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Dış Politika Enstitüsü-Foreign Policy Institute

Foreign Policy Institute founded in 1974, is a private corporation engaged in research, organising conferences, seminars and working groups on foreign policy and strategic issues. It is currently affiliated to the Turkish Foundation for International Relations and Strategic Studies.

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By its statute and law, Turkish Foreign Policy Institute is not allowed to express views on political matters. Therefore, the views expressed in this publication are solely those of their authors.
This year “Foreign Policy-Dış Politika” Journal is celebrating the fortieth anniversary of its publication life. When we published the first Journal in 1971, a friend of mine wanted to have a bet with me and said “you should be happy if you could publish only four issues”. He proved to be wrong because nobody expected that there would be such an interest in a serious foreign policy journal in those days. Today I am happy to observe that we are no longer alone in this field as many new Institutes have been formed after the Cold War and many serious publications are appearing on Turkish foreign policy.

Although after forty years we have decided to continue with our old format, we have introduced several changes in our content to meet the requirements of young academics and those readers who want to read serious articles cleared by referees. Nevertheless, FPJ is a political publication and we cannot remain aloof to essays and op-eds of other people of knowledge. We give on the inner cover page the list of our Editorial Board members who are distinguished academics or diplomats-experts in their fields.

Soft power or hard power are concepts that came in policy jargon especially after the Cold War. But the soft power concept enlarged the scope of the concept of security. We are pleased to publish the article of Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu on the subject.

Ambassador Reşat Arım, for many years, has been following and writing about the changing global system and in the midst of the troubles in the Middle East and power balances he looks at where we stand in respect to foreign policy issues.

Every year I try to look at the problems Turkey faces in the execution of its foreign policies. In this issue I followed the tradition. As Turkey rapidly grows in economy and attains a central position, I used the title “caput magna cura magna” phrase originating in the Roman empire; as we grow so does our problems.

As Turkey has become a little disputed central power in its region, we have decided to peruse our neighborhood in some detail and we began with Southern
Caucasus region countries because this troubled region is highly important for Turkey for economic, strategic and even cultural reasons. Three former Turkish diplomats, all are Board members of the Foreign Policy Institute, look at the developments in the three Caucasus Countries. Ambassador Ömer Lütem takes-up Armenia-Turkey relations; Ambassador Oktay Aksoy analyzes the situation in Georgia and Ambassador Reşat Arım looks at the complex problems of Azerbaijan and the impact of the question Nagorno-Karabagh.

With respect to General Elections of 12 June 2011 our research staff summarized the Foreign Policy Platforms of the three major political parties as their programs will also be important after the elections.

Seyfi Taşhan

Editor
Soft Power in Turkish Foreign policy

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of scholarly studies on the idea of soft power in foreign policies of states. Though Joseph Nye popularized this concept in the early years of the post-Cold war era in the context of the American foreign policy, the late 1990s saw scholars begin to use this concept frequently in relation to the European Union. It has been argued that the European Union has been a distinctive international actor repudiating hard power in the materialization of European security and foreign policy interests. This early literature had been mainly about the ways of comparing a traditional hard power actor, the United States, with a soft power, the European Union.

Discussions on soft power have gained a new dimension at the turn of the new century, particularly following the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a number of scholars began to examine the growing salience of the so-called ‘rising powers’ in international politics. While uncovering the differences between the foreign policy strategies of the well-established existing powers on the one hand and the rising powers on the other, the concept of soft-power has been increasingly mentioned in the context of explaining China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ strategy. Noteworthy in this context is that China, of all rising powers, has invested a lot in soft-power strategies in her attempt at challenging the primacy of the US-led western international community in world politics. Not only has the Chinese leadership taken a great pain to improve China’s material power capabilities but also capitalized on image-making projects aiming at radiating a positive Chinese image across the globe. Today many believe that China offers a non-western model of economic development and international order. Similarly, many have concluded that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the one hand and the particular foreign policies understanding of the Bush administration on the other have eaten away the soft power potential of the United States.

Turkey has also been one of those ‘rising powers’ coming under limelight over the last decade. As years went on, a consensus view has emerged that Turkish foreign and security policies, particularly in the Middle
East, demonstrate a radical shift in the conceptualization and implementation of Turkey’s national interests. It is now believed that Turkey has already become a soft power foreign policy actor in her region that prioritizes the adoption of a transformative, trade-based, civilian, normative and diplomatic foreign policy understanding. The continuation of the EU accession process and the concomitant demand on Turkey to prove that she has good relations with her neighbors; the advent of the Justice and Development Party to government and the adoption of the so-called strategic depth doctrine under the stewardship of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the growing instability in the Middle East in the wake of the US-led war in Iraq have all been cited among possible factors that could potentially account for the soft-power turn in Turkish foreign policy. It is now believed that Turkey could deal with the challenges to her security and assert her primacy only through the adoption of soft power tools and strategies.

Despite this surge in the number of studies on the idea and implementation of soft power strategies, the ambiguity still persists as to how to define soft power. Even though analysts share the common assumption that power is the ability to get what one wants from others, they are still far away from offering a non-contested definition of this particular phenomenon. While some scholars tend to define soft power in the context of foreign policy instruments and capabilities by highlighting the nature of tools used in the implementation of foreign policy interests, some others point out to the fact that soft power, as well as hard power, denotes the existence of a power relationship between two particular countries. The latter argue that ascertaining whether or not there exists soft power relationship requires a more detailed analysis than merely examining the tools employed in the process of implementation. A country might possess a great sum of hard and soft power capabilities, yet it might be unable to have an influence on the foreign policy strategies and behaviors of other actors. Capabilities do not automatically translate into influence. Soft power defined as relationship suggests that power is relational and contextual. An implicit assumption of the scholars who are predisposed to define soft power as relationship is that for a state to be recognized as soft power, analysts need to answer if other states, being the target of the state that claims to act as a soft power, change their behaviors in line with the
expectations of the first state out of interests or identity related motivations. Without uncovering the motivations of the countries at the receiving end of this relationship, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to claim that the particular country at the sending end of this relationship holds soft power. That said, the conceptual difference between ‘soft power as the sum of capabilities’ or ‘soft power as a particular relationship’ should be underlined as unambiguously as possible.

That said, this article mainly tries to examine the relevance of soft power in the context of transformation in Turkish foreign policy. There are two particular questions to answer in this regard. First, to what extent has Turkey been relying on soft power tools and capabilities in order to help influence the preferences and behaviors of other states? Second, is it possible to talk about the existence of a soft power relationship between Turkey on the one hand and the countries that stand at the receiving end of Turkey’s messages on the other? Answering the second question is a far more complicated business than handling the first question because it requires an extensive study of the main reasons as to why other states might want to change their preferences and behaviors alongside Turkey’s priorities. Would they act out of fear, profit or identity concerns? This study argues that for a pure soft power relationship to exist between two particular countries, two preconditions need to be fulfilled simultaneously. First, the country that stands at the sending end of the spectrum should utilize soft power strategies and tools, meaning ‘power of persuasion’ and ‘power of attraction’. The goal on the part of this state should be to convince the target country through deliberate argumentation and persuasion. Second, the state that stands at the receiving end of this relationship should change her strategies and behaviors mainly out of identity related considerations, rather than pure cost-benefit calculations. Complying with the terms of the sending state should be found legitimate and appropriate. Stated somewhat differently, an ideal soft power relationship would arise if the sending state could get what she wants from the receiving state through the power of attraction and persuasion, rather than coercion and temptation.

Against such a background, the remainder of the article will first try to shed a light on the conceptual discussions on the idea of soft power. Here, the main argument is that six different power relationships, as well
as tools and strategies, might exist alongside an hypothetical power spectrum ranging from the soft power of attraction to the hard power of imposition. Then, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the soft power turn in Turkish foreign policy by mainly examining the foreign policy tools and capabilities employed by Turkish decision makers in their efforts to help change the behaviors of other states, particularly the ones which are located in Turkey’s neighborhood.

**Conceptual Discussion**

The conceptual discussion that follows revolves around two particular questions. First, what do state do in order to change the behaviors of others? Second, why do states change their behaviors in the image and expectations of others’ demands and priorities?

The soft power of attraction (1): Do nothing and get what you want

The softest power resource of any country is its particular identity and the feeling of admiration and legitimacy that its material successes, values and policies arouse/inspire in the eyes of others. Here, there would be no need for the country A to employ any particular instrument or policy tool to affect the decisions of others, for others would comply with the terms of A automatically. A would be admired by others for who it is. If the citizens of the country A are happy with their lives and if the country A has already become a well-governed polity that does not suffer from any lack of internal and external legitimacy, others might come to the conclusion that they would also achieve similar successes should they follow in the footsteps of A. This is the least costly strategy of materializing one’s foreign policy interests, for there would be no need to explain who the ‘one’ is and what the ‘one’ wants from others. A would do nothing to affect the incentive matrixes of others. Stated somewhat differently, the county A would simply lead by example and through the demonstrative effects of her norms and material
achievements.\textsuperscript{1} A would be seen as the role model or the shining star over the hill.

The soft power of attraction (2): Explain yourself and get what you want

A less softer version of the soft power of attraction takes place if countries feel the need to explain who they are and what they want in order to influence the decisions of others. The assumption here is that because states do not always possess an automatic power of attraction/admiration in the eyes of others, they might deem it necessary to invest in self-advertisement/image-making projects.\textsuperscript{2} The goal here is to help project a positive image of one’s self in the eyes of others. Similar to the previous case, countries would not employ here the logic of conditionality in order to change the incentive matrixes of others. The country A would not directly engage other countries. The goal would be to make one’s self known to others so that others would be attracted to you.

The soft power of persuasion: Act as a normative power and get what you want

Another soft power tool might be that states try to promote a particular regional or global vision of their own. The prime motivation here is to explicate the contours of the normative regional/global order that one state aims to help create. This is an exercise that requires more investments than the ones mentioned above. The goal is beyond explaining one’s identity and domestic success

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stories. The particular regional order that one state aims to promote might be of realpolitik or non-realpolitik in nature, but the point is that this order would reflect the existence of a particular normative understanding of regional/global order. The state that holds a regional/global vision would not only need to explain what kind of a vision it aims to help institutionalize but also convince others why this vision is much better than other visions. The states that appear to possess a particular regional/global vision would try to materialize their visions by persuading others through communication strategies. In their efforts to engage others, they would invest in concrete initiatives with a view to winning the hearts and minds of others. However, similar to the previous cases, states would not use tempting or coercive strategies while explicating their normative projects. The goal would never be to push other states to engage in a cost-benefit calculation. Others’ followership should be secured through manufacturing of legitimacy. The counties which adopt this strategy aim something more than leading only by example. The prime goal of such states that make use of persuasive strategies would be to explain their differences from others on ideational and normative grounds. They would need to justify their regional/global mission/vision in the eyes of others. Norm projection is the most important foreign policy tool in this context. Here others would be directly engaged through persuasive strategies, mainly diplomatic initiatives.

The hard power of temptation: Offer carrots and get what you want

Moving from the softer side of the spectrum to the harder side, one first witnesses that states might employ economic tools/strategies to help produce a change in the behavior of others. Here, the goal is to buy the cooperation of others by offering them some rewards. If the others came to the conclusion that complying with the terms of the state A, or following its leadership, would bring them more benefits than costs, one might argue that the state A has the hard power of temptation. Here the goal is to push others to make a cost-benefit calculation. Here one would mainly employ economic tools, ranging from trade to developmental aids, in order to change the behaviors of others. The message given by the state A would be ‘if you cooperate with me and reconstruct
yourself in line with my norms and preferences, then you will gain this or that.’ The state A would act as a civilian power in this configuration, for it would try to influence others’ decisions through the employment of non-military instruments.

The hard power of coercion: Threaten others with sticks and get what you want

Here the goal would be to force other states through coercive strategies, such as economic sanctions, threat and use of force, to change their behaviors. The immense military capabilities at the disposal of some actors might embolden them to resort to a threatening language in their dealings with other states. For this foreign policy instrument to yield success, both the power holder needs to possess a military advantage vis-à-vis others and others need to conclude that they have no alternative but to comply with the preferences of the power holder. Here the power holder would not spend any effort to help convince others through deliberate argumentation or to buy their cooperation through offering rewards. Rather, the power holder would see herself so powerful that she would simply coerce others militarily/economically to change their behaviors. The message given would be that ‘If you do not cooperate with me, you will lose this or that!’ The intended goal on the part of the actor that uses such strategies is to warn others that it would be much better for them to change their behaviors should they not lose anything vital to them.

The hard power of imposition: just go and impose your will onto others

Here the state A would simply impose its will onto others without spending any time to convince, coax or coerce them. The immense coercive power capabilities at one’s disposal or one’s highly negative perceptions of others would lead one to go and grab what it wants.

Relationship

For an exemplary soft power relationship to exist, the way how others respond to the strategies of power holders is as much important as what kind of power instruments the power holder employs. Theoretically speaking, the target
country might change its behaviors out of three different motivations, namely fear, interest and identity/admiration. Only in the case of admiration, one could talk about the existence of soft power relationship. Here, the target country would not engage in material cost-benefit calculations but simply conclude that changing its behaviors in line with the expectations of the power holder would be the most appropriate and legitimate thing to do. The target country would follow the leadership of the power holder automatically. Simply stated, it would be attracted by the power holder.

**Soft power in Turkish foreign policy**

Recent years have made it increasingly clear that there has been a soft power turn in Turkish foreign policy, at least insofar as soft power is conceptualized in terms of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to argue that what we observe on the ground amounts to a text-book case of soft power relationship between Turkey on the one hand and the countries that she wants to influence on the other. We do not know exactly why some countries have heeded Turkey’s policy advices as well as cooperated with her. The following analysis will mainly focus on the demonstration of Turkey’s soft power oriented foreign policy alongside the conceptual discussion offered above.

*Turkish foreign policy and the soft power of attraction (1)*

To ascertain whether or not Turkey has had the soft power of attraction, one would be well advised to show the extent to which international community has begun talk about Turkey as a particular role model, or source of inspiration, for other counties to emulate in their efforts to resolve their internal problems as well as to integrate to global system successfully. The more others mention Turkey as a success story or appropriate example, the more Turkey would have the soft power of attraction. The first observation to make in this context is that the transformation Turkey has been going through over the last 15 years constitutes the most important source, as well as the asset, of Turkey’s soft power. The reforms undertaken at home alongside the EU accession process appear to have contributed to Turkey’s soft power potential as well as led some to opine that Turkey
represents the best example of a political community where a predominantly Muslim society could develop functioning liberal-democratic structures and establish cordial relations with the Western international community. Second, Turkey’s economic and military power capabilities have increased impressively in recent years. Turkey is now the seventeenth largest economy in the world and its national economy has been growing by 6 to 8 percent annually over the last decade. Turkey is now a member of the G-20, an international platform that brings together the most developed 20 economies all over the world. Turkey’s inclusion in the United Nations-led Alliance of Civilization Project together with Spain is another indication of the power of attraction. Here, Turkey works with Spain to help create the most appropriate global structural conditions for different civilizations to coexist peacefully.

Third, the 9/11 attacks and the new geopolitical dynamics that have taken place in its aftermath appear to have encouraged many circles to contend that Turkey’s significance in global and regional politics do now first and foremost emanate from Turkey’s identity. Turkey has now become too important a country on earth because of who she is. That increasing number of international observers, both western and regional, point out to Turkey as a potential role-model to emulate confirms this. That many have begun to attribute the main source of Turkey’s growing significance in global politics to her identity and internal transformation process on the one hand and material successes on the other is indicative of Turkey’s soft power potential. The idea is that Turkey been been increasingly found valuable and important for who she is and what kind of achievements she has had. The strengthening of liberal democratization process, the desecuritization of long-time traditional security problems, the civilianization of decision making process in foreign and security policy, the galloping development of Turkish economy, Turkey’s growing determination to look after diplomatic solutions to regional security problems, the

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growing scale of her representation in international organization, the continuation of EU membership process and her success in demonstrating the peaceful existence of Islam with secular democracy have all added up to Turkey’s soft power.

Fourth, recently Turkey’s particular identity has become a more important source of her soft power potential in the aftermath of the people uprisings across the Middle East. That people have increasingly pointed out to Turkey as a potential role model to follow attests to this.

However, such observations as mentioned above do not automatically suggest that Turkey has now become a truly soft power country succeeding in influencing the policies of other countries by merely relying on her power of attraction. The next two sub-sections will demonstrate that not only has Turkey increased her efforts to explain herself to the international community but also engaged others in bilateral and multilateral platforms with a view of explaining Turkey’s differences and policies in a persuasive manner and on moral grounds.

Turkish foreign policy and the soft power of attraction (2)

The question to answer in this context is whether there exists any specific initiative on the part of Turkey’s ruling elites to help manufacture a positive Turkish image across the world and the Middle East. For example, that Turkey has opened many new embassies across the world; that Turkey has increased the amount of money she gives to poor and less developed countries; that Turkish Radio and Television Organization founded new television channels in non-Turkish languages targeting the nationals of Turkey’s neighbors; that Turkish Airlines has extended its destination points towards new places; that many international events, ranging from civil society activities, sport events to international conferences were organized in Turkey; that a public diplomacy branch was established within the Prime Ministry do all show that Turkey has begun to invest quite significant tangible and non-tangible capabilities to help produce a positive Turkish image abroad.

