The Cyprus problem is an ongoing struggle between those defending the law and those trying to violate it. Turkey has all along defended the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, when needed by using her right of intervention provided for in the Treaty of Guarantee. In the international arena, however, the legal realities regarding Cyprus sometimes tend to be forgotten and legal requirements have been disregarded for political considerations. The most flagrant example to this is the acceptance by the European Union of the Greek Cypriot application for full membership and the initiation of negotiations with them. Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have firmly objected to this situation which constitutes a breach of international law. It is also a well-known fact that,  during the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side refrains from showing respect to the legal basis of the problem. Undoubtfully, the law has been and will continue to be the main source of strength for the Turkish Cypriots. It is with these thoughts in mind that the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute has compiled and published a study by Turkish authorities on International Law. Articles in the book are written by Prof. Mümtaz Soysal, Prof. Hüseyin Pazarcı, Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, Prof. Rauf Versan, Legal Adviser to the TRNC Zaim Necatigil and Dr. Kudret Özersay. An introduction is written by the editor of the book, Reşat Arım, Ambassador Rtd.

The first chapter in the book deals with the 1960 State of Affairs and the agreements which founded the "1960 Partnership State". Following the agreements signed by the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers in Zurich in 1959, the Prime Ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom as well as the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders the same year decided on the shape to be given to the Cypriot State. The Partnership State of Cyprus was established by the Treaties signed in 1960. One of these international treaties is the Treaty which established the Republic of Cyprus. The other one is the Treaty of Guarantee, guaranteeing the 1960 state of affairs. Thus a restricted sovereignty and independence was envisaged for Cyprus. The third one is the Treaty of Alliance, concluded against any attack to Cyprus. It is also envisaged in the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, that a threat from within the island of Cyprus can not be directed at the Guarantor States (to Turkey).

With the 1960 State of Affairs an internal balance was established by means of a functional partnership between the two sides and also an external balance is set up by according Guarantor power status to Turkey, Greece and the UK. The Constitution of the Partnership was adopted after having been negotiated between the parties. However, the Greek Cypriot party has unilaterally amended 13 articles of the Constitution that are qualified as unamendable "Basic Articles" which had been negotiated and adopted by the Zurich and London Agreements; has driven the Turkish Cypriots out of the Partnership State by use of force and thus ended the Partnership. The Turkish Cypriots were ejected from the partnership structure by force and coercion. Today the international community accept the continuation of the 1960 State of Affairs; the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance continue to be in force and this fact is acknowledged by the signatory parties.

When in 1990 the Greek Cypriot administration applied for full membership to the European Union it was clear that such an application was in violation of the treaty requirements. The Treaties were made to safeguard the independence of Cyprus and consequently prohibited any union with any state or any activity likely to produce that result. The Turkish government at the time attached particular importance to this matter and it requested the inclusion of specific provisions to prevent any loopholes. The Turkish government expected that the Greek Cypriots would take any action in line with their ENOSIS dreams. That was the reason why the document on the Basic Structure of the Republic which was part of the agreement signed on 11 February 1960 in Zurich between the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers, in its Article 8 stipulated that the Republic could only be able to join international organizations and political and economic unions in which both Turkey and Greece are members. The Treaty of Guarantee in its Article 1 likewise prohibited any activity likely to produce the union of the Republic with any state.

The second Chapter in the book deals with United Nations Resolutions on Cyprus. The Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted numerous resolutions on the subject. The resolution of the Security Council on 4 March 1964 has been the major factor preventing the finding of a solution to the problem until today. The resolution which was adopted for the purpose of stopping the armed attacks  by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963, stipulated that the peace-keeping force would be sent to Cyprus with the consent of 'the Government of Cyprus'. The Greek Cypriots took it as it was referring to themselves only, and they posed since that time as the legitimate government of Cyprus. However, it could only be assumed that the reference in the Security Council Resolution would be to the government established in accordance with the 1960 Treaties, i.e. the partnership government of both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. There is no single joint authority in Cyprus representing both sides since 1963. Recognition by the international community of the Greek Cypriot side as the "Cyprus Government" in violation of 1960 Agreements is the main reason that has caused Cyprus problem to remain unsolved for about 40 years.

In the Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the following years, it was stipulated that negotiations between the two parties should be held in view of a settlement. These Resolutions underlined the equal status of both sides and stated that the negotiations will be conducted on an equal footing.

The UN General Assembly on the other hand has served as a forum where the Greek Cypriots with the support of the Non-Aligned countries could manipulate this issue. The decisions of the Non-Aligned Conferences were easily adopted in this forum.  The attempts of the Greek Cypriots to include the Cyprus issue in the agenda of the General Assembly with a view to internationalizing the problem has disrupted the inter-communal talks many times.

