Roundtable Discussion of Turkey-European Union Relations

Turkey’s preparations for starting accession negotiations are progressing. As the date of December 2004 when EU will make its decision is approaching a general assessment is provided in a debate, transcription of which is as follows:

Seyfi Taşhan:

Today in our studio we have several distinguished experts on Turkey and European affairs. Our speakers will discuss the general conditions that affect Turkey-European relations, its security questions, and its future. We will also have a general assessment of the relations. Our first speaker will be Ambassador Reşat Arım. Ambassador Arım has been Turkish ambassador to Bonn, Beijing and before that Jordan. Ambassador Arım will be the first speaker. Please, Ambassador Arım.

Ambassador Reşat Arım:

Thank you sir.  I will take the issue from the point of view of the international conjuncture; that is to say, conditions prevailing at a certain time. In fact, the international conjuncture has always played a major part in Turkish-European Union, European Economic Community, relations.

 If we start with the Association Agreement of 1963 this agreement was signed when the European Economic Community was looking forward to its own natural expansion. But when the Cold War really set in and the members of the European Economic Community started to look at Turkey as a peripheral country of NATO they then shifted their focus on military rather than economic and political considerations.  It was in this line that in 1972 the additional protocol was signed but at that time there were many difficulties.  Later on, detente set in and it was supposed to put Turkey-European Economic Community relations back on track.  It was under these circumstances that Turkey applied for full membership; but then again, the international conjuncture changed.

The end of the Cold War brought about a new international conjuncture; at that time the European countries were busy with the unification of Germany and were also busy in dealing with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Let me for instance refer to the commission opinion in December 1989 about Turkey.  It says, “It would be inappropriate for the community which is itself undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux, to become involved in a new accession negotiations.”  This I think draws our attention to the international conjuncture. At the 1999 Helsinki Summit the European Union started to pay attention to geopolitical considerations and there Turkey was declared a candidate country.

Now I come to the last international conjuncture, which started to be formed after the September 11th attacks.  Here if I can take the separate elements the first and foremost component, in my mind, of the new conjuncture is the value of democratic societies.  This value is really appreciated. Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe for fifty years.  Before September 11th it was sometimes taken for granted, but in its aftermath in the war on terror it was clearly understood that Turkey was an indispensable element of the free world. Second, if we look at the larger picture we see the U.S.-Russian rapprochement as another important element of this conjuncture. President Putin made the first telephone call to President Bush after September 11th attacks and during their two summit meetings they decided on many things as far as the world situation is concerned. As Europe is situated between the two giants that is the United States and Russia, I am sure EU needs Turkey. It needs this associate member to become a full member. Another element to consider is that this new international conjuncture will also bring about a new world order. In this world order, the European union should have a proper foreign and defense policy. Turkish contribution in this domain cannot be overlooked.

Lastly, this new international order will be brought about by the end of the Iraq affair. During this episode, the whole world has clearly seen what Turkey’s position is; what a valuable asset Turkey is for the promotion of stability and peace. The new international conjuncture will benefit Turkey and in turn will aid the EU to better understand the position of Turkey. I think this will bring Turkey much closer to the European Union; that is to say, probably the negotiations for accession will start soon. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Ambassador Arım.  Our next speaker will be Professor Atilla Eralp.  Professor Eralp is the head of the International Relations department of the Middle East Technical University and is also a member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute.  Professor Eralp will discuss Turkey-EU relations. 

Professor Atilla Eralp:

Thank you. I will try to look at the Turkey-EU relationship within the context of the European Union integration process. I will try to focus primarily on the process of enlargement of the European Union and the Turkish case within that process.

When I look at the process of enlargement of the European Union there are some striking patterns.  One pattern that is quite striking is that the European Union has enlarged in terms of groups of countries. In the first enlargement process, for example, the European Community at that time accepted three countries: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark together. In the second enlargement process of the 1980s the European Community accepted Greece, Spain and Portugal at similar times. In the third enlargement of the 1990s the European Union accepted Sweden, Austria and Finland. In the present enlargement the EU is trying to incorporate the Central and Eastern European countries.  So there is a pattern of enlargement in terms of group of countries. 