A relevant observation to offer in this context would be that Turkish rulers have increasingly stated over the last years that Turkey’s soft power in its region stems first and foremost from her success to put her home in
order by getting rid of the structural economic, political and security problems. This demonstrates the existence of a strong consciousness on the part of the ruling Turkish elites that Turkey represents a role model for others. Turkey would simply become happy to see if others chose Turkey’s route. The existence of such a strong belief in Turkey’s successes appears to have led Turkish decision-makers to use the every opportunity available to make the Turkish example known to others.

**Turkish foreign policy and the soft power of persuasion**

Turkey’s inclination to rely on diplomatic tools on the one hand and the particular ‘order-creator’ discourse adopted by the current Turkish foreign policy makers on the other attest to the fact Turkey has in recent years increasingly invested in the soft power of persuasion. The process oriented foreign policy understanding, the penchant for contributing to the solution of regional and global security problems through the engagement of conflicting parties in diplomatic mechanisms, the predisposition to rely on diplomatic tools and mechanisms in this process and the growing determination to offer a particular regional/global political order are of value in this context.

Turkey’s increasing diplomatic activities abroad attest to the growing salience of soft power of persuasion. For example, the number of Turkish embassies across the globe has increased. Noteworthy is that Turkey has opened new embassies in African countries. Erstwhile considered as far distance places, some parts of the globe have now become major areas of Turkish diplomatic activity.

Besides, the number of international organizations where Turkey holds the status of either full membership or observer has increased in recent years. For example, Turkey acted as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during 2009-2010 period; one Turkish national was twice elected to the General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference; high-level Turkish diplomats were appointed to the key positions within the United Nations and NATO; one Turkish MP was elected to the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Turkey was also accepted to the organization of the most developed countries-20, G-20. Lastly, Turkey hosted the fourth UN
conference of the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul in May, 2011.

Turkey’s involvement in the solution process of regional conflicts has also increased in recent years. For example, Turkey has not only played a facilitative role during the negotiations between Israel and Syria but also helped mediate the conflict between Israel and Palestinians.\(^4\) Turkey’s efforts to help reconcile the differences between the two representative blocks of the Palestinian community, Hamas and Fatah, have also intensified following the ouster of the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip by Hamas in July 2007. Turkish diplomats have on the other hand worked for the incorporation of Hamas into the Peace Process as a legitimate party. Turkey has also involved in the Afghanistan-Pakistan negotiations and brought the leader of both countries together in Turkey. Turkey’s role to help diffuse the nuclear tension between Iran and the western international community is also another example.

Turkey’s involvement in Iraq has also been noteworthy. For example, the participation of Sunnis in the new political regime in Iraq has been made possible by Turkey’s efforts. Turkey played a key role in the composition of the Iraqi government after the elections held in both 2005 and 2010. In the Balkans, too, Turkish leaders helped organize trilateral meetings among Bosnian, Serbian and Turkish representatives and such efforts have contributed to the amelioration of relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo. Bosnia opened an Embassy in Serbia. Turkey has also proposed the Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, with a particular view to helping contribute to regional stability.

Turkey’s efforts to engage her neighbors through bilateral, trilateral and multilateral platforms are other indications of the soft power of persuasion. All such efforts appear to reflect the idea that Turkey tries to come up with solutions to regional insecurity and instability through regional cooperation and collaboration, rather than imposing its will onto others. A novel development in this context is that Turkey established high level strategic

cooperation councils with neighboring countries. So far, Turkey has established such councils with six countries, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Greece and Lebanon. The bilateral meetings are held under the chairmanship of two prime ministers and attended by particular cabinet members depending on the issue under consideration. The main idea behind such meetings is that Turkey in cooperation with her neighbors tries to develop a regional consciousness in the solution of regional problems. Similarly, lifting of the visa restrictions before travel and other transactional activities has now become a vital component of Turkey’s regional policies.

Another notable development to mention in this context is that Turkish decision makers paid an utmost care to help secure internal, regional and international legitimacy before letting the Turkish army enter Northern Iraq to chase after the PKK terrorists in early 2008.

The messages given by high level Turkish statesmen in the wake of the recent people uprisings in the Middle East are also noteworthy in this regard. Turkish leaders have continuously advised and urged their counterparts in the region that they listen to the demands of the people, improve their life-standards and develop the feeling of accountability.

In addition, the idea that Turkey should act as an ‘order-creator’ country in its environment amounts to the emergence of the soft power of persuasion, for this is an attempt at explaining Turkey’s vision and polices at regional and global levels on normative and moral grounds. The goal here is not that Turkey, due to a combination of some factors, is by nature entitled to know the best and lead the community of nations in its neighborhood in a hegemonic way. Rather, Turkey’s efforts should be mainly confined to attempts at helping bring into existence new structural environments at global and regional levels so that political entities, be they states or non-state actors, do no longer feel discriminated against. This role model ascribes Turkey a particular mission to work for the emergence of a new regional/international political order that is more inclusive, just and participatory than the current one.\(^5\) In this sense,

his Turkish claim is based on the idea that the emerging world order should not be based on polarizations and binary oppositions. A successful regional and global order would take place if the feeling of legitimacy prevailed and parties considered themselves as responsible stakeholders of the current system. Turkey is a multi-identity country and whose mission in global politics should be to help bridge global differences. The sooner the existing imbalances and injustices are remedied, the more legitimate the system would become.

The international system that took place in the aftermath of the Second World War had been designed in order to reflect and help maintain the interests of the victorious powers of the war. This system came to an end first with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, a new system had not been established in its stead. On the contrary, with the defeat of communism the liberal West appears to have come to the conclusion that the History finally came to the end. It had been believed that the projection of the liberal-capitalist-democratic norms of the western international community to other parts of the globe under the leadership of the United States would pave the way for global peace, stability and development. However, such expectations did not come true, as the world was struck by another event on Sep. 11, 2001, when the United States, the most powerful actor of global politics was hit by transnational terrorists. These attacks produced revolutionary impacts in the sense that great powers were no longer immune from territorial attacks; that non-traditional actors, such as transnational terrorist organizations or other non-state actors, have increasingly become more assertive; that cultural and civilization-related issues have turned out to become the main frontline issues dividing the international community into alternative camps and opposing blocks; that the continuation of non-settlement of traditional political problems, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, fuelled worldwide polarization along ideational faultiness.

Besides, the recent years have witnessed that the overwhelming power of the United States has increasingly

been challenged and counter-balanced by the rise of other states, such as China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey. All such developments combined seem to have underlined the point that a new world order needs to be established as soon as possible so that the emerging century would be less prone to global conflicts and wars. It is within such a context that attempts at reorganizing the existing international organizations, such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and G-7, have radically increased over the last decade.

Against this background, the architects of Turkey’s ‘order-creator’ role model argue that the existing international order has not only contributed to the perpetuation of perennial security problems around the world but also thrived on their continuation. Even though, the world of 2010 is very much different from the world of early 1990s, we are still far away from the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the specter of peaceful coexistence of different civilizations and finally a long term cooperative mood in inter-great power relations.6

This role model, ascribed to Turkey by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, denotes that Turkey should have a visionary diplomatic perspective with respect to any issue that might potentially concern international stability and order. Turkey should come up with an articulate global vision that could potentially help the international community move on to a more prosperous, peaceful and stable environment. One of the key aspects of such a role on the part of Turkey is that Turkey should be seen as one of those wise-counties across the globe whose opinion really matters in international politics and whose involvement in any particular conflict could lead the way to the solution. Therefore, Turkish decision-makers and diplomats should be consulted and respected wherever they are engaged. Turkey, if she wants to play an ‘order-creator’ role, should not have only a region-wide

geopolitical mindset. Turkey needs to adopt a global vision and feel responsible for what is happening in far distant places.

This vision holds that Turkey cannot simply react or respond to events and crises after they occurred. In congruence with the idea that Turkey is not part of problems but solutions, Turkey should adopt a more proactive stance in the sense that crises should be prevented from being occurred and once they occurred Turkey should lead the way to their solution. Remaining complacent in the world order created by others and simply reacting to developments would not allow Turkey to play the order creator role. Turkish soldiers and diplomats should not solely act as ‘fire-fighters’, when the call for duty is issued by others. Rather, they should mainly act as ‘city planners’ in that Turkey should have a say in the way how the new international order should be re- configured.

This identity-laden mission suggests that Turkey define herself as a strong agent of global politics, rather than as a tool or issue in the context of the materialization of others’ interests. No one should be in a position to define Turkey’s identity in reference to a particular geography, religion, group of countries or international organizations. Therefore, that Huntington defines Turkey as a ‘torn country’ would be in total contradiction with the ‘order-creator’ role model. Turkey’s vision should be to help bring alternative identities and civilizations together, rather than acting as the spokesperson of any of them.7 Turkey should not only prove that it is a melting pot of a plurality of identities at home but also act as the glue sticking different civilizations to each other abroad. Turkey’s main mission within the international organizations of which she is a member should be to play ‘connecting’ roles. Turkey can no longer be defined as an insulator country that shields the Kantian security environment in the West against the security dangers emanating from the Hobbesian security environment in the so-called ‘greater Middle East’.

This role model also holds that an effective balance should be achieved between security and freedom, both internally and externally. Democratization should be increasingly defined and justified the context of enhancing freedom and contributing to security.

This vision does not challenge the fundamental premises of western dominated international order/society, but aims at helping reconstruct it so that it becomes more inclusive, fair and representative of emerging geopolitical realities on the ground. Turkey’s approach towards the main western international organizations of which she is either a full member or aspiring to join is also indicative of her emerging ‘order-creator’ role. In the context of both EU and NATO, Turkey’s prime goal should be to help transform these international institutions from within in the image of her ‘order-creator’ identity.

For example, the way how Turkey has behaved during the transformation process of NATO is worth mentioning in this context. Turkey has tried to influence the process of NATO’s transformation in several ways. From Turkey’s perspective NATO should not transform into a global sheriff acting as a global firefighter; NATO should not act as a political body that helps legitimize unlawful and illegitimate unilateral American military interventions; NATO’s transformation should not impair Turkey’s good neighborly relations with Russia and Iran; NATO should not be reconstructed as an anti-Muslim organization and finally NATO should not become a league of Democracies that acts in a patronizing manner. Stated somewhat differently, Turkey has been very keen on the point that NATO’s transformation does not lead to further polarizations and binary oppositions in Alliance’s relations with outside countries. This seems to explain why Turkey has adopted a critical position on NATO’s enlargement towards the post-Soviet area as well as the installment of missile defense system within the Alliance. From Turkey’s perspective NATO’s transformation should not lead to the perpetuation of Turkey’s frontline state identity. Neither NATO nor outside countries should perceive each other as existential threats.

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A similar situation can also be observed in the context of Turkey’s changing approach towards the European Union. Since the time the JDP came to power, Turkey’s Europeanization process has certainly accelerated which eventually resulted in the start of the formal accession negotiations in 2005. Despite all road accidents and the fading possibility of Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU, Turkish decision makers continue to value the Europeanization process insofar as this strengthens liberal/plural democracy and contributes to the resolution of perennial structural problems at home.

Besides, Turkey now defines her mission vis-à-vis the EU as helping transform the EU’s international identity so as to make the EU the true representative of ‘unity in diversity’. With Turkey’s accession to the EU, the EU would turn out to become a truly multicultural polity in which different civilizations could co-exist peacefully. Turkish decision makers seem to act on the assumption that Turkey’s membership would not only transform the EU into a credible international actor but also add up to its power of attraction/admiration in the eyes of third parties.

**Turkish foreign policy and the hard power of temptation**

Here one should mention Turkey’s economy based foreign policy understanding and the particular initiatives that have been taken in recent years with a primarily economic motivation. The most notable one is Turkey’s suggestion that a free-trade area be formed among Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Defining Turkey as a trading country, prioritizing Turkey’s establishment of free-trade relationships with some neighbors, including Turkish

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9 Ömer Taşpinar, “A complacent West could easily face the previously unthinkable question: ‘Who lost Turkey?’ Turkey’s Fading Dream of Europe”, *Current History*, March 2007, pp. 123-129.

10 Hasan Kosebalaban, “The Permanent ‘other’? Turkey and the Question of European Identity”, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 87-111.

business sector as a driving force of Turkish diplomacy abroad, investing in mutually interdependent economic integration in the Middle East and diversifying Turkey’s external economic relations to keep pace with the globalization process are all examples of Turkey’s efforts to help produce a Turkey friendly regional/global order through the employment of economic tools.

Both Turkey’s traditional business elites based in Istanbul and the emerging Anatolian tigers appear to believe that Turkey should define her national interests with a global mindset and on the basis of economic priorities and motivations. According to these economic elites, thinking globally and acting locally should be the maxim of Turkish foreign policy and an economy-based multi-directional/multi-dimensional foreign policy is the only game in town. The economic success stories with Syria, Russian Federation and the Kurdish region of Iraq demonstrate Turkey’s predisposition to improve relations with neighbors through economics.

*Turkish foreign policy and the hard power of coercion and imposition*

Recent years have made it undoubtedly clear that relying on military power instruments and coercing others to adopt pro-Turkish stances on some vital issues are no longer the strategies adopted by Turkish decision makers. The Imia crisis of 1996 in which Turkey and Greece almost came to the brink of war and the Ocalan crisis with Syria in late 1998 are no longer mentioned as appropriate models to carry to the future. Besides, that Turkey continued to organize limited military incursions into northern Iraq to chase after PKK terrorists does not negate the fact that Turkey’s current rulers saw the use of force as a last resort and did their best to help convince the international community to the legitimacy of such operations in the context of Turkey’s national security interests. Similarly, recent past does not offer any example in the context of Turkey’s power of imposition.

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Conclusion

Based on the analysis above, this research has reached the following conclusions. First, even though it is now possible to argue that there has been a soft power turn in Turkish foreign policy, this does not mean that Turkey has succeeded in constructing soft power relationships with external actors, most notably her neighbors. In order to ascertain if this has been the case, one needs to make a research on the motives of other actors as regards their decision to cooperate or not with Turkey.

Second, there is still a good degree of confusion and ambiguity over Turkey’s foreign policy priorities as well as the substance of Turkey’s ‘order-creator’ role. Confusion still persists as to what Turkey wants. This has become more noticeable in Turkey’s responses to the latest people uprisings across the Middle East. Turkish decision makers seem to have experienced great difficulty in explaining Turkey’s responses to uprisings in different countries. Why Turkey has supported the people uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt yet adopted a more low-profile stance in Libya and Syria begs a convincing explanation. Has Turkey been acting on the premises of realpolitik or moral/ideapolitik?

Third, even though it is somehow difficult to argue that Turkey’s growing influence in her relations with external actors does mainly emanate from Turkey’s soft power of attraction, it is quite possible to underline that Turkey has increasingly benefited from her soft power of persuasion and hard power of temptation. Turkey has to a significant extent transformed into a persuasive and trading actor in her foreign policy understanding.

Finally, the ‘order-creator’ discourse adopted by Turkish decision makers demonstrates that Turkey wants to act as a normative power in her region. For this normative power to survive future challenges, though, Turkish decision makers should convincingly explain why the particular order advertised by Turkey would be more promising than others in terms of being more cooperative, legitimate, just, inclusive and stable.
A New Global System difficult to recognize

Reşat Arım
Ambassador Ret.

Ambassador Arım has been monitoring the international scene since 9/11 attacks on the United States and in previous articles he analysed the developments in the World to show their impact on the International System. The present article is a continuation of this endeavour.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been efforts in many quarters to make predictions on the evolution of the International System. Then, we were faced with the events of September 11 in the United States that came to confuse the situation still further. Two major wars, one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan made the job really difficult. It was under these conditions that the New Strategic Concept of NATO was adopted; it would be the vehicle to advance the modernization of the alliance in the face of “unclear yet systemic change”. When the New Strategic Concept was adopted it said: Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. (1)

Then came the developments in the Arab World and the crisis in Libya which made the predictions of the New Strategic Concept a reality.

Under the circumstances what we may do today could be just to look at the various developments in the World that might sooner or later come together in one way or another to form the system in which we are living.

We could say that we are in a transition to a new system. As it looks today, the New Global System would probably be a multi-polar system. Many analysts accept that we are living in a Multi-Polar World. (2) (3) (4)
Developments in the Arab World.

We already had two major wars, which prevented us from making sound predictions as to the future shape of the International System. Then came to add to this complex situation the developments in the Arab World. This will certainly going to influence the march of things in this century.

To comprehend the meaning of what is happening we should start looking at the situation of the Arab countries since the Cold War. During the Cold War many of the Arab countries were allies of the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, therefore, they found themselves in the same position of the countries of the Eastern Europe. “The Arab Human Development Report 2002” prepared by a team of 30 authorities, including sociologists, economists and experts on Arab culture commissioned by the United Nations gives a good picture of the situation in these countries. On the occasion of the publication of the report, what was said by the director of the United Nations Development Program’s Arab regional bureau was important even to our understanding of the developments today. She said “there were some very scary signals that were specific to Arab countries and not to other regions.” Another statement came from the head of the economic policy team: “Why are Arab counties lagging behind?” Finally, Fouad Ajami, a well known director of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University said during an interview that rulers, even elected, stay in power for life and “People just don’t know how to overthrow, how to reform, how to change them”. (5) The same conclusions were drawn in the comments made in the international press. (6)

The developments that we first observed in Tunisia and Egypt have proven the opposite. Some commentators went as far as comparing the protests in these two countries to the 1848 revolutions in Europe. The whole World watched with amazement. It was unprecedented to see the Presidents of Tunisia and Egypt leave their positions as a result of popular uprisings. It took Egypt a little longer than Tunisia. But the western press has acclaimed it as “Brave New Arab World”. Egypt is a very important country in the Arab World and what happens there might have ramifications all over the region. In the region, the country most concerned is of
course Israel. We should not forget that the late Egyptian President Sadat had signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and suffered the consequences. Also, at that date Egypt was involved in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and has been engaged in this problem up till now. The present state of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the settlements in the West Bank will certainly have a bearing on what happens in Egypt next. Egypt has also very close relations with the United States. President Obama and his administration made it clear that they want President Mubarak leave Office. The position taken by the President Obama has been welcomed in the Western press even as a new Obama doctrine. It was alleged that the US President dramatically changed the way his country does business in the region; since the US is backing the popular pro-democracy revolt in Egypt, it is bound in all conscience to do the same elsewhere. We shall see if this prediction comes true.

