

**“The Turkomans of Iraq as A Factor in Turkish
Foreign Policy: Socio-Political and Demographic
Perspectives”**

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This paper was written with two clear purposes in mind. First is the aim of making assessment as to the current presence of the Turkomans in Iraq and the second is to draw an analysis as to the current Turkish foreign policy in regard to northern Iraq. In doing so, the underlying motive lying behind this study has been an attempt at working out some new openings for the Turkish foreign policy towards northern Iraq, which would certainly imply the figuring out of Turkomans in Iraq as a more effective policy option needed to be capitalized on by Turkish foreign policy makers.

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INTRODUCTION

There are two main research interests in this paper. Making an inquiry into the demographic structure of the Turkoman people residing in Iraq (though 'Turkmen' and 'Turkman' are also used, hereafter 'Turkoman' will be used) will be followed by a further analysis as to how the existence of the Turkomans in Iraq might serve Turkey's interests in the region. While doing this, I will also examine the ways as to how Turkey might contribute to the betterment of Turkomans' life. Throughout the paper, I will mainly deal with the political aspect of the Turkoman life in Iraq with a view to better comprehending the contemporary history of these people since the establishment of Monarchy in Iraq. Despite the fact that a large literature exists on the cultural and social aspects of Turkoman life in Iraq, I will avoid of engaging in those aspects.

Constituting one of the three major entities of the modern Iraqi State, the Turkomans have been the least advantageous of them. Since the foundation of Iraq in the aftermath of the First World War, the existence of Turkomans has been denied by the official regimes in Baghdad in accordance with the state policy of 'Arabization'. It was the attempt at sealing the border with Turkey that motivated the Baghdad regime and their protector, Britain, to deliberately ignore the existence of the Turkoman people in the early years of Iraq. To the British and official circles in Baghdad, the presence of a large Turkish entity in the parts of Iraq bordering Turkey seems to have constituted a impediment in the process of state building in Iraq. (1)

Having strengthened the external borders, the next step of the Iraqi regimes was to create a nation state on the basis of Arabic identity. From an Arabist perspective, the fact that the overwhelming majority of the northern part of the country consists of the Kurdish and Turkish people was a problem needed to be tackled with. The policy of 'Arabization' was set into motion by Baghdad as soon as Iraq came into being. However, the process of Arabization was accelerated with the ascendancy of the Ba'athist rule into power in the 1960s. Since then, the Turkomans have been put under intensive pressure by the official regime and life has been made difficult for them as each year went by with the Ba'ath rule in Baghdad.

This paper consists of two main parts. The first part discusses the demographic aspects of the Turkoman community in Iraq in an effort to better understand the contemporary history of these people. The first section under this part will stress on the historical presence of the Turkomans in Iraq. Then, I will continue with the section on the demographic aspect of the

Turkomans. The major aim, in this part, is to estimate the Iraqi Turkoman population. Estimating the current Turkoman population in Iraq is a difficult task to do due to the lack of reliable sources to avail of. I need to admit at this stage that many of the sources, on which I had to rely in making estimations of the Turkoman population, are of Turkish or Turkoman origins. The reason for this lies in the scarcity of the western sources related with the issue. All foreign sources take a similar pattern to draw their estimations on the official records of the Iraqi government, which the Turkomans think reflect political motives. In addition to Turkoman and western sources, there are also some Kurdish studies on the demographic structure of the Turkoman people in Iraq. As an exemplary I will refer to one of them, which is thought of being reflecting a proto-Kurdish view on the issue.

The next section, following population, will be on the settlement issue of the Turkomans in Iraq. Aiming at pointing to the places where Turkomans live in Iraq, this section is mainly descriptive and short compared to the others.

After the part on settlement, I will give a sketch of the political-demographic history of the Turkoman people in the contemporary Iraqi State. In doing so, the underlying interest is to make an analysis of the situation of the Iraqi Turkomans as far as their relationships with the official regime in Baghdad and Kurdish entities in northern Iraq are concerned. Whether or not there is an observable 'up-down' trend in the situation of these people constitutes my fundamental interest.

I will then make some general points regarding the socio-political history of the Turkomans in Iraq. The aim in this section will be to uncover some observable regularities in the Turkomans' life in Iraq.

The second part of the paper will be about Turkey's foreign policy regarding the developments in northern Iraq. The underlying research interest here is to make an inquiry into the current Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq. I will mainly try to assess the credibility of the policy of supporting Saddam in the expectation that only a strong Saddam can guarantee the territorial integrity of Iraq. Based on this assessment, I will further ascertain the possibility whether Turkey could take up the option of Turkomans in Iraq so as to realize her interests in a more satisfactory way. While doing this, a special attention will be paid to the discussions revolving around the future shape of Iraq. Whether Iraq will continue to live with Saddam or end up having with a new regime, likely to take place following either a coup or a popu-

lar insurgency, will definitely have impacts on the future conditions of the Turkomans, as well as the Turkish foreign policy towards the region.

The paper will end with a conclusion by recapitulating the findings of the research.

ORIGINS

Even though the Turkic origin people living in Iraq are generally called differently as 'Turkomans', 'Turkmens' or 'Turkmans', it should not be misunderstood that these people are not coming from the same Turkish origin, so do the Turks of Anatolia and Azarbaijan. There were mainly two occasions when The Turkomans of Iraq were intentionally called 'Turkmens' mainly for political reasons. The first occasion took place during the Losusanne negotiations when the British delegates made the point that these Turkic origin people were different from the Turks of Anatolia in that the former came to Iraq from the steps of Central Asia and they are the direct descendants of Turkmen people who used to live in today's Turkmenistan.

The second occasion emerged in the aftermath of the 1958 Republican Revolution in Iraq when the new regime seriously considered to grand cultural rights to minorities in Iraq. When the Ba'ath regime granted on 24 January 1970 new cultural rights to these people, they were again called 'Turkmens'. The underlying motive behind these attempts was purely political. Both the British and the Iraqi regimes tried to cut off the links of these people with Turkey lest the latter succeeded in proving that the Iraqi Turks are the relative of Anatolian Turks and Turkey had natural rights to rule in northern Iraq. (2)

Ketene (3) claims that Turkmens are a mix of many migrating Turkish tribes mainly Oguz tribes. Though they speak a unique Turkish dialect similar to the one spoken in Azerbaijan, they use the Anatolian Turkish in writing.

As for the origins of Turkoman people in the region, there are different interpretations. The Iraqi historian Abdul-Razzak Al-Hassani asserts that the Turkoman of this region are: "part of the forces of Sultan Murad the Fourth who captured Iraq from the Saffawis in 1638 and remained in these parts to protect this route between the southern and northern Ottoman Wilayets". (4)

Tracing the origins of the Turkomans back to the remnants of the Turkoman soldiers, who served under the Abbasids, the Atabekians, and the Ottomans, is one of arguments of the Turkish sources.

According to the Turkomans themselves, this group began to settle at the foot of the mountains in northern Iraq and was a continuation of the wave of migration by Turkmen tribes coming from present-day Azerbaijan and Central Asia. (5) They migrated to Iraq during the Amawi and Abbasid eras because they were in demand by these rulers as a result of their prowess in the battle; however, they acknowledge that this period of their residence in Iraq was one of introduction rather than settlement, therefore, the Turkomans of that era were integrated to the existing population. They believe that the real settlement began during the Seljouki era and was later expanded during the Ottoman era.

According to Demirci and Hurmuzlu, the Turkoman people came to Iraq in three consecutive waves. The first era of migration occurred under the Amawis and Abbasids. The second took place during the era of Seljouki, and the final flow of Turkomans to the region occurred after the Ottoman Empire got control of this land. (6) One can surely claim that when the British tried to carve up an artificial Iraqi State out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War, the region was to a great extent a part of the broader area of Turkish Culture. (7)

POPULATION

According to all Turkoman people I have interviewed the estimation of the current population of the Turkomans residing in Iraq is a daunting task to do mainly for two reasons. One concerns the relative lack of official and objective sources as to the Turkoman population in Iraq. Given that the only reliable official source cited by the people I have interviewed is the 1957 Iraqi census, the urgency of the situation becomes more palpable.

The second reason relates to the population movements of the Iraqi Turkomans within Iraq due to the official state policy to decompose the Turkish character of the Turkoman regions. It is even attested to by the interviewees that the current Turkoman population in Iraq can not be accurately calculated due to these intra-country population movements, mainly caused by the assimilation policy of the regime in Baghdad. (8)

I have observed that the lack of accurate information regarding the Turkoman population in Iraq sometimes led my interviewees to make highly speculative statements. To give an example, Kerkuk talked about the places of Turkoman population in Iraq, particularly the traditionally Turkoman-populated areas of northern Iraq, in the following terms: The inner of Erbil is

Turk, outer is Kurd; both inner and outer of Kerkuk are Turk; and inner of Mosul is Arab while the outer is Turk. (9)

Before making any estimation of the Turkoman population in Iraq, one should concede that it is a very difficult task to do because the figures of the Iraqi official censuses were not disclosed to the public except the one conducted in 1957, whose results were announced in 1959. All later projections of Turkoman population in Iraq had to rely on results of the above-mentioned census.

Although this is the case with the contemporary sources, one might claim that the Ottoman sources might be helpful in making predictions about the Turkoman population in Iraq. However, this is impossible because of the fact that all Ottoman censuses in relation to the region reflect the numbers of people on the basis of their religion, not ethnicity. Because people were asked to identify themselves with their religion, estimation of Turkoman population during the Ottoman Empire is impossible. For example the detailed study of Marufoglu, titled 'the Northern Iraq during the Ottoman Empire' documents the figures of Ottoman censuses in relation to the region on the basis of religion. (10)

In the hope that the historical developments in relation to northern Iraq might shed some light on the population issue, I would like to refer to the Mosul question, which followed the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic as the Turkish attempts at incorporating the Mosul region into Turkey were accelerated. Following the war of independence Turkish attempts at incorporating Mosul into the newly established Turkish Republic did not cease as this region was mentioned within the contours of 'Ahd-i Milli', which was accepted by the last Ottoman Parliament on 28 January 1920.

