handle security in the West Bank.

All of the pro and con arguments are merely conjectural. The immediate challenge facing the Quartet is to ensure that the PNA retains its institutional coherence. For Palestinians, the immediate goal is everyday survival, with the hope that hardships such as checkpoints, closures and curfews can be progressively removed and access to work opportunities and public services speedily restored.

A "Northern Ireland solution" may be too far a departure from past plans, and too radical an idea in itself, to have much chance of being implemented by the two sides. Nevertheless, the idea could encourage creative thinking about the future shape of Palestinian institutions and the institutionalization of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

5. FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN

Moving with the "Jordan is Palestine" slogan, right-wing Israeli voices called for another option of "Jordanian solution": A federation or a confederation with Jordan. The "Jordanian solution" has seemed strangely attractive to some. In large part, this is due to the internal Palestinian situation. The occupation has encouraged Palestinian infighting, which has devaluated the Palestinian cause among Arab countries as well as in the West, in addition to creating an ever-growing gap between HAMAS and FATAH.

PROS

The Palestinians, especially in the West Bank, long for the "good old days " when they enjoyed normalcy, stability and security during the era of union with Jordan.

Many middle-class Palestinians would restore legal and political relations, especially when status quo ante is viewed as much more promising for their future and progress than continuing to experience the hardship and chaos that started ever since their quest for statehood and liberation commenced.

What makes the idea of federation or confederation all the more appealing and tenable is the legal proposition that the severance of legal and administrative relations between the two sides in 1988 was most likely unconstitutional.

As the Constitution forbids any secession of any part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and as the West Bank was part and parcel of the country, it stands to reason that the separation of the two banks was legally flawed albeit politically necessary.

All these factors would make the restoration of the unity between the two Banks of Jordan River all the more acceptable and must not be disregarded altogether.
CONS

Any form of unity between Jordan and the projected Palestinian state is premature; it remains an abstract idea as long as the creation of a Palestinian state is uncertain. A federation/confederation between Jordan and a future Palestinian state can only have legal or political standing when a Palestinian state exists as an accord between two independent countries. This is not the case until now. The King of Jordan has described any talk about federation or confederation as some sort of a conspiracy against the two sides.

Jordanian officials have voiced their concern regarding the rise to power of Palestinian Islamists and their growing connections in Amman. The Jordanians are also unhappy with the vacuum of law and order in occupied Palestinian areas. However, they also reaffirm having no interest in future re-involvement in Palestine. Jordan has enough problems with the refugees from Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine as well its cool relations with Syria.

The question of Jerusalem and the holy places - a major component of Jordanian-Palestinian concern, especially in light of the "Israelization" policies and practices of recent years in the city - has been a target of Islamist criticism. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994 emphasized that Jordan is to enjoy custodianship over the holy sites in occupied East Jerusalem. This legal responsibility for Jordan is to be respected by Israel and for the time being shared with the Palestinians. In other words, there is a confused relationship over the issue between the occupier, Israel, the indigenous Palestinians, and the "guardians," the Jordanians.

UN Security Resolution 242 called for the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank in favour of Jordan and not to any other side. The Rabat Arab summit decision to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people laid the groundwork for Jordan’s decision to sever legal and administrative relations with the West Bank, in political deference to the will of the Arab and Palestinian peoples and to the realities on the ground.

To put this issue in proper constitutional perspective, Jordan’s 1988 decision to sever legal and administrative relations with the West Bank cannot be construed as “separation” between the two territories or West Bank secession from Jordan as the Article 1 of its Constitution outlaws territorial secession of any part of the Kingdom.

In reference to the argument that the West Bank was part and parcel of Jordan, the Jordanian Parliament, composed of elected deputies and appointed senators from both banks, decided on April 24, 1950, to forge unity between the two territories. The unity between the two sides was based on the exercise of the right to self-determination of the two peoples and on the geographic and historical realities that unite the peoples of the two territories. The unity that was struck then did not jeopardise or compromise the Palestinians’ rights in Palestine or any final settlement of the Palestinian question. Despite the fact that only a handful of countries
recognised the unity between the two banks, it is not relevant as far as constitutional law in Jordan is concerned.

The legal status of any territorial unification is not contingent on the recognition of foreign countries, even though a wider recognition of any such unity would give it wider credence by the international community. What is more relevant is whether the legal and political steps undertaken by the peoples of the east and west banks were constitutional and lawful.

The legal and constitutional facts uniting the two banks were overtaken by political events of disputable import from a constitutional perspective. For nearly two decades, the PLO tried in vain to negotiate a peace deal with Israel with a view to end the occupation of the West Bank and establish an independent Palestinian state.

The timing, the content and the consequences of the Jordanian option need to be analyzed. There are four major aspects of Jordanian-Palestinian relations that will continue to govern each side's positions, interests and needs depending on the vision, mission and power of their respective leaderships.

- Geographically, Jordan and Palestine lie at the heart of the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East and they share each other's longest borders.
- In spite of having developed their distinct national and domestic identities, both Palestinians and Jordanians are deeply rooted in the Arab house.
- The Zionist movement challenged both entities, wanting Palestine as an exclusively Jewish homeland and Jordanian territory to be used either to assimilate the Palestinian people or to "Palestinize" Jordan.
- The Palestinian and Jordanian relationship went through rough and tumultuous stages. The open wounds will not easily heal.

The opponents of a Jordan scenario are concerned that the Jordanian role will be used by the Israelis as a solution to their Palestinian demographic predicament rather than as a means to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They also wonder about the fate of the Gaza Strip and whether Jordan would also end up having to resolve the problems of many more Palestinian refugees. Consequently, any talk now about a federation or confederation between the two banks of the River Jordan is not only premature but also unnecessary. The Jordan-is-Palestine idea is not only historically wrong, legally superficial and geographically ignorant but also politically obdurate.

6. KOSOVO OPTION

Following the declaration of Independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008, the Secretary General of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Committee, and a member of the negotiating team, Yasser Abed Rabbo called for unilateral declaration of independence for Palestinian statehood asserting that if the situation does not progress toward putting an end to the construction in the settlements and toward a serious and continuous negotiations, the Palestinians must undertake steps.
similar to that in Kosovo and unilaterally declare independence. PNA President Mahmoud Abbas quickly dismissed this call stating that the Palestinians are committed to reaching a negotiated peace agreement.

This was not the first time the issue of unilateral independence has been broached. The Palestinians declared independence in 1988, but the international community was divided in recognizing the declaration done in exile without a territory under Palestinian control.

Should the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza follow the example of Kosovo and unilaterally declare their independence as an option?

**PROS**

- Muslims of Kosovo constitute an absolute majority of the population and the same is true for the Palestinians.

- The American and EU impatience to recognize the independence of Kosovo is in contrast with their enduring patience when it comes to ending the 40-year-long belligerent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

- It should serve as a wake up call to induce the Israelis to be more cooperative. Palestinian leaders can make clear that if the world fails to recognize and support their state, they will dissolve the PNA and seek a one-state solution in all of historic Palestine.

- With the failure of "Annapolis process", the Kosovo precedent offers the PNA leadership, an option to reaffirm the legal existence (albeit under continuing belligerent occupation) of the State of Palestine, explicitly in the entire % 22 of Mandatory Palestine which was not conquered and occupied by the State of Israel until 1967, and to call on all those countries which did not extend diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine in 1988, and particularly the US and the EU states, to do so now.

**CONS**

- The unilateral declaration would be purely symbolic and consequence of it would be the end of the "two-state" solution.

- Currently, the United States stands for the continuation of Palestinian-Israeli talks for a two state solution. Under different circumstances, the Palestinians could take up the Kosovo example, declare unilateral independence and asked to be backed by other Arab and Muslim states and international organizations.

- For any kind of Palestinian independence declaration to be recognized and effective, it must still be directly negotiated on an unequal bilateral basis between the occupying power and the occupied people. Therefore, unilateral declarations will not be relevant practically unless recognized by the occupying power
- Palestinians need genuine independence, not declarations. They are not living in Kosovo, but under Israeli occupation.

- Israeli officials rejected out of hand any idea of a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians.

**FAYYAD PLAN**

Furthering the Kosovo option, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad came out with a plan to build the Palestinian national institutions on a robust economic base and to declare the State of Palestine by the end of 2011, reminiscent of the classic Zionist strategy under David Ben-Gurion. In Zionist parlance, this was called “creating facts on the ground”. This plan rests on the argument that the Palestinians’ only chance to achieve their national goals is by non-violent means and in close cooperation with the US.

Fayyad’s plan is based on the assumption that the US will recognize the Palestinian state and impose on Israel the well-known peace terms: Two states, return to the 1967 borders with small and agreed-upon land swaps, East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, evacuation of all settlements which are not included in the land swap, the return of a symbolic number of refugees to Israeli territory and the settlement of the others in Palestine and elsewhere.

It sounds like a sensible option, but it raises many questions.

Can the Palestinians really rely on the US to play their part?

**PROS**

President Obama so far had given the impression that he is serious in finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He made it clear that this is not a side-show, but a strategy based on a sober assessment of American national interests, supported by the military leadership.

The main question is whether the US will recognize the Palestinian state on the day of its foundation, and whether the UN Security Council will follow suit. If Fayyad’s hope comes true and the US recognizes the State of Palestine, the Israeli government will have no choice but to sign a peace agreement.

**CONS**

Fayyad’s plan is based on the hope that Barack Obama, with the help of General David Petraeus, will win the struggle between the two most powerful lobbies in Washington: The military lobby and the pro-Israel lobby or the White House versus the Congress. It’s a reasonable assumption, but a risky one with a lot of “if”s.

If the pro-Israel lobby wins against the statesmen and the generals, if some world crisis diverts the attention of the White House into another direction, or if Fayyad fails, every Palestinian will draw the self-evident conclusion that there is no chance...
whatever for a peaceful solution. A bloody intifada will follow supplanted by far more radical forces.

The Palestinian National Council already declared an independent Palestinian state in 1988. Dozens of countries recognized this state, and the PLO representatives there enjoy the official status of ambassadors. In the final analysis, did it improve the situation of the Palestinians? No.

**EU PLAN**

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and his Spanish counterpart Miguel Moratinos came up with an initiative by which EU would recognize a Palestinian State in 18 months whether a permanent settlement is reached or not.

Sweden during its EU presidency has put together a draft document calling for the division of Jerusalem between Israel and a future Palestinian state implying that the EU would recognize a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood.

Israel has warned that undertakings as such would undermine any chance of a successful peace process.

