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Year-End Notes For 2007

As this volumes covers the entire year we have chosen to summarize Turkey's foreign policy status at the end of the year in respect to major areas that has occupied Turkey during the current year. These areas principally are the Middle East, European Union and relations with such major powers as the United States, Russia and China.

Turkey-EU: 2007

The year 2007 did not begin auspiciously for Turkey-EU relations. Only a few days before the year began EU suspended negotiations on 8 chapters as punishment for Turkey's refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek-Cypriot vessels as part of the extension of the Customs Union to ten new members of the EU. It did not accept the Turkish argument that Turkey would do so when the EU as it promised to do so earlier, lifted the isolation imposed on Northern Cyprus. The EU's decision for such a partial suspension of negotiations was surprising because of several reasons:

First of all, the Negotiations Framework adopted by EU Council provided that negotiations could be suspended only if there was a gross violation of human rights in Turkey. The suspension of negotiations on 8 chapters out of thirty-five, is one of them as it contradicted what was agreed before. The rejection of the Turkish proposal to open its ports in return to the lifting of the isolation imposed on Northern Cyprus had no legitimate basis, except pursuing Greek Cypriot objective forcing Turkey to recognize the Greek Government in Cyprus as the Government of Cyprus since that government did not exercise sovereignty all over the island and rejected to unite with the North-

ern part of Cyprus as part of a plan approved by UN and worked out together with EU. While Greek Cypriots have been rejecting to normalize their relations with their northern neighbours, EU is paradoxically asking Turkey to normalize its relations with Cypriot Greeks. EU also sees the resolution of the Cyprus question between the two communities on an equal footing as set by UN, but the solution has been jeopardized by EU's favoring of one Community to the disadvantage of the other. As a new development one may indicate a change of attitude in the Security Council. The Secretary General of UN in his report on Cyprus dated December 3rd, which was welcomed by the Security Council, declared "*...the objective should be to engender greater economic and social parity between the sides by further promoting the development of the Turkish Cypriot Community, so that reunification of the island may occur in as seamless a manner as possible. The maintenance of economic, social, cultural, sporting or similar ties or contacts does not amount to recognition. On the contrary, it will benefit all Cypriots by building trust, creating a more even playing field and thus greatly contributing to the unification of the island. It is therefore important for all actors concerned to reframe the debate and their actions with a view to achieving this crucial objective...*" If guided by this new development EU can open up Northern Cyprus to all kinds of contacts than it should be possible for Turkey to fulfill its promise to open its ports to Greek vessels carrying goods from Cyprus. This would end a sour stage in the negotiations.

Ever since EU decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004, words and arguments prevalent in several European countries' public opinions against Turkey's eventual membership became a significant factor in the negative votes on the referenda on Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. The Turkish issue was the subject of the quixotic quest of the new French President Mr. Sarkozy, and Mrs. Merkel maintained her party's "special membership" call for Turkey while at the same time stating that she would stick in case of Turkey to the dictum of *pacta sunt servanda*. So far the Commis-

sion has stuck to its position with respect to Turkey's accession process. Nevertheless, its progress reports, mostly justified on the need for greater and faster institutional, legislative and human rights reforms, contain a number of political requirements reflecting the special interests of some EU members that could hardly be fulfilled by Turkey. Among these one can mention special demands of the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey that far surpass the size of their flock in Turkey. The reciprocal media campaigns both in several EU countries and in Turkey greatly hurt mutual feelings regarding Turkey's accession process. The bold move by the French to resist the opening of five more chapters that, if concluded satisfactorily would pave the way for Turkey's accession and their insistence to remove any reference to Turkey's eventual membership in EU documents are the results of these campaigns. As a reaction to these unwelcome noises the support for joining EU in the Turkish public opinion has fallen down from 63% in 2005 to 49 % in 2007. The corresponding percentages in EU countries are much lower. In 2007 the legislative harmonization efforts in Turkey seem to have slowed down may be because of elections in the country; yet, the Government insists that these reforms will continue in an accelerated manner. The fulfillment of this promise will not only bring Turkey closer to EU standards but it should be a necessary outcome of the changing face of Turkey from an agricultural country into a highly developed modern, secular democracy. The desire for these harmonization with European standards are supported by a very large majority of the Turkish people.

No timeframe have been defined in Turkey's accession process and the speed of the accession process in terms of chapters being negotiated. More than two years have elapsed since the beginning of accession negotiations, only one chapter has been opened and closed and three of them were opened in 2006 and two more in December 2007. If the rest of the negotiation process continues in a similar pace the negotiations for the rest of 28 chapters may take another 14-16 years more provided that

these do not face *a la carte* vetoes. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether EU will include provisions for Turkey's accession budget for 2013-2020 period. EU's absorption capacity is another undefined handicap put before Turkey's accession.

All these foreseen and undefined difficulties brings an almost Odysseic feature to Turkey's road to EU.

Societies in Europe are not static and every aspect of social, political, economic life in modern societies is subject to dynamic transformation because of national and international conditions, fashions and scientific and technological progress in the world. This transformation may be slow or rapid depending on the country's need and opportunities available. These changes may happen more slowly in developed conservative countries with low population growths. But, this should be very rapid in a developing country like Turkey and it is happening that way.