As far as the population of the aforementioned region is concerned, the statistical figures, which the Turkish delegates presented during the Lou-sanne negotiations, puts the number of Turkish population in the region far ahead of the Arab population. However, the British estimates privilege the Arabs at the expense of Kurds and Turks. The figures given by Oke in his study on the Mosul question gives the following numbers: According to the Turkish figures, the Turks consisted of 146.960 people whereas the Arabs and Kurds 43.210 and 263.830 respectively. In stark contrast to these figures, the British statistics put the population of the Arabs at 185.763 and those of Turks and Kurds at 65.895 and 427.720 in order. (11) The significance of these finding lies in the discrepancy between the two figures regarding the Arab population. While the Turkish government claimed that the Turks and Kurds out-

number the Arabs, and therefore, Turkey had the right to incorporate this region into Turkey, the British government of that time put an effort in proving that the area is actually Arabic, hence, the borders of Turkey should not be let extend to this region.

As for the current population of the Turkomans in Iraq, there seems to exist a consensus among the western sources. According to them, the population of the Turkoman people living in Iraq does not exceed 2% of the overall Iraqi population. Most of these sources rely on the statistics provided by the Iraqi government. To a country study conducted by the Federal Research Division in the United States in 1990, the Turkoman population lingers around 220.000. (12) The results of the 1987 census gives the following numbers: The overall Iraqi population is 16.278.000, the ratio of the Arabs is 76%, of the Kurds is 19%, and of the others, including Turks, is 5%.

A very recent CIA estimate of the Iraqi population is 22.675.617 consisting of Arabs at the ratio of 75-80%, the Kurds at the ratio of 15-20%, and the others at the ratio of 5%. (13)

One independent source estimates the Iraqi population at 22.675.617 as of July 2000. Out of this figure the number of Turkoman people is less than 5%. The same source puts the ratio of Arab population at around 77% and that of Kurd at 17%. (14)

A recent Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty report estimates the Turkoman population in Iraq at not less than 16% of the Iraqi population, coming after the Kurds. (15)

A country profile estimates the Iraqi population around 21.7 million, of which the Turkomans constitute less than 5%. (16)

Another western source, under the heading of 'Indexes of People in Iraq' estimates the Iraqi Turkman population at 1 million. (17)

In contrast to the Iraqi and western sources, the Turkoman sources give different numbers regarding the population of the Turkomans. As a reaction to the denial of their fair existence, which was made evident in the censuses of 1927, 1934, 1947, 1957, 1965, 1977 and 1987, Iraqi Turkomans try to prove that these official figures do not reflect the truth. By no means, according to them, the Iraqi Turkomans can be making up just 2% of the overall Iraqi population. For example, Köprülü claims that the overall Turkoman population in Iraq living in Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Selahattin, Diyala and Baghdad is above 2 million at the worst prediction. (18)

Another Turkoman source estimates the overall Turkoman population in Iraq to be around 2.5 million. The Province of Mosul has 450.000 Turkomans, making up 40% of the regional population. The Province of Erbil has 215.000 Turkomans at the ratio of 35%. The province of Al-Tamim, which includes Kirkuk as well, has 300.000 Turkomans at the ratio of 65%. The province of Salahaddin has 300.000 Turkomans at the ratio of 60%. The province of Diyala has 220.000 Turkomans at the ratio of 33%. Lastly, the capital city Baghdad has 300.000 Turkomans. (19)

Another Turkoman figure, Mustafa Ziya, the representative of the Turkmen National Front in Turkey, estimates the current Turkoman population in Iraq around 2.600.000 making up 10-12% of Iraqi population. The population in and around Talafer, the biggest city within the Mosul province, is around 1.000.000. Arbil has a Turkoman population of 300.000. The center of Kirkuk has 350.000 Turkomas, while the environs of Kirkuk have 650.000 Turkomans Lastly Baghdad has 300.000 Turkomans. (20)

According to Demirci and many other Turkish and Turkoman scholars the populations of Turkoman people in Iraq cannot be less than 10-15 percent of the overall Iraqi population. In Demirci's study, the 1957 census puts the Iraqi population at 6.300.000 and the Turkoman population at 567.000. (21) The importance of the 1957 census lies in the fact that this was the first and last Iraqi census, which allowed the Turkoman people to register themselves as Turks. In other censuses conducted later, the "Turkoman" category under the section of "nationalities" was dropped out but these people were given the right to state their languages as a sign of their nationalities. Therefore, all the estimates of Turkoman population using the statistics of post-1957 censuses relied on the numbers of people who stated that they knew Turkish, alongside Arabic, and sometimes, Kurdish.

Koprulu cites the 'Inquiry' periodical, which estimated the number of Turkoman population in Iraq in 1987 around 1.500.000 out of 16 million Iraqi people. The percentage of Turkoman people in Iraq is around 9% of Iraqi population. (22)

In an article Demirci gives the following figures as for the population of the Turkomans in Iraq as of 1995. 310.000 Turkoman (15%) live in the region, which lies above the 36th parallel yet is not under the control of Operation Provide Control/Operation Northern Watch. He goes further to claim that the number of Turkoman who live in the area above the 36th parallel and under the control of Allies amounts to 610.000 (40%), whereas the number of Turkoman who live in and around the province of Kirkuk, which is not un-

der the control of Allied Powers, is 618.000 (65%). Moreover, he claims that the number of Turkoman people who live in the region between Kirkuk and Baghdad is estimated around 770.000. If you further add up the approximately 300.000 Turkoman who live in the capital, you would end up having an overall 2.800.000 Turkoman people making up the 16% of Iraqi population. To him the Iraqi population in 1988 is 18.100.00 and the composition of it is as follows: The Christians are 546.000 with 3%, the Kurd are 3.240.000 with 18%, the Arabs are 11.444.000 with 63% and the Turkomans are 2.880.000 with 16%. These figures put the Turkoman population in Iraq at one of their higher levels. (23)

According to Turan, 85% of Turkoman people continue to live under Saddam's rule whereas the remaining 15% live within the no-fly zone, which covers the regions of Iraq above the 36th parallel. However, Turan makes the point that when the borders of the no-fly zone was drawn in the aftermath of the Gulf war, the first and foremost aim of the Allied Powers was to free the Kurdish people from Saddam's rule. Therefore, it becomes easy to understand why Sulemaia was incorporated into the no-fly zone even though it lies under the 36th parallel whereas Mosul was excluded from this area. Given that the former is a city highly populated by Kurds and that the latter is populated by Arabs and Turkomans, one can conclude that the underlying reason behind the demarcation of the boundaries of the no-fly zone was to contribute to the emergence of a would-be independent Kurdish area in northern Iraq. (24)

Turan also expects the Turkoman population in Iraq at around 2.5 million, living in an area of 50.000 km². (25)

Another Turkoman scholar, Suphi Saatci estimates the Turkoman population in Iraq around 2.129.000 with the ratio of 12% of overall Iraqi population. To his estimates, the Iraqi population in 1990 is 17.742.000 and the composition of it is as follows: the Arabs rank first with the ratio of 60% numbering 10.645.000, the Kurds come second with the ratio of 20% numbering 3.548.000, the Turkomans follow the Kurds with the ratio of 12% numbering 2.129.000, and the other consist of 8% numbering 1.420.000. (26)

As of 1991, Lasinlioglu gives the following numbers in order to estimate the Turkoman population in Iraq. To him, 450.000 Turkomans live in around Mosul, making up 40% of the province; 215.000 living in and around Arbil, making up 35% of the province; 400.000 inhabiting the province of Kirkuk, consisting of the 75% of the province; 300.000 residing in and around Selahat-

tin, making up 60% of the province; 220.000 Turkomans living in and around Diyala, making up 33% of the province; 300.000 living in the capital. (27)

The most exaggerated Turkoman figure puts the proportion of the Turkomans at 22% of the overall Iraqi population. (28)

According to one Kurdish scholar, the majority of the northern Iraq consists of Kurds, as opposed to the counter-claims made by Turkomans. To him, in the 1920s and 1930s the Turkoman consisted of 2.1% and 2.1% of the overall Iraqi population respectively. In the 1957 census the Turkoman ranked the third among the ethnicity in Iraq at the figure of 2.16%. This number further went down to 1.15% in the 1977 census. (29)

Regarding the population of Kirkuk, which is the city claimed to be populated overwhelmingly by the Turkomans, he claims that Turkomans rank second after the Kurds with the ratios of 21.4% in 1957 and 16.75% in 1977 respectively. He puts the Turkoman population in Mosul at lower levels with ratios of 4.8% seen in 1957 and 0.99% in 1977 census.

This particular Kurdish scholar draws a picture in which he tries to show that the Kurds, rather than the Turkomans, are the majority in the northern Iraq. He even cites Shamsudin Sami (Şemsettin Sami) who describes the demography of Kirkuk at the time of his writing of famous dictionary "Qamous Al-A'ala'm" as follows: "three quarters of the inhabitants are Kurds and the rest are the Turkomanism Arabs, and others".

To lend credence to his argument that the Kurds were the majority in the area he mentions about the number of deputies in the Iraqi National Parliament during the monarchy. The fact that two thirds of the deputies in the Parliament representing Kirkuk province were Kurd, he thinks, seems to have corroborated his claim.

