Chairman Seyfi Taşhan 

Today we will discuss Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey’s neighborhood is a fairly large neighborhood stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus to Central Asia to the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.  This encompasses a very large area and therefore we will discuss it bit-by-bit, region-by-region. We have here today a distinguished group of experts including:  Ambassador Resat Arım, Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, Professor Huseyin Bağcı, Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı, and Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu. We will begin with Central Asia. I will ask Meryem Kırımlı to inform us of the current situation in Central Asia, what Turkey’s interests in the region are now and what they will be in the future.

Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı

Thank you.  Central Asia emerged as an increasingly important region with its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This huge area presents many opportunities for Turkey economically, politically, socially as well as with regards to providing several cultural and religious influences.

The independence of Central Asia has sparked several assessments in the western media on behalf of Turkey.  One interpretation in particular is that Turkey’s enthusiastic foreign policy approach towards the newly Central Asian countries is the start of a new age for the Turkic world in the 21st century. All of these predictions after 12 years of independence have not proven to be correct.  For all the fear in Central Asia about Islamic radicalism and ethnic conflict a major threat has yet to materialize in the region.

We have to divide the existence of post-Soviet ruled into two periods: the first period began with independence in 1991 and ended with the September 11th attacks and the surfacing of the second period, in which we currently find ourselves. September 11th has opened another period for Central Asia because in its aftermath American presence has emerged in the area as the third leg of the great power struggle.

In my personal opinion, the presence of another important power, China, has not been assessed correctly. In the international arena after September 11th, particularly for international politics, international law, and also for other important matters, China becoming increasingly influential not only in Central Asian affairs but global issues as a whole. With its participation in all international organizations, platforms, and conferences it is gaining too much power from the “American War Against Terrorism.” On top of this, almost all of the Central Asian states have signed the Shanghai cooperation agreement. Looking at this from the Turkish perspective, one has to, thus, pay particular attention to not only the presence of Russia and America, but also the presence of China. Its position is not particularly offensive in a military sense, but it is still very active. One has to be very cautious of the presence of China in the area, for the security, inhabitants, economic, as well as military matters in the region.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

You accurately pointed out the increasing role of China in the region.   Another important issue is the attitude of Central Asian countries towards Islamic movements.  Professor Kirimli, can you expand on this topic?  How strong are Islamic pressures in the region?

Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı

Islamic pressures, or rather Islamic fundamentalism, in the area have not proved to be very important particularly for countries like Kazakhstan and even Kyrgyzstan. The fear that emerged in Tajikistan right after it gained its independence has died down as its political/religious civil war gradually turns into an economic war. For example, Tajikistan’s population cares only for the economic well being of society and the struggle for economic survival. In all Central Asian countries one has to pay attention to the fact that the occupants of leadership and other high level political and societal positions have not changed. The names of the leaders of the area still are in a struggle and they have already established their authority against all kinds of oppositional movements. In Uzbekistan, particularly, not only Islamic fundamentalist, but also any other kind of oppositional group cannot exist under the iron fist of a leader like Karimov.

When these Central Asian countries gained their independence the expectation that they would soon become democracies and join the international club followed. I suppose only the Caucasian countries have made progress in that direction.

There are several security threatening issues in the Caucasus. In the news recently we have heard that there are also such problems in Iran with regard to nuclear proliferation. I would like to ask Mustafa Kibaroğlu to elaborate on the military aspects of this situation, the current situations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and on inherent dangers interconnected to the harshening of American policies after 9-11.

Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu

Thank you.  Iran, for a long while, had designs to develop a nuclear infrastructure/capability that, especially after the Islamic revolution, has become a major cause for concern for the West and, particularly, for the United States. Iran’s ambitions to develop such a large infrastructure date back to the mid-1970s; the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war, which gave, rise to the emergence of OPEC. Afterwards, the oil prices increased four times and consequently provided Iran with a huge influx of hard currency. This huge influx of money gave so much incentive to the Iranian regime that the shah actually commenced an ambitious nuclear program. In this program he declared that his aim was that in the following 20 years Iran would establish a 20,000megabyte electric nuclear infrastructure, requiring the building of some 20-25 nuclear reactors. Two of these nuclear reactors began to be built in the Büshehr region, southwest of Tehran on the Gulf coast, by German companies; but the building of the reactors was halted by the Islamic revolution at about 95% completion.