**7. OTHER OPTIONS**

**State with Temporary Borders**

The formula of a Palestinian state within temporary borders was included in the second stage of the Road Map of 2003. Then on Israeli leaders tried to advance the idea of a Palestinian state within temporary borders as a reasonable recipe for breaking out of the current political stalemate. The Palestinian leaders opposed this option then and reject it now, considering it a recipe for keeping Israeli occupation. PNA President Mahmoud Abbas conveyed its last stand to the Americans on this plan that he would agree to a Palestinian state with provisional borders if the interim agreement bases the permanent borders on the 4 June 1967 lines and proportional land swaps.

**Protracted Interim Solution**

A Palestinian state with temporary borders option conforms with the Israeli plan to implement its plan for a protracted interim solution. This option will strike at the heart of the Palestinian national project, which is the unity of the people and the land and the establishment of an independent state. Israel rationalizes its predilection for this plan on the grounds that it constitutes Phase II of the Road Map. There is a consensus among all PLO forces to reject this plan.

The Separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank: Three states for two peoples

This option was consolidated after the HAMAS coup in Gaza in mid-June 2007. This is what Khaled Mash'al intimated in a press conference in Damascus when he talked
about setting up one central government within the framework of two separate Palestinian entities. HAMAS, however, showed serious interest in the plan when Israel embarked on its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. At the time, many calls came from the HAMAS leadership to form a so-called independent administration in Gaza. This option is rejected by all the Palestinian forces and the presidency of the PNA, as it was perceived as resonating with the Israeli plan for a protracted interim solution prolonging the separation and isolation of Gaza from the West Bank and feeding the factors conducive to perpetuating this situation and forestalling the establishment of a viable, geographically contiguous independent state.

**Gaza Strip and Egypt**

There are also plans that are brought to the foreground from time to time to place the Gaza Strip under the control of Egypt in one form or the other. This plan is supported implicitly by Israel. Egypt at this stage is not willing to take the risk of handling HAMAS which has an umbilical cord connection with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

**West Bank and Jordan**

Another concomitant option is to annex West Bank with Jordan, thereby transferring it to Jordan’s authority and control. Such an eventuality is concurrent with the Israeli strategy to secure the potential threats that might emanate from the South (Egypt) and the East (Jordan) through the countries which are bound by international treaties.

**Regional solution**

The so-called “regional solution” has also been receiving considerable play recently. According to this scheme, Egypt would resume indirect control over Gaza, overseeing the security, economic and political situation there while Jordan and Israel would work out a division of labour in the management of the situation in the West Bank.

**International solution**

To the foregoing initiatives one can add the proposal to internationalise the Palestinian question. This proposal calls for placing the occupied Palestinian territories under a UN mandate for a set period in accordance with a Security Council resolution that would create an international board of guardians that would oversee the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces, the construction of Palestinian governing institutions and the establishment of a viable independent state alongside Israel.

**8. TWO STATE SOLUTION**

Amongst the options, two state solution is in the mainstream. The basic and widely agreed upon parameters of two state solution are the following:

- A Palestinian state, to be established side-by-side with Israel;
Hata! Burada görünmesini istediğiniz metne Heading 2 uygulamak için Giriş sekmesini kullanın.

- Borders based on the Green Line, perhaps with an agreed-upon and equal limited swap of territories;

- Jerusalem as the capitals of the two states: East Jerusalem (Palestine) and West Jerusalem (Israel);

- An agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem. (An agreed number will return to Israel, the rest rehabilitated in the Palestinian state or their present places of domicile, with payment of compensations. The choices must be submitted to the refugees wherever they are, as partners in the final decision.)

PROS

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict spiraled into a vicious circle of inconclusive cycles. In the past, despite the various plans put on the table, the international community has been unable to come up with a creative intervention for solution and has presently let the United States to run the show. Comparison with the other options as less viable and feasible alternatives, makes the two states formula more vital and compelling than all other options. A state with provisional borders will only be a recipe for the continuation of the conflict.

Two states formula seems to have the blessings of the members of the Quartet, Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the majority of the third states, as well as the tacit but tactical approval of Israel subject to the results of negotiations to be carried out under the US auspices.

The obstacles to the two-state solution are small compared to the obstacles to a one-state solution, and can be overcome.

The Oslo process, built on the strategy of stages, was meant to bring about the settlement of the conflict by identifying points of agreement as a basis for interim agreements, which would lead in turn to the creation of areas of common interest while improving trust between the sides. These principles are meant to lead to a basis for dealing with the foci of major disputes prior to permanent agreements. The historical evidence affirmed that this strategy has failed.

Ehud Barak, when he was the Prime Minister of Israel, attempted to overturn the strategy of stages by the strategy on focusing on the core problems (refugees, Jerusalem and borders). This strategy was promoted at Camp David in 2000 but proved as unsuccessful as its predecessor.

CONS

The two state solution is undermined by the spread of permanent Jewish settlements and security barriers on the West Bank, so that the logic of Zionist expansionism may ultimately destroy the very idea of an exclusive Jewish state. Post-Zionists view an exclusive ethnic state as an anachronism. However, in the Middle Eastern reality of communal hostilities and national identities, the Zionist vision is deeply rooted and
more difficult to dislodge than racist supremacist illusions in South Africa. It is doubtful that the Israeli public will ever abandon its Zionist identity and embrace an inclusive civic nationalism of all its inhabitants.

Despite their political divergence, the successive Israeli governments continue to create facts on the ground in the occupied territories through the expansion and intensification of settlements and the building of new ones; the construction and completion of the separation wall; the isolation of the Jordan Valley, which has led to the evacuation of the population from a land area that constitutes 30% of the occupied territories; the isolation and “Judaization” of East Jerusalem; the separation of the West Bank from both Gaza and Jerusalem, and its fragmentation and “cantonization”. All this makes the two state option all the more a distant possibility.

HAMAS’s takeover of Gaza Strip in June 2007 and the decrees issued by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as a response, dissolving the government, declaring a state of emergency and forming an emergency cabinet, are evidence of an unprecedented geographical and political division between the legitimate authority and opposing factions. If prolonged, this rift could spell the end of the likelihood of the Palestinians achieving their right to self-determination through the establishment of a Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as the solution to the refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

A 57-state solution

For some leaders, the two state option is not a two-state solution, but a "57-state solution", whereby the Arab and entire Muslim world would recognize the Jewish state as part of the deal.

9. WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE?

For the sake of a more plausible analysis, it would be proper to recognize some basic facts of life in the peace process, the most important of which is the two sides’ inability to reach an end to the conflict within the limited time ahead with the inability to bridge the gaps in the historical narrative, and in the absence of legitimacy for alternative narratives among both the Israelis and Palestinians.

The division that has erupted within Palestinian society and politics and the PLO leadership’s lack of power to lead a diplomatic initiative and agree on a document that would obligate the HAMAS leadership in the Gaza Strip as well, preclude the conclusion and implementation of such a document. Same is true for the Israeli political leadership for domestic reasons.

In view of the very low expectations of achieving an end to the conflict in the near future, it would be necessary and realistic to adopt an approach the objective of which should be to accomplish limited political arrangements to bring the PNA as close as possible to a state entity. The establishment of a Palestinian state would change the asymmetrical dimension of the logic of the confrontation and would transform it into
an inter-state conflict, which is acted out according to the rules of states within the international community.

Although it appears that the two-state option plays “hard to get” spoiled by Israel's facts on the ground, the US administration's biases, and ineffectiveness of the third parties, those very same factors may give more legitimacy and urgency to this solution. Both sides should make the best use of the window of opportunity offered by the proximity talks. Once a two state solution becomes a reality, the next stage could be contemplated:

- Two states as a permanent solution; or
- A union of the two states into one; or a gradual move, with mutual consent, towards a confederation or federation; or an economic partnership within the framework of two states; or
- “Benelux solution” (Yasser Arafat spoke of this solution as a composition bringing together Israel, Palestine, Jordan and perhaps even Lebanon.)

For the immediate future, the focus must be on the pending problem. Decades of conflict have accumulated in Palestinians and Israelis alike, a huge reservoir of hatred, prejudice, suppressed guilt feelings, stereotypes, fear and an mistrust towards each other. Despite these, both peoples should be convinced of the benefits to be gained from the two states solution.

10. CONCLUSION

The solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the core and the key of the problems and the crises in the region as a whole. Therefore, finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial not only for the region but beyond. The options presented above offers different solutions to the conflict. Analysis of such options brings forth the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The road to a two state solution is full of impediments. On the Israeli side, the internal political system is not as stable as it is touted to be. It is subject to oscillations in reflection of deep divisions in the Israeli society wherein the group identities and interests tend to dictate patterns of political behavior and the course of the political system. Theo-political instability plays an important role in regard to internal solidarity and the goals of Zionism. The significance of this instability for Israel's relations with the Palestinian people is not conducive for agreement. Under the threat of the interest groups and their representatives in the Knesset, it has become impossible to achieve the stability that would allow for far-reaching decisions concerning the future of the conflict and an arrangement acceptable to the Palestinians. Only an agreement that is viewed by the major influential groups in Israeli society as not endangering their interests will be acceptable by them. The vast majority of Israelis envision a solution that is far from what the Palestinians demand, even within a two state compromise. The Israeli right, which has the control of the political process, or at least the capacity to threaten the stability of the Israeli government, thereby blocking any Israeli
commitment to an acceptable resolution of the issues associated with the Palestinian problem, such as the return of refugees, the dismantling of settlements, going back to the June 1967 borders, and the partition of Jerusalem. Given different national, religious and ideological interests of these groups in the context of Israeli politics, a peace settlement that coincides with the Palestinian parameters is not plausible.

On the Palestinian side, the latest developments indicate that the Palestinian national movement revived in the mid-1920s and peaked in the 1970s/1980s is not in good shape now. It has been defined as a failed national project as it has been unable to achieve its objectives. In the absence of a political platform accepted by all factions and of a broad internal mobilization around defined national goals, the ability of the Palestinian national movement to make a difference on Israel is very limited. This situation is the result of a variety of factors, including the internal state of the Palestinian national movement, the conflict among the various factions, Arafat's long lasted leadership style, the antagonism displayed by some Arab states and regimes and, above all, Israeli policy, which has sought to constrain the Palestinians' ability to function as a national group. The recognition of the PLO by Israel did not bring about a practical willingness on the part of Israeli officials to resolve the Palestinian problem in accordance with international resolutions. The fact that different approaches reign Israel's approach to the Palestinian problem renders progress toward its solution difficult.