Despite the Turkomans' claim that they constitute the majority in their traditional areas, the Kurdish figures prefer to put the Kurds ahead of the Turkomans in the population map of the region. According to Köprülü, why some Kurdish estimates of the northern Iraqi population put the number of Kurds far ahead of the Turkomans can be attributed to a specific policy of Saddam, which was set into motion in 1980s when Iraq was fighting Iran. Fearing that the Kurdish people might have fought against the regime in Baghdad alongside with the Iranian army, Saddam tried to entice the Kurdish peshmerges to hand in their weapons in return for a promise made to them to be exempt from military service. Having seen that it become possible for the Kurdish not to serve in the army during the war, some Turkoman people also

wanted to avail of this opportunity. Therefore, they registered themselves as Kurds in the 1987 census. (30)

Having compared the three different views of the Turkoman population in Iraq, it is now the turn to look for the places where the Turkomans live in Iraq.

SETTLEMENT

The Turkoman people in Iraq live in northern Iraq on a diagonal strip of land called Turkmeneli or Turkmenland, stretching from the Syrian border in the north to the Iranian border in Central Iraq.

This area is composed of the major cities of the region and the small districts associated with those cities. Starting from Talafar in the north and ending in Mendeli in the south this region lies between the 33th and 37th parallels. Called Turkmeneli in Turkish and Turkmenland in English, this region lies between the Arabic areas of settlement to the south and Kurdish areas to the north. Reminiscent of the political history of these people, the areas of their settlement are squeezed between the Arab and Kurdish regions. The major cities in this region in a north-to-south order are Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Salahaldeen and Diala. Telafer, Sancar, Altunkopru, Kifri, Hanekin, Kizilribat, Bakuba and Mendeli are some of the districts of these cities, which are highly populated by the Turkomans. In addition to these historically Turkoman populated areas, there is also a sizeable Turkoman presence in the capital city Baghdad. (31)

TURKOMANS DURING THE CONTEMPORARY IRAQ

In order to analyze the conditions of the Turkoman people and their relationship with the Arabs and Kurds, a brief history of the contemporary Iraq should be given. For the sake of simplicity and better understanding, we will divide the contemporary Iraqi history into four time periods starting with the proclamation of the monarchy under Britain's mandate in 1921, turning a corner in 1932 with the registration of Iraq in the United Nations as an independent state, further continuing with the proclamation of the Republic in 1958, and finally having the imprints of the Ba'ath regime since 1968. It is the aim in the following lines that the situation of the Turkomans in Iraq will be analyzed in conformity with this historical framework.

Following the end of the First World War, Britain, in accordance with its policy of holding the geo-strategically important places under its control,

helped establish the Iraqi State as a monarchy under the rule of Emir Faisal Ibn Hussain in 1921. Though Iraq was granted its independence in 1930 with a treaty signed by Britain and the Iraqi Monarchy, Iraq continued to stay under the British Mandate officially until 1933 when Iraq was allowed to register as a member of the United Nations. Though Iraq continued to be a monarchy until 1958, the British governments were so influential in Iraqi politics that they could manipulate power politics in Iraq to an uncontrollable level through the enormous influence, which had over the monarch and his family.

This quasi-independent status turned an important corner in 1958 when a group of soldiers, called 'Free Officers', under the command of Brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassem overthrew the monarchy and took the control into their hands on 14 July 1958. Qassem was assassinated in February 1963, when Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party Members took power under the leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr as prime minister and Colonel Abdul Slam Arif as president. After nine months Colonel Arif ousted the Ba'athists from the government and consolidated his own rule, which was to continue until 1968 when the Ba'athists came back strong and determined to take the reign of the country into their hands. On 17 July 1968 Ba'athists overthrow Arif and Ahmed Hasan al Bakr became president and the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Bakr ruled Iraq until July 1979 when Saddam Hus-sain came to power through a bloodless intra-Ba'ath putsch. Since then, Iraq has been under the rule of Saddam.

Even though the process of granting political rights to the Turcomans of Iraq seems to have started with the inclusion of a Turcoman in the first Iraqi interim cabinet in 1920, hopes for more participation in the political life were soon dashed as the following years saw no such inclusions of Turkomans in governments.

It was the question of Mosul that matters in the Kingdom era as far as the Turkoman presence in Iraq is concerned. The dispute over the provinces of Mosul and Kerkuk was highly contested between the newly born Turkish State on the one hand and Britain and Iraq on the other. Even though the Mosul problem was resolved to the disadvantage of Turkey with the Ankara Treaty of 1926, the Turkish claims to the region were based on solid grounds. The Turkish claim to the region was predicated on the population structure of Mosul and Kirkuk in that the majority of this region consisted of Turks. This Turkish claim was corroborated by the statistical figures that put the Turkoman and Kurdish population far ahead of the Arabs. Even though a plebiscite was never undertaken in the region, the British fears that the result

of such a plebiscite would most probably yield pro-Turkish results seems to have lent credence to the Turkish claim.

This point was further consolidated by the proclamation of the 1925 constitution, which implicitly recognized the Turkish entity in Iraq as one of the constitutive elements of the newly established Iraqi State. This can be inferred from the fact that this constitution was written in all spoken languages used in Iraq, including Turkish. (32) However this is the case, it needs to be pointed out that, there was no mentioning of any single word associated with the Turkoman identity whatsoever in the constitution.

On the way to the 1925 constitution lies the landmark draft constitution of 1920, which states through its 14th article that Turks are one of the constitutive people making up the Iraqi nation together with Arabs and Kurds. (33)

There is a consensus among Turkoman scholars whom I interviewed that neither the original text of the 1925 constitution nor the later revised forms of the same constitution either in late 1925 and in 1943 utters a single word in the recognition of Turkoman presence in Iraq. These sources point out that this constitution does not include any word directly related with either the Turkomans or Kurds in Iraq. The only positive thing about this constitution is its acceptance that all people residing in Iraq are equal before the law irrespective of their religion, ethnicity and language. Conceived in the ideal sense, the clauses stressing the equality of the Iraqi people might be regarded as the greatest achievement of the Turkomans. However, despite all statements of equality and privileges concerning their rights to use their own languages in education and interactions with state authorities, the Turkoman community could not see the proper implementation of this constitution by the Baghdad regime.

The 1925 constitution allowed the Turkomans and other ethnicity to use their own language in their schools. Moreover, through this constitution all Iraqi nationals were put on an equal footing before the law. There was no discrimination against any particular ethnicity on the basis of majority-minority relationship. In the interim constitutions of 1958, 1968 and 1990 only Arabs and Kurds were mentioned as constitutive people of the Iraqi nation whereas the Turkomans were categorized under the clause of minorities. (34) If one observes a trend in the constitutional process of Iraq, by comparing the 1925 constitutions with those of 1957 and 1968, it might be claimed that there has taken place a gradual deterioration of the situation of Turkomans.

An important milestone in the constitutional process, as far as the Turkomans are concerned, took place in 1932 with the declaration of the Iraqi

government following the membership of Iraq in the League of Nations. In this historical document Turkomans was classified as one of the minorities living in Iraq with special rights to education and other aspects of life. (35)

It was with the 1932 declaration that the Iraqi government, for the first time, recognized the Turkomans as one element of the Iraqi nation, though as a minority. Through a declaration, read out by the Prime Minister Nouri Saaid in the wake of Iraq's entry to the League of Nations as an independent country, Turkish language was accepted as one of the official languages in the Turkoman populated areas. The importance of the declaration lies in the fact that for the first time Turkomans were mentioned within an official declaration. (36)

With the 1932 declaration of the Iraqi government and the revisions in the 1925-constitution, the first seeds of discrimination against the Turkoman community were sowed. From then on, Iraqi Turkomans was regarded as a minority under special protection. Arabic was made the only official language. Turkish and Kurdish languages were allowed to become official languages only in the areas of Turkish and Kurdish concentration. Though rights to use their own languages both in education and transactions with the state were protected by laws, this situation began to take on an 'up-down' character following the fall of Hikmet Suleiman from the government in 1938. Since then, the cultural and educational rights of Turkomans were seriously curbed by the successive regimes in Baghdad, though not at the same level of severity as with the Ba'ath rule.

The hopes of the Turkoman community to have better treatment under the republication rule established by the coup of Free Officers in 1958 seem to have been bolstered by the announcement of the leaders of the coup in radio that Iraq consist of Arabs, Kurds and Turks. However, this announcement become void with the proclamation of the 1958 interim constitution, which only recognized Arabs and Kurds as constitutive people of Iraq.

An important turning point in the history of the Turkomans in the contemporary Iraq took place with the proclamation by the Ba'athist regime of cultural rights for the Turkomans on 24 January 1970. The backbone of these cultural rights consists of the rights for the Turkomans to have their schools and prints in their own language.

OBSERVATIONS

In what follows I would like to make some general points as to the general conditions of the Turkomans during the contemporary Iraqi history.

The first point that warrants attention is that the destiny of the Turkoman people in the northern Iraq was held hostage to the relation between Arabs and Kurds. The history saw that whenever the Arabs were in open conflict with Kurds and the Kurds challenged the Iraqi authority in their region in an effort to gain regional autonomy, the Arabic rulers of the country showed sympathy towards the Turkomans. Many of the Turkoman and Turkish sources argue that the destiny of the Turkomans has been indexed to the Kurdish-Arabic political struggle over the Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. Whenever the relations between the regime in Baghdad and the Kurdish fractions living in Northern Iraq soured and became tense, the relative position of Turkoman community improved compared to the situations in which Arabs and Kurds had an understanding and better relationships. (37)

The conditions of the Turkoman people after the 1968 Ba'ath coup demonstrates this point well. Although the new regime declared in 1970 that new cultural rights would be given to the Turkoman, those were never implemented. After the Ba'ath regime signed an accord with the Kurdish fractions in the mid-1970s granting them an autonomy, the conditions of the Turkomans started to deteriorate again. Once the need to gain the support of the Turkomans against the Kurds withered away, the Arabic establishment began to forget the promises they made to these people in 1970 whereby the Turkoman community was going to have better cultural and educational rights. That is exactly what happened in the mid-1970s in the aftermath of the historical understanding struck between the regime in Baghdad and the Kurdish fractions in the northern Iraq.