During the Islamic revolution the new regime cut off many of its ties with the rest of the world. Its policy can be summarized as neither East nor West. Therefore, nuclear projects were pushed aside as the new regime spent most of its effort on securing its position in the country. In the mid-1980s, focus was put on completion of the nuclear reactor in Büshehr and the development of a nuclear infrastructure, but as the country was subject to a U.S. policy of containment, along with Iraq, it was especially difficult to find foreign assistance, a subcontractor to terminate these projects. The United States put pressure on all countries, such as European and Latin American countries that specialized in the nuclear field, and companies that Iran approached to finish its nuclear infrastructure.  During the 1990s the Russians took over the Büshehr project. Quite significant progress in Russian-Iranian relations came about as the Iranian regime signed a contract with Russian firms in January 1995 to complete its nuclear projects.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

I want to ask you two questions regarding points you previously brought up. My first question is:  Does Iran, an oil rich country, really needs to invest in nuclear energy for itself? How convincing are their arguments regarding this issue?  Secondly, there is much talk about the uranium and plutonium enrichment plants, the output of which can be used for nuclear weapons. I would like you to expand a little on this second point.  During the last G8 meeting, a declaration was issued by the Russian president stating Russia’s opposition to nuclear proliferation. You pointed out that the Russians have helped Iran to develop nuclear capabilities yet, at the same time; they have declared their position against nuclear proliferation. Does this constitute a change of attitude in Russia or was this declaration just a gesture to please Americans.

Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu

Thank you for reminding me of these points. The Russians signed a deal with Iran at quite an important at time because they needed hard currency; their economy was in bad shape. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the state of the economy in the country, the social economic structure, was almost upside down. Firms and experts needed hard currency and Iran was the one that could provide these companies such hard currency. The deal is estimated to be worth around one billion dollars.

Within the nuclear cooperation agreement, Iran does not only secure the construction and termination of the nuclear reactors, it also expands its infrastructure by sending its PhD students and master students to Russian institutes where they receive quite a sophisticated education. Moreover, Russian companies, firms, and institutions provide Iran with very significant contributions in terms of laboratories for labor-scale experiments, quite crucial for a country to have a self sufficient nuclear infrastructure, enabling that country to have a nuclear weapon developing capability in years to come. Countries with such capabilities include India and Pakistan; both countries, the Russian federation, and Iran are states party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which gives them the authority to enter into such cooperation. Actually on paper there is nothing wrong, no one can claim to say that what Russia and Iran are doing is something illegal, but there are certain questions that must be raised.

First of all, if we ask whether or not Iran needs energy the answer is quite obvious; they don’t need nuclear energy for securing their energy needs in the years to come. When I discussed these issues with my Iranian colleagues their explanation is, “We have spent a lot of money on the Büshehr reactor already, some 4 billion dollars, and we don’t want to waste that money. We want some recovery, to what extent we can get this money is not certain, but this is our right according to Article 4 of the MP10. So we want the firms to complete the once-halted uranium enrichment facility project “discovered” in Natan’s province. Another thing that raises much concern is that the Iranian government had to submit the project design information about the facility to the International Atomic Energy and did not, this is not illegal nor a violation but one wonders what they have to hide. A cause for further concern is that there is an additional protocol, which makes the inspection safeguards more stringent and requires the country to be more transparent and Iran is dragging its feet to sign this protocol.

Taking these points into account, when we analyze the declarations made at the G8 meeting by Russia as genuine or merely a nod to the western countries, I don’t think Russia will ever give up its relations with the Iranian nuclear field. In my opinion, Russia sees this kind of cooperation as a safety valve to keep Iran far from the Central Asian territories. Iran, otherwise, would have meddled in the region’s affairs making life much more difficult for the Russians, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

Thank you very much.  It has been a very interesting discussion thus far. From here we have to pass onto other nuclear-rich countries in the region. There is a power plant currently operating in Armenia, which causes some concern in Turkey. I don’t know if the Iranian nuclear program causes as much concern in Turkey or not, but I do believe the U.S. thinks that Turkey should feel concerned about it. There are obviously certain areas where Turkey considers nuclear proliferation as harmful in general. I think there are two areas we need to pay special attention to: the first being the Caucasus region. In the Caucasus we have the economic and security problems. Additionally, there is a major dispute in this region that involves Turkey to a certain extent. I would like Professor Huseyin Bağcı to discuss with us Russian policy in the Caucasus as well as refer to Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus region.

Professor Huseyin Bağcı

Thank you Mr. Taşhan. Russian foreign policy has to be viewed in two phases: the first starting after the demise of the Soviet Union until 2000, the so-called Boris Yeltsin period; the second phase was inaugurated in 2000 and continues to this day, the Vladimir Putin period. There is certainly a continuation in Russian foreign policy, in this sense, but with one difference, Putin takes a much more careful and cooperative approach when dealing with leaders of other powers.