The second pattern, which is striking in the EU enlargement process, is that the EU enlargement has been successful in cases where there has been a turning point, a sense of a beginning. When you look at, for example, the second enlargement process when Greece, Spain, and Portugal became part of the European Community in those countries there was a transformation process from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes; so there was a sense of a beginning, a sense of a turning point in those cases. When you look at the present enlargement process again you see a sense of a turning point. Central and Eastern European countries are transformed from state run regimes and command economies into democratic regimes and they are turning towards Europe in this process.  So there is, again, a sense of beginning.

When I look at the Turkish case within these patterns I can say that Turkey does not fulfill the so-called enlargement criteria. Turkey is trying to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, but in terms of fulfilling the enlargement criteria Turkey faces difficulty. Why? Primarily because Turkey has been alone in applying to the European community. It has not been part of a group. For a while Turkey was a part of a group together with Greece, as we know during the 1950s and 1960s, but then Greece became part of the European community and Turkey was left alone in this process. Turkey applied alone in 1987 and from that point on Turkey has been alone in this process. 

In terms of the second criteria of enlargement, again, when we look at the Turkish case we haven’t seen a sense of a turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship. Instead we have seen an element of continuity. Turkey-EU relationship goes back in history.  In the last forty years or so we haven’t seen turning points in the Turkey-EU relationship. The only time when I was able to observe a turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship was at the Helsinki summit.  At the Helsinki summit there was a sense of a turning point, there was a sense of a beginning.  Why? Primarily because Turkey was becoming part of a group for the first time. Turkey was assessed together with 12 other countries and there was this sense of possibility of at least belonging to a group. 

After Helsinki there was another possibility of turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship primarily, as Mr. Arım also mentioned, due to the fact that the EU for the first time was focusing more on geopolitical considerations.  It was adopting a broader vision on enlargement, thus, it was becoming more inclusive.  As a result, the EU became more positive towards Turkey and we started to see better or improved relations in the Turkey-EU context. But the Helsinki process remained incomplete.   The EU was not able to clarify a timetable for Turkey.  Turkey was put on a slow track, but probably more problematic than that there was no clear timetable given for starting negotiations.  When you compare the Turkish case with other countries in the enlargement process in all cases there was a clearer timetable presented. In the case of Turkey, there was no clear timetable. So, this slowed down Turkey in the EU relationship. 

Also, again, when I look at the Turkish case comparatively with other countries in the enlargement process, in all cases the EU has provided a mixture of incentives and conditions.   Comparatively in the case of Turkey the EU set clear conditions but gave limited incentives.  The EU was unable to provide enough incentives in the case of Turkey.  I’m not talking only of material incentives; we all know that they were limited, but also in terms of immaterial incentives.  The EU was not forthcoming, it was not positive in supporting the Turkish reform process. So this created problems in Turkey-EU relations and as a result we were not able to progress in the EU relationship as other countries were progressing and as they were becoming part of the EU.

When I look at the present circumstances, especially after the Copenhagen summit, we have all witnessed a certain frustration in the Turkey-EU relationship. In my opinion, when I look at the Turkey-EU relationship after Copenhagen I see that Turkey is again becoming alone in this process of negotiation for membership.  Turkey is getting away from the group. After Helsinki there was a possibility for Turkey to catch up; to be part of the group containing Bulgaria and Romania that will be come part of the EU around 2007 or 2008.  However, now when I look at the Copenhagen decisions that possibility is somewhat lost.  It is quite difficult now for Turkey to be come part of this group, which will enter the EU around 2007 or 2008.

Turkey is again becoming alone in this process and when you are alone in this process it is more difficult in my opinion.  This thought makes me somewhat pessimistic about the Turkey-EU relationship.  But, when I assess this situation in a more comprehensive way I also feel some optimism in the sense that there is another possibility in the next enlargement in the EU. The EU will be incorporating the so-called West Balkan countries starting with probably Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These countries will be part of the EU enlargement in the next ten years or so. Turkey has already had a long history in its relations with the EU. There is the possibility that Turkey will be the first country accepted for membership in this group.  When I think of, for example the second enlargement, Greece was the first country that entered the EU of its group; Spain and Portugal followed Greece in the second enlargement.  Greece became part of the European community in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. Now there is a possibility that Turkey may be part of the EU around like 2011 or 2012 and other West Balkan countries may follow Turkey in that process.  I think that Turkey and the EU should work on that possibility.