The same way of thinking seems to have captured the logic of the cordial relationship between the Arif Brothers' regimes in Baghdad and Turkoman people in northern Iraq. In 1963, Colonel Arif and his nationalistic brothers in arm toppled Kasim and established an anti Kurdish and anti communist rule in Iraq. When a military struggle with the Kurdish fractions started, the new regime sought to seek the support of the Turkomans in northern Iraq. In addition to this anti-Kurdish attitude of the new regime, the fact that Arif brothers had Turkish origins within their family tree led them to develop pro-Turkoman views.

While the Turkoman sources mention the coup of Arif and the establishment of his regime in Iraq as one of the best periods in the history of the

Turkoman people (38), the Kurdish scholars see this period as one of the ominous periods in the history of Kurdish people, since the Arif regime executed the Kurdish instigators of the 1959 Kerkuk massacre of Turkomans and that Arif was tolerant towards Turkoman people due to his family lineage. (39)

The second point that I would like to make concerns the character of the regime in Baghdad. Whenever pro-British and non-pan-Arabic nationalistic regimes reigned in Baghdad, the conditions of Kurdish and Turkoman ethnicity were better compared to the times of pan-Arabic-nationalism in the capital. The long period of monarchy attests to this point. When pro-British prime minister Nouri and King Faisal reigned in the capital, pressures on the Kurds and Turkomans were relatively less compared to pan-Arabic Ba'ath rule since 1968. The reason of this situation seems to be attributed to the British policies of preventing Arab nationalistic forces from gaining the rule in the capital, and of preventing any ethnic community (in this case the Arabs) from overruling the others on its own.

This British Policy seems to be one of the reasons why the constitution of 1925 seems to have implied, implicitly though, that the Turks are one of the constitutive elements of Iraq. We see that this situation changed in the 1970 and 1990 constitutions where there is no reference to Turkomans as one of the constitutive parts. Only Arabs and Kurds were mentioned as such.

Compared to the open hostility of the Republican regimes, Iraqi Turkomans lived relatively better times under the reign of monarchy, at least as far as individuals are concerned. However this is the case, Koprulu claims that the first ten to twenty years of the monarchy seem to dilute the accuracy of this finding. To him, the Baghdad regime orchestrated a de-Turkification campaign in the region, with the full support of Great Britain, in order to stifle nationalistic zeal of the Turkoman people to see Turkey's rule in their areas. If one recalls that those were the years when Turkey was trying to incorporate Mosul region into her territories and that the newly established Iraqi monarchy was endeavoring to strengthen her frontiers, this thinking might warrant a special hearing.

Given that Turkish claims to these oil-rich areas were strong due to the Turkish character of the region and that there was a strong political will in Turkey to annex Mosul and its vicinity into Turkey, Britain and her cronies in Baghdad might have attempted at diluting the Turkish character of the northern Iraq. (40)

As far as the post-Gulf War period, Koprulu argues that the western community of states began to accept the Turkoman reality in Iraq. However, he continues to argue that this acceptance of Turkish reality did not come about for the sake of the Turkomas living in Iraq but within the general anti-Saddam campaign set into motion in the aftermath of the Gulf War. To him, once the West felt that Turkoman support might also be enlisted for its anti-Saddam campaign, they began to be aware of the Turkish reality in the region. (41)

Despite the recognition of this reality, Koprulu goes on to claim that this recognition has not envisioned a Turkish autonomous region in a possible post-Saddam Iraq. This has, according to him, become evident in the demarcation of the boundaries of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. That all the places, where the ethnic identity is overwhelmingly Kurdish, are included within the contours of no-fly zone seems to lend credence to this logic. The fact that the Turkoman-dominated areas were not included within the boundaries of the no-fly zone seems to prove the western thinking that only the Kurdish people should possess the right to have regional autonomy in a post-Saddam period and that Turkomans should not be let dream of any-autonomy-like future. (42)

In other words, the West sees that the future of the Turkomans in Iraq has to lie with that of the Arabs. Köprülü claims that this is not bad at all provided that their educational, social and cultural right be granted and made constitutional. After all, he points out that, the Turkomans have never revolted against the regime in Baghdad and have never wished the territorial dismemberment of Iraq, and they would be happy to see the continuity of the territorial integrity of the country, rather than being exposed to counter-territorial claims of the Kurds in the north and the Arabs in the south. (43)

The third point I would like to make relates to the intentions and policies of the regimes in Baghdad to change the demographic structure of the northern Iraq where Kurds and Turkomans outnumber the Arabs by far margins. These policies started soon after the proclamation of the Monarchy in 1921 and gained momentum and a new face with the coming of the Ba'ath regime to power. The gist of the Arabisation, or put it differently as 'de-Turkification', policies are based on the concurrent claim of the British and Arab authorities to Kurdify the Irbil area and to Arabise the Mosul area, where the Turkomans constituted the bulk of the population. By enticing the Arabs families to come to the Turkoman areas with a view to settling there, the Baghdad regime have been paying large sums of money to them. Those Arabs who would like to marry Turcoman girls are given attractive rewards.

Those Turkomans who work in the civil service are forced to move to other parts of Iraq. They would have lost their jobs otherwise.

In addition to these, the Ba'ath regime shrunk the size of the City of Kirkuk nearly half and incorporated the Turkoman dominated provinces into Arab dominated cities with a view to decompose the Turkish characters of those regions. (44)

The establishment of the Iraqi Oil Company in 1925 provided the regime with the opportunity to bring in Arab people to the area from the other parts of Iraq. This trend continued up until today.

The Ba'ath regime of 1968 started a policy of Arabization of the northern Iraq at the expense of Turkomans and Kurdish people. Since then the proportion of the Arabic people living in Northern Iraq, the traditional areas of Turkoman and Kurdish settlement, increased dramatically. The figures given by Nouri seem to have confirmed this point. While the Kurdish people consisted of 48.3% of the Kirkuk Governorate in the 1957 census, this went down to 37.53% in the 1977 census. The figures for the Turkoman changed from 21.4% in 1957 to 16.31% in 1977. The sharp increase in the Arabic population from 28.2% in 1957 to 44.41% in 1977 explains the fall in the numbers of others. (45)

Another reason of the flow of Turkomans from their traditional areas of settlement to other parts of Iraq, especially the capital Baghdad, stems from economic considerations. Since the Ba'ath regime made it difficult for the Turkomans either to run their own businesses or to get involved in other aspects of economic life in northern Iraq, it turned into a necessity for some of the Turkomans to flee these areas and seek their chance in other places. They thought that it would be easy for them to be active in economic life and to be able to avail of economic incentives, such as taking credits from banks or being allowed to buy and sell their properties, without denying their distinctive identities. (46)

According to Köprülü, the policy of forced migration of the Turkoman people from their original places to other parts of the country, where they would become minority, was intended to dilute to the Turkish character of the Turkoman places, of which Kerkuk is the most ostensible one, and to assimilate Turkomans either within Arabs in the south or Kurds in the north. (47)

Suphi Saatci claims that the Turkoman people in Kirkuk have been exposed to unbearable pressures coming from the Saddam regime. He points out that Turkoman people are allowed to stay in Kirkuk and get involved in

economic life provided that they disclaim their Turkoman identity, which they registered in the 1957 census, and to re-register themselves as Arabs. This is a well-intended policy of discrimination against the Turkoman people. (48)

It is not only the intra-country population movements caused by the forced assimilation policies of the Baghdad regime but also the migration of Iraqi Turkomans outside the country that effects the population structure of this community in Iraq. According to Hasan Özmen, nearly 25.000 Turkomas left Iraq for Turkey during the great exodus in the aftermath of the second Gulf War in 1991. Of whom, only 6.000 decided to stay in Turkey. (49)

In conformity with the general policy of 'Arabization', the Iraqi Turkomans have been exposed to severe limitations of their fundamental human rights. Documented by Koprulu in a very detailed brochure published in 1992, (50) it suffices here to say that consecutive Iraqi governments have not honored their commitments toward the Turkomans arising from the treaties they signed.

The latest constitution of Iraq, dated July 1990, does only recognize the Arabs and Kurds as the constitutive parts of Iraq. There is no mention of the Turkomans in the related article of the aforementioned constitution, article 6, to that effect. (51)

In overt violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Turkomans were denied the rights to have peaceful assembly and association; to buy and sell property; to travel freely within the country and to leave the country he resides; to express thoughts of various kind freely; to be exempt from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment; to be equal before the law; to be exempt from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; to be exempt from arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, attacks upon his honor and reputation; to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives; to have equal access to public service in his country; to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests; to freely participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

Furthermore, it seems to be worth paying attention that the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad has frequently been resorting to tactics so as to spark anti-Kurdish feelings among the Turkoman people and vice versa. For example, Koprulu argues that the reason why Saddam let the statutes of two Turkoman figures, who were massacred by the Kurds during the 1959 bloody

events in Kerkuk, be built in the central squares of Kerkuk lies in his sinister intention to keep anti-Kurdish feelings among the Turkomans refreshed. (52)

GETTING POLITICISED?

Having observed that passive resistance could not help them improve their status, a new trend began to take root among the Turkomans with the advent of the 1990s. Tracing back to the early 1980s and gaining momentum in the aftermath of the second Gulf War, the Turkoman community began to get 'politicized'. This process of politicization became conspicuous with the establishment of political organizations, of which the Iraqi National Turkman Front is the most important one.