Then came the drama in Libya which put the international community at standstill. The first reaction was of course to do something to stop the bloodshed. But, that should be short of military intervention, in any case not without a clear Security Council mandate. Discussions on the matter took some time. First, the Security Council met, but could not adopt a resolution, not even a presidential statement. In a press statement it condemned the actions of the Libyan regime and called on it to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens. When the situation in Libya worsened, the Security Council met again and on February 26 adopted the resolution 1970 to impose sanctions and impose an arms embargo. It also called for an international war crimes investigation into attacks against Libyan citizens. (7) The UN General Assembly, on the other hand, suspended Libya’s membership rights in the Human Rights Council in Geneva. During the same time, the European Union was also discussing the situation in Libya. First they suspended negotiations on an EU-Libya Framework agreement and ongoing cooperation contracts. On 28 February EU followed the Security Council resolution and also imposed an arms embargo and prohibited trade with Libya in any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

During the worsening situation in Libya, the main focus was on how the international community could interfere. It was said that “no-fly-zone” would be
tantamount to "war" and would spoil the glory of the protesters in the Arab World. Some analysts, therefore, spoke about the "liberal intervention". That would entail the International Criminal Court, the doctrine of a "responsibility to protect".

But, as indicated above, there should be a mandate from the Security Council to take any action that would have military consequence. However, the international community will certainly remember how military action against Iraq started in 2003. There was the Council Resolution 1441 which spoke of the engagements broken by Iraq; it was a resolution incriminating Iraq but not giving a mandate for military action. In any case, some members of the Council strongly objected to any such move. Many years later it became clear that Iraq did not really have weapons of mass destruction at the time. Of course, the Libyan situation is much different than the Iraqi one. Still, because it is a matter of going to war, the members of the Security Council will no doubt keep the Iraqi case in mind when debating the issue. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is no unanimity among Council members about the imposition of a No Fly Zone: China and Russia are opposing such a move.

On the 11 March, NATO Defence Ministers as well as the leaders of the European Union met to discuss the situation in Libya. The Defence Ministers took up the question of no-fly zone. They agreed that further planning would be required in case NATO were to receive a clear UN mandate. For the time being, they decided to increase the presence of NATO Maritime assets in the Central Mediterranean using ships from two NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups. They would contribute to the surveillance capability with regard to the Arms embargo established by the Security Council Resolution 1970.

The European Union leaders adopted a Statement in which they said that the situation in Libya remains a cause for grave concern, they expressed strong solidarity with the Libyan people, they firmly condemned the violence the Libyan regime applies against its citizens. They say Colonel Khadafi must relinquish power immediately. His regime has lost all legitimacy and is no longer an interlocutor for the EU. The European Union welcomes and encourages the Interim Transitional National Council based in Benghazi which it considers a
political interlocutor. The European Union stands ready to help Libya build a constitutional state.

The Arab League Council meeting on 13 March has decided to ask the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone. The Arab League voted Saturday to back a no-fly zone in Libya and is asking that the U.N. Security Council impose the measure, officials of the regional body told reporters. “It has one goal: To protect the civilian population,” Amre Moussa, the body’s secretary-general said. “We will inform the U.N. Security Council of our request to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya,” Moussa said. “The U.N. Security Council should decide how it will be enforced.”

The Arab League Council meeting on 13 March has decided to ask the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone. The relevant news item said:

Cairo, Egypt (CNN) -- The Arab League voted Saturday to back a no-fly zone in Libya and is asking that the U.N. Security Council impose the measure, officials of the regional body told reporters.

Security Council Resolution No. 1973 was passed under very special circumstances. The Libyan leader was threatening its own population. The two major powers having the veto power, Russia and China, who were objecting to a resolution, abstained and let the resolution pass probably because of these special circumstances; the Arab League also asked the Security Council to administer a no-fly zone. Finally, a resolution was adopted: the main idea was to protect the civilian population. This idea was to be kept in mind all through its implementation.

After the adoption of the resolution its implementation created problems. Some kind of force was to be applied. NATO had been debating the issue for some time. Also a coalition of countries had to be formed. But was there enough time for its formation? Kaddafi was on the point of attacking Benghazi. So Sarkozy benefited from the emergency and with Britain started the assault on Kaddafi forces. The US joined them. But Obama had already his hands full with Iraq and Afghanistan. The military planning necessitated the work of NATO; it was the only organization to make the military planning. So, on March
27 the whole military operation in Libya under Resolution 1973 was taken over by NATO.

Following the air assault of the coalition forces for the two days before NATO took over, Russian Federation and the Arab League criticized the harm that was given to the civilian population. All eyes were turned to the Security Council resolution which created the framework for any action. No-fly zone by itself would require the attack on the air defence systems of Kaddafi. To take all necessary measures to protect the civilian population, short of occupation of the territory, again would understandably require some kind of military action. This should have been clear to the Russian Federation, the Arab League and others who criticized the actions; they should be aware that this kind of military action would be required.

The following episode in the Libyan drama was even more confusing. That was because the concepts of (humanitarian intervention) and (responsibility to protect) were still evolving.

As it was mentioned in the above paragraphs, it should be reiterated that the emphasis of the Security Council Resolution was on the protection of the civilians.

A large meeting in London was scheduled for the 29 of March to decide the future actions on Libya. Participants have reaffirmed the importance of full and swift implementation of UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 (2011). They have reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. They have reaffirmed their commitment to enforce the restrictions and sanctions on the regime and to act to prevent the supply and operations of mercenaries. The British Foreign Secretary made the following statement after the meeting: “We are working together to ensure that all states implement these Resolutions, of which Qadhafi still stands in breach. We agreed to consider pursuing, in the UN and regional organisations, additional sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the regime. Participants here today are implementing these measures as a clear message to Qadhafi that he cannot attack civilians with impunity.” UNSCR 1973 (2011) authorises all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form. A no-fly zone is in place over Libya and is preventing Qadhafi from attacking civil-
ians from the air. We have a broad based coalition to implement the military actions mandated by UNSCR 1973 (2011). So far, the action we have taken has been successful in protecting countless civilians from Qadhafi’s forces and in effectively wiping out Qadhafi’s air capability. Participants paid tribute to the bravery and professionalism of military personnel from all contributors in the coalition.

Current and potential contributors to military operations, including NATO Allies, also met to underline their commitment to the necessity of military action to implement fully the provisions of UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 (2011). They reaffirmed their unified support for this course of action through making effective and sustained contributions to military operations until the international community’s goals are secured. Participants, including regional states, welcomed NATO’s contribution in agreeing to take on command and control of all military operations to enforce the arms embargo, the no-fly zone, and other actions needed, as authorised in UNSCR 1973 (2011), to protect civilians.

Participants have reaffirmed their support through military, logistical, financial or humanitarian contributions and pledges in support of the people of Libya. UNSCR 1973 (2011) laid out very clear conditions that must be met, including the establishment of an immediate ceasefire, a halt to all attacks on civilians and full humanitarian access to those in need. Participants agreed to continue their efforts until all conditions are fulfilled. The Libyan regime will be judged by its actions and not its words.

**Preparing for Libya’s future**

We agreed that it is not for any of the participants here today to choose the government of Libya: only the Libyan people can do that. Participants agreed that Qadhafi and his regime have completely lost legitimacy and will be held accountable for their actions. The Libyan people must be free to determine their own future. Participants recognised the need for all Libyans, including the Interim Transitional National Council, tribal leaders and others, to come together to begin an inclusive political process, consistent with the relevant UNSCRs, through which they can choose
their own future. We call on the international community to support this process, working closely with the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib. Regional actors, particularly Libya’s fellow African countries and Arab neighbours, have an important role to play.

Participants today are concerned for the wellbeing of up to 80,000 internally displaced persons. We have agreed priorities for a humanitarian response. We have also agreed on the need to develop and coordinate the international approach to ensure the availability of sufficient resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people. We noted the offer of Qatar to facilitate the sale of Libyan oil where consistent with international law, in particular the provisions of UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 and other relevant UN resolutions, and to support the people of Libya in using the proceeds to help meet their humanitarian needs. Learning the lessons from the past, we agreed on the need for priorities for long-term support. Activities to stabilise the situation will need to start early and be part of an integrated and comprehensive international response.

**Taking forward support from the International community for the people of Libya**

To take this work forward, participants of the conference agreed to establish the Libya Contact Group. This Contact Group will meet to: provide leadership and overall political direction to the international effort in close coordination with the UN, AU, Arab League, OIC, and EU to support Libya; provide a forum for coordinating the international response on Libya; and provide a focal point in the international community for contact with the Libyan parties. Qatar has agreed to convene the first meeting of the Group as soon as possible. Thereafter, the chairmanship will rotate between the countries of the region and beyond it. The North Atlantic Council, meeting alongside its coalition partners, will provide the executive political direction to NATO operations. Participants welcomed the UN Secretary-General’s offer to lead the coordination of humanitarian assistance and planning for longer-term stabilisation support. Turkey, other key regional players and international agencies offered to support this work and take it forward with the Contact Group.
During the struggle in Libya continued important questions came to the fore: could the rebels be supplied with arms? The Security Council resolution did not openly permit it; but Hillary Clinton and William Hague claim arming rebel groups may be legal under the recent UN resolution. At the end of the conference on Libya in London, US secretary of state, said for the first time that she believed arming rebel groups was legal under UN security council resolution 1973, passed two weeks ago, which also provided the legal justification for air strikes. The British foreign secretary, agreed that the resolution made it legal "to give people aid in order to defend themselves in particular circumstances".

Finally, the warring parties in Libya reached a stalemate and this opened the way to negotiations. The sons of Qaddafi apparently proposed a transition to a constitutional democracy. (11) Contacts in several capitals ensued. One of the capitals was Ankara where the representatives of the two warring parties visited. (12)

The Contact Group created at the London Conference met on 13 April in Qatar. The Road Map prepared by Turkey would also be discussed at this meeting. The Road Map proposed by The Turkish Prime Minister urged an immediate cease-fire, the lifting of sieges by Kaddafi forces of rebel-held towns, safe zones to be created to enable the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian aid to the Libyan people and the initiation of a "transformation process" so that a constitutional democracy can be established. An African Union delegation also brought proposals for a cease-fire and talks.

The Contact Group met in Doha on 13 April. Reading the final statement, Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al Thani said the contact group wanted "an immediate end to all attacks against civilians, and for Gaddafi and his regime to pull back all regime forces from Libyan cities they have forcibly entered, occupied or besieged".

He added: "Gaddafi and his regime should comply with their obligations under international law, international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law including protecting civilians and meeting their basic needs".
Contact group members, he said, "were united in believing that Gaddafi’s continued presence would threaten any resolution of the crisis.

"There should be an inclusive political process so that the Libyan people can determine their own future. They called on all Libyans who wanted to see a process of political transition to urge Gaddafi to step down. Participants noted that Gaddafi’s regime was weakening as his followers left him."

That was followed by NATO countries meeting on April 14. The Foreign Ministers of the Allies and operational partners participating in NATO-led Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in support of the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973, met in Berlin to discuss the situation in Libya. The Secretary General of NATO made the following announcement: “The valuable contributions made by OUP partners demonstrate broad-based support for this operation. NATO will continue to coordinate its actions in close consultation with the United Nations, other regional actors and international organizations. We deplore the continuing violence and atrocities in Libya perpetrated by the regime against its own people, which have resulted in a very serious humanitarian situation, particularly in cities under siege. We underline the need for the regime to restore water, gas, electricity and other services to areas that have been brutalized by regime forces and to permit full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all the people of Libya in need of assistance. Qadhafi and his regime have lost all legitimacy through their comprehensive and repeated refusal to abide by UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. We welcome the outcome of the first meeting of the Contact Group which took place yesterday in Doha and strongly endorse its call for Qadhafi to leave power and its steadfast commitment to implement UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. We commend its role in providing wider political guidance for international efforts in Libya, recognizing that the political direction of the military mission is executed by the North Atlantic Council, with the indispensable involvement of its OUP partners. We reiterate our adherence to the strong commitments made at the London Conference by the international community to help end the violence and to support the Libyan people and their legitimate aspirations. NATO-led forces are taking robust action to
protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in Libya and enforcing the No-Fly Zone and arms embargo authorized by UNSCR 1973. We pay tribute to the skill, bravery and professionalism of our men and women in uniform carrying out this difficult task. We will continue to adapt our military actions to achieve maximum effect in discharging our mandate to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. To this end, we are committed to provide all necessary resources and maximum operational flexibility within our mandate. A high operational tempo against legitimate targets will be maintained and we will exert this pressure as long as necessary and until

1. all attacks and threats of attack against civilians and civilian-populated areas have ended;

2. The regime has verifiably withdrawn to bases all military forces, including snipers, mercenaries and other para-military forces, including from all populated areas they have forcibly entered, occupied or besieged throughout all of Libya, including Ajdabiyah, Brega, Jadu, al Jebal al Gharbiyah, Kikla, Misrata, Nalut, Raslanuf, Yefrin, Zawiya, Zintan and Zuara;

3. The regime must permit immediate, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all the people in Libya in need of assistance.

We remain committed to the full implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. In carrying out our mission, we reaffirm our support to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. We reiterate our strong support for the development of a transparent political solution as the only way to bring an end to the crisis and build lasting peace in Libya and a better future for the Libyan people.

The stalemate continued with a human tragedy that goes with it. In a NATO attack a son and grandsons of Kaddafi were killed. Kaddafi forces were attacking people in Misurata. Insecurity in Tripoli followed. Turkey evacuated its Embassy there. Also Prime Minister Erdoğan urged Kaddafi to cede power and leave the country. He said this was important for Libya’s territorial integrity and peace. (13 )
Then, protesters took to the streets in Syria, in Dera and Damascus. Unrest in Syria continued for a long time. President Assad was encouraged by the Prime Minister of Turkey to make reforms; so he made some concessions but Protestors were not satisfied unless the emergency rule was lifted. Finally, President Assad decided to lift the emergency rule. But, the protests continued. Army units entered in Dera with tanks; so casualties increased. Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey again advised the Syrian President on reform processes and called not to use excessive force demonstrators. He also sent emissaries to talk to the Syrian authorities.

A group of Syrian citizens entered Turkey and were taken to a camp where they were provided food and lodging.

The protestors in Yemen asked for the President to leave Office. The unrest there gave also way to serious clashes. At one point the Gulf Cooperation Council prepared an exit plan for the President.

Israel-Palestine: During this turmoil in the Arab lands, talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians were at a standstill. Israel even took a bold step to start new construction of houses in Palestine. Efforts were undertaken to bridge the existing gap between the Fatah and the Hamas, so that they could form a government before September when a Palestinian State would be declared and recognition by the international community would be requested. Turkey made contacts with the two sides and a meeting in Istanbul was proposed.

Finally Fatah and Hamas on 4 of May in a ceremony put an end to their division by signing an agreement.

Changes in the Economic Environment:

The G20 was established in 1999, in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, to bring together major advanced and emerging economies to stabilize the global financial market. Since its inception, the G20 has held annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meetings and discussed measures to promote the financial stability of the world and to achieve a sustainable economic growth and development.

The last meeting was held in Paris in February 2011. The Ministers observed that the global recovery was
strengthening, but still uneven and downside risks remained.

Energy: Energy has been closely linked to developments in the international system. After the first oil was struck at the beginning of the 20th century, the major producing regions attracted the attention of the big powers. During the First World War the attention was focused on Mesopotamia. In the second World War, the transport routes of oil played an important part in the conduct of hostilities. Following the end of the Cold War, natural gas became as important as oil. Also producers Russia is a major producer of gas and most of European countries consume this gas. No wonder, EU and Russia are fostering a special relationship. China, following its enormous development, comes in as a big consumer of oil and gas and affects the international system. The regions surrounding Turkey includes many of the producing countries and that enables Turkey to become an energy hub.

**End Notes:**

1. “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon


3. “Neither with the West, nor against it”, Alain Gresh, Le Monde Diplomatique english edition


10. The Arab League Council meeting on 13 March has decided to ask the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone.

11. “Qaddafi sons are said to offer plan to push father out”, David Kirkpatrick, New York Times, 3 April, 2011.


Turkey’s Main Foreign Policy Issues in 2011
“Caput Magna, Cura Magna” (*)

Seyfi Taşhan

In recent years Turkey has been pursuing a proactive foreign policy in respect to its neighborhood and to the far flung regions of the Earth. This activism has led Turkey to support Turkish economic expansion to Africa, the Far East and Latin America and to the creation of new diplomatic missions. Turkey has also effectively participated in many UN and NATO operations. Consequently, the aim of Turkish foreign policy can be summarized as “zero-problems with neighbors” and the active use of its soft power to contribute to world peace and security. Against this positive development a number of chronic disputes still remain unresolved as some other new problems have arisen.