All EU countries and Turkey have a strong conviction that under every circumstance Turkey and Europe must be firmly bound to each other. Even the opponents of Turkey's eventual membership agree on this geographic, economic, strategic, social and political necessity. In view of this necessity why should we make things difficult and tie fulfillment of the necessity to the completion of the negotiations? One way that might be suggested is to use and enlarge the institutions created by the Association agreement. A natural corollary of such an approach would be to provide seats for Turkish representatives in EU committees and institutions either as full members or as observers so that the changes in EU *acquis* could be reflected in Turkey and Turkey-EU relations in a continuous process of approximation. So that EU and Turkey may continue the accession negotiations, while at the same time they may remain bound together in a comprehensive way, as it has been the case since the end of World War II in the field of security.

Conclusion:

Progress in Turkey-EU relations has not been conspicuous in terms of public opinion attitudes and political level, while the human contacts, trade, investments and social cultural issues have shown remarkable development in Turkey-EU relations. We have to find ways and means in 2008 to reflect this real progress in our accession process as well.

Seyfi Taşhan

Turkey and the Major Powers in 2007

2007 has been a year when the major powers had the occasion of assessing once again the power and the potential of Turkey. Turkey is a secular country, trying to develop its economy at a rapid pace and looking forward to having good relations all around. Turkey strictly adheres to the principles of the United Nations; sanctity of the treaties, territorial integrity of countries, etc.. There are certain questions of importance for Turkey. One of them is the terrorist organization located in the North of Iraq which caused so much suffering to the Turkish people. The other is the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish public is expecting that these two problems be resolved according to the principles of the United Nations.

Turkish-American relations.

Turkey-US relations faced difficulties in 2007. But, the positions taken by Turkey on every instance has shown that Turkey's attitude was always related to principles and was not opportunistic. That facilitated the solution of the problems.

The main point of discord was related to the danger posed to Turkey by terrorist attacks coming from the North of Iraq. Turkey's position on Iraq being well known since 2003 and the efforts deployed by Turkish diplomacy in Iraq and among the neighbors of Iraq with a view to securing a stable Iraq being appreciated by all concerned, it was only natural that the meeting of the Turkish Prime Minister with the US President would produce the result awaited so eagerly by the Turkish public, That the US President would consider the PKK terrorist organization also as a threat against the US was certainly something to be expected from a longtime ally. It was good that the last months of 2007 would help create a much better atmosphere in the relationship of the two countries. If we turn our eyes to the past and consider the several mishaps that came to afflict relations between Turkey and the United States, we can not escape the impression that it was rather the extraneous factors, like the Armenians or the Greeks living in several districts of the US that played the major part. The Armenian question came to the fore again in 2007 with the support they found in the Congress. It could not go very far, however, when the Congress had also to take the US national interest into account. There is no denial that the world is changing. But, we all are in need of mutual trust and respect for the interests of the other. Those basic elements are all the more important in today's world when terror became the primary threat we have to deal with.

Turkish-Russian relations

Following the end of the Cold War, Turkish-Russian relations were freed from their bloc-to-bloc character and the two countries entered into a neighbor-to-neighbor relationship. We can say that 2007 on the whole was a good year as far as this relationship is concerned. Of course, the international conjuncture has a bearing on relations. All the same, neighbors should always be careful to exclude as much as possible the external influences. This is very true for Turkey and Russia, since in their neighborhood are located many countries which gained inde-

pendence following the demise of the Soviet Union. Turkey has close relations with many of them. Such relations should not harm anyone.

Therefore, relations took their natural course. Trade developed greatly. Turkish businessmen were involved in major projects in Russia. Russian tourists came in big numbers to the resorts in Turkey.

Energy, a priority topic in today's World was of course at the background of relations. The Russian Federation is the big oil and gas supplier. Turkey is a major oil and gas consumer. The oil comes from Azerbaijan through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The natural gas comes from Russia through land since 1986 and through Black Sea underwater pipeline since 2005. Turkey also receives natural gas from Azerbaijan since 2007 through another pipeline. This makes Turkey a transit hub. Turkish requirements are growing every passing day. Also the European Union is now engaged in a new energy policy and would like to diversify its resources. Turkey would like to do the same. Hopefully, this should not be a problem between Turkey and Russia.

The other question at the background as far as the Turkish public is concerned is the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. In 2004 when the Turkish Cypriots in a referendum voted for the Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriots voted against, the UN Secretary General submitted a Report to the Security Council and asked that the unnecessary restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots be lifted. This Report was never discussed at the Security Council because of the objection of Russian Federation.