The first Iraqi Turkoman organization was established in 1960 with the title of 'Turkman Brotherhood Association'. As a reaction to the execution of their community leaders in 1980, the Turkomans founded the 'Iraqi National Democratic Turkman Organization' in 1981. In 1988 the 'Iraqi National Turkman Party' was founded following the suspension of the activities of the previous Turkman Organization in 1985. In April 1995 Iraqi National Turkman Front was established as an umbrella Turkman organization, uniting other Turkman parties and associations under its roof. So far, the Iraqi National Turkman Front organized two international Turkman conferences, the first one in 1997 and the second in 2000. (53)

Although the momentum of politicization is gaining support among the Turkomans, this should not mean that the Turkomans favor the dismemberment of Iraq and the establishment of a Turkoman state. On the contrary, according to Turan, the overwhelming majority of them would like to see the territorial integrity of Iraq continuing provided that their fundamental rights were granted and that their status was elevated to those of Arabs and Kurds. Their first priority continues to be the continuation of Iraq's territorial integrity and independence alongside with improved status of all suppressed people under Saddam's regime. A life in a democratic Iraq recognizing the fundamental political, economic, social and cultural rights of all Iraqi nationals would satisfy the Turkoman people more than anything else. (54)

The sincere desire of the Turkomans to see the continuation of Iraq's territorial integrity and indivisibility can be seen in the peaceful way they have been trying to improve their well-being. Having never taken up arms against the regime in Baghdad, the Turkoman community in Iraq seems to be well aware of the fact that its well-being passes through a well-planned and managed democratization process in Iraq, which would free the Turkomans

of the pressures coming from the Arabs in the south and the Kurds in the north.

In explaining the reasons why the Turkomans have never revolted against Baghdad and harbored any secessionist desire, Kerkuk refers, first, to the geographical location of the areas where Turkomans live, and second, to the level of education among Turkomans. Given that Turkoman places lie between the Kurdish and Arabic areas and that the terrain is very flat, it becomes difficult for the Turkomans to continue a secessionist movement very long. Assuming that Turkomans took up arms against the regime in Baghdad, it would not be difficult for Baghdad to overrun the Turkoman places in a counter military attack. Another reason for the disinclination of the Turkomans to take up arms against Baghdad relates to their high level of education and culture of having a settled life back to centuries ago. (55)

Having analyzed the contemporary history of the Turkomans within Iraq, the turn now is to focus on another dimension of the Turkoman reality, namely the connection with Turkey.

OPTIONS FOR TURKEY: NEW FACTS ON THE GROUND

Owing to the developments that have taken place in Northern Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey seems to have been faced with new facts to accomplish, which have counted on the formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards the region.

The new challenges confronting Turkey emanate from the new facts on the ground. First off all, Saddam has not had undisputed control of the area following the decision of the Allied Powers to forbid Iraq's forces' entry into the region lying above the 36th parallel. (56) This situation seems to have created a power vacuum in the area likely to be filled by the warring Kurdish factions. In the absence of Saddam's effective ruling in the area, the main Kurdish organizations, namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), found themselves in a unique position to act in an independent manner.

Secondly, an international campaign was set into motion in order to overthrow the official Saddam regime in Baghdad by helping organize a nation-wide opposition movement. Organized under the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the fundamental aim of this opposition movement would be to complete the job that father Bush left incomplete by not letting her soldiers to move on to the capital to finish off Saddam. (57) Though there are serious

thoughts as to whether this opposition movement has been successful in succeeding the job, to which it was assigned, it nevertheless contributed to the weakening of Saddam's legitimacy in the international arena. True, Saddam is still holding the sway in the capital, yet, there have arisen very serious doubts regarding his right of being the legitimate ruler of the country. So what is the new fact on the ground, which is likely to affect Turkey's look towards Iraq, is the question of to what extent Saddam is still the legitimate interlocutor of his Turkish counterparts.

Thirdly, and related with the previous points, Turkey had found herself in a new position in that she would have to take into account new power centers in the region while formulating her policies. Among the local power centers come the belligerent Kurdish parties of KDP and PUK first. (58) Then follow the neighboring countries Iran and Syria, which seem to have paramount interests as for the future of the region owing to their Kurdish subjects within their borders and to their common borders with Iraq. (59) Then comes the international community with the United States and Britain taking the lead. The questions lying ahead are to what extent Turkey's preferences towards the region coincide with those of the other possible actors in the area; how risky and feasible it would be for Turkey to design and implement policies in disregard of the United States and Britain; and whether Turkey has the capability of either dictating her policy options to the others or of enforcing them to take Turkish interests into consideration while formulation their policies.

Fourthly, It is a fact today that Turkey seems to have lost a significant sum of money, which would be accrued to her otherwise had the economic embargo on Saddam's regime not been imposed. The ex-president Özal's calculation that Turkey would reap there if she puts one seems to have defaulted in the face of economic losses in the wake of the economic embargo, which the international community imposed on Iraq. As Turkey implemented U.N. Security Council resolutions and economic sanctions, its costs escalated. The closure of the oil pipelines from Iraq to Turkey engendered high losses. Additional costs resulted from Turkey's loss of a major export market (Iraq) and the reluctance of foreign investors and tourists to deal with a frontline war situation. (60) According to some estimates, the closure of the pipeline incurred significant losses to Turkey with a total value of more than \$ 30 billion in the last decade. (61) So, what one can infer from this economic loss is that the ongoing situation in Iraq, meaning the continuation of the economic embargo, has been unfavorable to Turkey.

Fifthly, another fact concerning the ongoing situation in Northern Iraq seems to be that the possibility of having either a Kurdish entity independent

of Iraq or a federal Kurdish entity within the borders of Iraq would possess direct relevance for the future situation of Turkey's own Kurdish population. This effect is likely to be compounded as Turkey is eager to speed up the membership process in the European Union. If Turkey could deal with the problems of the Kurdish community in a satisfactory manner for the Kurdish people, there would not be any reason to fear of any spill over effect, which the ongoing situation in Northern Iraq is likely to trigger. A solution within the democratization process would satisfy the Kurdish people more than anything else and, thus, the northern Iraq region would not continue to be considered as a dreamland for Kurdish people, who reside outside Iraq.

The last and maybe the most relevant fact for the purpose of this paper concerns the emergence of the Turkoman entity in Iraq as a unique factor to weigh in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards the region. Owing to its new political structuring under the 'Turkmen Front', the Turkoman community in Iraq seems to have finally managed to speak as one voice, a situation desired for long yet never materialized due to the existence of many Turkoman organizations. (62) Following their participation into the Iraqi National Congress as one of the constitutive parts of it, the Turkomans seem to have a great stake in the shape of Iraq's future, for they might bear either the costs or reap the benefits of it.

In what follows the question of how Turkey might incorporate the Turkomans in her policy towards Iraq and contribute to the well being of Turkomans will be answered.

THE 'CONSTANT' IN TURKEY'S IRAQ POLICY

Since the end of the Gulf War in 1990, the major concern of the respective Turkish governments has revolved around the discussions in regard to the ongoing situation in Northern Iraq. The reason for that lies in the fact that, for the first time, the Kurdish fractions located in the area were given the chance to rule themselves on their own independent of Saddam, within a safe area, which came into being following the decision of the Allies to create a no-entry zone for Saddam's forces above the 36th parallel of Iraq. This enabled the Iraqi Kurds to master on their own administration with a possibility that they might either constitute an independent Kurdish state or one of the federal units in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Fearing that the presence of the safe-area in Northern Iraq might contribute to the existence of an independent Kurdish entity in the region, the backbone of Turkish foreign policy towards the region has been formulated

with a view to preventing any such possibility from occurring. (63) The possibility that such an independent Kurdish existence in the region might have direct impact on Turkey's Kurdish population led the Turkish foreign policy makers to make it clear that Iraq's territorial integrity and indivisibility has been the essence of Turkish approach towards the region. Since the creation of the Operation Provide Comfort in 1992, and then the replacement of it by the Operation Northern Watch in 1997, Turkey has been alert to the possibility that such a situation in the region might pave the way for an autonomous, federal or independent Kurdish rule in Northern Iraq. This anxiety was kept low while the Turkish military had been engaged in its struggle with the separatist PKK forces in the region.

Until the last year, when the Turkish military seemed to have dried up the power sources of the PKK in the region following the apprehension of PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan, Turkey appeared to have believed in the necessity that a strong authority in the region should fill the power vacuum in the region and, thus, prevent PKK from using this area for sheltering and training purposes. So Turkey tolerated the strengthening of KDP-PUK control in the region. Turkey has also acquiesced in the presence of the Operation Provide Control/Operation Northern Watch in the region, in return for tacit American support to Turkey's military incursions into the region in her attempts at finishing off PKK there. (64)

However, this situation does not seem to continue with the apparent end of the struggle against PKK. It would be highly unreasonable to argue that Turkey still harbors the same desire to see the region controlled by the Iraqi Kurdish entities.

Within this logic, what becomes clearer is that Turkey does not want to see Northern Iraq detached from Iraq's rule forever. To Turkish foreign policy makers attempts at weakening Baghdad's rule in the region on a permanent basis could spell the end of peace and stability in the region.

Looking from this perspective it would not be an overestimation to argue that Turkey should stop giving support, though tacitly, to American efforts to weaken 'Iraq-as-country' in the region. It should be made by Turkey very clear that attempts at removing 'Iraq-as-Saddam' from the rule and attempts at bringing a regime change in Iraq are not always the same things. By drawing the lines between them very clearly, Turkey should always maintain the policy of contributing to Iraq's territorial integrity, but not through giving full support to the continuation of Saddam's rule in Baghdad. The current trend is that as long as Saddam remains in power in Baghdad, the likelihood

of the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in the north increases. In other words, supporting Saddam would mean endangering Iraq's unitary character by enabling the Kurds to run for their embryonic state on their own. Acting on this assumption, Turkey has to make every effort to affect the content and style of American foreign policy towards the region in that the Americans would continue to pay utmost importance to Iraq's territorial unity and stop harboring ambitious plans as for the future of Iraq. The ideal situation for Turkey would be that Saddam be removed and the frontiers of Iraq remain intact.