Greece and Cyprus

If we take up our neighborhood, the most important problem is our relations with Greece and Cyprus. Despite many efforts, it has not been possible in the past half century for Greece and Turkey to take constructive steps for the solution of the multiple problems in the Aegean Sea - and most of these problems are interrelated. Whereas Turkey believes that if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12-miles, there will be no continental shelf left in the Aegean to be divided and Greece refuses the question of territorial waters and the illegal militarization of islands in the proximity of Turkey and says it may bring the disputed limits of continental shelf to ICJ and as far as Turkey is concerned such a course cannot be taken if Greece insists on 12 miles of territorial waters as its rightful choice and in the past ICJ has refused to arbitrate on a unilateral application in a similar application by Greece.

In spite of these problems, Turkey and Greece have very good economic, social and cultural relations since 1999 that has enabled both countries to push the Aegean

(*) “Bigger the Heads, Greater the Problems”
problems to the background. However, any wrong decision on either side may create an undesirable clash.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, despite Turkey’s conciliatory policies to find a solution under the auspices of the UN, Greek Cypriots have used all of their diplomatic skill and obstinacy for preventing the current negotiation process from reaching a solution. Greek Cypriots also intend to use their membership in the EU assuming that Turkey will eventually accept Greek sovereignty also in the Turkish areas of Cyprus. Such a policy has damaging effects in Turkey-EU relations and the loser from such a policy may not be Turkey alone. This ossification in the Aegean and Cyprus disputes is partially due to solid perception of each other as basically hostile, caused by historically based enduring prejudices.

Turkey’s difficulty arises from the inconceivable Greek demands in the Aegean and in Cyprus that reduce the possibility of an understanding based on reciprocal compromises. Another cause for the difficulty in arranging compromise solutions may be the existence of outside interlocutors with their special concerns over the disputed issues. For example, United Nations deals only with certain aspects of the Cyprus dispute as it is obligated to treat Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on equal footing but accepts Greek Cypriot Government as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Government that is in existence since nearly forty years as non existent. This attitude, clearly against accepted UN norms infringes the neutrality of UN role. Furthermore, EU has also entered into the problem as an advocate of the Greek Cypriots because of membership solidarity creating another difficulty for finding a compromise solution on the basis of equal footing between the two peoples in Cyprus. Against this setting Turkey’s status as a negotiating EU partner for membership encourages both Greece and Greek Cypriots to play waiting games hoping that Turkey might accept sacrifices from its positions in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus as a price for EU membership.

In the East, Turkey’s neighborhood, relations are of a paradoxical nature where problems and good neighborhood overlap.
Iran:

With Iran, Turkey supports the development of economic relations and political consultations whereas a definite contrast in the socio-political structures of both countries is in the foreground. The situation is further complicated by Iran’s alleged desire to develop nuclear arms to chagrin of the world at large. While Turkey objects to the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, at the same time it also objects to harsh sanctions and military intervention in Iran. Naturally, from our side, this double-thronged approach is considered highly paradoxical but Turkey’s geography, national interest and way of life forces it to maintain such a paradoxical policy - particularly also because some of the domestic threats faced by Iran are also felt by Turkey. Furthermore, we have some economic complementarities in our relations.

Caucasus:

I do not want to discuss the Caucasus at length at this introduction, as the topic will be subject of a section of this journal. It suffices to say that similar paradoxes and interdependence characteristics of the region impact our security, diplomatic and economic relations with the region. Nevertheless, the absence of Soviet troops on our borders has opened the Caucasus for Turkey as a gateway to Russia and Central Asia in addition to oil and gas resources of Azerbaijan encouraged mutual trade with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The rifts between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia and Russia, as well as the domestic instabilities and lack of respect to democratic norms make this region a sensitive area in Turkey’s neighborhood.

Syria

Until the end of the First World War, Iraq and Syria were part of the Turkish empire until they became mandated territories of Britain and France respectively, parting was full of bitterness for both Turks and the Arabs; the 1916 rebellion of the Arabs in alliance with Britain and France was considered by people of modern Turkey as a betrayal and a stab-in the back. On the Arab side European trained nationalists felt they had liberated themselves from the Turks. After the Second World War, Turkey for its own security reasons allied itself with Western Powers and countries in the South of Turkey established close
relations with the Soviet Union. The demise of the Soviet Union changed the picture. Turkey is now closer to the Arab world as it has started to follow an omni-directional pattern of foreign policy.

In spite of many complex problems with Syria (i.e. Euphrates River transboundary water sharing, irredentist claims and terrorism), the impact of these issues on Turkish Syrian relations have become negligible paving the way for lifting visa restriction, great increase in trade and even joint cabinet meetings. There has become significant affinity between the two Governments despite autocratic character of the regime in Syria. The recent uprisings in Syria pose a problem. Turkey basically supports the desire for reforms that encompass freedom and democracy in the Arab world. In this context the frequent uprisings in Syria and ruthless suppression leading to many deaths cause great concern also in Turkey. Since as a matter of policy Turkey refrains from interfering with the domestic affairs of other countries, Turkey has so far chosen to remain aloof to what is happening in Syria but what will happen if the violence continues in Syria will certainly affect Turkey by not only impairing economic relations but also causing a major influx of refugees into Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey calls on Beshar Assad to carry out reforms demanded by his people and refrain from killing demonstrators. For all appearances President Assad seems to have been caught in the web of autocratic institutions that can hardly accept democratic reforms to their own destruction.

Iraq:

Iraq is another country where the situation has and is still creating foreign policy, domestic policy and security policy challenges for Turkey. The only benevolent part of the relations for both countries is economic ties. Many challenges have arisen as a result of the creation of a quasi independent Kurdish region in Iraq (to the creation of which Turkey has contributed by helping the implementation of the no-flight zone in Northern Iraq after the first Gulf War in the 1990s and by its service as a mediator in the conflicts between the two Kurdish factions and finally taking an important part in the building of the Kurdish area). One of these challenges is the continued existence of the main base of the PKK terror organization in Northern Iraq and their cross-border conduct of
operations in Turkey and Turkey’s inability to crack down PKK in Iraq because of the refusal of US and Iraqi authorities for a major Turkish military intervention even if it may only carry out inefficient and far between air attacks against PKK targets. The presence of a Kurdish state on the South East borders of Turkey, the failure of Turkey to put an end to PKK has led to a rise of nationalism in the Kurdish areas of Turkey. Since Turkish state is based on the French type of unitary state model, Kurdish nationalism that defy one of the immutable principles of the Turkish constitution has become a problem with a foreseeable solution that would satisfy the nation.

Turkey continues to invest heavily in the building of Northern Iraq and Iraq has become one of the leading trade partners of Turkey. Even if only for this reason, Turkey, while tasking all necessary steps for its security, must defend unity and stability in Iraq.

“Reformation” in the Arab Lands?
During demonstrations and riots in many Arab countries in Magreb and Mashrek areas of the Arab world the people demanded freedom, democracy, rule of law and an end to corrupt regimes. Many of the protestors and particularly young people aspired reforms that would turn their countries and consequently reduced pressure of religion in their daily lives. Another and probably the stronger part of the protestors wanted political Islam to come to power. If they come to power it is a question if they will implement the principles of democracy and freedom as understood in secular communities. In other words, will they be able to set up “reformed” Islam unlike those practiced in Saudi Arabia, some Gulf countries and Iran? The developments in either direction will also have serious implications for Turkey’s relations with most of the Arab countries. Whatever happens, Islamic tinted administrations in the Arab countries will most likely support Islamist elements in Palestine and elsewhere unlike most of the outgoing regimes.

Europe:
Over one and a half centuries of reform and Europeanization efforts and the great reforms achieved in the past three quarters of century, have extensively
transformed the residue of the Islamic Ottoman Empire within the current borders of Turkey into a modern, secular state where the majority of Moslem Turks can perform their religious rituals in a democratic and secular state. This state has adopted European norms for its system of government, laws and institutions. As Turkey is determined to adopt and implement basic values and norms prevalent in today’s Europe and as a prolongation of these efforts it has chosen to take part in all organizations that call themselves as “European”. Turkey is a member of the oldest and largest European organization, the Council of Europe that represent about 800 million Europeans and is the guardian of human rights of all Europeans. It is a member of NATO which is responsible for the security of Europe and has assumed responsibility for enforcing some of the decisions of the UN Security Council in other parts of Europe. Turkey signed a deal in 1963 to become a member of the predecessor of the current EU, the EEC and established a road map in 1973 that would lead to full membership. Several mutual steps were taken in this direction and led to the creation of a Customs Union in 1995. In 1999 Turkey was declared a candidate for membership (a delayed confirmation of what made in 1964) with a delay of more than thirty years. It took ten years from the date of the Customs Union to start in 2005 membership negotiations that are in reality at a stand still after 6 years of decline in the spirit and actions of many European Union countries to have Turkey as a member and Turkey is mulling over long term policies without being a member of EU although it is very reluctant to do so because there is a sense that irreconcilable differences on the problems in Cyprus and Aegean and the membership of both Greece and the Greek Republic in Cyprus, Turkey’s full membership is nigh impossible. This does not mean that Turkey should cease to be a European country and cut-off relations with EU that will proceed in the measure that is politically and economically feasible for both sides without losing the sight of full membership, but with less enthusiasm.

As Turkey is one of the largest countries with an economy that ranks 16th in the world and has ambitions to expand its economic and political interest on a global scale, it has many small or important issues to take care elsewhere
and these issues should be considered normal if we remember the Latin dictum “caput magna, cura magna”.

AZERBAIJAN

Reşat Arım

Azerbaijan is the most populated and richest country in Southern Caucasus region. Its people is ethnically and linguistically related to Turks and they were part of the Great Seljuk Empire. The other part of the Azeri population is in Iran. They constitute a high proportion of Iran’s population. The withdrawal of Russian troops after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 allowed northern Azerbaijan to become an independent state and this was rather short lived and in 1922 the Bolsheviks united the three independent republics in the Caucasus into the Transcaucasus Federation of Socialist Republics which became the basic foundation of the USSR. Stalin in 1936 disbanded the Transcaucasus Federation and redrew the state line. Azerbaijan like the other two countries of the region became a federated republic of the Soviet Union.

The section on Azerbaijan comprises of the following headings: internal situation and foreign policy, relations with regional countries, relations with major powers, oil and gas.

1. Internal situation

The breakdown of the Soviet union in 1991 brought once again independence to Azerbaijan. State structure was modified to adopt the democratic norms of the West under a presidential system. Its first President Elchibey was a fervent supporter of the Ataturk model and close ties with Turkey. But soon he was deposed favour of Haidar Aliev who was a former member of the Soviet Politbureau like his colleague Eduard Shverndaze who also became the President of Georgia. Under Haidar Aliev Azerbaijan began to develop its own resources but the war with Armenia brought great sufferings to the people of Azerbaijan. 200 thousand of the people of Azerbaijan became refugees in their own homeland. Haidar Aliev died in 2004 and he was succeeded by his son Ilham Aliev.

Both presidents reserved a democratic structure and even joined the Council of Europe but received strong criticism of their election system and imprisonement of their opponents. The development of oil and gas fields in the Caucasus brought a relative richness to Azerbaijan and
many foreign investors came to contribute to the economy and infrastructure. Turkish companies played a significant role in this respect.

2. Relations with regional countries

a) Turkey

Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey contain the element of ethnic kinships and linguistic similarities. In fact, some people in both countries call themselves as one nation living in two states. This affinity has very much eased development of the relations between the two countries. In fact Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan after the break up of the Soviet Union. Turkey initiated steps to facilitate Azerbaijan’s participation in the United Nations, in OSCE, in the Council of Europe and Black Sea Economic Cooperation scheme. Turkey paid great attention to Azerbaijan’s security and together with the other two Southern Caucasus States, Azerbaijan was included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. Turkey helped Azerbaijan to train its army. Economic relations of Azerbaijan with Turkey has marked a great increase and economic interdependence helps the closeness of its relations. As it will be explained later, The Bak-Tbilisi-Ceyan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline form solid bonds between the two countries.(1)

b) Georgia

Azerbaijan’s relations with Georgia has been friendly but sometimes it has included a certain rivalry. The US Congressional Research Service’s report (2) on the subject includes valuable information. “The path to independence proved thorny for both Georgia and Azerbaijan. After the collapse of the USSR, both Georgia and Azerbaijan saw their territorial integrity challenged. While Georgia suffered from bloody conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Azerbaijan became enveloped in a protracted, undeclared war in the mountainous heights of Karabakh. Azerbaijan attempted to curb a secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nonetheless, the bloody conflicts have not stopped the development of either Georgia or Azerbai-
jan, and both states have managed to establish a firm position in the region.

The strategic partnership between Georgia and Azerbaijan has resulted in increasing economic cooperation. Azerbaijan has invited Georgia to participate in many regional projects. Heydar Aliyev used to describe the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as 'The Way of Friendship and Cooperation.' Georgia and Azerbaijan are cooperating within the framework of various international and regional organizations. Leaders of both countries used to consider historical backgrounds when extending their hand in friendship.” (3)

Georgia and Azerbaijan have maintained cordial relations ever since the first establishment of their independent statehoods in 1918. On June 16, 1919, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Democratic Republic of Georgia signed a defensive treaty against the White troops of General Anton Denikin’s Volunteer Army, who were threatening to start an offensive on their borders. In spite of a territorial dispute over the Zaqatala district and Georgia’s concerns over Azerbaijan’s support of the short-lived South West Caucasian Republic, the two countries maintained peaceful relations in the chaotic years of the Russian Civil War.

After the collapse of the USSR both Georgia and Azerbaijan saw their territorial integrity challenged. Nonetheless, the bloody conflicts have not stopped the development of either Georgia and Azerbaijan, and both states have managed to establish a firm position in the region. The strategic partnership between Georgia and Azerbaijan has resulted in increasing economic cooperation and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan (BTC) pipeline was the sign of the friendship between Azerbaijan-Georgia and Turkey. Georgia and Azerbaijan are improving relations as members of GUAM. Both countries, as GUAM states, have always prioritised cooperation with the Transatlantic community.

During the Georgia-Russian crisis, when the BYC pipeline was frozen, Azerbaijan diverted its oil supplies to Russia via the Novorosisk pipeline and to Iran via the port of Neka. The August war, showed that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan independently can guarantee the security of
the transit routes. Only a strong European and American presence will prevent disruptive actions that sabotage the transit infrastructure.

The August war, contrary to expectations, did not negatively affect the relations of Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the strong economic support of Azerbaijan was helpful. Indeed, pragmatism became a trademark Policy for Baku and Tbilisi, establishing the foundation of a strong bilateral partnership. The Azerbaijan-Georgia partnership has forced the world to look at the Caucasus in a new, different way. In spite of all challenges, no longer is this solely an area known for bloody conflicts and incompetent leaders and its resources being too problematic to develop. Regional cooperation is now at least feasible.

Finally, an important element of the partnership between Baku and Tbilisi is inability to overcome mutual historic and more recent emotional grievances as well as an understanding that all unresolved issues can be addressed through bilateral negotiations.

c) Iran

Azeri-Iranian relations is also a relationship of kinship. Azerbaijan and Iranian people share a long common history and as stated earlier a great portion of Azeri people live in Iran. The fact that with respect to religion both Azeris and Iranians belong to the same religious sect, Shiism. Although the long atheist Soviet rule in the Republic of Azerbaijan has reduced the impact of religion in the Azerbaijan Republic, whereas in Iran shared religion between Azeris and Farsi elements has not only facilitated the founding of a religious state but also a common Iranian identity. These divergent attitudes to religion has always remained as a source of coolness in the relations between Iran and secular Azerbaijan. While Iranians are worried about the zest of Azerbaijani nationalism, secular Azerbaijan is equally worried about Iran’s religious fervor which disturbed the people of Azerbaijan particularly in the early years of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This mutual suspicion led Iran to establish close relations with Armenia that was an enemy of Azerbaijan.
**d) Armenia**

Tsarist Russia’s policy of “divide and rule” in order to preserve the Empire and its Soviet successor has been the cause of the hostility between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to Nagorno-Karabagh changing hands between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia consider the possession of Nagorno-Karabagh under their sovereignty and control as a national cause. In Nagorno-Karabagh, Azeris and Armenians lived together but the hostilities between two motherlands have brought misery to the people and caused massacres of Armenians in Azerbaijan and Azeris in Armenia in their history. Last time in 1936 Stalin gave Nagorno-Karabagh to Azerbaijan as an Autonomous Oblast. But with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabagh became the object of war between the two independent states. Soviet Union evacuated most of their troops from Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabagh and left their arms to Armenia that began to invade not only Karabagh but also the neighboring Azeri territories and declared independence of Nagorno-Karabagh. Azerbaijan deprived of Russian assistance in arms could not match the fighting capability of Armenia. Since the end of the war Armenia has refused to return any of the Azeri territories back to Azerbaijan and kept even those out of Nagorno-Karabagh. The Minsk Group of OSCE has been trying to negotiate a settlement between the two countries. Turkey along with other countries is a member of the Minsk Group. But negotiations on behalf of the Group are conducted by its co-chairmen Russia, US and France. In all these three countries, from which impartiality is expected, there are significant Armenian minorities and lobbies. Yet nationalist Armenians (the current President of Armenia, Serge Sarkisian was the Communist Party Chief of Nagorno-Karabagh and the previous President Robert Kocharian was the president of Nagorno-Karabagh) with the support of the Armenian diaspora in France and in the United States are not inclined even to accept a compromise solution.