In the post-Arafat era, the Palestinian national movement has been facing a serious and deep internal schism that prevents Palestinians to function as a national group with aspirations and a consensual vision. This crisis has been exacerbated by the January 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which gave HAMAS the upper hand which resulted in waves of anarchy in the form of mutual recriminations and violent confrontations between HAMAS and FATAH. The ongoing US mediated indirect “proximity talks” can be considered a low point in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, which have shifted from direct bilateral talks to indirect ones. Hamas and many other Palestinian groups have voiced their rejection of indirect talks and one of the two letters sent by HAMAS to President Obama warned Washington that any political settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that excludes HAMAS is doomed to fail.

The absence of stability on the Israeli and Palestinian internal political scenes; doubts about the honesty of the most influential broker as well as its ability and willingness to put the necessary pressure on Israel; indifference, reluctance or inadequacy of the third parties as states, groups or international organizations are the main factors preventing the two sides from arriving to and implementing a mutually acceptable “finish”, two state solution being the head runner.
REFERENCES


Bainerman, Joel, “The ‘One State Solution’ is the best solution”, Middle East Affairs, 24 July 2007.


Dumper, Mick, “A two state solution that really works”, The Guardian, 1 April, 2008.


**Euro-Atlantic Relations in the Obama Period**

Gökhan Akşemsettinoğlu

**Introduction**

The year of 2009 has become a turning point for the Euro-Atlantic region. In the first month of 2009, Barack Obama has taken his office as the new United States (US) president while the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force following the completion of a painful ratification process, in the last month of the same year. Both of the developments have had important implications not only for the transatlantic region itself, but also in international political arena, at large. Of course, the inauguration of Obama has had more radical effects on foreign political decision-making of the both sides of the Atlantic.

In the first year of Obama’s presidency, disappointments and frustrations have constituted the major headings of the agendas of the both sides’ governments. In the beginning, however, everything was so clear for most of the authorities of the Euro-Atlantic region that they were so sure about the shiny days of the transatlantic relations. There were some pessimists, of course, about the future of the Euro-Atlantic region, which preferred to make more cautious statements about the transatlantic relations. These pessimists were experienced realists who were seen the changing international order with new dynamics and the differentiated priorities of the European Union (EU), after the Lisbon Treaty.

This article, therefore, examines the causes of disappointments of the both sides of the Atlantic by focusing on the changing policies of the US, in the Obama administration, in conjunction with the new realities of international system; and the priorities of the member states of the EU. The article also sets forth the importance of cooperation of the transatlantic partners by emphasizing their mutual needs.

**President Barack Obama: Expectations and Frustrations**

When Barack Obama was elected new president of the US on January 20, 2009, a new period began in the US. The Obama administration was welcomed with great excitement and high expectations. The election of Obama was also greeted with great excitement across Europe. As a matter of fact, when Obama was elected as a president in November 2008, polls in Europe about favoring the US leadership jumped from % 19 to % 77 immediately. For the Europeans, Obama was promising...
“to reconnect America’s foreign and security policies with the values of human rights that appealed to Europe’s image of their own commitment to universal liberal values”\(^4\).

Some political circles in the US, however, were taking the victory of Obama with a pinch of salt. They were reminding historical examples by emphasizing that “some newly-elected presidents had pursued disappointing policies in their earlier years. For instance Kennedy’s approach to Khrushchev had led a stalemate first, and then the Berlin Wall”\(^5\). By the same token, there were voices in the European countries warning that Obama “would not be able to live up to the image that was being constructed and that, his political and diplomatic inexperience would hamper his ability to achieve the goals that he had set himself and that others expected of him”\(^6\).

In that context, although American transatlanticists and some Europeans saw Obama as a new president willing to improve transatlantic relations, great expectations on starting a new period of transatlantic harmony replaced by American interests at large. Considering political developments, stemming from the new administration, it is not difficult to assume that the relations between the US and Europe are not the same as the relations were in the Cold War era. Dan Drezner, for instance, had articulated the different national interests by emphasizing the divergent approaches on some significant international issues such as Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, Iran, Russia, and China. Similarly Alex Massie has said that “Obama’s foreign policy will be much more similar to Bush’s than widely believed”\(^7\). In fact, it seems that the dynamics of Euro-Atlantic relations will be determined by how the partners will evaluate issues they will face in the future.

**New Foreign Policy Outputs of the Obama Administration**

It is necessary to evaluate the new foreign policy objectives of the Obama administration, which will be directly related to transatlantic relations. First of all, it is obvious that Obama’s first priority will be about the economic recovery of the US\(^8\). The implementation of domestic economic policies will interdependently affect foreign political applications of the US and consequences on its international policies.

---

4 Ibid.
5 Kushner, op.cit., p.31.
6 Niblett, op.cit., p.188.
Focusing on international policies of Obama revealed that there will be considerable differences comparing the Bush administration. For instance, The Bush’s divide and rule policy - with us or against us policy - is now gone and the Obama administration has believed in a strong US partnership with the EU. The US has an interest in a strong, united, and peaceful Europe as a partner in global by 2030. Also, unlike the Bush Administration, the Obama administration has planned to deal with environmental issues. In this sense, the new administration will implement an economy-wide cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the level recommended by scientists. In fact, the new administration has planned “to invest $ 150 billion over the next ten years to develop and deploy climate friendly energy supplies; improve energy efficiency to reduce the energy intensity of the US economy by % 50 by 2030, and reduce dependence on foreign oil and reduce oil consumption by % 35”.

Obama has different ideas on security comparing the earlier administration. The US administration is in favor of using “soft” missile defense systems in Europe. This could create a “single missile threat monitoring system”. Obama has also supported the ongoing transformation of the Atlantic Alliance from a Cold War security structure to global partnership for peace and security.

The Obama administration believes that “the US must work with the EU to isolate Iran politically, diplomatically, and economically if it continues to support terrorism”. The new administration is committed to success in Afghanistan and will encourage the European allies to join the US in enhancing and accelerating “a multi-billion dollar effort for the reconstruction of Afghanistan over the next decade”. The new administration believes that America’s intelligence, police and judicial partnerships with the European allies are a critical component of efforts to combat terrorism.

In fact, considering the major international issues and problems such as Iran, the Middle East, and Africa, it can be said that the new policies of the Obama administration and the key European policies overlap. However, Obama has considered these problems more practically than the most of the Europeans thought.

10 Ibid., p.2.
13 Ibid., p.2.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p.3.
124
In other words Obama has not looked these problems through the European perspective.  

**The Priorities of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty**

For the EU a significant change took place when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force as of December 1, 2009. A new “president” and a new “foreign minister” of the Union became major changes in the side of the European integration process and were discussed in international agenda at large. According to most of the European authorities, although “the Lisbon Treaty enables the Union to take an important step forward in closer cooperation and greater integration”\(^ {17} \), it has “brought less clarity to partners and more infighting for European leaders, distracting them from tackling important issues”\(^ {18} \). As a matter of fact, after the Lisbon Treaty, one of the domestic problems of the EU has been “institutional infighting”, which is symbolized by “multifaceted presidents” of Europe.\(^ {19} \)

The members of the EU have been finding out how the Union could be a more active player in the international stage. In this context, the Union has concluded some strategic partnerships with major powers such as the US, Russia, and China. In this sense, the EU could be an active player in the “quartet”, formed by the US, Russia, and the United Nations (UN).\(^ {20} \)

On security/defense issues NATO is still the principal actor for the EU although the Europeans have taken some independent steps on these issues. “The EU currently relies on NATO’s planning and leadership capacities for major operations – based on the Berlin Plus agreement”\(^ {21} \). After the Maastricht Treaty and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), negotiations between the US, NATO, and EU began on the potential for the EU to share NATO military capabilities for operations of mutual interest in which EU nations might take the lead.\(^ {22} \)

---

20 Riecke, op.cit., p.11.  
21 Ibid., p.9.  
22 Niblett, op.cit., p.186.
However, for some European leaders “NATO is no more enough for the Europeans to answer all their problems.” As one senior EU leader remarked “Europeans cannot always be the junior partner to the US ... the time to be nephew to Uncle Sam has passed.” The members of the EU focus on creating a new security organization replacing NATO. “This process could well lead to tensions between the EU and its transatlantic partners.”

**Different Perspectives and Problems between the US and EU**

From time to time, in the history, the Euro-Atlantic relations have faced crises. The chief problems based mostly on different viewpoints and approaches. In this sense, the authorities have always emphasized the importance of the nature of relations and significance of similar approaches. For instance, even in the 1970s, when the relations were stable, Leo Tindemans had recommended constructive dialogue between the EU and US on the “nature and scope of their relations”. Of course, after the end of the Cold War, when the common threat lost its effectiveness, new challenges created different interests and approaches. In the post-Cold War period, the most important challenge for the relations was the Iraqi crisis and further development that took place in the Middle East. In other words, in the first half of the 1990s, “differing political philosophies, divergent attitudes towards Israel, and trade disputes” have affected relations negatively. The evolution, in those years was creating “a new institutional infrastructure”. In other words, the leaders have always been optimistic about the relations through thinking of finding shared goals in fighting terror, promoting democracy and human rights, creating a barrier-free transatlantic marketplace, and returning to a bi-partisan foreign policy. For the leaders, the US-EU relations have always been based on non-zero-sum game, which means that “disagreements on one issue don’t preclude agreement on many others.”

In fact, transatlantic relations had become more constructive in 2005 at the start of Bush’s second term. In this period, the parties were agree that they had common interests to deal with global challenges such as combating international terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); dealing with Russia’s growing assertiveness; challenging Iran over its nuclear program; rebuilding Afghanistan; or

27 Ibid.
developing coordinated policies on climate change. However, it became soon clearer that the parties were disagreed in most cases on the applications. Europeans frustrated with the Bush’s refusal to play a constructive role in the EU’s negotiations with Iran; with its engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process; and disengagement from the UN-sponsored climate negotiations. Most probably, the similar problems on different tactics between the US and EU will be the major challenges of the new Obama administration, as well.

In this context, one can draw a conclusion that there are two sides of the transatlantic relations. First, there are important differences in geopolitical interests and priorities and points to the limits of future transatlantic cooperation in the security realm. Second, however, there are some common interests and approaches dealing with growing global challenges, from proliferation to international financial stability.

However, the legal basis of the Europe-Atlantic area seems not enough to cover all threats of the continent in the near future because of some different approaches among the actors towards the security issues. The most important reason for this is that although both of the parties have converging interests and policies, they have different and uncoordinated agendas. Their priorities are considerably different in some specific issues. For instance there is a huge disagreement on NATO’s position in Europe so that “most transatlantic issues no longer concern NATO.”