Turkish-Chinese relations

Being the inheritors of the two peoples on the historical Silk Road, Turkey and China appreciate each other's endeavors to develop their economies. They also desire to develop trade and investment. 2007 has been a year when this desire has given some concrete results. The Turkish Businessmen's and Indu-

ustrialists' Association (TÜSİAD) opened a representation in Beijing. The Mayor of İzmir and the President of the Aegean Free Zone attended the International CEO Roundtable of Chinese and Foreign Multinational Corporations in Beijing. On the Chinese side, there is the decision to give life to the historical Silk Road. As is known, this trade route was connecting China to Turkey. China has embarked since 1980 on a major economic effort and the results it obtained made it a great economic power. Today, we see China getting involved in all parts of the World for economic purposes. The thinking behind this drive has recently been given by the Chinese in their semi-official paper in the following terms. There are four growing economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS according to Goldman Sachs definition of 2003). Recently five other emerging economies have been added: Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina (VISTA). Once steered onto the economic fast track, these countries will cause changes to the world economic map. This conception shows that China is looking to Turkey in this new light.

The two countries looking forward to their future economic partnership, continuously exchange visits of their political and military officials. 2007 has been a busy year on this score as well.

Reşat Arım

Turkey's Middle Eastern Neighborhood

Turkey has great interest in the establishment of peace and stability in its Southern neighborhood. However, 2007 has not witnessed much change in the general outlook of the region. Instability in the region is a big concern for the many nations around the world meaning disruption of essential oil flow. For Turkey it is more than that.

The US intervention in Iraq has disrupted the presence of a certain balance of power in the region and encouraged ethnic and sectarian rivalry and infighting among the many groups to take advantage for domination. The prolonged uncertainty of the future of Iraq has never the less created a major security threat for Turkey. The rise of fundamentalist tendencies, the conflict between the Sunni and Shiite, the increasing aggressiveness of the Kurds in Iraq at times reaching irredentist levels and also the harboring of the PKK terrorists in Northern Iraq and their over the border incursions have all constituted serious security challenges. The fate of Turkmen in Iraq is also another consideration as they constitute a significant part of the population.

While there is a certain progress made in handing over responsibility and achieving coordination among the Shiites and Sunnis, the chaos in Iraq remains to be a serious problem and the intransigence of the Kurds continue. The fate of Kerkuk remained on the agenda until very recently when the Kurds agreed for the postponement of a referendum intended to decide whether it will be part of the autonomous Kurdish region or play a crucial role in amalgamating the differing groups around Iraq's territorial integrity. As envisaged in the interim Constitution the referendum would have been held after holding a census and normalization of the situation there. Normalization was not possibly achieved due to Kurdish agitation and transfer of population to influence the outcome of the census. To avoid a *fait a complis* on the fate of Kirkuk, Turkey believes that as a multi ethnic city possessing also enormous oil reserves, a special status should be accorded to that city since this will also serve as a positive factor in holding the territorial integrity of Iraq and enabling the whole population to benefit from the oil revenues. Moreover, Kirkuk has historically been populated mostly by the Turkmen who had been reduced in size with the systematic deportations during the Saddam years.

Turkey has from the very start of the US intervention advocated search for a solution to the fate of Iraq at a regional level. It has

been instrumental in the establishment of Iraq's Neighbors Forum which has finally been recognized as a positive initiative also by the US. The Forum meeting in Istanbul this year was indicative of the need to search for regional solutions.

However, the immediate threat for Turkey from this unstable Iraq was the increasing over the border incursions of the PKK terrorist elements now harboring in Northern Iraq and receiving not only a welcoming hand and protection but support from some Kurdish tribal elements there who have remained distant to Turkish sensitivities. The Turkish public opinion, government and the military, on the other hand, were much irritated by the loss of lives at the hands of these terrorists.

Patience were running out and Turkey tried hard to seek the cooperation of the Iraqi Government in fighting these terrorist groups, in ending the hospitality they had received, in preventing the PKK utilization of the Iraqi territory as a base against Turkey and in handing over the leadership residing in Northern Iraq for trial. In fact, an agreement was signed which did not prove to be effective so far. As no progress could be achieved in these attempts, Turkey sought the assistance of the US as the occupying power in Iraq when Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Washington on November 5th. The declaration by US President Bush that the US considered PKK terrorists as common enemy and that they would cooperate in providing necessary intelligence to fight these groups was a turning point in the soured relations between the two allies since the Turkish Parliament's decision to permit US troops utilizing Turkish territory to invade Iraq fell short of the required majority. Lately, Turkey, in self defense, has made several precision air raids to the PKK camps in Northern Iraq to eliminate the operational capabilities of the PKK, making sure that the civilians in the vicinity were not harmed and no other resident of Northern Iraq was targeted.

Since the balance of power in the region tilted towards Iran as the result of the US presence in Iraq, the nuclear ambitions of

Iran has also been a concern for Turkey. The claims by Iran that its main focus is the strengthening of its defense should not be overlooked. However, its other neighbors around are restless as well and while it may seem paradoxical they are becoming more and more dependant on US presence in the region. In the face of the Iranian nuclear ambitions, Turkey has adopted a very cautious approach advocating a diplomatic solution to this problem: suspension of enrichment activities and full compliance with the strict IAEA inspection rules. Despite its military power and capabilities and its NATO membership presumably protecting it from foreign aggressions, Turkey may be compelled to consider also to strengthen its defenses even in the absence of territorial issues between the two neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Turkey's increasing energy needs compel it to seek cooperation with Iran which is rich in oil and natural gas reserves. Therefore, Turkey has made several agreements with Iran in the exploitation and purchase of gas to diversify its needs. This has met US criticism. But since that agreement would not materialize soon it is hoped that the situation in the region will improve by then and this will also receive the understanding of its ally US. In the mean time, the US representatives have already had contacts with the Iranians in Baghdad this year although strictly related with their involvement in certain activities there and limitation of their influence on radical Shiites. However, this may augur new developments in connection with the US-Iranian relations which may gradually alleviate the pressure on Turkey in the long run.