Currently the dispute continues. As President Ilham Aliyev stated in the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2010, “The UN Security Council has adopted four resolutions and expressed its full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the
inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territories. It has also recognized that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan and called for immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The UN General Assembly and other international organizations, including the OSCE, Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the Organization of the Islamic Conference have adopted a similar position. Unfortunately, despite the consolidated position of the International Community, Azerbaijani Territories continue to remain under occupation. “

The situation is not only untenable for peace and security in the Caucasus but Armenia’s determination to change the character of the occupied lands into full scale Armenia against the growing power of Azerbaijan and its increasing military strength probably could not be contained indefinitely from reclaiming real Azeri territories around Nagorno-Karabagh if not Karabagh itself. Another war between these two states may have further ramifications that could involve other states in the region. Meanwhile, in support of Azerbaijan and UN Resolutions mentioned above Turkey has officially made the following declaration to the UN General Assembly on 11 November 2008:

“Turkey, in line with its commitment to fully support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the relevant United Nations Security Council, General Assembly and OIC resolutions, does not accord permission to any Turkish official, non-governmental or business structures to operate any activity in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In this context, Turkey has made sure that all Turkish non-governmental and business structures are well-informed on the issue. As a result, no Turkish non-governmental and business structure has so far been involved in any economic, political or humanitarian activities in the occupied territories.”

e) Major powers

United States

US is in difficulty to develop a solid neutral policy between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Because of the Armenian lobby, US provides support for Armenia like it does to Israel. In fact, the Freedom Support Act adopted
by US Congress bans any kind of direct aid to Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan with its geopolitical situation and oil and gas supplies is a country that cannot be ignored completely in United States global policies. Actually United States interests are much higher in real term in Azerbaijan and US has supported Azerbaijan’s NATO links even though it did not go far for supporting NATO membership for Azerbaijan or Georgia. (4)

Never-the-less, United States spared every effort to have good relations with both states and supported a conciliation process by bringing heads of states of both Azerbaijan and Armenia at Key West under President Bush. Unfortunately, because of the attitude of Armenia no solution could be obtained. United States has also been a great supporter of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and has welcomed the idea of Nabuco Pipeline to bring Caspian gas to Europe.

Russia

The fact that Russia has given military support to Armenia by moving some of the evacuated forces from Georgia to Armenia, probably because of the Armenian lobby in Moscow, has created serious reaction in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has entered strong security cooperation with Turkey and the West yet continuous Western support for Armenia and lack of serious efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute has created in Azerbaijan a disappointment and Russia has taken up this opportunity to normalize its relations with Azerbaijan. A free trade agreement between Azerbaijan and Russia has contributed to a significant increase in trade and economic relations. Russia takes the second place in the foreign trade of Azerbaijan after Turkey. (5)

4. Oil and Gas

As far as Turkey is concerned three projects, of which two are already functioning, have great significance for Azerbaijan and Turkish economies.

a) Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

This project started in 1993 after much hesitation and difficulties caused by competition and by those
companies who had deep oil interests in Russia. Serious support of Turkey and the United States contributed greatly to persuade oil companies to invest in this project. The consortium that finally built the pipeline is headed by the British Petroleum Company. The BTC Pipeline carries 1 million barrels per day from the Azeri/Shirag/Guneshli oil fields in the Caspian Sea to the port of Ceyhan which is a hub of oil pipelines also with the Iraqi Kerkuk-Yumurtalık Pipeline.

**b) Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline**

The BTE gas pipeline is the second important pipeline transporting Azeri natural gas to Turkey. This natural gas pipeline entails shipping Azeri natural gas from the Shahdeniz field to Turkey. BTE which has a capacity of transporting 16 bcm per annum has become operational in 2007.

From this pipeline Turkey supplies gas to Greece. However, this supply was recently cut off because of the ramifications of the economic crisis in Greece.

**c) Nabuco Pipeline Project**

This project came into being because of the need of many European countries to alternative gas supplies in order not to remain under the monopoly on Russian supplies. It is a complex and great project extending from various gas producing countries around Turkey to Central Europe. Turkey is the longest stretch for the pipeline. However, there are many problems, including the sources of supply and commercial factors. It is not known if Azeri gas from the Caspian would be adequate for this project. Iran and Iraq could be possible additional sources but political situation in these countries are not yet ripe for the building up sufficient capacity gas fields.

**Conclusion**

Without any doubt, Azerbaijan is the most important country for the economy and stability of the Southern Caucasus. It is a genuine partner of Turkey and is in the direction of becoming a modern European state. Because of its natural resources and hard working population Azerbaijan will become an important power in the region.
End Notes:
(1) Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs web-site
(2) Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress
(4) Embassy of Azerbaijan, Washington, D.C.
(5) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Influence of historical events on the relations between countries is observed quite frequently. However, it is hardly seen that the historical events go beyond “some” influence and begin playing a more deterministic role in relations between those countries, especially if almost a century has passed since those events. This is the case concerning the relations between Turkey and Armenia and the burden of historical events is the main reason which obstructs the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations.

Upon closer examination, the elements preventing, or at least delaying the normalization of relations with Turkey for Armenia and in general, for Armenians, can be summarized as follows: The disappointing dream of “Great Armenia”; the genocide allegations being rejected by Turkey; and those living within the Diaspora, with the fear of losing their Armenian identities, identifying themselves with the genocide allegations. Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan without any reservations concerning the Karabakh Conflict should also be added to these.

The difficulties experienced by Turkey concerning the issue of normalization include the genocide accusations and the recognition of these by various countries’ Parliaments, the uncertainty prevailing about the recognition of the border with Armenia, the Armenian atrocities committed in Eastern Anatolia during and right after the First World War, the Armenian occupation of Karabakh and the surrounding Azeri territories, and hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis taking refuge in Azerbaijan as a result.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia had become independent. This new state lasted for approximately 2.5 years. During this period, in order to fulfill

* Ret. Ambassador, Director of Center for Eurasian Studies
their dream of Great Armenia, Armenians have waged wars with the Ottomans in 1918 and the Ankara Government in 1920, only to be defeated in all of them. Losing their independence at the end of 1920, they were obliged to join the Soviet Union.

The most significant event of the Soviet Armenia period regarding relations with Turkey has been the demarcation of the border between the two countries as defined by the Treaty of Kars on 13 October 1921. This treaty, which is still valid today, not only has delimited the border, but has also legally ended the aspirations for “Great Armenia”. In essence, the Soviet Union has not permitted any nationalist movements taking place within the dependent Soviet republics, particularly during the Stalin era. Aspiring to reach the borders of the Czarist period following the Second World War, apart from the control of the straits the Soviet Union also requested Kars and Ardahan to be given to Armenia and Georgia which caused nationalist feelings to be re-awakened in Armenia. Almost at the same time, in order to avoid losing their national identities within the Diaspora as a result of assimilation of the Armenians, the Dashnak Party, with the support of local churches, has put forth the genocide allegations.

We can see that since the 1950’s, the genocide allegations have also been stated in Soviet Armenia. However, taking into consideration their relations with Turkey, Moscow has prevented these allegations from turning into formal demands. Yet, by permitting the commemoration of 24 April, the erection of a great ‘genocide’ monument near Yerevan (1967), and the organization of ceremonies there, Moscow has caused these allegations to be perpetrated.

When it became clear that the Soviet Union would collapse, Soviet Armenia has started its preparations for independence. While on the one hand the initiatives for the separation of Karabakh to from Azerbaijan have continued, and on the other, a Declaration of Independence which determines the principles upon which the new state would be established has been adopted on 23 August 1990, approximately a year before Armenia’s independence. Article 11 of this Declaration states the following: “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia”.

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There exists three fundamental points within this short statement:

Firstly, the genocide allegations are accepted as a truth.

Secondly, the support for the international recognition (by international organizations and international scientific circles) of these allegations has been bestowed on the Republic of Armenia as a task.

Last of all, by means of describing Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia, Armenia has indirectly revindicated a part of Turkish territory.

When Armenia declared its independence about a year later by conducting a referendum, Turkey did not hesitate to recognize the new Armenian state, despite the statements in the Declaration of Independence which do not recognize Turkey’s territorial integrity. Just as with the other new states formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in order to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, Turkey has suggested for the signing of a protocol which would also recognize the border between the two countries; when Armenia refused to comply with the Protocols, Turkey also failed to establish diplomatic relations. Tensions have also erupted later on in Turkey-Armenia relations because of the Karabakh Conflict and in 1993 Turkey closed the border between the two countries as a reaction to Armenian occupation of Azeri territories outside of Karabakh.

Therefore, three problems have developed between Turkey and Armenia: the mutual recognition of borders, the genocide allegations, and the Turkey-Armenia border being closed. These three problems still exist today.

During the twenty years since Armenia’s independence, both countries have aspired to create normal relations, but have had different views concerning the settlement of the existing problems between them.

Turkey has preferred to normalize relations with Armenia after the existing problems have been settled. This approach reflects the concern that if relations are established without the resolution of the problems, these relations will
be damaged. Indeed, it is not realistic to assume that Armenia will recognize Turkey’s territorial integrity, abandon their genocide allegations, and end the occupation of Karabakh and other Azeri territories once diplomatic relations are established with Turkey and the border is opened.

On the contrary, Armenia has pursued the policy of establishing normal relations and opening the border without any preconditions. This means that relations should be established without the resolution of the issues between the two sides. Due to the objections mentioned above, this has not been accepted by Turkey.

Despite these contradictory approaches, the officials from both countries have held talks from time to time since 1992 in order to normalize their relations. Moreover, the foreign ministers of both countries have also met each other by taking advantage of the conferences of international organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Since neither side has changed their stance, no results have been obtained from these talks.

The most important development during this rather long period has been Turkey’s proposal to Armenia in 2005, which states that “Turkey invites Armenia to form a group comprised of the historians and other specialists of our two countries to investigate the developments and events related to the 1915 period by researching all the archives of not only Turkey and Armenia but also all relevant third countries and to report their findings to the international community.”\(^{[1]}\) In response to Prime Minister Erdoğan’s letter regarding this issue, Armenian President Kocharyan has stated that “Your proposal to address the past cannot be efficient if it does not refer to the present and the future….. Governments are responsible for development of bilateral relations and we do not have the right to delegate historians. Thus, we have proposed and we again proposing establishment of normal relations between our coun-

\(^{[1]}\) Review of Armenian Studies, Volume 2, Number 7-8, 2005, p.133
tries without preconditions”\textsuperscript{14[2]}. Although this response does not openly reject Turkey’s proposal, it shows that it has not been accepted in practice. However, if the Turkish proposal was accepted, the crucial “genocide” issue would have been transferred to historians and other specialists and would be removed from the agenda of bilateral relations. This way, a determining step would have been taken towards normalization of relations.

Like Diaspora, Armenia’s public opinion also considers the genocide allegations as the truth, therefore they are absolutely against the initiatives for putting aside or even alleviating these allegations. However, as long as these allegations are kept alive, it is very difficult for normal relations with Turkey to be established and the opening of the border to be possible. From this angle, Turkey’s proposal for a “Commission of Historians” comprises a fair solution. However, President Kocharyan has not displayed the courage to accept this suggestion.

It was expected that Serge Sarkisian, being elected as President in February 2008, would also follow the same policy of Kocharyan with whom he had worked together for years. However, that has not been the case and while not making any change in the Karabakh policy, Sarkisian has attempted to normalize relations with Turkey.

In the congratulatory message of President Gül delivered on 21 March 2008 to Sarkisian for his election as President, by stating that “I hope your new position will permit the creation of the necessary environment for normalizing relations between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, who have proven over centuries they can live together in peace and concord”\textsuperscript{15[3]}, Gül has indirectly invited the new President of Armenia to try to reconcile with Turkey. This gesture of goodwill has remained unanswered for some time.

\textsuperscript{14[2]} Review of Armenian Studies, Volume 2, Number 7-8, 2005, p.134

Around three months later, in a speech delivered on 24 June 2008 during a visit to Moscow, President Sarkisian has expressed that they will take further steps to stimulate Armenian-Turkish relations and will invite Turkish President Abdullah Gül to Yerevan to watch a football match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams. He has stated furthermore that the borders must not be sealed in the 21st century. As to the proposal made by Turkey to form a “Historical Commission” which would examine the historic facts of the ‘genocide’, the Armenian President has said that they are not against any study as studying does not mean to doubt the real facts; but the establishment of such a commission would be quite logical if the two countries have set diplomatic relations and have opened borders\textsuperscript{16[4]}.

The main reason for Sarkisian behaving differently from Kocharyan is that he has been elected President by receiving more votes and therefore, holds greater political authority. His desire to improve relations with Turkey must be based on the idea that their problems with Turkey can easily be settled, compared to those problems with Azerbaijan. Moreover, if relations are normalized and the border is opened, Azerbaijan will be in a rather weak position in front of Armenia in relation to the Karabakh issue. However, it can also be understood that beyond all these, Sarkisian has a strategic purpose and by settling their issues with Turkey, he aspires to eliminate Armenia’s isolation at a certain degree.

Armenia has no diplomatic relations with two of its four neighbors (Turkey and Azerbaijan) and its borders closed. Since almost Armenia’s entire economic relations are with Western countries and in particular Russia, having friendly relations with Iran and their border being open does not carry much economic significance. In this situation, communications with Russia and Western countries are made through Georgia; this not only puts Georgia in a monopo-

\textsuperscript{16[4]} Interfax News Agency, 24 Haziran 2006. Armenian President Plans to Invite Turkish-Leader to Yerevan and Panorama.am, 26 June 2008. President Remained Stable to Armenian-Turkish Relationship
istic position, but its instability and its conflicts with Russia, such as the Ossetia crisis of 2008, could stop Armenia’s import and export for some time.

On the other hand, Armenia’s conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey have caused this country to be left outside the regional cooperation in the Southern Caucasus. Despite the possibility of shortening the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline of about 400 km if passed through Armenia, this has not been the case and this has deprived Armenia of obtaining oil and natural gas for a cheaper price and from tolls. Last of all, while there is a railway line from Kars to Armenia, a new line began to be constructed which would directly link the Turkish railway line to Georgia. It could be seen that if Armenia does not settle its conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, it will not be able to participate also in regional projects in the Southern Caucasus, such as NABUCCO.

However, President Sarkisian’s invitation for Turkey’s President to come to Yerevan in order to watch the Turkey-Armenia National Football Match and President Gül’s acceptation of this invitation have not only broken the ice between the two sides, but have also accelerated the negotiations which have been continuing for some time.

Negotiations have lasted for quite a long time and have experienced difficulties. On 22 April 2009, almost 5 months after the Turkey-Armenia National Football Match held on 6 September 2008, the two sides have provided information to the public with Switzerland, which has acted as a mediator\(^\text{[5]}\)\(^\text{[5]}\), regarding their negotiations. In the statement, it has been expressed that they “have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region” and that “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process; they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified”.

\(^{[5]}\) http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-_56_-_22-nisan-2009_-_turkiye-ermenistan-iliskileri-hk.tr.mfa
This text expresses that there is tangible progress between Turkey and Armenia, but is not clear what this progress is. Also, no information has been given on the "comprehensive framework". Moreover, the constituents of the "road map" were not clearly defined. Considering that a draft resolution has been submitted to the House of Representatives on 19 February 2009, which foresees the recognition of the Armenian genocide allegations, it seems that the purpose of this statement is to give the US President the opportunity not to use the term "genocide" in his 24 April message. As a matter of fact, the President has not used this word.

Approximately four months after this statement, on 31 August 2009, Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland as mediator, have made public the texts of the two Protocols, which have not been signed, but initiated. The "political consultations" are expected to be completed within six weeks, following which the two Protocols will be signed and submitted to the respective Parliaments\(^{18[6]}\).

This period of six weeks has mostly been utilized by Armenia. Within this framework, President Sarkisian has conducted extensive negotiations in his country with the Parliament, political parties, the press, the Public Council, and the Supreme Spiritual Council. Moreover, he has unexpectedly traveled to Paris, New York, Los Angeles, Beirut, and the city of Rostov in Russia to provide information on the Protocols to the Diaspora Armenians. During these consultations within and outside of Armenia, it could be seen that with Dashnaks being at the forefront, extreme nationalist circles strongly opposed the Protocols. However, the majority, although unwillingly, have supported President Sarkisian. Upon this development, the Dashnak Party has withdrawn from the Armenian Government Coalition.

The two Protocols have been signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia on 10 October 2009 with a ceremony in which the foreign ministers of US, Russia, 

\(^{18[6]}\) [Link to the Protocols](http://mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Türkiye-ermenistan-turkce.pdf)
France, Switzerland, the Chairman of the EU Committee of Ministers, and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy have been present.

The Protocols’ principles and their main points can be summarized as follows\(^{19}\)\(^{[7]}\).

The First Protocol entitled "The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Armenia" establishes diplomatic relations as of the date of its entry into force. This Protocol, along with the Second Protocol, shall enter into force on the same day i.e. on the first day of the first month following the Exchange of instruments of ratification.

Apart from this main provision, the most important point in the First Protocol is the mutual recognition of the border between the two sides. The text of the Protocol concerning this matter is: "Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law".