Some studies point to the danger that the termination of Saddam's power in Baghdad through the channels of Iraqi Opposition Movement contributes to nothing but to the disintegration of Iraq. (65) Given that the INC consists of more than 90 Iraqi opposition movements, it will become difficult to see Iraq being ruled by a common opposition front in a post-Saddam era. If the Sunni Arab dominance were swept away with the end of Saddam's rule, Iraq's future would seem to lay nowhere but in chaos and a possible civil war. The overwhelming Shi'a population would not want to cave in Sunni minority rule again and the Kurdish fractions in the north would not want to be ruled again by the center, even though their situations were to be improved.

Even democracy in a post-Saddam Iraq cannot seem to stop the descent into disintegration while the majority Shi'a population in the south and Kurdish population in the north would not want to see the Sunni Arab rule continuing in the capital. (66)

In order for such a situation not to arise Turkey should not support the existence of a very strong Iraqi opposition movement, which would be based on the 'sole' participation of Shi'a Arabs and Kurds, challenging Iraq's territorial integrity. However, if Turkey presses for the inclusion of the Turcoman community in the opposition movement, not as a paper but as a real factor, she would hit two birds with one stone. On the one hand, she would elevate the position of the Turcomans to one of the players in the broader Iraqi games and, thus, guarantee a better future for the Turkomans in the post-Saddam era, on the other hand, she would send her sincere signals to Baghdad, or the future rulers of the country, that she supports the territorial integrity of Iraq. The second effect would take place, since the Iraqi Turkomans would play the role of pacifier against the partitionist claims of the Kurds and the Shi'a Arabs. It has been well proven that both Turkey and the Iraqi Turkomans are have been in favor of Iraq's unitary character. The first two of the Turkish foreign policy objectives towards Iraq should be that Iraq's territorial integ-

rity is respected and the situation of all repressed Iraqi nationals, including the Turkomans as well, is improved. Any solution that assists in these two goals would be welcome in Turkey. (67)

TURKOMANS AND IRAQ'S FUTURE

Turkey's policy in relation to the Turkomans is definitely related to Iraq's future in the years to come. If one asked to list the possible power configurations in Iraq in the near future, the first place would go to the possibility that Saddam is still ruling. The second likely alternative would be a new Iraq being ruled by someone like Saddam, though more respectful for both the interests of regional and global players and the constitutive parts of the state, namely Shi'a Arabs and Kurds, and the Turkomans. The least likely option would be a new Iraq where the majority Shi'a population in the south would be joining forces with the Kurdish people in the north against the present holders of power, with a view to transforming the existing political structure into a democracy.

A current analysis of these alternatives would reveal that the third option is the least likely given that a-decade-long sanctions regime against Saddam could not pave the way for the end of his rule. Neither the opposition movement supported by the United States nor the comprehensive sanctions regime set into place once the Gulf War ended could rack the ground on which Saddam's rule is based. The western hope that suffering of the Iraqi people due to the continuation of sanctions would unite them against Saddam and in the end Saddam would have to give up his throne seems to have defaulted on the facts that Saddam has been the undisputed ruler of his country over the last decade and that the opposition seems far away from putting into ground any serious alternative against Saddam. (68) Capitalizing on his people's economic suffering and on the fear of dismemberment percolated well down to the Sunni Arab elite, Saddam seems to have succeeded in preserving his rule (69) It is not likely that this situation is going to change soon.

Why the third alternative is the least likely also relate to three other points. The first concerns the obvious weaknesses of the Iraqi National Congress to mastermind such kind of a grand strategy despite the American support. The second reason stems from the objections of the regional countries against such an occurrence. The American support to any contingency vis-à-

vis Iraq's future, which foresees predominant positions for the Kurds in the north and the Shi's in the south, would certainly be rejected by Turkey on the grounds that this process might lead to disintegration of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq with destabilizing effects on Turkey. Turkey would not be the only country resisting to such an alternative and thus be joined by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis would never like to see an Iraq dominated by the Shi'a majority, with Iran playing the role of the guardian of Iraqi Shi'as in the region. (70)

So the question arises whether the United States might run the risk of alienating two of its most important allies in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This is a very unlikely outcome given that how Turkey is a pivotal country for the realization of vital American interests within the Greater Middle Eastern region, Central Asia, Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the central Asia. The same logic holds also true for the undeniable importance of the Saudi Arabia for the Western oil interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region

The third concerns the feasibility of democracy in Iraq. The argument that the situation of the Turcoman people living in Iraq would improve under a democratic regime in Iraq is the kind of argument that sounds nice to ears and would definitely be the one that would provide the best protection to the Turkomans. However, it needs to be pointed out at the outset that the emergence of democracy in Iraq is difficult for both internal and external reasons.

Despite the attempts of the capital at fostering an umbrella Iraqi nationality, which would attract the allegiance of all different ethnic communities living in Iraq, the majority of Iraqi nationals today direct their loyalties to their families, clans, and tribes before the state. (71) This fact has been compounded by Saddam's latest attempts in the post-Gulf War period at seeking support of the tribal leaders so as to survive in the capital. So there took place a tacit agreement between Saddam and the tribal leaders in that the former would let the latter administer their traditional areas in return for their acquiescence in Saddam's continuing reign in Baghdad.

Another important variable, which is likely to determine the likelihood of democracy in Iraq, concerns the intentions of the West. Can one surely claim that the West sincerely aims at paving the way for democracy and, thus, contributing to the emergence of a democratic regime in a post-Saddam in Iraq. I have doubts about this. Look to the other states in the region where the West, namely the United States, has vitally important interests. Does the United States help those states transform into democracy? Does the realiza-

tion of American interests require democratic regimes in those countries or does the United States seem compatible with the authoritarian character of those regimes as long as they continue serve to the American regional interests? Provided that American interests are not interrupted, the United States would not care much about the kind of regimes in those countries. Examples are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries. Promoting democracy would be a tool of American foreign policy in the region, if and only if the alternative democratic regimes would continue to support American interests. However, this does not seem to hold true if one looks at the possible alternative rules in those countries. It seems highly likely that more fundamental and anti-Western regimes might come to power in a democratic restructuring in those countries. If the alternatives of the existing authoritarian regimes are to be fundamental anti-Western regimes, why does the United States feel obliged to support democracy? (72)

This logic holds true as far as Iraq is concerned. Imagining an Iraq, which is a democratic country in the ideal western sense, would definitely lead one to conclude that such an Iraq would be dominated by the majority Shi'a Arab population. Given that religious fundamentalism is in vogue among this community and that the neighboring Iran might easily exert her influence over them, it would be unlikely to see Americans countenancing to the emergence of such a possibility. In addition to fears emanating from Iran's desires for regional leadership, the Sunni Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Gulf Region countries would certainly resist to the birth of a Shi'a dominated Iraq.

Another necessity for the United States to act on a low gear towards democracy in Iraq concerns both the positions of the Kurds in such a democratic Iraq and possible reactions of Iraq's neighbors where there are sizeable Kurdish people. In an ideal democratic Iraq, Kurds of North would have the right to govern their areas either as a well-enriched autonomous region or a constitutive federal unit of the state. Such an occurrence is improbable for two major reasons. One is related to the disunity between the Kurds of Northern Iraq, whereas the other concerns possible Turkish objections to such an eventuality.

It is not only that the eradication of Saddam's rule through a popular insurgency is unlikely but also the realization of a military coup by someone close to Saddam is unfeasible in the short-run. Having fomenting the seeds of tribalism and drawing on the Sunni Arab's fear that a Shi'a-Kurdish joint venture of Iraq would spell the end of Sunni Arabs' domination helped Saddam pacify any possible Sunni revolt against his reign. (73)

Therefore, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that Saddam is going to rule in Iraq in the years to come, albeit in a very restricted manner, unless something happens, with effects to alter every dynamic in the Iraqi politics.

WHY ARE TURKOMANS IMPORTANT FOR TURKEY?

If Turkey incorporates the Turkoman entity in Iraq into her Iraq policy and invests in this possibility much, then the attitude of the regime in Baghdad would be more tolerant toward the Turkomans. So far, the official Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq has been based on a near denial of Turkoman entity in Iraq. How would it be otherwise possible for the regimes in Baghdad to keep the Turkomans under severe conditions for many years and even to persecute them. (74) If Turkey had acted as a big brother of these people, could one still claim that Turkomans would have experienced the same course of history, characterized by repression? A close inquiry into the reactions of the respective Turkish governments to the treatment of the Turkomans at the hands of the regimes in Baghdad would unravel that Turkey has usually been indifferent to Turkoman's plight. The passive reactions to the 1959 Kirkuk massacre and the 1980 bloody events are some of the cases, to mention the least. (75)

Having seen that Turkey does not care for the well-being of the Turkomans, regimes in Baghdad increased the pressure on them.

One of the reasons why Turkey needs to pay much more attention to the Turkoman factor in Northern Iraq stems from the fact that this region constitutes both the 'near abroad' and 'soft belly' of Turkey. While, on the one hand, the current situation seems to offer the potential to Turkey to mould the future shape of the region, on the other hand, a passive and reactive Turkish policy, in a denial of Turkoman entity in the region, seems to run the risk for Turkey to be caught off guards as far as the emergence of a Kurdish independent entity in the region is concerned.

If Turkey does not want to see an independent Kurdish entity in the region and, thus, wants to ward off the effects of such a development on her territory, the optimum course of action might be to give support to the Turkomans in the region against the Kurds, not to opt for Saddam in the hope that he would provide the territorial integrity of the country and start treating the Turkomans better.

So far it has been proven that Saddam has very strong anti-Turkish feelings and could not help himself demonstrating those feelings in the past. For this to understand, it would be enough to remember how cruel Saddam behaved against the Turkoman community since his ascendancy to power. The period under Saddam is the worst of all for the Turkomans in Iraq. Why the current policy of supporting Saddam in the hope that a strong Saddam would be enough to inhibit the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in the north of the country is flawed can be attributed to three reasons.