As for the Palestinian issue, Turkey is aware of its limitations. However, since it is a problem underlying the many factors of instability in the region, Turkey tries hard to be a facilitator in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since it is one of the rare countries in the region having close diplomatic relations with both parties. Turkey, through its Union of Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges, is involved in the establishment of an industrial zone initially envisaged for Rafah in Gaza but later moved to the West Bank. For the signing of the

agreement for this initiative the President of Israel Shimon Peres and President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas were in Turkey just before the November 27 International Middle East Conference in Annapolis. The two Presidents' addressing the Turkish Parliament was a rare and important event considering the distancing of many countries in the region for any similar initiative. It is hoped that a non-illusionary peace could be achieved if the parties stick to their commitments and negotiate in good faith.

Turkey has troops within the UNIFIL II in Lebanon to assist through the UN in the stabilization of the situation there. Turkey's relations with another of its Southern neighbors, Syria, is improving drastically. President Bashar Asad's visit for a second time to Turkey and signing of cooperation agreements is indicative of this. Turkey had been instrumental in Syria's participation at the Annapolis Conference.

Whether you call Turkey the only European country neighboring the Middle East or at least the only accession negotiating country bordering the region, the forthcoming year will keep Turkey busy following developments in this restless corner of the world. Geography cannot be changed and Turkey will be affected with developments there. However, as a facilitator or through other means it can affect developments where it has historical and cultural ties.

Oktaay Aksoy

The Evolution of the International System

Reşat Arım

Introduction

When we consider the major trends in the international system since the September 11 attacks, we cannot escape the impression that the international conjuncture which started to be formed at that point in time is slowly coming to fruition. Its basic components are the United States and Europe. US-European relations which suffered at the beginning of the Iraq crisis later on improved and have taken a new dimension within the NATO-EU cooperation. Of the other two big powers the Russian Federation is recovering its lost stature mainly with the support of its oil and gas resources, China has been on the rise. The focus of world attention is on the Middle East. There Iraq is the main issue. Together with it goes the Palestinian-Israeli problem. These problems and their ramifications, be it religion, ethnicity, oil or struggle for power stretch as far as Afghanistan.

There is nothing in this picture that resembles a Bi-polar or Multi-polar World. It is a Uni-polar World: the United States is the dominant power.¹ Still it needs Europe. Europe in the last fifty years has come a long way. But it has to make another leap

¹ Vladimir Poutine dénonce une “vision unipolaire” du monde. LE Monde, 11.2.2007

forward to face the challenges of the World together with the US and be a global power. One of the challenges is coming from within Europe. The Western Balkans can be seen to contain a ticking bomb: Kosovo. The other force they have to come to terms is in a distant place but is fast approaching: China. In this paper these two issues will be handled to see to what extent they may influence the development of the international system. Between these two regions lies a vast area from which the world energy needs are supplied. So, energy will be third issue of major concern to the international system.

The Balkans

The European Union has always felt a responsibility for Western Balkans. The end of the Cold War created a new constellation of forces which affected the European Union and the Western Balkans. The reunification of Germany, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union were major developments of this period. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia is, if not a direct, at least the indirect result of the end of the Cold War. When Slovenia and Croatia were recognized by Germany, the chain of events started to unfold. The independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought about an atrocious war that lasted many years. European Union or individual European countries could not cope with the situation. United Nations and OSCE could not either. It was thanks to the US action that the Bosnians could be saved from extermination. The next tragedy was going to be in Kosovo. Despite all efforts to prevent it the war came to Kosovo. Milosevic government attacked the Kosovars, again causing a human tragedy. Again, Europe could not do anything about it and the US had to take action within NATO context.

In the meantime, EU's Foreign and Security Policy was developing. 1998 Saint-Malo was realized following the crises in the Balkans. In 1999 Petersburg tasks were designed for the same purpose. Kosovo crisis was a turning point.

EU took a fundamental decision in 1999 to give the Western Balkan countries the prospect of integration into EU. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was the first step. Then in 2000 the Feira European Council stated that all the countries covered by SAP are potential candidates for EU membership. The Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit in June 2003 had confirmed the EU's support for European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. In June 2005 the European Council reaffirmed this position.

The European Commission in its communication of 27.01.2006 said that three years after that Thessaloniki Summit, the Western Balkans region has further stabilized and advanced towards the European Union. ² The European perspective provided a powerful incentive for political and economic reform and encouraged reconciliation among the peoples of the region. It was in the interest of the EU as a whole, as well as the countries concerned, that this process should be stepped up.