As a matter of fact, there are differences for globalist views of the parties. For instance, the Obama administration focuses its attention on cooperating with the rising global powers such as China and India, and therefore refusing the assumption that the “transatlantic alliance will remain at the heart of the multilateral order” that is the general outlook of the Europeans. In this context, the neutralization of Britain as a “bridge” between Europe and America has become an important sign for this new policy of the US. In addition, when Obama announced a series of regulatory reform proposals for the banking industry unilaterally, without coordinating with the G20’s Financial Stability Board, the Europeans leaders resented much of it.

Obama, as a reflection of his new policy, has aimed at eradicating of all nuclear weapons. In this context, removing the US nuclear weapons from Europe has evaluated from some European authorities as a negative attitude because it means

29 Ibid., p.188.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p.185.
32 Lukov, op.cit., p.46.
33 Vasconceles, op.cit., p.1.
34 Ibid., p.2.
36 Ibid.
that “transatlantic security is no longer indivisible”\(^{37}\). However, for the Europeans, nuclear deterrence is the best choice to maintain peace and security in a still dangerous world where Iran and North Korea have both nuclear and conventional capabilities to strike the US and its allies\(^{38}\).

As a matter of fact, starting with the Iraqi crisis, Americans and Europeans have seen the world through different lenses. The US accused that the Europeans favored process over policy decision and implementation\(^{39}\). Therefore, it is obvious that the US and the EU have different security outlooks. They perceive global threats differently. In this context, examining some significant security issues will give us a general framework of differences between the parties of the Atlantic:

Afghanistan: In the case in Afghanistan, for instance, “the US is discontent with European NATO members’ relatively small contribution to the Afghan war”\(^{40}\). In this issue, the Europeans don’t think any serious threat that would encounter. For the US, however, the Europeans must directly contribute to the “hard security” issues to establish a real partnership in security issues\(^{41}\). Specifically, the Europeans, among themselves, have disagreements on Afghanistan issue. For instance, France is in favor of helping the US on the Afghanistan issue while Germany is not\(^{42}\). In other words, “disproportionate share of fighting and military death toll that has been shoudered by the US and only a small number of European states has generated a great transatlantic frustration”\(^{43}\). For the Americans, there has always been a risk that a Taliban victory might mean for the direct security threat for both the American and European citizens. Thus, any Taliban victory could spill over other conflicting areas such as North Africa, Yemen and Somalia\(^{44}\).

Russia: Major European states have been trying “to integrate Russia into the broader European economy and avoid political steps that would antagonize its leadership, such as further NATO enlargement”\(^{45}\). The most important reason for this attitude is about the great energy link between Russia and the Europeans. The US is anxious about indifference of Europe’s largest continental powers, Germany and France; towards Russia because the US authorities insist that Russia has been using its

---

\(^{37}\) McNamara, Sally and Baker Spring, President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, WebMemo, Published by the Heritage Foundation, No:2824, March 4, 2010.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Niblett, op.cit., p.187.

\(^{40}\) Moran, op.cit., p.1.

\(^{41}\) Greenstock, op.cit., p.2.

\(^{42}\) Kushner, op.cit., p.32.

\(^{43}\) Niblett, op.cit., p.190.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Moran, op.cit., p.1.
energy resources for a kind of leverage to become a more powerful actor in international politics.

On the other side, however, the Obama administration persists on reconstructing its relationship with Russia, which has been interpreted by the Europeans as a rejection of the hard applications towards Russia, supported by many Central and Eastern European countries. This impression was “deepened when the US announced that it would not deploy missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic for any possible threat of Iran”. For the Americans, the question is whether the US interests can be better pursued through a more confronting or accommodating diplomatic approach towards Russia. The Obama administration has chosen the second one and aimed at constituting a new atmosphere with it. However, for the Europeans, Russia is an unpredictable power and the Europeans are bound to it because of energy fields.

In this context, the Obama administration’s Russian policy has based on the dynamics of non-proliferation and disarmament, in conjunction with the Iranian nuclear question, and Afghanistan. It seems that the Obama administration has “moderate expectations” towards Russia because it has tried to improve relations and integrate with the West externally, and worked on its institutional transformation to set up democracy, and market economy, domestically. The Europeans, however, consider Russia, first of all, as a neighbor. Therefore, the policies of the EU towards have been around neighborhood, energy security and trade.

Arab-Israeli Conflict: Although it seems there is a convergence, there are some differences in strategic interests on Arab-Israeli conflict. American interests in resolving the conflict are clear, because it is important for international security. Although the Europeans share this idea as a long-term solution, most of the European authorities think that insistence on any inappropriate solution could lead to “radicalization of minorities among European Muslim populations” that frightens the Europeans very much.

China: The Obama administration “avoids clashes with China, focuses on economic interdependence and downplays differences over human rights and political systems”. For the Europeans, China’s rise carries different strategic implications for the interests of US and European governments. China-EU relations operate at a functional and non-strategic level with bilateral competition for economic advantage.

46 Ibid.
47 Niblett, op.cit., p.190.
48 Ibid.
49 Vasconceles, op.cit., p.5.
50 Ibid.
51 Niblett, op.cit., p.191.
52 Ibid. p.192.
between EU members. The difference is about “Pacific-focused America and neighborhood-focused Europe”\textsuperscript{53}.

Apart from security issues focusing on some specific regions, arms control is another disputable area for the Euro-Atlantic region. The Obama administration’s nuclear policy is based on strengthening arms control policies. According to Obama, nuclear deterrence is no more a viable policy for the US, although it was very effective in the atmosphere of the Cold War. The US administration has proclaimed this new nuclear approach in Prague and now expects a confirmation and support from the EU\textsuperscript{54}. The Europeans, however, are in favor of counting on the deterrence of nuclear weapons against Russia and other rising threats like North Korea.

On environmental issues, however, the Europeans are more sensitive in taking effective measures to solve major environmental problems such as global warming, ozone depletion, deforestation, and soil degradation. In these issues, the leaders of the EU have pressured the US to adopt regulations to speed up fighting with climatic problems. The US, on the other hand, has acted slowly to deal with these vital issues, although the Obama administration has stated the importance of the subject. It seems that the US has planned “to pursue a lowest-common-denominator approach vis-à-vis the EU”\textsuperscript{55}.

The recent crisis about Euro-Atlantic relations has come out when Obama announced that he will not attend the US-EU Summit in May, 2010. This can be good example showing discomfort between the parties. Of course, this announcement of Obama has created discontent among the Europeans. In fact, Obama’s so-called indifferent attitudes towards the Europeans have begun last November when the leaders had met a US-EU Summit, held in Washington, D.C. In that meeting Obama had met with the EU leadership for ninety minutes and left an extended conservation over lunch to Vice President Biden\textsuperscript{56}. For some, it is obvious that Obama is not enthusiastic for these types of meetings. For some others, however, “this is ironic that the US needs a strong, active and engaged EU on many issue although continue to feed insecurities of the Europeans”\textsuperscript{57}.

In addition, new arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty might be one of the reasons of Obama’s absence from the May Summit. For some authorities, the “awkward institutional structure” of the EU (so-called various executives at different levels)

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Vasconcelles, op.cit., p.2.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p.3.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

130
justifies the Kissinger’s famous statement of “who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”\textsuperscript{58} It is said that the Americans wonder “whether the Lisbon Treaty is creating more difficulties than it is resolving”\textsuperscript{59}. Even some others believe that “Obama has been facing a cacophony of different voices”\textsuperscript{60}. In that context, many believe that the EU has been trying to challenge to the American global power rather than working with the US\textsuperscript{61}. For some others, Obama will not attend the US-EU Summit in May, 2010 because the EU is not on the priority list unlike some important places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, China, and Russia\textsuperscript{62}. It seems that the EU is not at the top of the US agenda. In fact, when the US think of Europe, topics such as Russia, Turkey – relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Balkans are more important than the subject directly related with the EU itself\textsuperscript{63}. 

People in Europe, on the other hand, are not happy with Obama’s lack of interest in dealing the issues in Europe. Some people are anxious that US would not be able to be a reliable guarantor of security as it has always been in history. The British people, for instance are talking about the end of the “special relationship” with America. In this regard, Roger Cohen labels Obama as “not a Westermer, no an Atlanti\textsuperscript{ist\textsuperscript{64}}. He shares the idea of Constanze Stelzenmüller of the German Marshall Fund, who said that “Obama is very much a member of the post-Western world”\textsuperscript{65}. In other words, Obama’s “feelings are tied more to the Pacific and to Africa” than the Atlantic. Of course, Obama is not a unilateralist, and therefore his priorities are shaped by globalization. In this context, Obama, as a pragmatist, has an interest-based approach rather than values and feelings. Doubtlessly, in crises situations transatlantic cooperation will be important for both of the sides. Recently, for instance both of the parties focus their attention on health care and euro zone crisis\textsuperscript{66}.

\textsuperscript{60} Joyner James, Obama Has Not Yet Fixed US-Europe Relations, March 1, 2009, http://acus.org/new_atlantist/obama-has-not-yet-fixed-us-europe-relations.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
In Transatlantic relations, even the US-United Kingdom (UK) relations have some problems. For instance, the Argentinean government has been complaining about British oil exploration in the Falkland Islands' territorial waters. In this situation, the US government has remained neutral and this attitude has been seen by the British as treason. Formally, “the US recognizes de facto UK administration of the islands but takes no position on the sovereignty claims of either party”67.

Another dispute between the US and the European is that “a European-American consortium - comprised of North Grumman and Airbus-parent EADS – has decided to drop out of a $35 billion contract for airborne refueling tankers, conceding the ground Boeing”68.

**Common Needs and Opportunities of Cooperation between the US and EU**

In the eve of a multipolar world, relations between Europe and America should be thought on a broader perspective where the remaining of the actors in international stage become effective in dealing with most of the issues and problems such as economic crisis, financial transactions, and environmental degradation. In this sense, the Euro-Atlantic relations need a reform to rearrange relations and even to build a “common global agenda for effective multilateralism”69. Therefore, since “the Obama administration has shown its willingness to engage in multilateral negotiations ... the EU should support Obama’s efforts to build a more effective multilateral system”70.