The first concerns the likely attitude of the international community not to let Saddam or any other regime in Baghdad subjugate the Kurds again. How could one claim today that the Kurds would be pressured by the international community, actually the United States, to acquiescence in the rule of the capital in their region again, after they have been enjoying the benefits of self-rule over the last decade? In other words, as long as Saddam rules in Baghdad, the prospects for independent Kurdish rule increase.

The second relates to the intentions of Saddam to do everything to remain in power. It is not inconceivable that Saddam would cave in to the Kurdish demand to rule in a well-defined autonomous region in the north, in return for the relaxation of the sanctions-regime. When the goal was to hold the sway in the capital, why not for Saddam to acquiescence in a quasi-independent Kurdish rule in the north? As long as the official title of the ruler of overall Iraq rests with him, Saddam would not bring up serious objections to any Kurdish self-management in the north. He is neither capable nor willing to do this.

The last reason stems from the incapability of Turkey to turn the tide back in northern Iraq, in the face of strong international determination not to divest the Kurds of their gains accrued to them over the last decade. The best for Turkey to achieve in northern Iraq would be the prospect of a weak Kurdish autonomous area. For this prospect to arise, Turkey has to play the Turkoman card in a way to balance the Kurds. Pressing for the inclusion of the Turkoman areas in such an autonomous region would both curb the desires of the Kurds to act independently and strengthen the Capital's hand against the possibility of further Kurdish demands. Pursuing such a policy would at least result in a weaker Kurdish rule in the north. Assisting the Turkomans in their claims to have the same rights, which the Kurds seek to achieve, would enable both Turkey and Iraq to feel relieved of a strong Kurdish rule in the region. After all, Iraq should not have any reason to doubt about the true intentions of the Turkomans. Both Turkey and the Turkomans desire the territorial integrity of Iraq and made this very clear over years.

It also seems that Turkey has misunderstood the intention of the American governments as for Iraq. From all the evidences on the ground, it appears that the United States has been working for a 'seemingly weak Saddam' and 'weak' Iraq. By keeping Saddam busy with domestic opposition, it is hoped that his interest in the region would dwindle, and, thus, the US would be relieved of an important threat to the West's interests in the region. (76) By letting Saddam still rule in Baghdad, the US has continued to the perpetuation of the 'Saddam bogeyman' and, thus, kept the fears of the regional countries with respect to 'Saddam the bully' alive. Capitalizing on the fear of the other countries, the United States has increased her military sales to the region over the last decade.

What seems to lie in contention between Turkey and the United States relates to their view of Iraq. While the US seems to favor a weak Iraq, Turkey definitely opts for a strong Iraq. While Turkey pursues policies to see Iraq resurrected as a strong country by supporting Saddam's regime, the United States does seem to favor the emergence of a new Iraq, which would have a pro-Western administration yet not play the role of the bully of the region. It does not matter that both Turkey and the United States seem to favor the territorial integrity of Iraq, when it is the case that they are in dispute as to how powerful and strong Iraq should be again.

Therefore, a conflict of interests becomes inevitable between the US and Turkey whenever the latter gives support to Saddam in an effort to see a strong Iraq. If Turkey's aim is the prevention of an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, this should not be realized through giving support to Saddam in the hope that he would be able to keep Iraq intact. Instead of assisting Saddam in his reign in Baghdad, as the latest Turkish attempt at elevating the diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level has proven, Turkey should try to reach this goal through supporting the Turkomans as a balancing factor against the Kurds.

HOW TO INCORPORATE TURKOMANS IN TURKEY'S POLICY TOWARD IRAQ?

Now Turkey is in a much better position to be able to mantle the big brother cloth of the Turkomans, with Iraq being so weak and open to foreign manipulations. In order to strengthen the Turkomans against the Kurds, their economic conditions should be improved. For this to happen, the 'border-trade' with the Kurds should be made to continue on the condition that the Turkomans would also get a share from this trade. Besides, if Turkey chan-

nels financial support to the establishment of Turkoman companies either based in Turkey or Northern Iraq to undertake border trade with Turkey might also contribute to the economic well-being of the Turkomans.

The necessity to act in a more assertive way stems from the fact that Turkey is the only country in the region able enough to press ahead the Baghdad regime to improve the conditions of the Turkomans. Acting in an undetermined and equivocal way by not making it clear to Baghdad that Turkey is behind the Turkomans and has both the will and determination to come to their help, the regimes in Baghdad might have emboldened in the past not to treat the Turkomans well.

Having seen that Turkey does not possess the determination to support the Turkomans' claims in Iraq, respective Baghdad governments have not felt the necessity to restrain their mistreatment of the Turkomans. This must change. It seems to be the case that Baghdad has developed a negative perception of Turkey regarding the latter's intentions over Iraq, irrespective of Turkey's real actions. Whatever Turkey does and whichever policy options she implements, it seems that Iraq has continued to believe that Turkey has been harboring irredentist claims over Iraq. (77) When this is the case, it would not be enough for Turkey to keep on showing respect for Iraq's territorial integrity both in words and deeds.

If Turkey wants to feel assured that the Turkomans are treated well, she has to act in a much more 'determined' and 'assertive' way. However, 'assertiveness' by no means includes any daring policy in terms of border changes. It is neither to the advantage of Turkey nor in conformity with the constitutive principle of international society of states, i.e., sovereignty, that Turkey makes any territorial claim to Iraq. It has been a well-known fact that the most important dictum of Turkish foreign policy is 'peace at home peace abroad'. Contrived in this way, a 'determined' and 'assertive' Turkish policy toward Iraq will have to continue to rely on the principle of inviolability of internationally recognized borders. While reassuring Iraq of her territorial integrity, Turkey needs to stand by the Turkomans in their struggle for a better future in Iraq.

What Turkey can do is not unlimited, however. The best course of action seems to be that Turkey can help elevate the Turkomans' entity from its current status to the position of 'knot' tying herself to Iraq. If Turkomans were assigned a function of economic 'intermediaries' between the two countries, both their economic welfare and social, political and cultural rights would be guaranteed. If Turkey attaches an important role to Turkomans in

her trade relationship with Iraq, it would be extremely difficult for the regimes in Baghdad to interrupt this process by leveling unbearable treatment at the Turkomans. The reasons would be twofold. Firstly, Turkey would react to this harshly, since by the time Iraq implements pressure on the Turkomans, Turkey would have internalized the identity of the 'big brother' of the Turkomans. Second, economic interests of the regimes in Baghdad would not allow her the luxury to sever the links with Turkey by putting pressure on the Turkomans. After all, it is their economic interests that would be affected negatively.

For a 'big brother' identity to arise in Turkey, the first precondition would be that Turkey puts her home in order and do all the required adjustments within the country to satisfy her people's demands. The reason for that lies in the possibility that if Turkey takes up such an affirmative role regarding the Turkomans of Iraq, Iraq might perceive such Turkish actions as attempts at interfering with her domestic affairs and coveting a part of Iraqi territory. Turkey has to make it clear that embracing the role of the guardian of Turkomans' rights in Iraq would not mean irredentist claims over any Iraqi territory. As long as Turkey continues to suffer from a 'fear of loss of territory', which the Turkish elite inherited from the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, it would not become possible for Turkey to pursue a such role vis-à-vis the Turkomans. A Turkey, which continues to feel insecure regarding her territorial integrity, would be likely to act indifferently to the conditions of her brethren living abroad.

Acting through the Turkoman connection rather than the Kurdish links, Turkey would signal to Iraq her respect for Iraqi's territorial integrity in the best possible way. The reason is twofold. One lies in the Turkoman's desire to see Iraq as an integrated and unitary state, whereas the other stems from the dictum of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic, that is 'peace at home, peace abroad'.

Trying to increase the trade volume between the two countries and using the Turkoman entity in Iraq as a possible conduit for this purpose should never mean that Turkey needs to feel complacent about Saddam and pursue passive, at times reactive, policies towards the attempts of the international community at getting rid of Saddam. By now, it has been proven that Saddam rules like a dictator and has no respect for the fundamental human rights of non-Arabic communities of Iraq, let alone his own ethnic group. The ideology of the Ba'ath party to create a collective secular Iraqi national identity above tribal and ethnic allegiances seems to have turned into a repressive policy of 'Arabization' at the hands of Saddam. Therefore, the continuation of

Saddam's reign in Iraq would not bode well for the future of Iraqi nationals, as well as other ethnicity but the Sunni Arabs.

As mentioned in the lines above, the possibility of Saddam's removal from power by a popular insurgency organized by the Iraqi National Congress seems dim for the time being. However this is the case, it would not be a reasonable course of action for the Turkomans to disengage from the Iraqi opposition ranks. The seemingly optimum course of action for the Turkomans would be to preach for the Iraqi territorial integrity among the opposition circles and to stay as far away as possible from the attempts at dismembering Iraq in a post-Saddam contingency. The passive stance regarding the use of arms should be continued and further aided in by moves at distancing from the attempts of the Kurdish fractions at carving an independent territory out of Iraq.

Given that the removal of Saddam from power can more likely be achieved by a coup instigated by people among the circle of Sunni Arab elite, rather than a popular insurgency, Turkomans should make it clear that they do not dream of any secessionist claims and would be happy to live in Iraq provided that their fundamental human rights be guaranteed. Such a course of action might endear them to the possible Sunni Arab rulers of the country and pave the ground for their intermediary role in Turkish-Iraq economic relations.

All possible scenarios regarding the future of the Turkoman community in Iraq and the Turkish policy towards them should in no way ignore the potential power of the Turkomans, which lies in their population. Though divergent depending on different sources, the Turkomans constitute the third largest ethnic community in Iraq with no less than a population of 2 million. With such a population it is hoped that these people would acquire their rights that they have been yearning for years. However, this has not been the case thus far. Due to their weakness in organization capability their struggle for a better life in Iraq did not seem to succeed in the past. The new political atmosphere in Iraq, with Saddam's influence over a large part of the country weakened and the chance of non-Sunni Arab ethnicity to have a say in determination of their future within Iraq increased, seems to have offered better opportunities to the Turkomans.