The border between the two countries has been delimited by the Treaty of Moscow signed between the Soviet Union and the Ankara Government on 16 March 1921. Since Armenia was part of the Soviet Union in that period, this Treaty has also been valid for Armenia. However, bearing in mind that this could create a conflict in the future, Ankara Government wanted to conclude a separate treaty with the Soviet Socialist Republics on its Eastern border. This Treaty, signed in Kars on 13 October 1921 between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, has confirmed the borders delimited by the Treaty of Moscow. The two treaties mentioned above are still valid today. Although this is the legal situation, there is a common belief among Armenia and the Diaspora public opinion that the Treaty of Kars is not valid since it was not signed by an independent Armenian state. The Armenian Governments

\(^{19}\)\(^{[7]}\) Detailed information on the Protocols could be found in Review of Armenian Studies, no. 19-20 and pp 40-49. The full English texts of the Protocols could also be found in the issue number on pages 199-204..
have preferred to remain silent on this issue; in other words, they have refrained from making statements on whether the Treaty of Kars is valid or not. The vague wordings concerning the recognition of the border reflect the stance of the Armenian Government. It is obvious that including a provision into the Protocol which indicates that the border between Turkey and Armenia has been delimited by the Treaty of Kars would have eliminated all reservations. This has not been made or at least was not possible to do so and instead, a text that is open to interpretations has been adopted. As will be seen below, the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court regarding this issue has been that the parties have not definitely accepted the existing borders.

Apart from the recognition of the border, the most important principle in the First Protocol is for both countries to condemn all forms of terrorism, violence and extremism irrespective of their cause, pledging to refrain from encouraging and tolerating such acts and to cooperate in combating against them. Between 1973 and 1986, Turkey and especially Turkish diplomats have been subjected to Armenian terror with 32 diplomats and their relatives being murdered in foreign countries and many being injured. Although there is no indication that the Armenians will resort to terror again today, the tradition of Armenian nationalists using terror for political purposes still exists. It is difficult to identify the Khojaly Massacre, which had caused the slaughtering of hundreds of individuals during the Karabakh wars, as something else other than terror. On the other hand, this terror has also been inflicted upon Armenians. On 27 October 1999, a terrorist group had attacked the Armenian Parliament, murdering eight of its members, including the Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament, and injuring 30 individuals.

Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, the US has adopted a decisive stance towards terror, especially in Western countries. Now, it is very difficult, in principle, for countries cooperating with these states to directly or indirectly use terror. However, remembering the extremism of Armenian militants, it is not totally impossible for these kinds of activities to be triggered again. Therefore, incorporating an item into the Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which condemns and emphasizes the need to combat terror has been very appropriate.
Some other crucial principles existing within the First Protocol are the following: respect and ensure respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, to refrain from the threat of the use of force, to refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations, to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes, and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

As can be understood from its title, the Second Protocol is on the development of relations between the two countries.

As in the First Protocol, the parties have also touched upon some points in the Second Protocol which they deem important or essential and have expressed them as the following: develop their bilateral relations based on confidence and respect to their mutual interests, enhance their bilateral relations in the political, economic, energy, transport, scientific, technical, cultural issues and other fields based on common interest of both countries, support the promotion of the cooperation between the two countries in the international and regional organizations, especially within the framework of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the BSEC, cooperate for enhancing regional stability and security for ensuring the democratic and sustainable development of the region.

Moreover, the two countries have reaffirmed their readiness to actively support the actions against terrorism, transnational organized crimes, and illicit trafficking of drugs and arms.

In this Protocol, the parties have stated that they have agreed mainly on three issues. These are: 1. Opening the common border, 2. Determining the areas in which relations will develop, 3. Establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned above.

In summary, the parties have determined the areas in which they will develop their relations as follows: implement a dialogue on the historical dimension of their rela-
tions, cooperate on transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks, develop the bilateral legal framework and also in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage, establish consular cooperation, take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation and engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues.

As can be seen, the areas in which they will cooperate are extensive. Since no cooperation existed between the two countries in any area except for indirect trade, a detailed identification of the areas must be considered as normal.

The two countries have also organized the planning, implementation and inspection of the cooperation within the above-mentioned areas. Accordingly, an intergovernmental bilateral commission will be established and there will be a sub-commission for each of the areas of cooperation.

There is no doubt that this cooperation would be beneficial for both countries. Moreover, the most important disposition of the Second Protocol for Armenia is that the common border with Turkey will open within two months after the entry into force of the Protocol.

For Turkey, the most important disposition is that with this Protocol, “a Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension” would be established. The provision related to this is the following: “the sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archive to define existing problems and formulate recommendations, in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take part, at the latest 1 month after the first meeting of the intergovernmental commission”.

The name and the description of this Sub-commission’s tasks require that the genocide allegations will be addressed here. However, it is interesting that expressions such as “genocide” or “1915 events” are not present in the text. As will be explained below, the Armenian side has
put forth later on that this provision does not require the discussion of the genocide allegations.

There is no reference to the Karabakh issue in the Protocols. This could be accepted as normal considering that Turkey is not a party to the Karabakh Conflict.

What is very unusual with the Turkey-Armenia Protocols is that not de jure, but de facto, these documents have lost most of their significance on the day they were signed. In order to explain this, we must examine the five-month period before their signing date.

We had mentioned above that Turkey and Armenia had stated on 22 April 2009 that they have agreed on a “comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner” and that they have “identified a road-map”. This statement has created the expectation within the public opinion that an agreement will be concluded shortly between the two countries. This has caused concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey will abandon its support to Azerbaijan on the Karabakh issue and has even created harsh reactions against Turkey. In a speech delivered at the National Assembly of Azerbaijan on 13 May 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan has expressed that Turkey will never ignore the interests of Azerbaijani people, that the Turkish border was closed in 1993 as a result of Karabakh and other Azeri territories being occupied by Armenians, thus the border will be opened if the occupation ends and that Turkey will not take any step on this issue unless it agrees beforehand with Azerbaijan.

These statements link the opening of the border to the Armenian occupation of Karabakh and other Azeri territories. About three months later, when the text of the Protocols was made public on 31 August 2010, it was seen that the opening of the border was not linked to the condition of ending the occupation of Azeri territories, but it was only indicated that the common border with Turkey will open within two months after the entry into force of the First Protocol. However, the Prime Minister’s statements are not contradictory to the Protocols. His statements mean that unless the Armenian occupations end, Turkey will not implement the Protocols; in other words, unless the occupation ends, the Protocols will not be ratified by
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Since no provision exists in the Protocols which indicate the time frame for the ratification of the parties, it is possible that the Protocols could stay within the Turkish Parliament for a rather long period.

Another point which requires attention is that even if Armenia and Azerbaijan reach an agreement on the Karabakh issue, Armenian forces probably will not immediately withdraw from Azeri territories and this could last for some years. Consequently, Turkey’s ratification of the Protocols could also take many years. However, it is seen that Armenia or the countries supporting Turkey-Armenia reconciliation will not accept this. Therefore, Prime Minister Erdoğan has varied his statement later on and has started mentioning that significant developments for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict would be considered sufficient for ratification. With this statement, it could be understood that he refers to Azerbaijan and Armenia to reach an agreement on the “Madrid Principles”. As known, during the talks held on the Karabakh Conflict through the Minsk Group, it is foreseen that a document should be signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia determining the principles of the settlement of this conflict. The preparation and later the implementation of a treaty which settles the Karabakh conflict could take years, but a document concerning the principles of the settlement could be signed in a much shorter time.

Turkey indirectly linking the ratification of the Protocols to the resolution of the Karabakh Conflict has been highly criticized in Armenia. Although with a moderate language, members of the Minsk Group have also participated in these criticisms, but Turkey has not changed its stance.

On the day the Protocols were signed, President Sarkisian has issued a statement “to the people of the Republic of Armenia and to all Armenians”. The main features of this statement can be summarized as follows: The reality of the Armenian genocide cannot be questioned. The genocide should be recognized and condemned by the whole progressive humanity. The Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension to be established is not a commission of historians. The issue of the existing border between Armenia and Turkey is to be resolved through prevailing norms of the international law. The Protocols do not go
beyond that. The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is an independent and separate process. Armenia does not regard the clause of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders contained in the Protocols as in any way related to the Nagorno Karabakh problem. If Turkey fails to ratify the Protocols within a reasonable timeframe and does not implement all its clauses, Armenia will immediately take appropriate steps as stipulated by international law”.

As can be seen, the Armenian President does not accept the “Commission of Historians” and implies that the border between Turkey and Armenia could not be definitely recognized. However, Turkey has signed the Protocols with Armenia in order to resolve these two issues in particular (the genocide allegations and the recognition of the borders). President Sarkisian’s opposition to these has caused the Protocols to virtually lose their significance on the very first day they were signed. On the other hand, one can see that the main reason for the Armenian President’s unconstructive approach is Turkey linking the ratification of the Protocols to the Karabakh Conflict. Sarkisian has perceived Turkey’s stance as a pressure inflicted upon Armenia and therefore, has indicated that if necessary, they would renounce the Protocols in order to escape from this pressure. As a matter of fact, the developments taking place from then on has displayed that Armenia has lost their interest within the Protocols.

According to the Armenian Constitution, before ratification by the Parliament, the Protocols should be submitted to the Constitutional Court for the examination of their conformity with the Constitution. As a result of their examination, the Court has decided on 12 January 2010 that the Protocols are in conformity with the Constitution. When a few days later the full text of this decision was made public, it has been observed that the Court, with its interpretation, has altered the purpose of some of the articles of the Protocol and put forth various preconditions. These could be summarized as follows:

By referring to Article 11 of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia of 1990, which is part of the Armenian Constitution, the Court has stated that the provisions of the Protocols cannot be interpreted or applied in a way that would contradict this Article of the Declaration. Article 11 considers the Armenian genocide allegations as a reali-
ty. Therefore, according to that logic, the discussion by
the Sub-commission on the Historical Dimension, men-
tioned in the Second Protocol, of whether the 1915 events
are genocide or not would not be in conformity with the
Constitution.

Western Armenia mentioned in Article 11 of the Declara-
tion of Independence means Eastern Anatolia. Therefore,
it is implied that some areas of Turkish territory belongs to
Armenia, thus a claim is indirectly put forth on these terri-
tories. In other words, the Armenian Declaration of Inde-
pendence does not recognize the border between the two
countries. However, in the First Protocol, the mutual rec-
ognition of the existing border between the two countries
as defined by the “relevant treaties of international law”
has been confirmed. In this situation, a contradiction ex-
bists between this provision of the First Protocol and the
Declaration of Independence.

The Constitutional Court states that the commitment for
the opening of the common border is related to the wil-
lingness of Armenia to resolve legal-organizational and
institutional issues connected to safeguarding the normal
operation of border checkpoints. In other words, the
common border has been recognized for the operation of
border checkpoints. Therefore one can conclude that this
recognition is only for operational purposes and does not
mean that Turkey’s territorial integrity is being recog-
nized. In other words, Armenia could claim territory from
Turkey in the future by putting forth, for instance, that
they have historic rights.

The Treaty of Kars, dated 13 October 1921, has not been
mentioned in the Decision of the Constitutional Court. But,
it has been stated that international treaties can have le-
gal effect for Armenia only if they are in conformity with
the provisions of Article 6 of the Constitution, which states
that International treaties that have been “ratified” are a
constituent part of the legal system of Armenia. Just like
all the treaties concluded during the period of the Soviet
Union, the Treaty of Kars had not been ratified by the Ar-
menian Assembly, because this ratification was the task of
the Soviet Union parliament.

However the Kars Treaty is valid for several reasons: First
of all, Armenia, with some other ex-soviet republics, had
declared on 21 December 1991 that it would “fulfill their
responsibilities arising from the treaties concluded by the
Soviet Union”. Secondly, Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties states that a succession of states does not affect a boundary established by a treaty. Thirdly, Article 62/a of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations foresee that a fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary. Lastly, there is no official Armenian declaration indicating that the Treaty of Kars is not valid.

In summary, according to international law, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Kars is still valid. As to the contradiction of Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution with international law on the validity of treaties mentioned above, one can say that the Armenian Constitution is valid for the period after 1995, the year of its adoption. In other words, Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution cannot be applied to the Treaty of Kars signed in 1921.

The point worth mentioning here is that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and cannot be opposed. On the other hand, it is seen that the Decision of the Constitutional Court corresponds to the issues mentioned in President Sarkisian’s statement of 12 October, thus the Court Decision somehow “legalizes” President Sarkisian’s statement.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement on 18 January 2010, had reacted to the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court by underlining that “this decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols... and undermines the very reason for negotiating these Protocols as well as their fundamental objective. This approach cannot be accepted.... Turkey, in line with its customed allegiance to its international commitments, maintains its adherence to the primary provisions of these Protocols...and that the same allegiance is expected from the Armenian Government”\[20\].

In conclusion, it could be seen that with the Decision of the Constitutional Court, Armenia has attempted to alter the Protocols, has nearly abolished the articles related to the two most important issues for Turkey (the genocide allegations and the recognition of the border) and has tried to use the Protocols as a tool to resolve the issues which are highly important for Armenia i.e. to establish diplomatic relations and to open the border. Thus, there has been a retreat to the very beginning of the Turkey-Armenia normalization process; In other words, they have returned back to point zero.

The first reaction of Turkey to the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court has been the statement of the Foreign Ministry which we have mentioned above. Concerning this issue, Prime Minister Erdoğan has expressed that Armenia has tried to make an operation on the text of the signed Protocols, that the process will be damaged if this is not corrected, and that relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot be kept outside this process21[9].

Based on press news, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has prepared a legal document regarding the situation created by the decision of the Constitutional Court and has sent it to the mediating Switzerland and the US, Russia and France of the Minsk Group22[10]. The purpose of this initiative was to receive from Yerevan a legal guarantee that no alteration has been made in the Protocols and that the process is continuing as it is23[11]. However, Yerevan has failed in providing this guarantee. On the other hand, it

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has been observed that the mentioned countries have not interpreted the Armenian Constitutional Court’s Decision in the same way Turkey has. The US Assistant State Secretary Philip Gordon has made a statement, expressing that “the Court decision permits the Protocols, as they were negotiated and signed, to move forward parliamentary ratification, and does not appear to limit or to qualify them. We are confident that both Turkey and Armenia take their commitment to the protocols seriously, and we urge timely ratification of the protocols by both countries” 24[12]. The stance of the European Union is also similar to that of the US. There are statements from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fule that the Protocols must be ratified without being based on any preconditions and within a reasonable timeframe25[13]. On the other hand, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has only stated that the resolution of this issue directly depends on Turkey and Armenia26[14].

Later on, most likely upon the request of the US and maybe Russia, some contacts have taken place between Turkey and Armenia concerning the Protocols. Within this framework, Prime Minister Erdoğan has sent a written message to President Sarkisian and the two parties have agreed on coming together during the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Washington27[15]. Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Sarkisian have met in Washington on 12 April 2010. According to a press report, they have


agreed that the foreign ministers of both sides will continue their joint work on this subject. However, there has been no positive development within the issue of the Protocols. On the opposite, statements and initiatives have been seen which created the belief that Armenia has abandoned the Protocols. Within this framework, the three parties forming the Armenian Coalition Government have issued a joint statement on 22 April 2010 in which they have conveyed that Turkey’s inconsistent and evasive approach and its policy of setting preconditions has brought the ratification of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols to a deadlock, that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement which establishes the settlement of the Karabakh Conflict as a precondition to the ratification of the Protocols is unacceptable, that Turkey’s refusal to ratify the Protocols within a reasonable timeframe has made it meaningless for the Armenian Parliament to take any step in the future, and that this issue has been removed from the weekly agenda of the Armenian Parliament until the Turkish side is prepared to continue the process without preconditions.

The crucial point here is that the Protocols will remain on the agenda of the parliament, but will not be addressed. It could be understood that if the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratifies the Protocols, then the Armenian Parliament will do the same. However, this decision has not actually brought any change to the existing situation, because in response to Turkey refusing to ratify the Protocols until significant developments taking place within the Karabakh Conflict, the Armenians had stated that they would also not ratify them. The statements of April 22 have not carried any significance beyond confirming the actual situation.

The reasons for Armenia’s approach could be found in the country’s internal policy and its relations with the Diaspora. The Protocols signed with Turkey had drawn criticisms

28 Hürriyet, 13 April 2010. “İpler Kopmadı”

29 Hürriyet.com tr. 22 April 2010 “Ermenistan Protokol Sürecini Durdurdu. Topu Türkiye’ye attı”.
from both the Dashnaks and other opposition parties. The criticisms within the Diaspora were much harsher. However, if the Protocols were soon ratified or the border with Turkey was opened, this would have been a great success for President Sarkisian. But, when Turkey, in accordance with its stance, linked their ratification to the resolution of the Karabakh Conflict, both the Armenian Government and the President were put in a difficult position. The declaration that the ratification process of the Protocols has been suspended aimed to remedy this difficult situation.

It has been observed that after the suspension of the Protocols, Armenia’s attitude towards Turkey has become more severe, but it has been repeated on every occasion that Armenia aspires for the “normalization of relations without preconditions”. Turkey has been continuously criticized and there has been an attempt to convey the message that it is possible for Armenia to abandon the Protocols. For instance, in a speech delivered during an official visit to Southern Cyprus on 17 January 2011, President Sarkisian has accused Turkey of destroying the normalization process, stepping back from its commitments and setting preconditions. By also expressing that Turkey aspires to become a regional leader, he has opposed this and has criticized Turkey’s “zero problems with the neighbors” policy and has accused Turkey of blackmailing the Armenian people.