In the Obama period, the Euro-Atlantic region will need consolidating confidence and improving mutual relations in military-political security issues71. In this context, first step had been taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member states on agreeing a common strategic vision on security, which includes a pluralist decision-making mechanism in security issues; negotiation on the declared security interests of the states; and agreement on pursuing non-zero sum game in the security of the region72. This common strategic vision requires “new standards and styles of diplomacy”73. Therefore, the dynamics of the new approach between the US and EU should include collective action for preventing conflicts and potential instabilities in Europe; shared responsibility of a measure of interdependence; attention to the sub-regional contributions of security; consideration of the combining military, economic, and humanitarian issues; and coordination and

---

68 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p.2.
71 Lukov, op.cit., p.42.
72 Ibid., p.43.
73 Ibid.
consultation on strategic concepts and military doctrines of the member states and institutions, like NATO.\textsuperscript{74}

In Euro-Atlantic security, the US and Russia, and international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and OSCE should be considered as major actors. In this sense, extending the geographical scope of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, that is a system of air traffic information exchange along the borders of Russia and NATO member states;\textsuperscript{75} adopting mutual responsibility by both OSCE members and NATO-Russia Council members for keeping the mechanism of dialogue active;\textsuperscript{76} and agreeing to fight against arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and organized crime could be concerned as effective measures to solve some problems.\textsuperscript{77} In addition, some institutions should be reformed in order to share power and take effective measures of “cooperative collective security” in a broad range of area.\textsuperscript{78}

Therefore, the US should keep its nuclear capability in Europe to defend and protect the US and its allies’ interests.\textsuperscript{79} Keeping the US nuclear arsenal in Europe is important for NATO because the removal of the US nuclear weapons from NATO bases would be considered as the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security.\textsuperscript{80} In this context, some suggest to set up a Transatlantic Political Council that would be chaired by the US Secretary of State and the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy.\textsuperscript{81} In other words, NATO is likely to remain an important institution for coordinating US and European military resources and politico-military decision-making on direct threats to their collective security.\textsuperscript{82}

Strengthening the security sphere of Europe, therefore, needs an equal and indivisible outlook in the region. In this sense, a European security Treaty could provide a legal basis of official obligations of the actors in security issues.\textsuperscript{83} In such a treaty, measures should be convenient with the UN Charter dealing with the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{84}

In the long-run, however, a new security structure should be build for the Euro-Atlantic region. In this sense, what the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev suggests

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p.44.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p.45.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p.46.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} McNamara, op.cit., p.1.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Vasconcelos, p.2.
\textsuperscript{82} Niblett, op.cit., p.195.
\textsuperscript{83} Lukov, op.cit., p.46.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.47.
on constituting a legally binding document, the so-called European Security Treaty.\textsuperscript{85}

In fact, the partners of the Euro-Atlantic region should try “to achieve a new quality of strategic cooperation”\textsuperscript{86} and therefore get rid of “uncoordinated and overlapping agendas”\textsuperscript{87} of the actors stemming from their different institutional structures.

As far as regional policies are concerned, the African continent introduces more cooperative area for the Euro-Atlanticists than that of the Southeast Asia. Although there are divergent interests between the US and the EU in the Southeast Asia, they can find more common interests in Africa. Since the US has been acting as a global player trying to balance the raising powers in the region, such as China and India, the Europeans have chosen more bilateral relations with the major powers of the region. The EU has important transactions about energy security not only with regional states but with effective international organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Africa, on the other hand, is more fruitful region for the parties to cooperate and act effectively, together. The Obama administration has sought to define common strategies towards Africa with Europe.\textsuperscript{88} “Although Africa will not be a top priority region for the Euro-Atlantic relations, coordination efforts to support African Union capacity-building including the development of the African Standby Force”\textsuperscript{89} can be articulated as the area of common interest. Also, both of the parties have similar policies towards Sudan and Somalia.\textsuperscript{90}

Although the main area of partnership between the US and EU is about global economic evolution,\textsuperscript{91} this partnership could extend to the developing world since the Obama administration has emphasized priority areas such as food security, health, governance, and rule of law towards non-OECD countries.\textsuperscript{92} Also, both sides need to improve coordination “to lowering greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to supporting the transitions worldwide to low carbon methods of achieving economic growth.”\textsuperscript{93} In addition, the creation of a new Financial Stability Board to encompass all

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p.12.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Vasconceles, op.cit., p.4.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p.5.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} In fact, what is needed is a more open transatlantic market; and integrated transatlantic market of some 800 million people, currently accounting for some % 50 of world’s GDP. See, Niblett, op.cit., p.195.
\textsuperscript{92} Greenstock, p.3.
\textsuperscript{93} Niblett, op.cit., p.196.
members of the G20 from 2009 was important in terms of strengthening the legitimacy of international financial reform.

**Conclusion**

Considering the new policies of the Obama administration and the priorities of the EU, after the Lisbon arrangements, it can be concluded that Euro-Atlantic region has both opportunities and challenges. In the current situation, however, challenges prevail the US-EU relations because both of the sides have not only different perspectives but also they have different regional and global expectations and interests.

In this context, the Obama administration, considering the new dynamics of prospective international world order, has aimed at balancing power in the Asia-Pacific region where the regional powers such as China and India have begun to raise their powers lately. In other words, the Obama’s new foreign policy requires looking through the lenses of multilateralism.

The EU, on the other hand, has been trying to consolidate its bilateral relations with regional powers. For instance, the leaders of the EU have focused on concluding beneficial energy agreements with regional powers. China, for instance, can be a good partner of the EU for energy issues. For the US, however, China is a prospective polar of a new international system and its power must be “softly” balanced by using the means of “low politics” such as diplomacy, interdependent trade transactions, environment, etc. By the same token, for the US, Russia is an important international actor that has capacity to affect world politics globally whereas for the EU, Russia should be considered within the framework of neighborhood policies and it can be a good partner for trade and energy sectors.

These different perspectives will constitute the challenges and create some problems in the Euro-Atlantic region. In parallel with the Obama’s new political objectives some regions, for instance Africa, and some global issues such as environment can be opportunities for the transatlantic partners.

In the Obama period, despite everything, the parties should cooperate for to benefit from shared interests and avoid rising conflicts in challenges. One should always remember, after all, that the Euro-Atlantic relations have always based on non-zero-sum game.

**Bibliography**


---

94 Ibid., p.198.


McNamara Sally and Baker Spring. President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, Web Memo, Published by the Heritage Foundation, No: 2824, March 4, 2010.


The Changes in Images of Women in Turkey

Professor Emel Doğramacı (PhD) 1

Images of women in any country are strongly linked with their status within that country, whether traditional or industrial. Regarding the changes in the images of women in Turkey, it is imperative to study closely the developments of their social, economic and educational status throughout decades in order to bring about a better assessment of their images and status.

“The woman’s place is in the home.” So runs the time-honoured saying; and it has been time-honoured for a very long time now! In 19th century Turkey it was certainly the norm for then that most women remained at home, certainly when given the option. And home was not merely a place. In the charged rhetoric of the day, it was a sanctuary, a potent image of human security, solace, and renewal. Over that sanctuary the wife, the mother presided a ritually genius, and thinking about what she did there as work seemed indelicate. To discuss her ministrations in the mundane term of money and compensation would have been sacrilege. Here, the word “sacilege”, with all its religious connotations, is certainly a key word, stressing the fitness of this system, even almost endowing it with the quality of a divine order.

By the turn of the century, this traditional image of the woman was on decline especially in Europe, mainly as a result of the discovery of new techniques (in agriculture, handicrafts, manufacturing and trade.) Together with the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and the American War of Independence new waves of “equality of opportunities”, “economic independence”, “employment opportunities”, and most of all “feminism” began to spread everywhere none the least in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently new distribution of roles began to change the traditional images of women. Girls and women were admitted to education (though in the beginning very inequally provided, depending on social class and region) considerably later than boys and men of the same class and region. Women unquestionably began to gain power.

Regarding the changes in the images of women in Turkey, it would be appropriate to evaluate the chronological developments in their status, these developments are greatly carried out through the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In fact this war may be taken as the “War of Independence of Women” in Turkey.

Until the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Islamic laws and rules as well as the long standing patriarchal family system with the man being the sole head and

1 Prof. Emel Doğramacı, Chairperson of Gender Studies Unit, Foreign Policy Institute - This article is largely based on the paper, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Haklarının gelişmesi” by the same author in Türkiye’de Kadın Hakları Sorunları ve Çözüm Yolları
traditions, had been invariably implemented. This meant that women were kept shut up in their homes for the greater part of their time and when they did venture out, they were obliged to cover their faces with a veil. They had no political rights, polygamy was widespread and they were excluded from work force. There were very few schools for girls and only in Istanbul. Those who wanted to become teachers had to attend high schools for girls.

Radical transformation followed practices with the establishment of the present Republic of Turkey on October 29th, 1923, and all this was changed. Many drastic reforms concerning legal, social, educational, economic and political were brought about.

Some of Atatürk’s statements regarding women may shed a light to the vision and insight of the great leader: “It is necessary to recognize that women shape everything in the world.” (1923, Atatürk’s Speeches II, 85)

“We observe everywhere with gratitude that our women are marching with our men in the path of ideas and enlightenment, and proving themselves as worthy competitors. We should observe again with gratitude, that in no respects are our women inferior to our men. I see, particularly everywhere, an equality between the levels of attainment as far as the sexes are concerned. This gives us cause for pride. The fact that our women do not fall behind our men in unfavourable circumstances, that they perhaps even surpass men in identical circumstances gives us some causes for boasting.” (1923, Atatürk’s Speeches II, 152)

“No one can say that women anywhere in the world, in any other country, have worked as hard as Turkish women in the villages of Anatolia. And the woman of no other country can say, “I have worked harder than the Anatolian woman”. I have worked harder to lead my people to victory and liberty. I have exerted as much effort as the Anatolian men to my people to victory and independence.” (1923, Atatürk’s Speeches II, 147-148)

In education Turkey initiated a most ambitious programme of schooling with the introduction of the Unification of Education Law in 1924. Until the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, for over four centuries Turkey had been within the theocratic Moslem Ottoman Empire. During this period, seminaries, colleges of medicine as well as reading rooms and libraries were established around the mosques. They were all confined to boys, who were trained to become future administrators throughout Europe.

But it was with the Law of Unification of Education that education at all stages from grade school to graduate school became free, secular, and co-educational. Primary education became compulsory for both girls and boys. Parents who abstained from sending their children to school were severely punished.

2 The quoted speeches of Atatürk are translated into English by the present author.
Between the years 1926-1930 The Turkish Republic achieved a legal transformation, which might have required decades in most countries. A new Civil Code, based on the Swiss Code, was introduced in 1926, according to which religious laws (Sharia) were abolished. Complete equality between the sexes in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance was founded. Polygamy was prohibited.

