What happens in the Balkans now is the result of the Serbian's legacy of the Milosevic years. The Albanians, spread over nearly all the Balkan countries naturally considered themselves the victims of Serbian nationalism and this view still prevails. Since NATO's military operations in Kosovo starting in June 1999 and the subsequent change of the Serbian regime in Belgrade after Milosevic had to leave office during peaceful demonstrations last year, the whole political structure changed and this change is one of the most important reasons for the events in the Balkans. 

The Kosovar Albanians still feel themselves occupied by NATO and U.N. forces and any independence for Kosovo is still a dream. Actually, many Albanian politicians from Kosovo sincerely hoped that after Milosevic Kosovo would gain independence. At least this was expected and assumed. The reality, however, does not favor such expectations. New Serbian President Kostunica and Prime Minister Zoran Chincic are fully supported by NATO and the United Nations because both of them are considered the guarantors of the post-Milosevic Balkans and indeed until today the cooperation of the Serbian leadership is exceptionally good. Therefore, the Milosevic factor is still there and the new leadership is not willing to hand over Milosevic to the International War Crimes Tribunal because for the Serbs Milosevic is already a "matter of national honor." The recent NATO-U.N. understanding with Serbia came about in a way that indicates Milosevic should stay in Belgrade. If NATO and the United Nations should insist on it, the new leadership in Serbia would be in difficulty. This is a dilemma for both sides. But it seems that Serbia is "the winner" of the day. How long? This is a question. 

Kosovo became in recent years a transit passage for the trade in woman, illegal drug trafficking and weapons sales. Many Albanian groups, like in Afghanistan, northern Iraq and the Middle East, act independently from each other, and no doubt, in the Balkans the emergence of the new warlords is the case. Kosovo is the most strongly protected area in the Balkans; one in every 36 persons is a policeman and this density of security is creating insecurity. The new warlords will try to get much more of whatever they can get, and the Ottoman history of the Balkans since the 19th century shows very clearly how the Balkans passed many turbulent years and the Ottomans lost control in certain regions. Today, the NATO and U.N. forces as well as the European Union have to deal with such Albanian groups and try to satisfy them. It will not be an easy task for sure. In all the '90s from Somalia to East Timor it has been a phenomena in international and regional conflicts, and now, the Balkan countries will face this phenomena that will be stronger in the future. Actually, the events in Macedonia are only the surface of the iceberg, and no doubt, Macedonia will deal with this problem successfully with the help of neighboring countries and international forces, but the Albanian factor will remain. What does it mean in political terms? Will Kosovo become independent or what type of "new status" will be designed? How will the new Serbian government take economic and political measures to satisfy the Albanians in Kosovo? Can or should the Albanians in Kosovo trust the new government in Belgrade? 

Yesterdays 20-day cease-fire agreement will not last longer. It is a rule in such conflicts that any cease fire aims to gain time and better negotiation status. It will not be successful because cease fires do not satisfy the political expectations of the parties. That Serbian troops can now go in much deeper from the demarcations line will not change the reality that the Serbian troops will not be attacked. The problems in the Balkans lie also in the failure of the West to reach a permanent political solution there. The new government in Belgrade also faces a new examination in this respect. The new American administration is still watching and expects that the Europeans will be more active there. The German government for example strongly supports Prime Minister Chincic, and no doubt internal stability in Belgrade is important for Balkan stability as well. The recent meetings of the southern European leaders in Skopje where Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit participated has been dealing with this problem, of course without any concrete solution. Also President Sezer's meetings with the Bulgarian and Romanian presidents in Plovdiv tried to create an air of stability in the Balkans and certainly, stability in the Balkans is strongly needed now more than ever. Therefore, the political reality remains how to solve the Kosovo problem. It became an international problem and in all international problems the expectations are getting bigger and bigger. It does not matter which side you talk about. 

Kosovo and the Albanians remain the most urgent task for European security in the near future. Turkey's contribution to Kosovo before and after the NATO operation remains essential. However, Turkey is not at the table in a real sense. Therefore, Turkey can and should exercise influence on the Albanian groups, although from now on it seems not so easy. 

Kosovo will remain a thorny issue in the Balkans, and the Balkans is already a "paradise for any illegal activity" for the warlords. An early solution is not in sight. As long as Milosevic is not handed to the International War Crimes Tribunal the Albanians who have been the most victimized nation in the Balkans in the last decade will not be satisfied. The new Serbian government is aware of this political reality but is sitting on two chairs at the moment. Difficult times lie ahead.