On the tenth anniversary of the MEDA programme and the 9th anniversary of the EuroMeSCo, it may be appropriate to analyse the level of achievement of one of the primary objectives of the Barcelona Declaration that is providing for security and stability in the Mediterranean region.

Although the concept of security not being uniformly describable, at this juncture, we are in a position both to praise the work of the MEDA and at the same time critically analyse where it has failed.

Hard and Soft Security Issues: If we take into consideration the success or failure of the MEDA in respect to security cooperation in the Mediterranean region we need to accept the categorization introduced by Joseph Nye at the end of the cold war. With regard to the hard security isues consisting of interstate or intrastate conflicts, the achievement of the Meda must neither by lauded nor decried. In the first place we may say that there is no major interstate or intrastate warfare currently going on in the region. But there is no assurance that clashes in both areas may not restart at anytime or new clashes may arise. In respect to prevailing conditions of "truce" in the achievement of which it is not possible to attribute any significant role to the implementation of the MEDA programme. It is obvious that in Eastern Mediterranean the role of MEDA and in fact of other programs of European Union have either had little effect on the solution of interstate disputes or in certain cases have exacerbated them. In this context I am referring to the Arab Israeli dispute and the Cyprus conflict. EU's failure in this field may be considered as one of the reasons why a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean could not be approved.
Against this picture NATO-EU cooperation has succeeded in imposing peace in another region of the Mediterranean that is among the former Republics of Yugoslavia that are not part of the MEDA programme. The model in former Yugoslavia was direct outside intervention that was possible only with the cooperation of the US, UN, NATO and EU.

The evacuation of the Lebanon by Syrian troops is another step in reducing tension between the two countries; in this development the roles of US and France have been of greater importance, even though we cannot deny that the existence of free-trade agreement between Syria and EU has also had a positive effect in softening the attitude of the Syrian government. What is abeyance in the Lebanon is who will address and how, to the probable renewal of internal conflict in Lebanon; and who will help for the achievement of an accord between Israel on one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other. The possibility of a security cooperation scheme in the Mediterranean within or outside MEDA playing an effective role in this area is rather slim.

Can European Union use other instruments at its disposal to enhance conflict resolution in the Mediterranean? In the case of Cyprus, EU policy of enlargement has been used for supporting one of the parties to the conflict reducing the chances of a fair solution of the problem. Furthermore, the enlargement tool is being used to extract non curriculum political concessions from Turkey and from the Turks of Northern Cyprus in favour of Greek Cypriots.

Can Europe play en effective role for creating a real Mediterranean cooperation for hard security issues and confidence building if and when it possesses a new Constitution and creates an effective common foreign and security policy as well as its own independent ESDP?

At this moment it is dubious whether the Constitutional Treaty will ever see the day light in French and other referenda. Furthermore, the referendum debate in France has been linked with the accession of Turkey to the European Union mostly on cultural and tacitly on religious grounds. If this mood persists, I am afraid there will arise the danger that the credibility of EU and the whole Mediterranean oriented EU programmes will receive a serious set back.

For hard security issues we should not neglect the role of another international organization that is NATO. Under the North Atlantic Treaty NATO is also responsible for the safety of the sea communication routes in the Mediterranean. This task is carried out by the Southern NATO Command, mostly by the United States. In order to contribute to peace and security in the Mediterranean both NATO and OSCE also carry out dialogues with Southern Mediterranean states.

If European Union is going to contribute to hard security in this region we certainly must see greater interest in the Mediterranean by ESDP, at least for joint planning with NATO.

As regards soft security issues we cannot fail to notice a difference of perception in the definitions of such treats and an asymmetry between North and South in developing remedies.

To be more explicit the security risks considered today by many European may be termed as dangers facing the individuals and hence societies in Europe. These are immigration, drug and human trafficking, organized crime, money laundering and terrorism and religious fundamentalism.. The remedies suggested for fighting these threats in the Barcelona programme are encouragement for good governance, creating and supporting civil society, developing liberal globalizing economy, peaceful neighbourly relations, greater respect to human rights, fight against corruption, creating a free press and encouragement of democracy. Europe also foresees bi-lateral cooperation for joint action. MEDA programme offers economic support and cooperation in all fields to achieve these results. These dangers and risks and remedies are not only the ones recognized by EU lead MEDA programmes but also those of UNDP and of G8 in its Broader Middle East initiative.

If one looks at these issues some of the risks perceived by the North are perceived differently in the South. For example, emigration is considered not a risk but a boon for many Southern Mediterranean countries; drug trafficking as an unofficial source of income, human trafficking is of minor importance. Against these terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism are equally considered as great dangers.

As regards the remedies no one would dispute the desire of Arab countries in the Mediterranean to become modern and developed states and impediments in their path for growth are considered as serious dangers. There is no doubt that developed North also shares this objective and MEDA is a very useful instrument for this purpose. Free trade agreements between EU and the Mediterranean countries should be helpful for changing the autarchic economic structures of the South. But these instruments remain short of what is required by the formation of a free trade zone in the Mediterranean.
A serious anomaly exists in what should be the attitude the Southern countries against the possible rise of reactionary Islam (that is wrongly termed as fundamentalism in Europe). There is an overarching fear that under the present conditions of under-development and the current political conjecture now obtaining in the Mediterranean, greater political and civil freedom will play into the hands reactionaries. This possible danger is regarded as both a raison d'être and an excuse for the maintenance of the political and social status quo.

Furthermore, everyone agrees that the reforms and civil society must be supported and encouraged. But subjugating progress in this area to economic assistance is interpreted as a source of public resentment as it smacks of a type of neo-colonialism. The advocates of reform would rather rely on indigenous forces to bring about societal and political changes that are considered as sine qua non of modern societies. It is extremely hard to see public consent in these countries do development of conditions that would allow consent rise of reactionary opposition before strong and secular civil societies are somehow become firmly routed. This is why many of the regimes in the Middle East and the non-EU Mediterranean attach importance to military and non military security structures putting at risk a sound and healthy social transformation.. Under these circumstances the effectiveness of the MEDA program in bringing about a real social transformation soon will become rather marginal.

What are the Southern expectations from the MEDA programme or from Europe in general in the field of hard and soft security issues. Naturally, the most important issue at the moment is the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. Can Mediterranean countries themselves contribute to the solution of this problem? I am afraid the means at their disposal are meagre and mostly moral, but expectations in the Southern regions of the Mediterranean from the EU is very high.

In the areas of soft security for most of the Arab world both in the Mediterranean and in the Broader Middle East region mainly concern economic and social development that would help in reducing certain part of the dangers perceived in the North. It is generally assumed that larger and efficient economic assistance and investments, reduction of barriers for the export items of the South to the North and assistance in combating with lack of water sources and combating environmental degradation will increase mutual confidence and lay grounds of effective cooperation for development, social change and security cooperation. It is also believed that more economic assistance and investment will reduce unemployment and pressure on emigration and also reduce resort to trafficking of all kinds.

European assistance to the growth of civil society can be in the form supporting dialogue and education. In this dialogue an important item is the dialogue among cultures. However, the recent trends in Western Europe that is maturing after 9/11 is not helping in the reduction of xenophobia. Yet, it will also be necessary to encourage tolerance and acceptance of multi-culturism, if we are we encourage the growth of civil society and democracy in the South.