On March 1st 1926, Criminal Law of Turkey, based on Italian Criminal Law, was enacted.

**Change of Script and Calendar (1928):**

Another drastic reform was in 1928, when Atatürk decided that the Arabic script, which had been used by the Turks for a thousand years, should be replaced by the Latin alphabet. He asked the experts: “How long would it take?” The answer was “At least five years.” “We shall do it within five months,” Atatürk said.

**Secularism:**

In his programme of modernization, secular government and education played a major role. Religious faith was made a matter of individual conscience, thus a secular system was created in Turkey, where vast Moslem majority, and the small Christian and Jewish minorities were free to practice their faith. Secularism was officially endorsed in the Constitution on Feb.5th 1937. Several years before this official declaration, Atatürk, to prepare the public opinion on secularism said, “The Republic of Turkey has no official religion”.

All the laws and regulations relative to state administration were made and implemented according to global needs and the principles and forms with which modern scene had provided for contemporary societies. “As religious convictions are relegated to the conscience of every individual, our Republic considers the separation of religious opinion from the state, as well as from worldly affairs and politics, a major factor in the successful advance of our nation along the path of modern civilisation,” he said.

**Recent Amendments to the Turkish Constitution (2001):**

Article 10: Equality of men and women without discrimination before the law. Though, there is no legislation to punish discrimination on the basis of gender.

Article 41: Equality between spouses in marriage

The terms “wife” and “husband” have been replaced by the term “spouse(s)”.

The current Constitution of Turkey provides for, in Article 10, equality before the law of men and women without discrimination. This article reads: “All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, ethnicity, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any other such discrimination.”
Article 41 of the Constitution was amended in 2001 to provide for the equality of spouses in marriage. The Constitution now provides that the family is the foundation of Turkish Society and is based on "equality between spouses." Under the old Civil Code of 1926, the husband enjoyed a position of absolute legal supremacy in the family, with the legally sanctioned authority to make choices over domicile, children, and property.

This approach has been abandoned in favour of one that defines family as a union based on equal partnership. This new concept is also reflected in the language of the new Civil Code. The terms "wife" and "husband" have been replaced by the term "spouse(s).

The New Approach to Gender Equality (Women for Women’s Human Rights, the New Legal Status of Women in Turkey, April, 2002) reads:

The husband is no longer the head of the family; spouses are equal partners, jointly running the matrimonial union with equal decision-making powers.

Spouses have equal rights over the family residence.

Spouses have equal rights over property acquired during marriage.

Spouses have equal representative power.

The concept of "illegitimacy", formerly used to designate children born out of wedlock, has been abolished; custody of children born outside marriage lies with the mother.

However, multiplicity of traditions get in the way of enforcement of law, especially in Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia.

While the reform of the Turkish Civil Code constitutes a step forward in terms of establishing gender equality in Turkey, it is nevertheless evident that reforms in the legal domain alone are not sufficient to prevent gender discrimination and violations of women’s rights. In Turkey women’s lives continue to be shaped by a multiplicity of traditional practices which, at times, violate existing laws.

**Progress in Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>The law on the unity of education and teaching was enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Evening vocational and arts schools for women established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>The year Atatürk died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home arts and sewing courses for women established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The schools providing advanced study for women graduates of vocational schools were established.

Advanced degree program for women's studies established at Istanbul University.

First advanced degree for women's studies granted.

Compulsory education raised from 5-8 years.

Primary Schools (final year) 2009-2010 (Ministry of Education Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State and Private School</td>
<td>566,130</td>
<td>635,936</td>
<td>1,202,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Schools</td>
<td>549,654</td>
<td>616,083</td>
<td>1,165,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Schools</td>
<td>16,176</td>
<td>19,851</td>
<td>36,027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>517,530</td>
<td>580,432</td>
<td>1,097,962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

University Entrance Examination Results (2009) (Higher Education Council Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicants</td>
<td>603,754</td>
<td>746,370</td>
<td>1,350,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Year Programs</td>
<td>145,281</td>
<td>144,816</td>
<td>290,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Year Programs</td>
<td>55,642</td>
<td>70,743</td>
<td>112,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>122,932</td>
<td>135,017</td>
<td>257,949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress in Health (Ministry of Health Statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Abortion and assistance to it regulated by law as criminal act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Mother-child health services initiated by the Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Progress in Employment (State Statistics Institute)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Regulation for women worker’s social rights and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maternity leave regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Regulation for maternity insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Regulations for old age pension and insurance made equal to those for men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Equal Pay for Equal Work principle entered into the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prohibition against women working in heavy and hazardous conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>The constitutional court annulled the law on husband’s permission for a woman to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Low interest credit to promote women’s entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Progress in Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Women established the “Women People’s Party” to promote women’s political rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>The Association of Women’s Unity established for the same purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Women obtained the right to vote for local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Women obtained the right to be elected for local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Women obtained the right to vote and be elected in parliamentary elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>First elections held where women had the right to vote and be elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>The first female minister appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>A female elected member of parliament became a minister in the cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>First woman Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Female MPs in Turkish Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MPs in World’s Parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35.741</td>
<td>29.754</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>5.987</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 31 July 2006
Female MPs across Continents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scandinavian Countries</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Arabic Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% 40</td>
<td>% 20.6</td>
<td>% 17.3</td>
<td>% 16.4</td>
<td>% 8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 31 July 2006

However according to recent statistics in a report presented by Gülsen Büker, the Legal Advisor to the General Directorate of Status of Women during “The Rights of Women in Turkey Symposium 2-3 December 2009 at Yeditepe University-Istanbul” the following percentages of women are reflected:

Education:
- Within adult women, one out of each five is illiterate.
- The highest percentage of illiteracy (39.8%) is in the South East Region of Anatolia, and the lowest percentage (12%) is in the Marmara Region,
- According to 2007-2008 statistics, the rate of girls attending the primary schools is (96.1%), and for boys is (98.5%),
- The rate of women teachers at primary schools is (49.3%),
- The rate of women teachers in intermediate schools is (41.3%),
- The rate of women principals at schools is (8.78%),
- The rate of assistant principals is (11%),
- Out of the seventeen General Directors within the Ministry of Education only one is a woman.

Employment:
- Only one out of four women has a fulltime job,
- The rate of women employee is (22%),
- Looking for job period among unemployed women is longer than that for men,
- Employment of women is mostly in agriculture, services and industrial sectors,
- (99%) of women working in agriculture sector are without social security,
- 83 out of 100 women work on lands and (77%) of them are unpaid family workers,
- The rate of illiterate women participating to work force is (15.7%), those who have not finished high schools is (21.3%), graduates of high schools is (21.4%), and tertiary schools graduates is (70.4%),
- (37%) of architects, (29%) of M.D’s and surgeons, (33%) of lawyers are women,
Decision Making Positions:

- The rate of women M.P.s in the Parliament is (9.1%). (In Greece it is 13%, in Bulgaria 22%, in Syria 12%, in Sweden 47%, in Finland 42%),
- Out of (81) city mayors only 2, out of (923) town mayors only 15 are women,
- Out of 20 under-secretaries there are no women,
- Out of 166 ambassadors 15 are women and seven of them are ambassadors in foreign missions,
- There is no woman governor. Out of 408 deputy governors only 7 are women, and out of 900 town-governors only 21 are women.

Health:

- (5%) of women mortality are mothers,
- In 100-child delivery 28 mothers die. In developed countries this is below 10,
- Out of each 5 deaths of mothers, 4 of them for various reasons could be avoided,
- Throughout pregnancy one out of each three women has no medical care before delivery,
- One out of six birth delivery has no medical aid,
- (37.6%) of illiterate women, (76%) of primary school graduate women, (96%) of high school graduate women receive medical care.


The following statistics in the Report reveal where Turkey stands among the respective 130 countries:

Population (2006): 73.9 million, 50% (F), 50% (M)
Economic Participation and Opportunity
Employment: 29% (F), 80% (M)
Annual Income: $4,385 (F), $12,368 (M)
Legislators, Senior Officials, and Managers: 8% (F), 92% (M)
Professional and Technical Workers: 33% (F), 67% (M)
Ranked 108th among 130 countries

Educational Attainment
Literacy Rate: 81% (F), 96% (M)
Primary Education Enrolment: 89% (F), 93% (M)
Secondary Education Enrolment: 64% (F), 74% (M)
Tertiary Education Enrolment: 30% (F), 39% (M)
Ranked 108th among 130 countries

Health Life Expectancy
63 years (F), 61 years (M)
Ranked 88th among 130 countries

Political Empowerment
Women in Parliament: 9% (F), 91% (M)
Women in Ministerial Positions: 4% (F), 96% (M)
Years with Female Head of State (last 50): 3 years (F), 47 years (M)
Ranked 106th among 130 countries

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Arctic and the Dilemma of Climate Change

Onur Erpul

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to raise awareness of the importance of the often neglected Arctic, which is a resource rich, strategically significant area of the world, and is a source of many disagreements among its littoral states. On the other, the essay will argue that global warming – which it assumes is mainly caused by anthropogenic factors – will exacerbate these problems by providing new incentives for states to compete in the Arctic for territory and resources. While the mitigation of global warming is essential for avoiding global environmental disasters and for the reduction of conflict over territory and resources in the Arctic, global warming will be an incentive for some states to maintain the environmental status quo as climate change is profitable for them.

Introduction

Greenhouse gases are the lifeblood of our planet. Without them, the Earth would be no different than a frozen wasteland, not unlike Mars. Greenhouse gases help sustain life by providing the atmospheric pressure and agreeable temperatures we are so accustomed to. Yet, two centuries of industrial activity have greatly increased the natural levels of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere; so much so that the human race is now facing severe ecological problems.

There have been “efforts” in the past few decades to mitigate global warming. The most recent one of these, the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (or “COP-15”), which was expected to take off where the Rio and Kyoto Protocols had stopped and establish good environmental governance, took place in December 2009 at the Bella Center in Copenhagen. There were some well meaning members at Copenhagen. Encouraging signs were seen from South American and European Union member countries, despite the reverberating effects of the global recession. Yet, China’s attitudes crushed our hopes. Copenhagen fell well below our expectations and we will now have to wait for Mexico 2010. If the whole world continues to place its economic interests before the preservation of the environment, polar bears and Tuvaluans will soon share the same fate of having no place to call home – for starters.

While the whole world is busy with REDD, carbon reduction schemes and protocol country-annexes, global warming is slowly turning the North Pole in to a hotspot for great power rivalry.