The third chapter deals with the UN Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus. The Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964 recommended the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force and the appointment of a mediator. However, the "consent of the government in Cyprus" was foreseen for UNFICYP, whereas "the agreement of the government of Cyprus and the governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom" was foreseen for the appointment of a mediator. Thus the Greek Cypriots were treated as the "Government of Cyprus" and the consent of the Turkish Cypriots was disregarded. The Turkish Cypriots formally requested that their consent should be obtained and Turkey supported them. Despite this deficiency in the UN Resolutions, in practice, the UN cooperated with the Turkish Cypriot side. However the accreditation by this Resolution in 1964 of the UN Peace Keeping Force to the Greek Cypriot Administration has further complicated the Cyprus problem.

The following chapters of the book on the one hand deals with impediments to a solution in Cyprus and on the other deals with elements conducive to pave the way to the resolution of the problem.

One Professor argues that a major impediment to a solution is the inequality of the status between the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides. In reality, however, the two parties are equal since the founding of the Cypriot State. The sovereignty over Cyprus was transferred from the United Kingdom to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides conjointly. They are parties to the 1960 International Treaties and became subjects of the international law. Against this reality, the international community of nations and international institutions acted in a manner to enhance the pretension of the Greek Cypriots to be the sole representative for the whole island. The Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964 carries such a misconception. True, at the time of voting of that Resolution, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were assured that the "government of Cyprus" meant the constitutional government of "both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot elements", but the practice did not confirm this position. Also, when the Greek Cypriot administration applied  for full membership to the European Union in 1990, this application made in violation of  Article 8 of the Basic Structure of the State included in the 1959 Zurich Agreement and Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee was accepted by EU in disregard of treaty stipulations and the equal status of the two communities. Again, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg in the 1994 Anastasiou case and the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg in 1996 Loizidou case did not accept the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a state, basing their judgments on the "politically motivated" Security Council Resolution concerning non-recognition of the TRNC in 1983, rather than discussing the conditions for Statehood according to the international law. However, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus possesses all the qualifications that a state should possess according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention. It has a permanent population, a defined territory and a government. Its diplomatic relations of ambassadorial level is confined to the Republic of Turkey, but it has representatives and offices in many countries and international organizations.

To find a solution to the Cyprus problem one should start with a fresh appraisal of the present situation. As a matter of fact, the UNSG Kofi Annan, in his Statement of 12 September 2000, stated that both sides in the Island are politically equal; that each represents its side and no one else and that the comprehensive settlement should be based on the equal status of the two sides. On the other hand,  the Turkish Cypriot position paper of 29 April 2002 puts forth at the negotiation table the fundamental framework and the elements of a comprehensive settlement. According to this paper, the two Founding States as sovereign states should create a new Partnership State. In this way, "sovereign equality" will be achieved. The Partner States will transfer some of their powers to the Partnership State. Residual powers will rest with the equal Partner States. The Partnership State will be sovereign "to the extent defined in the Founding Document". The two states will sign the document by their present names.

A second professor looking at the question from another angle stresses that an association between sovereign states with linguistic, religious and cultural diversity could only be achieved by preserving their national identity.  Such a system would work in the following way: A founding agreement would be signed by two sovereign states. The agreement would guarantee the sovereignty of the partner states. The organs of the Partnership State may be a Partnership Assembly, a Partnership Council and a Partnership Court. The Partnership Assembly may legislate in matters concerning the Partnership State which do not fall within the authority of the partner states' legislative organs. The Partnership Council will consist of members elected in equal number by the Partner States.

Still another Professor investigates the modalities how Denktaş-Clerides talks could establish the "new partnership" mentioned by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 12 September 2000. For this the following essential elements have to be considered:

1.  National identity          2.  Security       3.  Representation of Cyprus at international arena        4. Cyprus membership to the European Union

On these four points, The Turkish Cypriots can only protect their legitimate interests through the "equality of status",  "bizonality" and sovereign equality.

 For the Turkish Cypriot side the ideal solution is a Confederation. The Greek Cypriots insist on a unitary state. Can the solution contain  the particularities of both of these two formulas? What are the sine qua non conditions on the Turkish Cypriot side? These conditions are the following:

1.  In the new State there should be two distinct territories and two politically equal partner and constituent states.     2.  It  should be guaranteed that the new partnership State will not be altered with Cyprus joining the European Union.   3.  If the parties decide on the single international juridical personality of Cyprus, each party should, as in the Belgian model, be represented in other states and international organizations on matters that fall within  their own competence.     4.  For the security of Cyprus the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance should  essentially be kept.     5.  The laws passed and decisions taken by the two parties following their separation from the 1960 system should be revised.   

The book "Cyprus and International Law" contains a thorough examination of the political and legal aspects of the Cyprus problem by the Turkish jurists, as well as some views and proposals regarding the establishment of a new partnership on the basis of  two States with equal status in Cyprus. Illegality of the unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot Administration to the EU has also been put forth in a detailed manner.