Putin attempts to portray Russia contrary to its previous image of aggressive country. It appears it is going to be a good natural partner of the European Union countries, in particular at the moment France and Germany. At the same time since September 11th, Putin giving the impression that the Russian federation is in an international fight against terrorism alongside the United States of America; he was the first western leader who called George W. Bush to assure him that his country is together with the United States on this issue. We have to see the evolution in the Putin period concerning Russian foreign policy in Central Asia, Caucasus, as well in Central and Eastern Europe.

It seems that the Russian federation to this day holds the view that the former-Soviet Union countries are still in its interest zone. This time it may not be playing the big brother role in an ideological sense, rather, in a physical sense, I mean economically, politically and militarily. Russia is trying to increase its influence under the new circumstances while, at the same time, accepting the fact that after September 11th, the United States of America is part of the global fight against international terrorism within the Eurasian area. The concept of Eurasia is entering into discussion more and more because it is a large region the Russians cannot dominate without some economic as well as military support from external actors, including the United States of America alongside other world powers.

Recently we have seen that China is an up-and-coming important player in international politics. Russian relations with India are still in discussion. Russia is trying to achieve, resemblant of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1960s and 70s, so-called multi-directional foreign policy, not concentrating only one block or one power center but having a global reach. Putin’s Russia stresses that it does not want to appear as a global opponent or rival of the United States of America, I think the most important characteristic of Putin’s foreign policy is. Rather, Putin is trying to highlight the readiness to cooperate within the international multilateral cooperation as the new character of Russian foreign policy within this context.  During the last three years in particular, Russia is getting Central Asia and Caucasia under its control again in the framework of international cooperation. The leaders of Central Asia and Caucasia are once more looking towards Moscow. Regular meetings are again held by these leaders in Moscow; there may not be the patron-client relationship experienced before the demise of the Soviet Union, but Russia continues to consult with these countries to fight against a common enemy, as Professor Kırımlı aforementioned, radical Islamist movements.  These certainly cause great concern to the Russian federation from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Chechnya.

As Professor Kibaroğlu said, Russian-Iranian relations, in particular considering the weapon selling and nuclear project, show that Russia is indeed going through an era of reform. Russia has a responsibility, as Putin stressed several times, to restructure its army, economy and society. While they attempt to do this within the existing international conditions they try to sell. To quote Russian academic Ruslam Pukov, an expert on Russian defense industries, “Russia is selling whatever it can, whatever it has in its hands as weapons. It sells them to those countries that have interest in buying them.” On the other hand, as Mr. Taşhan mentioned, the Caucasus is certainly one of the most problematic areas for Russian foreign policy at the moment. From Georgia to Armenia, as Mr. Taşhan mentioned again, there is still the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has not been resolved between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia, as everybody knows, is controlling Armenian security. The Russian army is providing this security for Armenia. Thus, Russian presence in Caucasia is a fact under these new circumstances.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

May I just ask a question? After 9-11, the U.S. began a new policy addressing the conflicts in the Middle Eastern region as a whole.  We have heard of the meetings at Sharm el-Sheik Kamose and Aqaba. Furthermore, there is new activity on Cyprus.  The U.S. might try to resolve the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh without support from the Minsk group. This conflict is damaging to U.S. interests in Azerbaijan because of Armenian domestic pressures in the United States.

Professor Huseyin Bağcı

At a later stage that might be the case, the United States of America is pursuing a global policy whereas Russia, not considering itself as a global power, is retreating from global power politics. Russia leans more towards involvement in regional politics while simultaneously trying to give the impression it is on the way to becoming a global player in the future. At the moment, within the American grand design of things, regarding Central Asian, Middle Eastern as well Caucasian problematic issues, Putin’s Russian federation must accept the reality that Americans are determined to solve all these conflicts which prevent stability in the Eurasian region for the next ten to twenty years. I think the Russians will try, without losing face, to accept this and try to find a solution.  My expectation or my analysis is that Putin, very careful in his handling of external as well as internal politics, will try not to give the impression that Russia is making big sacrifices or big concessions. He no doubt has realized that without regional and global cooperation with the United States of America Russia will not be able to solve these conflicts alone; this being the case Russia should become more active within the limited maneuver room as compared to the Cold War period.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

Could it be that Russia has a hunch on its back that is Chechnya? Without solving the problem of Chechnya, Russia does not dare move too much in the international arena in order to keep western public opinion at bay.