The North Pole is generally not considered to be an area with vital security implications; it is most often dealt only in terms of climate change and environmental

1 Onur Erpul is a researcher at the Foreign Policy Institute.
problems. However, its position as a barrier between the superpowers during the Cold War and its favorable geographic characteristics culminated the securitization of the Arctic in the later years of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has led to a relative calm in the North Pole. Yet, absent the rivalry between the two superpowers, there still exist problems of sovereignty and delineation in the Arctic. Furthermore, the North Pole is an area of the world that is becoming strategically more important with the discovery of many natural resources (most notably, oil and gas). As global warming worsens greater damage is inflicted on the Polar Regions, which will have severe global environmental consequences. However, the melting of the polar ice caps will enable ships to utilize the Northwestern and Northeastern passages for shipping and this development will intensify the strategic importance of the Arctic.

In their quest to exploit the riches of the Arctic, the littoral states will have to compete with each other, which will indubitably exacerbate the preexisting problems of sovereignty in the Northern seas. In addition to aggravating the rivalries between littoral nations, the melting of the North Pole, which is caused by anthropogenic global warming, will create a host of new security problems such as the problem coastal defense for the littorals, infringement on the rights and territories of indigenous peoples and, most importantly, problems related to environmental security, which will have global consequences.

Thus, the first section of this essay will deal with the history of the North Pole and how it became a military arena between the superpowers during the Cold War. It will also identify the various problems of sovereignty that remain in the Arctic after the Cold War subsided. The second section will deal with the rising importance of the Arctic as a result of global warming, which will bring with it a myriad of benefits. The third section will analyze how global warming and the prospects of the Arctic will aggravate existing problems and bring about a new set of problems for the whole world to address.

The article will conclude that far from being an incentive to reduce emissions, global warming may actually be an incentive for some states to maintain their inertia in seeking a comprehensive environmental agreement.

The Strategic Significance and Securitization of the Arctic

The world public generally did not and still does not consider the North Pole as a strategically vital area of the world. Regardless, several military operations have taken place in the Arctic in the past, notably during the Crimean War when British vessels attacked Solovetskiy and the town of Kola. The strategic importance was once more brought to bear in the Second World War as well, as it served as a battleground between the belligerents. The North Sea was an important artery for Allied shipments to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Germans gained access to Scandinavian weather stations after the defeat of Denmark and Norway, thereby depriving Allied

navies of important navigational information, which not only posed a danger to Allied navigation but it also threatened the Arctic possessions of Denmark and Norway. It was this conjecture that spurred the US to acquire bases in Iceland and Greenland.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers were direct neighbors in the Arctic. Not only did the North Pole serve as the closest point between the two, and thereby formed the shortest route for strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, but as time and technology progressed, it became a natural harbor for submarines with nuclear submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities. In fact, it made sense to commit military resources to the North Pole as submarines could launch ballistic through the often thin layers of ice. Therefore, the North Pole would have been at the heart of any hypothetical nuclear exchange between the superpowers. This danger has abated with the end of the Cold War, and the military presences of the littoral countries have been reduced, although the Russian government, in keeping with its policy of strengthening its position in the Arctic, is now contemplating on expanding its armed forces, strengthening its northern fleet and building new ice-breakers.

The end of the Cold War has also benefited commercial aviation, which took off thanks to the thaw in relations between USSR and the West. Since then, with the advent of longer-range aircraft and the air-traffic agreements made between Canada and Russia, the region has become a busy hub for intercontinental commercial flights, shaving off hours of flying time and saving companies millions of dollars in fuel costs.

The “Golden” North

The Circumpolar region and the subarctic have been known to hold important resources; most notably animal products such as furs and blubber, and various metals. Greenland was once our only source of cryolite, which is a necessary material for the production of aluminum. The area is also noted for an abundance of gold - the Arctic has witnessed several “gold rushes” in the past. It is now known that the continental-shelf in the North Pole contains ample amounts of oil. News of its conformation has whetted the appetites of government officials in littoral countries and oil-companies alike. Natural gas too is present in the murky depths. “The area north of the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids in 25 geologically defined

---

4 Ibid. 234-6
areas thought to have potential for petroleum.” To give a better idea, the Arctic will “account for about 13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the world.”

While skeptics will argue that exploiting these resources will be very inconvenient, countries like Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia have been drilling the depths of the North Sea for years now and they will be looking to expand their activities. Another important resource is fish. Fishing is a profitable and important industry for Europe; so much so that regulation of fisheries occupies a special chapter in the EU acquis.

The advantages are not limited only to natural resources though. An arguably more important benefit will be access to the Arctic for the purpose of navigation. Indeed, the ice-dappled waters of the Northern seas have been a menace to ships for centuries. It was only in the last decades of the 19th century that a relatively safer method of polar navigation was found. Ice-breakers have enabled us to traverse the ice covered northern seas. Their purpose has generally been to transport oil and other cargo to remote locations or have been used for conducting research in the North Pole. Currently, the littoral countries of the North Pole own considerable numbers of ice-breakers. Although ordinary commercial ships will soon have the opportunity to circumnavigate Eurasia and North America, the passages are not yet fully traversable and icebreaker escorts will be required for most parts of the year. The implication is that states with icebreakers will have an advantage in being able to patrol the Passages and exercise sovereignty in their Arctic domains. In this respect, Russia and Canada are a step ahead of their competitors.

The benefit for global trade is immense as it will greatly reduce the distances and costs between Northern European ports and those in the Pacific. Victorian age sailors dreamed of being able to reach the East via the Northern passages and it is finally becoming a reality. Last year, the German shipping company, “Beluga”, sent two of its ships to travel from Korea to Siberia via the Northeast-Passage. Essentially; the Earth has warmed to a degree in which it is possible to traverse the North Pole during summer without the need for ice-breakers, which will allow countries with ordinary merchant fleets to partake in trade activities in the Arctic; thus providing a boon to international trade.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Cohen, “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy.”
14 Mike, ”Two Beluga Vessels Successfully Transit the Arctic Passage,” (2009), http://gcaptain.com/maritime/blog/beluga-vessels-successfully-transit/.
152
The relatively temperate, accessible, areas of the Arctic, has the potential to attract tourists who wish to experience the Arctic. This development brings with it the potential to transform some areas of the Arctic, creating jobs and infrastructure. This might also provide an incentive for local governments protect the ecological riches of the region, as Arctic fauna will be a major tourist attraction. Local economies in the North may find an additional source of income in the form of agriculture as global warming will allow crops to be grown further north.\textsuperscript{15}

Sovereignty Problems

Some of the littoral states, namely Canada and the USSR raised claims but most of the Arctic was considered to be international waters. They benefited greatly from developments in the Law of the Sea and delineated enormous exclusive economic zones, claiming large patches of the continental shelves. Signatories of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter “UNCLOS") have to submit their continental shelf and EEZ claims within ten years of ratifying the treaty. Russia has claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, which it argues is as an extension of the Siberian Continental Shelf. However, its claims were rejected by the UN in 2001. In 2008, the Russian Air Force flew jets over the Arctic. In an earlier show of force, the Russian Armed Forces had planted its flag under the North Pole in 2007\textsuperscript{16}; much to the chagrin of the Canadians.\textsuperscript{17} Canada and Denmark are already in dispute over the sovereignty of Hans Island and other problems exist between Norway and Russia. The economic competition in the Arctic will certainly raise tensions – the spat between the Canadian Prime Minister and the Russian Foreign Minister in 2007 is just one example.

Even with these claims, great portions of the Arctic remain without an owner. Countries such as China and South Korea, that are nowhere near the Arctic, want to compete for this region. China is one step ahead because already has its own icebreakers and advanced Polar research facilities. It is so keen on taking a part in Arctic politics that it pays to participate in the meetings of the Arctic Council\textsuperscript{18} as an observing member. These developments are in line with China’s desire to secure access to natural resources to accommodate its rapidly growing industries. However,

\begin{flushright}
15 Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown," 64.
17 Ibid. The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, criticized the Russian move, stressing that "this is not the 15th century... You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this territory.'"
18 The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization that features the littoral countries of the Arctic. Its main aims are to solve environmental and political challenges in the Arctic – its decisions are non-binding.
\end{flushright}
Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, where China has established itself as the dominant power\textsuperscript{19}, it will have to face formidable opposition from Canada, Russia and US.

Being able to traverse the Arctic also means that an enormous stretch of coastal waters will now be at risk. It will become a new arena for transnational crime. The Russian and Canadian coastguards, for example, will have to step-up their efforts to combat drug-trafficking, human-trafficking and other smugglers. With such a large coastline to defend, even the most stalwart defenses can be circumvented by determined criminals.

In any case, Canada and Russia, in particular, want to exercise sovereign rights in the Northwestern and Northeastern passages. These will include strict regulations and tolls for traversing the passages.\textsuperscript{20} The situation for the Northwestern Passage is somewhat similar but Canada is more sensitive about the status of the Passage. Canada has declared the Northwestern Passage to be Canadian territorial waters (renaming the Passage at the “Canadian Northwestern Passage”) and demands that foreign vessels adhere to Canadian jurisdiction. The rest of the world, and the US, argue that the Northwestern Passage is in fact an international strait and that foreign commercial vessels should be allowed transit passage rights – meaning that under the relevant provisions of UNCLOS\textsuperscript{21}, Canada may take measures to prevent illegal activities and may impose environmental regulations but it cannot completely deny access to any foreign vessels.

**Environmental Dangers and Feedback Effects**

The risks are not limited to traditional economic and security concerns of states. There are other dangers, which are far more important, that can be identified within the framework of new security paradigms, which place an emphasis on the importance of environmental integrity.

One important detail to remember is that global warming produces various feedback effects. A feedback effect is a phenomenon in which one variable causes another, but increments of the latter also causes more of the former, which causes more of the latter variable and so on. With regards to this particular case, the adverse effects produced by anthropogenic global warming, in turn, leads to more global warming and, therefore, more problems. Some classic examples from the climate change

\textsuperscript{19} For a detailed analysis of China’s economic expansion into Sub-Saharan Africa, see “China's New Mercantilism in Central Africa” by Jonathan Holslag.

\textsuperscript{20} Paul Goble, "Moscow Planning Agency to Regulate Northern Sea Route Traffic," http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2010_03_18_archive.html. For example, the Russian government announced last year that it would draft a legislation to regulate sea traffic and collect passage fees:

literature that are particularly salient for the Arctic are (among others) methane releases, the ice-albedo feedback and ice retreat.