The Austrian Presidency held a substantive discussion on the Western Balkans during the informal meeting of foreign ministers on 10-11 March 2006 in Salzburg. They adopted the EU-Western Balkans Joint Statement where they said preserving peace, and enhancing stability and security in the Western Balkans remained a common European interest.

With Croatia, accession negotiations began on 30 October 2005. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia obtained the status of candidate country in December 2005. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are potential candidate countries.

Kosovo

Kosovo is administered according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Final status talks on Kosovo have started in

² Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 27.01.2006.

2006. Kosovo is probably going to affect the future developments in the Western Balkans. Therefore, it may be useful to take a closer look at it.

UN interim international administration (UNMIK) was created by UN Res 1244 in 1999. The UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy, Kai Eide, to undertake a comprehensive overview of the situation in Kosovo. On the basis of his report, the Secretary General recommended that the process of settling Kosovo's status should commence. Soren Jessen-Petersen, the head of UNMIK, said that the status quo was not sustainable.³ The Security Council in October 2005 authorized the Secretary General to appoint former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to start a political process to determine Kosovo's future status. Martti Ahtisaari started its mission on 20 February 2006. The key issue is the creation of a Kosovo that will have the greatest chance of lasting stability and development.

Since it was unlikely that any Serbian government would acquiesce to an independent Kosovo, many people thought that Mr. Ahtisaari should impose an independence package for Kosovo. The International Crisis Group in this report of 17 February 2006 made recommendations to all the parties concerned.⁴ Kosovo since 1999 was a UN protectorate under UNMIK. Since 2002 UNMIK has been following a policy of "standards before status" to defer pressures within Kosovo for independence. In March 2004 tensions exploded in Kosovo with Albanian riots targeting the Serb population and UNMIK. From the historical point of view, Serbs argue their historical right to Kosovo, Albanians claim they are the descendants of the Illyrians, whose presence pre-dated the Serbs' arrival in the Balkans by several centuries.

³ Sorren, Jessen-Petersen, For Kosovo only one way forward, IHT, Oct 23, 2005.

⁴ Kosovo. The Challenge of Transition, The International Crisis Report, 17 February 2006.

The EU is determined to play an active role in Kosovo's status process. It has appointed a representative to support the UN Status Envoy. EU will use its influence to help reach a balanced and sustainable settlement. It will also play its part in the international presence that will be required.

The negotiations continued for some time. At the beginning the issues addressed were the building blocks of the future such as: What municipal arrangements will exist to give minorities in Kosovo protection? What protection will exist for churches? What economic framework will a Kosovar entity deal with? The nature of the final status was supposed to be addressed later in 2006 and it seemed that the international community was determined to settle this matter soon. The intention is to get agreement on whatever the outcome to have a stable, functioning society with appropriate protections of minorities and a structure of acceptance inside the international community for a future security force, a future civilian presence.⁵

The first high level meeting was held in Vienna on 24 July 2006. The President and the Prime Minister of Serbia and the President and the Prime Minister of Kosovo headed the two delegations. Before and after this meeting also direct talks took place between the parties on the decentralization of governmental and administrative function of Kosovo.

The UN Secretary General reported to the Security Council on 1 September 2006 that the positions of Serbian and Kosovo delegations remain committed to "substantial autonomy" and "full independence" respectively, with minimal space for negotiation. He said that they should show flexibility.⁶ Thereupon, the Security Council held a meeting on 22 September 2006 on Kosovo. There was a call from interested states for Ahtisaari to

⁵ Interview of VOA with Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, US Special Representative for Kosovo Status Talks, June 23, 2006.

⁶ UN News Service.

prepare a comprehensive proposal for a settlement and for all possible efforts to be made to achieve a negotiated settlement in 2006. The Contact Group (US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Russia) met Ahtisaari.

However, the proposal of Mr. Ahtisaari was postponed to 2007 and it came on 2 February 2007. The proposal does not contain any reference to Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo; also it does not mention "independence" for Kosovo. It creates an international envoy mandated by UN and EU with power to intervene in government. This gives the impression that the formation of a *sui generis* state is being contemplated. Kosovo will have the right to use national symbols including flag and anthem: It will be able to join international organizations such as UN and IMF. NATO and EU forces in military and policing roles will be kept. The non-Albanian minority will be protected. Kosovo will not be able to join Albania; the Serb areas will not split off and join Serbia.

Kosovo is a test case for the European Union. The struggle between the West and Russia will determine the solution on Kosovo. On 2 February, when the Kosovo status proposals were presented to the two parties in Belgrade and Pristina, the German Presidency of the EU urged the two parties to approach the upcoming negotiations in a serious manner and without reservations. There was a need for a realistic compromise. The US State Department, on its part, said the Proposal was fair and balanced and called on the two parties to engage constructively with the Special Envoy in a period of consultations to finalize the settlement. The Russian side said there should not be a time limit for negotiations; already the Russians had said, before the Proposals were submitted, that if independence is required for Kosovo the same would be applied to other conflicts in the Caucasus.

Ahtisaari Plan was tabled by US before the Security Council. Russia not only rejected the resolution calling for UN endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan, but has warned it might exercise its

veto if there is a vote. Russia was circulating its own counter proposal for Kosovo that would keep it within the “General Sovereignty” claimed by Belgrade and put off the question of Kosovo’s final status.