In an interview delivered on 27 January 2011 to the Eko Moskovi Radio of Russia, President Sarkisian has continued his criticisms towards Turkey and has stated that normalization could resume only if Turkey ratifies the Protocols without preconditions and that therefore there is no point in starting new negotiations. Moreover, he has ex-

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pressed that if it continues like this, the only way out, probably, will be to just withdraw their signature from the documents.

Despite Armenia’s stance, Turkish statesmen have continued their statements of goodwill and have attempted to revive the normalization process of Turkey-Armenia relations. However, no positive development taking place in the Karabakh Conflict has prevented these efforts from creating any results.

In conclusion, Turkey-Armenia relations have entered a phase of suspension and the highly expected reconciliation efforts have not been fulfilled for the moment. However, the parties refraining from entirely bringing a halt to the normalization process signifies that there is hope for the future.
Georgia
Oktay Aksoy

Georgia has been a strategically important neighbor of Turkey not only because at times it was a part of the Ottoman Empire with extensions of same ethnic origins over a wide range of territory on both sides of the borders, but more so because of Turkey’s developing relations to its East after the end of the Cold War and Georgia serving as a gateway to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, as well as to the Russian Federation. Particularly because of its closed borders with Armenia through which the only railway connection with former Soviet lands was cut off, this neighbor has acquired additional importance.

Historical background

Historically Georgia has either blocked or facilitated passage to the Russian planes or Southern Caucasus. Georgia consisted of many tribes, the remnants of which can be traced even in today’s grievances. Tribal union was achieved in the 13th century. They had adopted Christianity as a state religion as early as 4th century and therefore Orthodox Christians there were tied to the Byzantine Empire. Persia had occasional control of the region and by late 7th century one witnesses the Arab conquest with the aim of spreading Islam. The Seljuk conquest was in the 11th century which opened the region to Seljuk colonization. However, it has basically remained as a Christian enclave surrounded by Turco-Iranian-Arabic Muslims, resulting in an additional fragmentation of the peoples of the region on sectarian grounds. In 1555 the Ottomans and Safavid Persians partitioned the region.

Russia annexed it to its Empire in 1801 after a long and difficult war with the tribes of the Caucasus. After the First World War a short lived Democratic Republic of Georgia was established from 1918 until 1922. It was part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Republic consisting of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia from 1922 to 1936 and then from 1936 until the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991 it was one of the Soviet Socialist Republics. During the Soviet rule it benefitted to a certain extent from Stalin’s Georgian origins, had a privileged position within the Union maintaining its alphabet and ethnic homogeniety. But ultranationalists could not escape the wrath of Lavrentii Beria, secret police chief of Stalin, who was also of Georgian origin, when he was the Comunist Party First Secretary in Georgia and later as the Soviet tool of terror. However, nationalist trends have always persisted in Georgia and in the elections in 1989 the Communist Party candidates lost, increasing tensions with the central authority.

**After the end of the Cold War**

More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991 brought back the possibility of its gaining independence. The early years of independence usually encourages the nationalists to be more active. First President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s over-nationalistic fervor could be interpreted from this perspective. He vowed to assert Tbilisi’s authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia which had autonomous status under the Soviets. With the end of the Union and with Russian support they had achieved de facto independence from the Republic driving the majority Georgian population out of their territory by force. It still remains a point of contention and a cause for Russian intervention in developments there.

Instability and uncertainties before the regime would settle could be traced even with changes in the national flag. The present one showing clearly the weight of religion in Georgia’s national identity. The first president Gamsakhurdia’s nationalistic zeal led to a coup deposing him from power. A military Council was established as an interim government and former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and later the last Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze was brought to power as the interim head of state. However, a civil war lasted until 1995 when elections were finally held and Shevardnadze was then elected president. Economic woes and power struggle made the country unstable and the Rose Revolution in 2003, presented by some as a continuation of the velvet
revolutions in the Central European States, forced Shvardnadze to resign. Mikheil Saakashvili became the third president. He had to deal with yet another attempt to secession in Adjaria led by the local strongman Aslan Abashidze. He was successful in preventing this autonomous region from breaking away in 2004. However, it did not take long for conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to lead to a short Russian-Georgian war in 2008.

**Security concerns**

As was the case in many other post-Soviet republics in the Baltics and East Europe, seeking security guarantees through Euro-Atlantic mechanisms remained to be a priority issue for Georgia as well. In the early years of the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation scheme Georgian President Shevardnadze at the time had emphasized enhancement of BSEC’s political role and had insistantly proposed to include a military aspect to this cooperation. Saakashvili’s coming to power highlighted the security concerns of Georgia.

For the new leadership, modernizing Georgia and transforming it into a viable and eventually a prosperous state necessitated a dramatic exit from the Russian sphere of influence and the stagnating post-Soviet space. Post-revolutionary government has relentlessly sought also stronger EU engagement in security issues. However, the focus on NATO membership took precedence over convergence with the EU norms and standards. Meanwhile, many observers did not find the Georgian policies towards these two Western spheres contradictory up until the War, as long as Georgia was relying on NATO more than the EU to anchor the country in the West and gain security guarantees. Integration with NATO, strategic relationship with the US and liberal economy agenda took precedence over an EU integration, wheras a reverse stand would have been preferable and more acceptable for Russia and would have prevented the antagonism culminating in the August war.

Georgia expected from the EU, after the Rose Revolution, a stronger engagement in security issues, in particular in the area of conflict resolution, while EU’s neighborhood policies that are set in a long term perspective of gradual convergance to the EU standards did not answer Georgia’s search for rapid resolution to exit from a problematic post-Soviet status quo. As a result, Georgia focused more on
NATO membership and the strategic relationship with the United States gradually took precedence over a Europeanization agenda. United States President George W. Bush visited Georgia in 2005 to demonstrate US support for the Rose Revolution naming Georgia a “beacon of democracy”.

Encouraged by the US Administration of the time, they applied for closer ties with NATO with the eventual objective of becoming a member. However, they failed to obtain a Membership Action Plan during the crucial Bucharest NATO Summit of 4-5 April 2008, being instead promised that it would become a member of the Alliance at some point in the future. The prospect of NATO integration has become even more uncertain following the August 2008 war with Russia with the chances having dramatically receded of Georgia being able to solve its territorial conflicts in the near to medium-term. The coming to power of a new administration under President Barack Obama in the United States also restricted the range of foreign policy options for Georgia, as the country appears to have lost some of its strategic weight for the United States. While Obama administration’s counting more on Russia’s support to move forward in Afghanistan and Iran has created concern in Georgia, they try to see some benefits in this imporved relationship which they hope may result in a more effective leverage being exerted on Russia. Furthermore, the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the South Caucasus in July 2010 also contributed to reassure the countries in the region as a sign of continuous support of the United States. Secretary Clinton’s use of the term “occupation” in reference to the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was crucial in this regard. (1) However, strategic relationship with the US has lost momentum after the war and at the same time the EU has acquired more weight as a security actor with its role as a peace broker during the war and the deployment of a monitoring mission there.

2008 War with Russia and its consequences

The August 2008 war with Russia brought forth the limitations of Georgia to recover its lost territories, of Russia to generate a change of leadership in Georgia, of US and EU to interfere directly in support of the Western oriented regime. While EU High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solona visited Tbilisi and Sukhumi in June 2008 stressing EU’s intention to play greater role in settling Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and later a visit by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier putting forward a peace proposal did not help and tensions grew, culminating in the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008. (2)

However, the War has prompted the EU to endorse a more visible security role and upgrade its policies towards the Eastern neighborhood with the launch of the Eastern Partnership. On the other side, Georgia has realized that depending on the United States only may not be sufficient to maintain its territorial integrity and independence and that it needs the EU as well which requires showing of readiness to embrace the process of European integration and improvement of its most criticized state structures.(3)

This was not the first time that tensions had reached uncontrollable levels. After independence the country faced more than a civil war. The breakaway regions attempted to a show of force with Russian support. Turkey then became a member of the UN Observer’s Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) established to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreed between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1993. However, this mission came to an end on June 2009 due to lack of consensus among UN Security Council members on expansion of its mandate. So was the OSCE observers’ mission ending after the 2008 war due to lack of consensus.

At a Turkish-Russian Roundtable organized by the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara just after the War, some Russian participants admitted the shortcomings of the Russian military operation and told that the military had been highly criticized in Russia for their ineffectiveness and that the NATO Summit in Bucharest had increased concerns in Russia that NATO was aiming at diminishing the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, some quarters in Russia found it inevitable to try to undermine a process that it perceived as a threat which resulted in this show of force. Georgia was considered easier to interfere, rather than Ukraine at the time. Had Georgia initiated closer relations with EU rather than NATO, Russia would have been less alarmed.
The War with Russia has resulted in restricting Georgia’s foreign policy options and forcing a return to more pragmatic positions. In a recent article, President Saakashvili stated that Georgia had not changed its mind in respect of NATO aspirations but had started developing relations with all the other countries in the region like Ukraine, Central Asia, Caspian, Turkey, and EU, and had also signed a strategic relations treaty with the United States. While, as some perceive it, Georgia’s misguided attempt to pull the West into confrontation with Russia (or rather to test West’s willingness and commitment to support Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity) Georgia’s credibility as a reliable partner for the West was damaged.

Georgia had filed a claim against Russia at the Hague International Court of Justice immediately after an EU brokered ceasefire, that Russia had violated the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) through interventions in Georgia’s secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and argued that Russia, through its state organs and through its control over the Abkhazian and South Ossetian militia had pursued a two decades long campaign in the two regions which resulted in the death of thousands of Georgians and the displacement of more than 300 thousand ethnic Georgians from their homes. The Court, however, dismissed this argument in its April 1, 2011 ruling, stating that there was evidence of a dispute between the parties with regard to the events during the August 2008 War but refrained from acknowledging the existence of a dispute within the means of the CERD before the August 2008 events. (4)

Since the War EU significantly upgraded its engagement through deployment of a monitoring mission and the launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative in March 2009.

Another signal of EU’s readiness to step up its engagement was to reinforcing the mandate of EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (presently Peter Semneby of Sweden) that provides for a stronger role in the settlement of conflicts, in fact
upgrading the mandate from “assisting” to “contributing” to the resolution of conflicts.

OSCE border monitoring mission at the Russo-Georgian border was closed in 2005. Georgian Government asked the EU to take over the mission. EU chose to send a small team of 3 border support advisers with the task of contributing to strengthening Georgia’s border management system, retaining a low profile in the region in order not to antagonize Russia. The support team gradually increased over time however hesitant in conflict resolution. It increased its engagement only in the first half of 2008 against the background of mounting tension in Abkhazia, as the anticipated negative Russian reaction to the Western backing of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Meanwhile, the parties to the conflict have been meeting in Geneva since the War but apart from mutual accusations, they have not been able to reach an agreement to ease the tensions. The EU mediation during the War resulted in the ceasefire and the start of a process of negotiations with the participation of co-organizers the UN, OSCE and EU with the representatives from Georgia, Georgia’s breakaway regions Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia. However, while the current Geneva process is the sole mechanism that brings parties involved together, the 15th round in the first half of 2011 ended without producing any agreement mainly because of the inability to conclude an agreement on the non-use of force. It must also be remembered that EU’s participation in the Geneva talks is perceived by some as too strong an anti-Russian orientation limiting EU’s contributions in the process.

Turkish proposals to reduce tensions

The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform made public on August 13, 2008 by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Moscow during the height of the War was to ensure the end of animosities in the region and create a basis for regional cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts and was aimed to include Russia and Turkey, as well as all the countries in South Caucasus. This attempt was not the first time that Turkey had sought a regional cooperation scheme to establish the much needed stability and peace. In fact, Turkey had earlier proposed in 2000 the establishment of a “Stability
Pact for the Caucasus” based on the OSCE model of confidence building measures and strengthening regional cooperation. While the countries in question showed a certain interest in the proposals, realization of the objectives was not possible as long as animosity, occupation of territories and outside interference continued.

**Process of Reforms**

While President Saakashvili has been criticized for sidestepping from the process of democratization highlighted with the Rose Revolution which brought him to power, shy steps in democratic reforms are never-the-less continuing after changes made in the Constitution with the advice of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Work on election law and legislation to ensure transparency of the media is progressing. Talks on electoral reform between Georgia’s ruling party (United National Movement) and 8 opposition parties have resumed. Consultations have been launched individually with separate parties. Delays in the democratic reform process, however, have led some opposition parties and groups to intensify their demonstrations in protest recently calling for President Saakashvili to resign without so far receiving widespread support from the public. In response, the Georgian President, on the other hand, has been hinting of Russian meddling in the internal affairs of his country.

**Relations with Turkey**

Turkey with deep-rooted historical and cultural ties in the region has always attached special importance to stability, peace and prosperity of the countries in South Caucasus. Turkey’s close friendly relations and intensive cooperation have resulted in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline and the continuing construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway, and all these projects have naturally increased the strategic importance of Georgia. Triangular type of relations between Turkey, Georgia and US mainly on energy security issues have attracted international attention. EU also began to concentrate its efforts in the region.
Turkey has a free trade agreement with Georgia. The trade volume which was around 240 US Dollars in 2002 exceeded 2 billion US Dollars in 2010. Batumi Airport is utilized to serve jointly the Georgian and Turkish passengers travelling to Batumi in Georgia and Hopa in Turkey, similar to the Geneva Cointrin Airport serving passengers to Switzerland and France. One must remember that during the Soviet times this border was closed and travels could only be realized through Moscow. Since 2007 Turkey has become the first trade partner of Georgia. Many projects are undertaken by Turkish construction companies and Turkey ranks third in foreign investments in Georgia. The Turkish companies have been active in the textile, energy, agriculture and services sectors.

Turkey has supported the territorial integrity of the countries of South Caucasus. Georgia is no exception. As recently as on 26 August 2008, after the War with Russia and after Russia’s recognition of the “independence” of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Turkey was the first country to make a statement supporting the preservation of Georgian territorial integrity. However, while Turkey hopes for a solution to the conflicts within internationally recognized borders, it also believes that a genuine engagement is crucial in bringing these regions closer to Georgia and also searches with the Georgian authorities for a workable maritime route of commercial vessels going to Abkhazia. For the people of Gori whose houses were gravely damaged during the War with Russia, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA) has constructed and handed over settlements already in 2009, a year after the War.

As trade to and through Georgia is constantly increasing, the present border/check points at Sarp and at Türközu/Vale where custom practices do not meet the requirements “single window” practice has been started to facilitate traffic. Moreover, new border crossings at Çil--dir-Aktas/Kartsakhi and Muratlı are being considered. Meanwhile, Turkey and Georgia have agreed to start passport-free travel between the two countries as of 31st of May 2011.

Military and security cooperation between Turkey and Georgia is one of the most important dimension of their relations started with the objective of incorporating
Georgia into NATO. Partly to prepare for this integration Georgian troops served under Turkish command in Kosovo. Restructuring the military apparatus and improving the training facilities were the initial objectives. Georgia’s active participation at Black Sea Defence Ministers’ process and at the BLACKSEAFOR are deemed important by Turkey to ensure cooperation on a regional basis in order to reduce possible misunderstandings and tensions among the countries of the wider region.

One important aspect of Turkey’s relations with Georgia is the fate of the Meshketian (Ahiska) Turks who had been deported from their lands and settled in Central Asia at the end of the Second World War by the Stalin administration. They are Muslim inhabitants of Meshketi known in Turkey as Akhalsikhe/Ahiska Turks. They were deported with a Beria decree declaring them to be “untrustworthy population” and calling for their immediate deportation from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Soviet troops forcibly removed them from their homes, confiscated their belongings, placed them on cattle trucks and wagons destined for Central Asia. Many did not survive the journey and nearly a quarter of one hundred thousand deportees perished. One of the requirements for Georgia’s membership in the Council of Europe was an obligation for their return to their former lands. The Georgian Parliament has enacted in 2007 the necessary law for their return. (5) However, the realization of this obligation seems to have entangled in bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Turkey is committed to carry out a comprehensive development project in the region where Meshkatian Turks will be resettled.

**Georgia’s tensions with Armenians**

Javakheti district in Southern Georgia bordering Armenia with a tendency of autonomy is a concern for Georgia. Ethnic Armenians form a majority of the region. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline passes through this district. So will the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway under construction. Some Armenian groups have proposed in 1998 to hold a referendum on autonomy or secession. Moreover, it is the land where the Meshketian Turks used to live. Another factor in Georgian-Armenian relations is the presence of Russian military base in Armenia. Since relations have soured with Russia after the war in 2008,
Armenia has been seeking transit alternatives to Georgia. Georgia’s recent move to block a transit route for Armenia-bound Russian military supplies has aggravated the situation. Under a 5 year transit agreement signed in March 2006 Russia used a “corridor” via Georgia to ferry supplies to its military base in Northern Armenian town of Gyumri. Since Georgia’s 2008 war with Russia, however, the agreement has existed only on paper. On April 19, 2011, Georgian Parliament voted to annul the deal which was set to expire anyway later in November. The loss of Georgian corridor would seem to create significant logistical challenges in the way Russia resupplies the base. Iran is left as the only country that can possibly handle overland freight traffic to Armenia. Some supplies arrived on Russian planes traversing Azerbaijani air space. It is believed that Baku would not defy Moscow, but one wonders for how long. For the time being, Azerbaijan may find useful Russia’s strategic influence in the Caucasus but officials have repeatedly objected to Russia’s 49 years lease on the military base in Gyumri. In the end Azerbaijan may not tolerate resupply flights.