When I look at the EU process in all cases of enlargement it has also initiated a reform process; thus, the enlargement process has gone together with a so-called deepening process.  In the present enlargement process when I look at the major reform process of the EU it focuses on the consolidation and the institutionalization of its foreign and security policy. I think that the present enlargement process the EU would consolidate its foreign and security policy The next enlargement process, the Balkan enlargement process, will pressurize the EU more along those lines. So as the EU will be working on the institutionalization of its common foreign and security policy I think the consolidation of this process will provide a more conducive environment for the inclusion of Turkey within the EU. This also makes me quite optimistic about the Turkey-EU relationship.

I think in the next decade or so the EU will be focusing more and more on this sensitive issue of institutionalization of its common foreign and security policy and within this context there will be more room for Turkey.   Turkish significance will increase within the EU and if Turkey is able to solve some of the problems facing its internal political and social reform processes then I hope that this progress will accelerate. Probably the turning point in Turkey-EU relations will be the start of negotiations. If Turkey and the EU are able to start negotiations around the beginning of 2005 or so, from that point on there is a possibility that the Turkey-EU relationship may accelerate. The start of negotiations may provide a needed turning point in the Turkey-EU relationship.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Professor Eralp.  Our next speaker will be Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, an assistant professor at Bilkent University ‘s International Relations Department. Dr. Kibaroğlu will be talking about European security and Turkey.

Mustafa Kibaroğlu:

I would like to take up from the point where Professor Eralp left off regarding the need for having a common security, defense, as well as foreign policy of the European Union. But before doing so I would like to have a short flash back into the recent past and see how things have developed in continental Europe in terms of security and defense.

Actually, for many decades Turkey’s geographical location has always been of highly strategic significance for Europe.  Turkey’s role in NATO in protecting Western Europe from a Soviet attack has been vital for decades.  With the detente period and then for a short period following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Turkey’s role was still significant.   But, with Gorbachev coming to power in the Soviet Union; the Perestroika; the Glasnost, which was some what influential in the disintegration of Soviet Union; as well as the Warsaw Pact, which actually was invented and took place earlier; Turkey’s role has, in my view, partly diminished. It has partly transformed from one of being a flank country in NATO “neighboring” the Soviet Union to one of a front-line state in the Middle East actually “neighboring” countries in the Middle East where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has gained pace actually with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East, authority and control over material weapons has been diminishing while as the know-how needed for development of weapons of mass destruction and many countries’ access to such material themselves have  increasingly become  much easier. Indeed when we look from this perspective at the Middle East, the European Union’s threat perception of the Middle East does not necessarily match with that of Turkey. For many decades and especially during the 1990s, the European Union’s relations with countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria have been rather stable and good when compared to the U.S. policy of applying a dual containment policy toward Iran and Iraq, which aimed at limiting trade relations with these countries. However, the European Union countries did not pay an equal importance to this policy of dual containment and it did not produce good results for the U.S.

We have seen several developments especially in Iraq throughout the second half of 1990s towards a crisis, especially in the early 2000.  The developments that have taken place during this crisis prior to war have shown the divergences between the U.S. and Europe quite clearly.  All these developments have shown to the world that the EU can be considered an economic power and even to some extent a political power, but not at all a military power. Therefore, a solution has to be found if the EU wanted to play a significant role in world politics.

One has to underline the fact that the EU not being a military power has to do with its limited means and capabilities in the military domain. For many decades the security of Europe ha s   to a great extent depended on the capabilities of the U.S. and NATO. The European countries, Western countries, and later on EU countries did not want to spend large sums of money on defense procurement. They, as Professor Eralp clearly underlined, wanted to deepen their political integration. But the developments in Iraq have shown to the world quite clearly that if the EU wants to play an important role in world politics it has to strengthen its military arm; not only for protecting its vital interests in the region, in Europe, and in its periphery, but also play a significant role in world politics as a growing challenge to U.S. hegemony, which is likely to last for several decades following the developments in Iraq, eventually in the decades to come.  There are several attempts, especially since the second half of the 1990s, to revitalize the military branch of Europe. The policies to create an institutionalized European security and defense identity, whereby the European security and defense policy could be pursued, have come to some fruition with the consent of Turkey at the Copenhagen Summit.