A troika of Ambassadors from Russia, America and the EU is holding talks with Kosovo and Serbia which is due to end on Dec. 10. After that date Kosovo want to declare independence. The Kosovars fear that, once the UN mission is replaced by an EU one, the Big Powers might pressure them to accept that, even if Kosova begins acting as an independent state, Serbia should retain sovereignty as least for a few years.⁷

The final chance before December 10 dead line to reconcile Kosovo Albanian’s desire for full independence and Serbia’s insistence that it remains part of Serbia were the negotiations in Brussels involving a troika. The EU’s envoy, the German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, backed by Washington, was offering a “status- neutral” pact, in which Belgrade and Pristina agree on practical measures such as trade ties without addressing independence. Serbia presented a new formula, a high degree of autonomy under Serbian sovereignty like Finland’s Aland islands.

Europeans are divided. Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain and Greece are dissenters. The big EU governments appear resigned to prompt recognition of independence.⁸

China

China is a major candidate to influence the evolution of the international system. Historically, that was also the case. In the 18th century, the Chinese considered themselves to be the center of the World. Their decline in the 19th century witnessed the Opium War and the colonization of parts of China. In the 20th

⁷ The Economist, Oct 20-26 2007, Kosovo’s future

⁸ New Bid to resolve Kosova status, Guardian, Nov 20, 2007

century from 1949 to 1979, the People's Republic of China had many ups and downs. The opening of China to the outside World under Deng Xiaoping has started to transform China to a Great Power status; Hence, its role in the making of the World Order.

When a new conjuncture started to take shape following the September 11 attacks, the triangle of US-Russia-China was there. However, it was not sure which way it would go. China was supporting US on the fight against terrorism. But many commentators were saying that in the long run US struggle against terrorism might threaten Chinese interests, leading to a tightening of the chain of containment around China⁹. On the other hand, Chinese- Russian relations were developing in a satisfactory manner, but September 11 prompted the question of whether this cooperation would be put aside for a while, or was this cooperation really so important as to forsake the benefit that may accrue from the military action in Afghanistan.

The six years that elapsed since September 11 gives us some idea about where things stand. The US continues to be the main factor in Chinese Foreign Policy¹⁰. Some scholars suggest that the country's strategy over the next 30-50 years could involve "band-wagoning."¹¹ It is also said that one should not think of China's rise mainly in military terms, that China is challenging the international system: to replace the status quo with the "tian xia" -under the heavens, the places all the nations of the

⁹ Harry Harding, IHT, October 18, 2001

¹⁰ Chinese Strategies in US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging, Rosemary Food, International Affairs, Chatham House, Vol. 82, No. 1, Jan. 2006

¹¹ Ibid

world in a rules-based system, negating global hegemony¹². The European Union is very much aware of the rising China ¹³.

In May 2006, as a Turkish Foreign Policy Institute delegation, we made a trip to China as guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. During our discussions with our counterpart Institute, the Chinese officials and the Professors at the China Foreign Affairs University as well as the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, we have taken up questions related to the international system. We have observed that the idea of multi-polar system was no more the focus of attention. Rather, it was only one of the theses, which was supported by some scholars. Another idea that was in the minds of the Chinese thinkers was multilateralism, where the United Nations and International Law would play the major role. They were also concentrating their studies on big economic groups in the World, such as the European Union, NAFTA and on transnational organizations such as the United Nations. The relationship between China and the US definitely had a priority. When it comes to Chinese-Russian relations, it was said that they were developing at their own pace; there was cooperation on the Palestinian-Israeli, Iranian and North Korean questions.

China- US

The phenomenal economic development of China makes it a natural competitor for the US. The most visible aspect of it, is the rapid growth of China's energy demand. China increases not only its oil and gas imports, but also forges close relations with major producers all over the World. Chinese demand has risen to six million barrels per day, with 40 percent coming from imports. The relationship that China established in the

¹² Howard W. French, Is it a Peaceful Rise? US Shouldn't bet on it, IHT, April 20, 2006
12- Facing China's Rise: Guideline for an EU strategy; Chaillot Paper No. 94, Dec. 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies.

¹³ Facing China's Rise: Guideline for an EU strategy; Chaillot Paper No. 94, Dec. 2006, EU Institute for Security Studies

1990s with the major Middle East countries continued and even strengthened after Sept 11. In Iraq, the 1997 agreement's status is unknown, but the Chinese companies wait for Iraq to open up¹⁴. In Iran, China is the main importer of oil; it also makes investments there. This also benefits Iran from the political point of view¹⁵¹⁶. Saudi Arabia is also targeted by China; by 2002 the Kingdom had become China's leading foreign supplier of crude oil. Saudi investments in China are also increasing. This certainly may annoy the US. On the whole, the US will have to think about finding ways to manage the Chinese challenge in the Middle East. It was therefore, expected that the question of oil would be an important item during the visit of President Hu to the United States. Both sides were trying to avoid a conflict in the coming decades¹⁷.