However, the point is to seize upon these new opportunities in efficient ways. So far, the Turkman Front seems have contributed to a betterment of Turkoman rights by representing these people within the Iraqi National Congress and running for the Turkoman administration within the safe-area un-

der the strict Kurdish control. Without a strong Turkish support for the extension of the safe-area in a way to include more Turkomans or without a strong pressure on the Kurds to behave towards the Turkomans in a satisfactory manner, the capabilities of the Turkman Front would be highly limited. Despite being represented within this anti-Saddam opposition movement, the Turkomans have been treated unfairly and given low representation within the INC. So the problem is how to make use of the population potential of this community either within the INC or regarding the calculations of Iraq's final structure.

It would be the best option for the Turkomans to see their future in a democratic Iraq, where they would be represented according to their population and might be given the constitutive federal unit status. However it sounds attractive, this option seems to be the least possible one among different alternatives. Despite this, the population potential of the Turkomans might be made use of in other Iraqi scenarios as well. For this to happen, a strong Turkish support is needed nevertheless. If Turkey backs up more strongly the argument that the 'equation of Iraq', especially northern Iraq, cannot be solved by taking only Kurdish and Arabic elements into account yet ignoring others, the Turkomans might find a better representation in 'Iraqi games'.

After all, what matters for such small communities to be represented in international politics is the support given to them by their protectors or guardians. Turkey seems to have all the leverage emanating from history to be able to act as the protector of the Turkomans rights in Iraqi politics.

However this is the case, the probability for a more active Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Turkomans would seem to covary with Turkish attempts at putting a more stable domestic order at home. The more the adjective 'glass' continues to precede the noun 'Turkey', the more likely Turkey would become a passive bystander and 'react' to developments in Iraqi politics. Once the word 'glass' replaced with 'granite', then a more assertive and confident Turkey would surface. What can be done on the part of Turkey at the present conjuncture seems to be the continuation of attempts at bringing in Turkoman people to Turkey with educational purposes, as has been done under the auspices of the distinguished personality İhsan Dođramacı. Besides, attempts at contributing to organizational capability of the Turkomans must follow.

None the less, the crux of the proposals for an active and efficient Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Turkomans is the idea that Turkey should speed up

her efforts at elevating the status of the Turkomans to 'intermediaries' or 'knots' in Turkish-Iraqi economic interactions. It is this new identity that might provide better prospects to the Turkomans in their attempts at being treated fairly in Iraqi politics.

CONCLUSION

To recap, there exist three different views on the population of the Turkoman community in Iraq. According to the Turkoman scholars, they make up 10 to 15% of the overall Iraqi population. To the official Iraqi and 'objective' western sources, they are less than 5% of the Iraq's people. Holding somehow a middle way, the Kurdish scholars seem to be tilting towards the official Iraqi stand in the hope to prove that the Kurds are the majority in the northern Iraq and that they deserve to be entitled to govern this region independently in a hypothetically disintegrated Iraq. Given that the fundamental aim of the Kurds is to incorporate the Kirkuk City into the Kurdish autonomous area, it would make sense for them to prove that Kirkuk, the traditional Turkoman City, inhabits more Kurds than Turkomans.

The significance of the Turkoman population lies in the calculations as to the final status of Iraq. If a more democratic regime replaces Saddam's authoritarian rule, the populations of constitutive ethnicity would matter to a great extent. Were the Turkomans regarded as one of three constitutive elements of the Iraqi nation, the prospects for a better life would definitely skyrocket. For this dramatic development to arise, Turkomans have to be, nevertheless, supported by Turkey. Without a strong backing of Turkey, hopes for a prosperous life would be bound to be low.

The option of supporting the Turkomans's rights in and around as many circles as possible would not only contribute to the betterment of Turkomans's life in Iraq, but also offer to Turkey more efficient means to realize the political objective of seeing the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity impeded. Rather than sticking with the option of supporting Saddam, if Turkey channels her sincere countenance to the Turkomans as a balancing factor in northern Iraq, the Turkish foreign policy goals in regard to the region would be materialized more effectively.

A caveat needs to be made here. Turkey's active and determined Iraq policy, incorporating Turkomans into formulations of her 'national interest', seems to be directly related with the strength of domestic order at home. A strong and 'democratically stable' Turkey will definitely have a greater capability of maneuvering in regard to Iraq.

A final point that seems to me quite important in considering the future of the Turkoman community is the 'tone' of the relationship between them and Turkey. What seems to hold crucial importance for the success of Turkish foreign policy towards the region is the need to see the transformation of the 'one-sided love affair' on the side of the Turkomans towards Turkey into a 'two-sided love affair' including Turkey as a partner as well. (78)

The impression that I have taken from the people I have interviewed is that the Turcomans feel sad to see Turkey having ceased to pursue an active policy vis-à-vis the Turkomans following the signing of the Ankara Agreement in June, 1926, which sealed Turkey's borders with Iraq. They are of the view that if Turkey had acted as a 'mother country' and given her full support to the Turkomans whenever the regimes in Baghdad tended to violate their fundamental rights, their history in modern Iraq would not have passed through the turbulent and bloody stages characterized by massacres and forced assimilation policies.

They look forward to see a pro-Turkoman Turkish foreign policy in the senses that Turkey mantles the role of 'big brother of the Turkomans' in her relations with the regime in Baghdad and that Turkey, first of all, believe herself, and second, has the world community believe that the future of Iraq cannot truly be planned and envisioned by taking into consideration only the Kurdish factor.

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53. For detailed information on these activities see the internet sites below:

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54. Turan, Ö., "Türkmen Mücadelesinde Yeni Bir Dönem," in Kerkük, year 3, no 7, March 1999, p. 16.

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56. Ibid.

56. In fact, the current situation in the region above the 36th parallel was created by the attempts of Turkey at propelling the Allied forces to establish a safe-heaven for the Kurdish and Turkoman people who had to head for Turkey and Iran in the wake of Saddam's assaults on them in the spring of 1991. Turkey had unintentionally contributed to the emergence of a de-facto independent Kurdish rule in the northern Iraq. For a detailed analysis of the developments that led to the establishment of the safe area in northern Iraq, see Kirisci, K., "Turkiye ve Kuzey Irak'taki Kürt Güvenlik Bölgesi," in *Avrasya Dosyası*, İlkbahar 1996, vol 3, no. 1, pp. 7-22.

57. For a thorough analysis of the Iraqi National Congress, see Gunter, M.M., *The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq A Political Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press: 1999, pp. 36-66.

58. Ibid., Gunter discusses the short history of the two main Kurdish political organizations since their foundation. He gives a detailed account of the developments that involved in KDP and PUK in the 1990s.

59. Neither Syria nor Iran invested sincerely in the Kurdish option in regard to their relations with Iraq. Though Iran, especially during the rule of Shah, gave support to the Kurds in their struggle against the regime in Baghdad, she ceased to aid in them once Shah came to a political understanding with Saddam in 1975, following the latter's acquiescence in Shah's demands over the border issue between the two countries. The main reason why both Iran and Syria feel uneasy about the developments in northern Iraq parallels the concern of Turkey, that is the prospect of an independent Kurdish entity in the region. Both countries are loath to see such a development because both have Kurds as their subjects.

60. Migdalovitz, M., 86065 Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues. A CRS Issue Brief, December 3, 1996

61. Interview with Orhan Morgil, an economic professor specialized on Turkey's trade relationships. According to him, the figure of \$30 billion might be an exaggeration. The claims that the economic losses of Turkey amount at least to \$30 billion take into consideration all possible sources of economic gains that would be accrued to Turkey had the economic embargo not imposed on Iraq. Possible losses include the costs incurred by the closure of the oil pipelines, the costs following the end of the trade with Iraq, the costs engendered by the termination of trade with the other countries of the region for which Iraq constituted a transit route, and so on.

62. See the section 'Getting Politicized?'

63. See Oran, B., "Kalkık Horoz Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti," in *Avrasya Dosyası*, İlkbahar 1996, vol. 3, no. 6, pp. 155-172. Oran shows how Turkish foreign policy towards the region is so perplexing. While Turkey felt happy that a kind of authority has been provided in the northern Iraq with the existence of safe-haven, she continued to feel uneasy about the consolidation of the Kurdish rule in the region as well.

64. *Op.cit.*, Gunter., 118-126. Gunter presents a detailed account of the major Turkish military incursions in to the northern Iraq in her pursuit of PKK forces.

65. See, Byman, D., "Proceed with Caution: U.S. Support for the Iraqi Opposition," in *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1999, vol. 22, issue. 3, pp. 23-38. Byman criticizes the Clinton's Iraq policy, which was set into action in 1998, to support the Iraqi opposition movements on the ground that excessive support to opposition forces could undermine the containment policy and may cause the disintegration of Iraq. To him, the fundamental aim of the U.S. in Iraq should be to see weak Iraq, not a disintegrated Iraq. For this to happen, the U.S. should assist in the opposition to the extent that Saddam is kept busy with the opposition and becomes unable to pose serious threats to the western interests in the region.

66. *Ibid.*,

67. See Barkey, H.J. "Hemmed in By Circumstances: Turkey and Iraq Since the Gulf War," in *Middle East Policy*, vol. VII, no. 4, October 2000, 110-126. According to Barkey, Turkey's first priority is to ensure Iraq's territorial integrity and prevent the Kurds from creating an independent state of their own.

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See also, Byman, D., "Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the End of the Gulf War," "A Rand Corporation Report, 2000. Byman argues that Saddam still hold his power centers under his control. The decade-long sanctions regimes could not lead to lose his grip on the sources of his power. Though the traditional supporters of Saddam lost some strengths, Saddam still wields undisputed control over the military, the security forces, the intelligence units, and the Ba'ath Party, which are the power bases of Saddam's rule.

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