The public is generally familiar with the implications of the melting polar ice-caps. These are the rise in the global sea levels, which is a menacing threat for water-side communities and the destruction of Arctic ecosystems. A lesser known but perhaps an even more frightening problem is the high traces of carbon-monoxide present the polar ice has accrued in the past millennia as a result of volcanic eruptions and other natural disasters. The melting of the ice will result in a feedback effect, as the released methane will contribute to further global warming and therefore more methane releases. The loss of ice is has other ominous implications. One important quality of ice is that it reflects sunlight off its surface, which mitigates global warming. However, in what is known as the ice-albedo feedback, the melting ice leaves the ground beneath exposed. Soil, being darker reflects less light and therefore traps more heat on the ground, thereby exacerbating global warming.

It is possible to conceive of another feedback effect; one which is a result of resource exploitation. As was mentioned before, states are primarily interested in the economic benefits of the Arctic. As such, they intend to explore the previously inaccessible areas of the arctic, setup suitable facilities, and then extract them – particularly, oil and gas. These resources will be transported to the south via pipelines and tankers, ready to be used by millions of consumers. Needless to say, these resources will be used to fuel our daily activities, releasing carbon dioxide, which is responsible for global warming. Indeed, global warming begets even more global warming. However, the picture is even grimmer given that the very processes of extracting and transporting these resources – particularly, oil – is rife with problems. As was demonstrated in the recent oil spill in the Mexican Gulf and dozens of more such incidents in the past, the exploitation of Arctic resources poses severe ecological risks.

Conclusion

It has been established that global warming poses a severe risk to the environment; but at the same time, it will have some benefits, particularly for the Arctic states. This is where a different kind of problem emerges. Any hypothetical solution to the situation in the Arctic, or vis-à-vis global warming, requires goodwill, cooperation and sacrifice. Realists and liberals have tried to explain international cooperation in various ways. Realists argue that a hegemonic state or a bloc of states set up their own regimes and can thus force their will on other states and induce other states to cooperate on a given issue. Liberals, on the other hand, assert that international institutions are founded by groups of states who wish to pursue their interests through contractual agreements with other states. According to them, regimes promote cooperation by reinforcing values, providing information, facilitating dialogue and punishing defectors. In either case, there will always be defectors who place their interests before the common good.
The grim reality is that some states actually benefit from global warming and therefore will not have any incentive to participate in efforts to combat it. Leaving aside the burdens of emission reductions, global warming is likely to produce favorable climate changes for some countries. While the global reduction of emissions is a matter of life and death for small-island nations like Tuvalu; countries in the Arctic, for example, may actually prefer global temperatures to continue rising so that they may experience shorter, more pleasant, winters. So, in an ironic twist, the very existence of global warming is a reason why some states are unlikely to have any interest in the immediate success of environmental agreements. For example, while Russia has “agreed” to reduce its emissions prior to COP-15, its stated goal of a “25% reduction on 1990 levels” actually means that Russia is allowing itself to increase its current emissions by another 30% until 2020.

A strategically significant area of the world, the Arctic is an area home to many disputes. It is abundantly clear that global warming is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the littoral states of the Arctic will benefit immensely from access to new natural resources and tourism, and access to shorter shipping routes. On the other hand, global warming will become a new source of security problems the states of the Arctic as ships of other nations and non-state actors will have the opportunity to take part in Arctic affairs.

Aside from increasing competition and tensions among Arctic states, global warming is exacerbating many environmental problems in the Arctic and is transforming the Arctic into a focal point for global problems. It is clear that both the territorial problems between Arctic states and global warming must be mitigated. Nevertheless, despite the dictates of commonsense, there are many obstacles - most important of which is a lack of trust - to reaching a satisfactory arrangement that would effectively combat global warming. The problems of Arctic powers are more likely to be alleviated because there are a limited number of actors who happen to share many similar characteristics. Cooperation is more likely among a limited number of homogenous actors because such states would be aware of the interests of its counterparts and this would promote greater understanding and build confidence among the states, thereby increasing cooperation.

24 Ibid.
156
Bibliography


Young, Oran R. "The Age of the Arctic." Foreign Policy, no. 61 (1985): 160-79.
35th Anniversary Conference

35th anniversary of the Foreign Policy Institute was commemorated at a Conference on “Eastern Mediterranean” held at the Bilkent Hotel on Wednesday, November 4th, 2009.

At the beginning of the Conference Mr. Seyfi Taşhan, President of the Institute, Prof. Ali Doğramacı, Rector of the Bilkent University, and Ambassador Halit Çevik, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, addressed the audience, composed mostly of the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Ankara and academics from different Universities. They emphasized the increasing role of Turkey in its neighborhood and the importance of the work carried by the Institute in its considerably long existence. The Rector also informed the audience of the plans to start a video-conference programme with the Universities in Baghdad, Musul and Kerkuk during the forthcoming weeks.

On the occasion of the anniversary, the Institute had published a special issue of its quarterly “Dış Politika – Foreign Policy” where some articles in its past issues had been compiled analyzing important foreign policy issues of Turkey over different periods (the Cold War years, final years of the Cold War, post Cold War and the present stage). This new edition of the quarterly was introduced by Prof. Ersin Onulduran, Chair of International Relations Department of the Ankara University and a Board member of the Institute.

Meanwhile, another recent publication of the Institute was on “Eastern Mediterranean” from which the Conference had assumed its title and it was introduced by its editor Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, of the Bilkent University and also a Board member of the Institute. Furthermore, a panel consisting of other Board members of the Institute discussed different issues related with this particular region. Prof. Meliha Altunışık, Chair of the International Relations Department at METU, addressed the Palestine-Israel dispute and Ambassador Reşat Arım addressed the Cyprus dispute. Security in the Eastern Mediterranean was discussed by Prof. Ali Karaomaoğlu of the Bilkent University and Turkey’s outlook at the region by Ambassador Oktay Aksoy. The Panel was presided by Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı, Chairman of the International Relations Department of the Bilkent University and Board member of the Institute.

The Conference was concluded with a live debate on the presentations.
Speech by Seyfi Taşhan at the 35th Anniversary Conference

On behalf of the Foreign Policy Institute I would like to welcome you all to this Conference marking the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Foreign Policy Institute. Such anniversaries usually call for a conceptual review of the past and a desire to remember when and how the Institute was formed and where we are now and where we are going. In this conference we will try to do this in the brief hours ahead of us. We have chosen the language of the conference as English, because this is also coincides with the meeting of me diplomatic discussion group.

Foreign Policy Institute came into being in 1974 after the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus when domestic national consensus was being tested and when our allies failed to understand the Raison D'etre of the Turkish action. Yet the Cold War was continuing in all its vehemence amidst attempts to create a détente between the two blocs.

For many years to come until the break down of the Soviet Union we were the only foreign policy NGO in this country trying both to analyze Cold War issues together with partner institutes in America and Western Europe, we were taking part in international efforts to further the détente process by becoming partner with Western Institutes working towards the same purpose. Among others, I would like to mention our role in the East-West Security Studies Institute based in New York, the European Strategy Group, the regular Conferences of the European Institutes for International relations.

Even before Turkey’s application for full membership we brought together several German, Italian, British and French institutes to prepare ground for Turkey’s eventual membership. In those difficult years of 1970s we organized two major conferences one with the EU and the other with a European-American group. Cold War years were important times with dialogue with institutes on both sides of the divide. We published many books and articles to advance Turkish views.

In parallel with Turkey’s globalizing its economic policies Turkish companies enlarged their activities into various neighboring countries. Similarly we began NGO dialogue and conferences with our neighbors in the south and East, while maintaining our vigilance into the security dimension in the continuing Cold War.

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s geopolitics assumed a uniquely important place in Eurasia. In those years many people thought that Turkey constituted a bridge between Europe and the Middle East while remaining marginal as in the Cold War period with both East-West and North and South. However, the changes in international conjecture led to a shift in the basic patterns of Turkish foreign policy that moved gradually from realistic model to an omni-directional liberal set of relationship.
It soon became evident that a bridge was no longer an appropriate definition of Turkey's place in its region. Despite vicissitudes of the chronic disputes in Turkey's neighborhood, Turkey was no longer marginal or a bridge. It was becoming a center for its region for matters of economy, security, culture and crisis management. I had underlined this central role at a lecture at the Chatham House in 1992.

During the current period Turkey is no longer obliged in its foreign policy conduct to give utmost priority to security concerns and was able to lead a policy pattern that laid greater emphasis on its national interests.

The special volume of the Foreign Policy Journal which will be presented this afternoon by Professor Ersin Onulduran depicts all these developments in articles published earlier in the Journal.

It is because of the new omni directional foreign policy in recent years we have been more engaged with the developments in our neighborhood in all directions. In the course of the year we have published two books on our neighbors. The first one covered the Black Sea region. Today we are happy to present you a book on Eastern Mediterranean, the editor of the book, Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kıbaroğlu will present a general review of the volume. This will also be the main theme of our Conference and our speakers Professor Meliha Altunisik, Ambassador Reşat Arım and Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu will discuss the chronic disputes and overall security issues in the region and Ambassador Oktay Aksoy will present a Turkish perspective for the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

The keynote inauguration speakers will be our rector Professor Ali Dogramaci and is the absence His Excellency Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ambassador Halit Çevik, Deputy Undersecretary of the Foreign Minister will speak on his behalf. However, before proceeding with the main part of the conference, I have a long list of Institutions and personalities to whom we owe gratitude for the guidance, help, support and protection they have given to our Institute in the past 35 years. The list is so long but because of time restrictions I can only mention a few. My first gratitude is for Presidents Özal, Demirel and Gül who have helped the work of the Institute in many occasions. Secondly, we owe much to our Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Ministers of the past 35 years who have not only given us material and moral support but have also cooperated with us. Personally, it was the greatest honor for me to be given a distinguished service award by our foreign Ministry; this has given us great encouragement in our work.

On behalf of the Institute and the participants I must express my thanks to Foreign Minister Davutoğlu who has not only accepted to take this meeting under his patronage. I cannot fail to express the gratitude of our Institute to our honorary President İhsan Dogramaci and our Rector Professor Ali Dogramaci who have given us hospitality and every kind of assistance and support during the past decade. I must thank our Rector also for accepting to make an inauguration address. Needless to say the Institute has had great support and guidance from its Board members, all highly distinguished personalities and from many other distinguished academics, diplomats and experts who have contributed to me work of the Institute.
During the past 35 years of activity we have for many years been the only Turkish think tank carrying the burden and honor of the task in Turkey; in recent years we have many new centers that share the work with us. There is important work for us ahead. As a Turkish poet Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı once said “35 years is only the half of the way”. We are looking forward to the other half with new ideas and renewed energy.