China-Russia

Chinese-Russian relations have received important boosts during the period since Sept 11. Energy cooperation seems to be the center piece in this relationship. President Putin in his last visit to China in March 2006 signed a very big natural gas deal. There would be two pipelines to carry 30 to 40 billion cubic meters of gas each to China. The cost of the pipelines is 10 billion dollars. In oil, however, the Russian side only agreed to a feasibility study of a pipeline; today Russia exports 55 million barrels of oil each year by railroad tankers¹⁸.

¹⁴Managing China-US Energy Competition in the Middle East, Flynt Lverett and Jeffrey Bader, the Washington Quarterly, winter 2005-6.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ China and Russia cool on Rice on Iran curbs, IHT, March 312, 2006

¹⁷Awaiting Hu in US there is unavoidable topic: oil

¹⁸ Energy Tops Agenda as Putin visits China, IHT, 22 March 2006

China-EU

The last EU- China Summit in Beijing on November 28, 2007 has clearly shown the importance of China for the European Union. There was also a EU- China Business Summit. The two sides even talked of a strategic partnership.

Energy in the Central Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East

The region.

The region surrounding the Caspian Sea is very important as far as energy requirements of the European Union is concerned. Let us see how the EU considers the energy situation. The Commission Green Paper in November 2000 on security of energy supply predicted that, if no action was taken, the EU's energy dependency would climb from 50% in 2000 to 70% in 2030.

The debate on the need for a European energy policy started again in 2006, because of the rising oil and gas prices and Europe's increasing dependency on a few external suppliers. (They are mainly OPEC and Russia) The Ukraine-Russia gas dispute in January 2006 has certainly gave an urgency to the problem. That is how the EU Commission opened the debate with the publication of a Green Paper in March 2006. The debate culminated when the Commission presented a Strategic Energy Review in January 2007 and the EU heads of states and governments adopted an Action Plan in March 2007. The Commission Green Paper lists six key priority areas, mainly on technical issues, but also emphasizes the need for a common external energy policy.

In May 2006, the Commission and the Secretary General/High Representative issued a joint paper on "an external policy to serve Europe's energy interests". The paper considered how EU external relations, including CFSP, can be used more effectively

to secure reliable, affordable and environmentally sustainable energy. The guiding principles they adopt mainly relate to what can be done in the third countries. As to practical means they propose two building blocks: functioning markets and diversification. To diversify energy sources, geographical origin and transit routes, the EU should facilitate the maintenance and upgrade of existing energy infrastructure in neighboring countries of key importance to the EU. The attention is drawn to the gas projects in North Africa, Middle East, Caspian region, Russia and Norway which will create new energy corridors. To obtain the desired results, it was proposed to engage with producer, transit and consumer countries. Bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives are considered. At bilateral level, a comprehensive agreement with Russia, partnerships with Norway and Algeria cooperation with other producer and consumer countries are foreseen. For Turkey the proposal is the following: "Help Turkey to make full use of its potential to become a major energy transit hub."

It was quiet clear that the energy pipelines in Turkey would find their place in the energy security of the EU.

Finally, the European Council in March 2007 adopted a comprehensive Action Plan for the period 2007-2009 based on the Commission's Communication entitled " An Energy Policy for Europe". The Communication emphasizes that it is imperative to facilitate the transport of the Caspian energy resources to the EU. The Action Plan underlines the need to enhance security of supply for the EU through effective diversification of energy sources and transport routes.

The producers.

The regions neighboring Turkey are rich in oil and gas. To have a proper perspective, we may look at the developments in those regions during the last 10 years. Indeed it was almost ten years ago that the phrase " New Great Game" was coined to describe the politics of energy in the Caspian region

In Azerbaijan in 1994 a group of western and Russian companies in a joint venture with the Azeri company SOCAR formed the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and signed an agreement with the Azeri government to develop the fields of Chirag, Guneshli and Azeri. in the Caspian Their production would reach one million barrels per day by 2009. To transport that oil there were three possibilities, either the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline or the Baku- Tbilissi-Ceyhan pipeline or the Afghanistan,Pakistan route. As is known the second pipeline materialized.

In Kazakstan, the area to be developed was Tengiz oil field. The reserves were estimated up to 19 billion barrels. American Chevron Company is developing the field.. The transportation is through Tengiz-Novorossisk pipeline, which is 1.500 km long and connects Tengiz Oil field to Noverossisk at the Russian Black Sea coast. A new area was discovered in Kashagan. Total oil reserves of Kazakhstan are estimated at 29 billion. Turkmenistan is rich in natural gas and oil with 88 billion of oil reserves and 22 trillion cubic metres of gas. Turkmenistan negotiated improved payment terms for its natural gas exports with Russia and Ukraine. Turkmenistan signed a 25-year agreement with Russia in the spring of 2003, and a 30-year agreement with China in the spring of 2006 for natural gas exports

The other littoral country in the Caspian is Iran. Iran is a member of the *Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC), and ranks amongst the world's top three holders of proven oil and natural gas reserves. Iran is OPEC's second-largest exporter after Saudi Arabia The continued exploration and production of the offshore South Pars natural gas field in the Persian Gulf is a key part of Iran's energy sector development plan. National Iranian Oil Co. claims production capacities of 3.8 million b/d of crude oil and 66 billion cu m/year of natural gas. It estimates Iran's crude oil reserves at 92 billion bbl. The majority of the producing oil fields are concentrated in southwest Iran.