**Issue of Russian Bases**

The ambiguity in the Russian military bases in Georgia has remained as a contentious issue in Georgian-Russian relations. While earlier Georgia may have needed the Russian military presence for border controls, they have negotiated for the evacuation of the bases for a long time. The four bases, in Vaziani near Tbilisi, Batumi, Akhalkalaki and Gudauta in Abkhazia, Russia was allowed to retain them under a 1995 agreement which was not ratified by the Georgian Parliament. Russia had been trying to turn these bases to Georgian-Russian joint anti-terrorist centres. However, Vaziani was evacuated first with pressures from the OSCE and the evacuation of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases were to end in 2008 had there not been the war. But the real argument is over the Gudaut military base in Abkhazia and Russia now claims that since they had recognized the independence of this region, their presence at the base was upon agreement with the Abkhazian authorities. In order to calm the Russian concerns President Saakashvili has declared that no other foreign bases would be established in Georgia.
(1) & (2) Lili di Puppo, “Between Hesitation and Commitment – The EU and Georgia After the 2008 War”, Silk Road Paper, Nov. 2010


Political Parties and Foreign Policy
2011 General Elections

For the 2011 general elections in Turkey 15 political parties are participating. In this article we will try in a Q&A form to look into the foreign policy declarations of the main political parties, namely Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People’s Party (CHP) and National Action Party (MHP) by referring to the points of convergence and divergence in their approaches.

What are the similarities and divergences in the general aspects of promised Turkish foreign policy?

All political parties agree on the multi directional character of the Turkish foreign policy. They also agree on the principles of peacefulness and fairness in approaching foreign policy issues and for the protection of the security and interests of Turkey. Having been in power in the course of the past 9 years, AKP has felt it appropriate to underline its achievements in the domain of foreign policy, one of the basic principles of which was zero problems with neighbors and taking part actively in crisis management and mediation in many parts of the world on the basis of a “win – win” principle. Against this the CHP has chosen an analytic approach for explaining its foreign policy objectives on the basis of ten principles which it intends to put into practice, among which the famous Atatürk dictum “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” and respect for international law are stressed highly. MHP stresses the necessity of developing a multidirectional and realist national strategy with emphasis on inalienable factors like national culture, integrity of the country and unitary nature of the Turkish State.

What are the approaches about regional issues and Turkey’s policies?

All parties agree in viewing Turkey as a regional and central power. AKP underlines continuity of its interrelations with regional countries by establishing partnerships and forming High Level Joint Strategic Cooperation Councils. (Such Councils have already been established with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Russia and Greece.) AKP again stresses the important contributions it has
made to peace, security and welfare in the Middle East. “AKP has overturned many historic tabus and has led to new friendships and brotherhood in the region.” AKP underlines that Turkey does not have a hidden agenda. While continuing this approach, AKP aims to remove artificial boundaries and barriers between Turkey and other countries in the Middle Eastern geography. In this respect Turkey will continue with the reciprocal removal of visa requirements and establishment of High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils and full economic integration between Turkey and the countries of the region.

In this context, CHP refers to Turkey’s relations with the countries in the Middle East and emphasizes that the main problem is the Palestinian question and promises to make every effort for the solution of this problem and supports two state solution. With respect to current situation in the Middle East, CHP confirms it is against all outside interventions in the area and supports all democratic reforms while establishing durable friendships with all Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.

MHP lays an emphasis on the priority of what it calls the “Turkish World”. It states that one of the fundamental aims of its foreign policy will be to widen and deepen the economic, social, political and cultural relations with Turkish Republics in Cyprus, Caucasus and Central Asia. MHP also considers that the opportunities presented by its central location in the Eurasian geopolitics should be evaluated for ensuring peace and stability and putting them into execution with its “strategic vision”. MHP underlines extensively what should be done for enlarging and deepening Turkey’s relations with these states and with ethnic relatives living out of Turkey.

Turkey is waiting for the past 46 years to join the European Union even though it is a member of all other European organizations. What are the political parties thinking about the current Turkey – EU relations?

AKP sees Turkey’s membership in the EU as a strategic objective. Despite baseless and unjust objections of some EU members for its membership, AKP will continue to take the necessary steps towards full membership. AKP believes that a Europe which rejects Turkey will be a Europe that has fallen behind the 21st
century and to find excuses with political issues such as Cyprus to delay negotiations would serve as a double standard on the part of some members. AKP continues to give the reasons why Turkey should become a member state and should reject such proposals as privileged partnership. With respect to Turkish citizens living in European countries, it refers to the Department of Expatriate Turks and relative communities and stress the aim of meeting their problems. It points out that the AKP rejects the assimilation of citizens living in Europe but encourages integration.

CHP envisages EU membership as a social transformation project. Therefore, it is determined to break the deadlock in the relations and would develop projects for the future of EU. CHP would put an end to anxieties stemming from Turkey falling behind in the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria. CHP is definitely against linking Turkish membership to the Cyprus problem.

MHP believes that the character, the basis and the framework of the Turkey-EU relations should be clarified and should be given a new definition.”Our Party”it says “does not consider the relations with the EU as a question of ‘identity and destiny’.” It defends a view that Turkey is not obliged, condemned or in need of dragging along EU’s orbit at any cost. It claims that the policies of the EU related with Turkey’s national unity and integrity, terror and separatism, as well as for such issues as Cyprus, Greece and Armenia should in no way impact membership negotiations. “The respect that countries within the EU show for our national sensitivities will be the basic criteria that will define our relations with those countries.”

In their election platforms all three parties refer to the Cyprus problem under separate headings and only the CHP has a clear reference to relations with Greece.

On the question of Cyprus, AKP defines its main strategic objective as protection of the interests of the Turkish Cypriot people and the creation of a zone of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. AKP further envisages to increase international recognition and respect for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and will continue its efforts to have TRNC as an internationally recognized fullfledged state.
CHP is of the view that the intercommunal talks should aim at a just solution and should be conducted on an equal footing between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots preserving the rights of the people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey’s presence and its right as a guarantor emanates from its treaty rights. The isolation of the Turkish Cypriots should come to an end and full respect should be accorded to the TRNC. Turkey should support Turkish Cypriot representation in the world and in case a just peace could not be achieved in a reasonable timeframe all efforts should be made for the recognition of TRNC. On the subject of Greece, CHP believes that the relations between Turkey and Greece should be developed by way of a constructive dialogue; the Aegean Sea would be an area uniting the two peoples and for this purpose there should be exchange programs between the people living in the Islands and the shores of the Aegean Sea. The Greek minority in Turkey are equal citizens of the Republic and their rights will be safeguarded. Turks living in Western Thrace would benefit from the stipulations of the Lausanne Treaty and other international treaties.

MHP states that Cyprus is the most important national cause for Turkey. Turkey has inalienable, undebatable legal rights and obligations over Cyprus stemming from founding treaties of Cyprus. Within the framework of the resolution of the Cyprus problem, it will not be accepted under any condition the diluting or undesirable impact on Turkey’s influential and practical guarantees. “Our Party considers that the only realistically applicable and durable solution should be based on the structure of partnership with bi-zonality, bi-nationality in a two state solution.

**What will be the policies towards Iraq?**

While AKP has no specific declaration on Iraq putting it within the framework of neighbors with which High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils have been established, CHP considers that Iraq’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity is vitally important for the region.

CHP also considers that the political order provided for by the Iraqi Constitution should be respected. Turkey would carry on and further develop relations with the Iraqi Government and local administrations as long as they are bound by the precepts of the Constitution and in every
field where the common interests of Turkey and Iraq are concerned.

MHP has a more direct approach, stating that their policy towards Iraq is based on the territorial integrity of Iraq, protection of the Turcoman community in Iraq and no security threat should emanate from the Iraqi territories towards Turkey. Furthermore, it states that in the face of existing threat and terror attacks emanating from Iraqi territories, Turkey will use all its rights under the international law and will take every measure to protect our national security for the liquidation of terror elements based in Iraq.

What are the views of the three parties on Turkey-US relations?

Since AKP has been in government during the past nine years, the Party platform states that the longstanding relations of “strategic partnership” between Turkey and the US have assumed a new dimension as defined by President Obama as “model partnership”. The Turkish-US relations based on mutual interest, respect and trust have gone beyond mutual friendship and is assessed as an opportunity to resolve regional and global problems. AKP will continue to develop the constructive and extensive relations between the two countries and continue to strengthen them within a frame focused on obtaining results. One of the targets of the new period will be to strengthen the economic ties and volume of trade with the US. It further states that Turkey will continue to work with the US in a perspective of partnership on such subjects as energy, security, fight against terror, climate change and science and technology.

CHP promises a new approach based on equality and mutual respect to overcome the difficulties encountered in the relations in the last decade. CHP also would like to have a new and balanced partnership, not confined to strategic and military relations but open to economic and cultural fields. CHP also promises to put into practice confidence building measures at the community level by increasing contacts between the businessmen, students, local administrators and the like to curb the anti-American sentiments.

On the other hand MHP has a brief reference to Turkey-US relations and says that relations with US shall be
conducted on the basis of mutual interest, equality and reciprocity in the fields of economy, politics and security.

What about the parties views on another major power, the Russian Federation?

AKP refers to relations with Russian Federation under the chapter devoted to Russia and the Caucasus. CHP platform has a separate chapter, while MHP refers to Russia as part of a wider region. AKP attaches special importance to the development of political and trade relations with Russia. Particularly cooperation in the field of energy, activities of Turkish contractors and the lifting of visa requirements have created a new ground for cooperation also in areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia.

CHP promises to support relations in the economic and cultural fields. It also considers that it would be important for the two countries, members of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation to balance their trade and ultimately to contribute to regional peace. Relations in the energy field would be balanced by diversifying Turkey’s resources. Everything will be done to facilitate tourism for the peoples in both countries. CHP also promises to further develop friendship and cooperation between the two countries to by way of programmes on joint educational and technological programmes.

MHP states that it will follow multifaceted policies aimed at peace, stability and regional cooperation as well as development of common economic projects with the countries of Black Sea and Caspian, chiefly with Russia and Iran, as well as Balkan and Middle East countries.

Similarly, for the region of the Balkans while AKP and CHP have separate paragraphs, MHP treats Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East as a triangle for the development of cooperation and stability and promises not to take part in any global project that might destabilize these regions and bring blood and tears.

AKP considers Balkans, where Turkey has strong historic and cultural ties, as one of the areas where our global perspectives can be implemented. “The establishment of peace and stability and the prevention of religious and political tensions in the Balkans is part of the priorities of our global policy. Without establishing peace
and stability in the Balkans and the Middle East it is not possible to talk about global peace and order. For this reason to contribute to the stability, social cohesion in the Balkans, this region has been the first priority of the AKP Governments and these policies will be pursued in the future to further strengthen our relations. “AKP platform also outlines Turkey’s interest and efforts for rehabilitation of Bosnia after the war and promises to continue efforts in the fields of economy, culture and education. “With Croatia and Serbia, our recent effective policy has yielded result. Mutual visits, volume of trade and fields of cooperation have grown. Efforts to secure the recognition of the independence of Kosovo have yielded positive results and we will continue to provide every support to this country in its process to become a state. Similarly our relations with Macedonia and Albania have gained significant momentum and created the possibility of developing new areas of cooperation. In the second decade of this century our contacts with these countries will further develop. We will continue to develop and strengthen also in the future our relations with people of Turkish origin and akin people living in the Balkans. We will contribute to make peace, cohesion and stability in the Balkans both by activating public means and if necessary encouraging both private sector and NGOs.

CHP considers that it is important to safeguard the political framework emerging after the breakdown of Yugoslavia. It will try to further develop relations with the Balkan countries with a view to preserving mutual interest and regional stability.

Policies for the Turks and relative communities living abroad

In many parts of the world particularly around our region there are many people of Turkish origin and people related to Turks because present day Turkey is a microcosm of the multinational Ottoman Empire. A Department under the Prime Ministry has been established to attend the issues concerning with Turks abroad and Related Communities. In its programme AKP states that through this Department they intend to find solutions to their problems starting from those in Europe. AKP also states that during the period they have been in power they have provided the Turcomen of Northern Iraq, Krimean Tatars, Turks of Ahiska, Gagauz Turks, Afghan-Uzbek Turks,
Turks in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Karakalpakia, Kazakhs of Mongolia, Turks in Kosovo and Macedonia, Turks of Western Thrace and Bulgaria with assistance for their development and preservation of their historical and cultural heritages.

CHP says it is determined to protect the people of Turkish origin in the Balkans and other regions of the world as citizens having equal rights and benefitting from human rights and freedoms and security in the countries where they live.

MHP promises to ensure that Turkish citizens abroad will enjoy all freedoms and benefits in the countries where they live without being subject of discrimination.

**Realtions with the countries of South Caucasus**

AKP considers peace and stability in the Caucasus a strategic priority for Turkey. Developing of relations with the countries in this region and continuation of their normalization process is the basic objective. In this vein the Caucasus Cooperation Platform was proposed to enhance a mode of relationships based on mutual trust and cooperation. Importance of special relationship with Azerbaijan will be maintained. An early and just resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh problem has a special priority. AKP envisages to continue to do its utmost to end the occupation of the Azeri territories and to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabagh problem through negotiations. Normalization process of Turkey’s relations with Armenia could not be achieved the desired result because of the negative attitude of Armenia. The Turkish positions on a solution for Nagorno-Karabagh and on the so-called genocide are very clear. AKP will not permit imposition of solutions not based on justice and equity. Another important country in the Caucasus is Georgia with which we maintain close relations within the regional framework.

CHP promises to contribute actively for peace, stability and development of the region. Brotherly ties with Azerbaijan will be further strengthened. With respect to South Caucasus, CHP would further strengthen relations with Azerbaijan and look for good neighborly relations with Armenia by instituting a dialogue to bring to a solution to problems between Turkey and Armenia. Also contacts between NGO’s, business people and students would be
encouraged and insists that Armenia should give up its insistence of using “genocide” as a condition for improving its relations with Turkey and also evacuate the occupied Azerbaijani territories. CHP would take all measures so that the Armenian citizens of Turkey would not be affected as a result of the problems between Turkey and Armenia. CHP would support contacts between the NGOs, businessmen and students with a view to start a process of detente between Turkey and Armenia and with the Armenian diaspora, similar to the one realized between Turkey and Greece. Armenia should evacuate the occupied Azeri territories, should relinquish initiatives it carries through Armenian organizations in the world against Turkey on the so called genocide allegations in contradiction with international law and should end all kinds of attitudes giving the impression that it has ambitions on Turkish territorial integrity. In case Armenia takes steps to prove that it has undergone a change of mentality, support will be given that this would not go unanswered. However, if Turkey is increminated by unjust prejudices, CHP would continue to counter these allegations with every determined position.

MHP refers to relations with the countries in the Caucasus within the context of the relations with the Turkic World.

**Relations with Central Asia**

AKP will continue to develop relations with countries in Central Asia and akin people and will try to create new areas of cooperation. To ensure economic development while preserving political stability of the Turkic Republics as one of its strategic priorities. Within this framework Turkey will continue to reciprocally lift visa obligations with these Republics to increase political dialogue, promote commerce and support civil society activities. AKP elaborates on the previous activities of Turkey in the field of culture. The establishment of Turkic World Council is an important step and expresses Turkey’s links with the wide Turkic geography. Establishment of High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils which was established with Kirgizistan will also be considered with the other Central Asian Republics.

CHP promises to develop political, economic and cultural relations with the Central Asian countries.
MHP states that it is their objective to develop relations with Turkic countries on the basis of sovereign equality, common interests and mutual benefits in every field and to give them a strategic depth. MHP also promises to set up an Energy Council for Turkic Republics alongside a science and technology database for Turkic Republics. MHP expresses its desire to establish a Ministry in charge of coordination of cooperation policies within Turkic World and Eurasia.

**Southeast Asia, emerging countries and Africa, Eastern Mediterranean and Latin America**

The Party programmes have given different emphasis to different parts of Asia. The AKP programme states that Turkey which has signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN, hopes to become a Dialogue Partner and hopes to further its relations with the countries in the region in every possible field. Special emphasis is given to relations with China, Japan and India. Turkey is deeply concerned with the stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Turkey hopes to be a bridge between these two friendly and brotherly countries. Relations with Latin America and in particular with Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela will be enhanced and enlarged also in the political field. In Africa where Turkey has established new Embassies, where our historic bonds are an important asset, Turkey will deepen its relations also in the fields of politics, diplomacy, trade and culture. Turkey will work to increase the role of Turkish businessmen in the African markets as an important step in its opening to Africa.

CHP promises to develop political and economic relations with China, Japan, India and Southeast Asian countries. There will be a diversification of relations through the addition of joint ventures in R&D fields and student exchange programmes. CHP also intends to further relations with the African countries and contribute to their welfare and democratic development. To develop trade would be an important instrument. Also cooperation projects in economy, culture and tourism will be enhanced. CHP attaches special importance to peace and security in Eastern Mediterranean and would counter any unilateral initiatives that would upset the prevailing order in the region.
MHP states that it attaches special importance to development of economic relations and to the creation of an atmosphere of dynamic economic cooperation with the countries of Africa, Far East and Southeast Asia.

(Summarized by the research staff of the Foreign Policy Institute)