I would like to refer once again to Professor Eralp ’s previously made commentary because he quite wisely referred to the turning points in the enlargement process and what kind of a turning point we can talk about with respect to Turkey’s possible accession to the EU. Maybe the events of the Iraqi war can play some role in accelerating Turkey’s accession to Europe.  There are several statements made by high-ranking EU officials as well as statesmen indicating that Turkey’s role has increased and that the EU would like to see some steps taken in the political domain from Turkey that might pave the way to a more rapid accession to the EU.  Turkey may have a lot to give to Europe in the military domain, which is Turkey’s major strength. Turkey has many military assets, capabilities, as well as traditions and much experience in the military field.  If the democratization process can be solidified and some reforms can be made in a timely manner, Turkey’s significance in the military field can be a very important asset for deepening its relations with the union.

Therefore Turkey, in my view, sets the threshold of taking a very vital decision because Europe needs Turkey, especially from the military perspective, and Turkey needs Europe for its future political orientation. The time and the conjuncture, as Ambassador Arım has mentioned, are right. If Turkey can take all these political steps in a timely manner and at a time when Europe has seen its weaknesses in the military domain; Turkey’s EU relations can be much developed and Turkey can start negotiations with the European Union. This in turn, may lead to full membership much sooner than many may even expect. Thank you.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu. And now the last speaker is Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu the head of the International Relations Department of Bilkent University and a member of the board of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute.  Professor Karaosmanoğlu, please

Ali Karaosmanoğlu:

Thank you Mr. Chairman.  I wish to approach Turkey-EU relations from the point of view of internal factors of Turkey and of Europe, despite the fact that EU membership has always been an important political objective of Turkey.

Various Turkish governments and even the civil society have not always been quite ready to take up the responsibility of defending Turkey’s European vocation. From time to time they seem to be rather hesitant and indecisive. The political parties actually have been indecisive from time to time and the private sector was hesitant especially in 1970 and the beginning of 1980s. However, today we can say that a consensus exists between major political parties and in civil society for Turkey’s EU membership.

When we look at the European attitude towards Turkey, Europe has also been hesitant to admit Turkey as a member of the EU. The EU position actually discouraged the integrationists in Turkey, but on the other hand, encouraged and strengthened the position of anti-EU circles in Turkey. The policy Europe has taken towards Turkey has been a policy of rather wait-and-see. Europe has not been very enthusiastic about the possibility of Turkey’s membership. On the other hand, the EU did not want to eliminate Turkey from Europe because from the point of view of geopolitics, defined in objective terms, some influential circles affecting European foreign and security policy believed that Turkey was an important state for various reasons.  They also believed in Turkey’s economic potential. For that reason, Turkey was an indispensable country for Europe. 

On the other hand, the EU did not want Turkey as a member especially for demographic reasons and for Turkey’s weak democratic credentials. After the Copenhagen summit, the conditions in Europe in particular and in international politics in general seem to be more favorable for Turkey’s membership.

One important point has already been made: In the aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis, the importance of the issue of institutionalizing European common foreign and security policy has grown.  We know the EU has already made strides in this respect. However, even in this context, Turkish democracy credentials are still important for the EU because Europeans see a very close conceptual link between a common foreign and security policy and a European identity. They define European identity in terms of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.  Turkey is still lagging behind in this respect.

We should point out, though, that Turkey has made strides in the field of democratization, however, there are still things that should be done. The issue of Turkey’s problems of implementation of democracy are being more focused upon /more emphasized in the discourse of the Europeans.

I think I should again say a few words about the common foreign and security policy and the European identity. Europeans, of course, would like to develop and institutionalize their common foreign, security, and defense policies. Yet, whenever they decide to intervene militarily within Europe or within the vicinity of Europe to defend their own interests and to project stability there they pay due attention to the legitimacy of the intervention. They do not prefer taking up action alongside a country whose democratic credentials are dubious. They believe that when they include in a military operation such a country as this it will affect the legitimacy of the operation. For that reason, Turkey is again unable to fully participate in the institutionalization and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and in a European security and defense policy. Therefore, Turkey should fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria and implement them appropriately.

Seyfi Taşhan:

Thank you Professor Karaosmanoğlu. In this roundtable on Turkey and the European Union we heard, in speaking order:  Ambassador Reşat Arım, Professor Atilla Eralp, Doctor Mustafa Kibaroğlu and a conclusion by Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu. Thank you all.