Professor Huseyin Bağcı

I think Russia has two problems, which are indeed huge challenges to Russian foreign policy in the future; the first being Chechnya, the second being Kaliningrad. Both of them are a question of honor for Russia and its foreign policy. In Chechnya, as you rightly pointed out, during the 1990s in particular, the Russians took on a foreign policy where use of the military was a much more determining factor, whereas, at the moment they are trying to emphasize use of political framework more.

Putin is exercising a type of policy which provides Chechnya with greater autonomy without giving complete independence, while at the same time, pleasing western public opinion, Americans as well as Europeans, with the hope that Chechnya will no longer be used by Russian generals in order to exercise their military strength. I think Putin recognized first after September 11th and again after the Iraqi war that Russia cannot employ the same policies it used towards Chechnya during the 1990s. Thus, less and less military power will be exercised there, but at the same time, Russia will try to find out how international organizations as well as external powers like the United States of America can be part of the solution of the Chechnyan question. In the meantime, Islamic radicalism will remain one of the biggest challenges at the moment for Russian foreign policy.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

Thank you. Moving on to the south, would anyone like to say a few words about Turkish-Russian relations, where they are going and how they are developing?

Professor Huseyin Bağcı

I’ll just make a brief analysis. I think in the past 12 years Turkish-Russian relations have moved from a level of confrontation to one of cooperation. I do not expect that there will be a confrontational line from the Russian nor the Turkish side in the foreseeable future because for the first time in the past 100 years Russian and Turkish interests coincide in the Caucasus as well Central Asian regions. Russians prefer possible Turkish membership in the European Union because, as a result, they believe Turkey will be much more accountable and cooperative. While the Russian government attempts to minimize Turkish influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus they realize there is no longer a rivalry between Russia and Turkey, rather, there is free competition. I think this competition will bring Turkish-Russian relations to a much better level than many analysts expect.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

Ambassador Arım wants to say a few words on this.

Ambassador Resat Arim

Thank you sir. I think Russian-Turkish relations will benefit from this new climate, which came about after the unfortunate event of the Sept 11th attacks. As Professor Bağcı previously mentioned, President Putin was the first leader to call President Bush about this incident, since then American-Russian relations have been greatly improved. There have been a couple of summit meetings where both Russian and American leaders have decided that they have a common interest with regards to several issues in neighboring regions. In addition, Russia is strengthening its ties to the west from within NATO. All this will likely result in much better relations between Turkey and the Russian federation.

Assistant Professor Meryem Kırımlı

May I add a couple of points? Thank you very much. I am still on the subject of anti-terror campaigns. An anti-terror committee was immediately established at the UN level in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The war against terror is a different kind of war, the anti-terror activities of states a different kind of struggle. With regards to Russian activities in Chechnya, even Russia’s anti-terror activities and methods are changing. It is directing its attention not only towards states but also to non-state actors that are rising in terrorist or separatist activity as a result of globalization. The Russian government also keeps in mind the importance of maintaining a positive image in the eyes of the global population. If Russia were to attack a region within its borders without justifiable cause then world public pressure would mount on its government’s shoulders. However, most often the global public opinion scale has been tipped to favor states acting in defense of their sovereignty, especially after the events of September 11th there is not much disagreement regarding this subject. The way in which a state deals with ethnic or religious conflicts within its own borders poses another challenge to efforts to build up its foreign relations.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

You have a significant point there. I personally think that while one kind of terrorism is being addressed another kind is pushed aside, in a sense. If terrorism is not of an international character and it only affects one country nobody else seems to care, but if it involves an international arena as a whole, international concept, or major power then we seem to have a problem that needs to be addressed. Mustafa Kibaroğlu wants to say something with regard to this issue.

Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu

In my view, the fight against terrorism is a major factor, among several others which were aforementioned by Professor Bağcı, in the strengthening of ties between the United States and the Russian federation. One very effective instrument in the fight against terror is collection of intelligence. Neither nuclear weapons, nor ballistic missiles, nor missile shields can be of complete help for any country in its defense against terror attacks. The important issue of accumulating intelligence has positively affected U.S.-Russian relations because in order for the United States to collect intelligence in areas that are controlled and patrolled by the Russians they must receive permission from Russia; therefore, they have to come to some agreement in this respect.

Chairman Seyfi Taşhan

Well, thank you all very much! Since Turkey is a large country with a great number of neighbors in regions in all directions, while our debate has taken longer than we assumed we were unable to cover all bordering areas. Therefore, we will discuss issues concerning the Middle East, Mediterranean region, and the Balkans at our next session. Thank you again.