With over 20 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves Iran is the second richest country in term of gas reserves in the world Major onshore and offshore gas fields are North and South Pars, Khangiran, Nar and Kangan, Aghar Dallan and Sarkhoon.

Finally, we come to Russia which is rich both in oil and gas. In 2006 the oil production was 4 million barrels a day and it was totally exported. Roughly 1.3 bbl/d exported via the Druzhba pipeline to Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, Poland and other destinations in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves, with 1,680 trillion cubic feet. The following countries are supplied with Russian gas: Belarus, Ukraine, Finland, Georgia, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Italy and UK.

The Middle East has an estimated 62% of the world oil reserves. Saudi Arabia 261 billion barrels, Iran 106, Iraq 67, Kuwait 50 and United Arab Emirates 44. The major producing countries are all exporting oil through international market mechanisms. In the area, proven gas reserves have risen sharply since 1970's. Most of the recent growth in reserves has come from Qatar's North Field. The biggest increases in production will occur in Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. At present, most gas exports from the Middle East move eastwards. According to the analysis of the World Energy Outlook in its report of 2005,, this situation could be reversed in 2010. Europe is becoming the largest market for Middle East gas. from 2 billion cubic meters in 2003 to 35 bcm in 2010 and 117 bcm in 2030.

Energy in the World.

To appreciate the richness in the region, we can have a look at the general energy situation in the World. First the energy demand: OPEC's World Energy Model projects growth of around 2 percent a year up to 2020, from 9 billion tonnes of oil equivalent in 2000 to more than 13 billion in 2020. 95% of the additional demand is expected to be met by fossil fuels, of which 2/3 from petroleum, oil and gas. OPEC possesses 4/5 of world's

proven crude reserves, it has also sufficient supply of natural gas (2. HE Dr. Alvaro Silva Calderon, Secretary General of OPEC. World Energy Outlook for the year 2020. Eight International Energy Forum, September 26, 2002. Osaka, Japan)

Oil demand: US Energy Information Administration estimates that world oil demand grows from 80 million barrels per day in 2003 to 98 million in 2015 and 118 million in 2030. (3. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2006)

Gas demand: Consumption of natural gas worldwide increases from 95 trillion cubic feet in 2003 to 182 trillion in 2030. (4. idem) OECD Europe's gas demand will grow very fast, from 17.8 trillion cubic feet in 2003, to 23.9 trillion in 2015, and 30.8 trillion in 2030.

Now, we can consider whether such demand will be met by energy supply:

Proven oil reserves: In 2006 world oil reserves were estimated at 1.293 billion barrels. Of these, 71 percent is located in the Middle East or Canada. Among the top 20 oil reserve holders, 8 are OPEC members that together account for 65 percent of the World's total reserves.

Oil supply: It is expected that the total oil supply in 2030 will exceed the 2003 level by 38 million barrels per day. It is generally acknowledged that OPEC members with large reserves and relatively low costs for expanding production capacity can accommodate sizable increases in petroleum demand. Non-OPEC supply also increased during the recent years. (5. idem)

Gas supply: As of January 1, 2007, proved world natural gas reserves, as reported by *Oil & Gas Journal* were estimated at 6,183 trillion cubic feet. The largest revisions to natural gas reserve estimates were reported for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and China. Almost three-quarters of the world's natural gas reserves are located in the Middle East and Eurasia. Russia, Iran,

and Qatar combined accounted for about 58 percent of the world's natural gas reserves as of January 1, 2007.

It is to be noted that we are witnessing a change in the international oil market. The Minister of Energy of the United Arab Emirates last year said some argue that China, India and the United States will form the triangle of energy consumer nations in the next few decades; some have begun to argue that global supplies cannot keep pace with the increasing world demand, thus deepening the fears over worsening crises. (6.Twelfth Annual Energy Conference, The Emirates Center for strategic Studies and Research, 19-21 November 2006) Other studies suggest that projections of oil demand and supply in the coming decades imply that major consumer countries must increasingly compete for the same oil flows. Therefore security of oil supply matters. The international oil market has changed from a buyer's into a seller's market. This renews fears of the use of oil(and gas) in power politics. (7.Coby van der Linde, Wilbur Perlot,Femke Hoogereen. *Tomorrow's Mores*. The future of geopolitical system and the structure of the international oil Market, Clingendael Energy Programme)

I should also point out that the study undertaken recently by CERA " Dawn of a new Age: Global Energy Scenarios" will probably be useful in assessing the energy situation in the World. Already at CERA yearly Conference in June 2007 In Istanbul one of the main questions discussed was the impact of growing competition for energy resources and markets on global politics at a time of high prices

The role of Turkey.

Finally we can see the role to be played by of Turkey.Situated at the proximity of the Caspian Sea and enjoying very close relations with many countries of that region, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, it was only natural for Turkey to assume a prominent role in the building of the East- West Energy Corridor. This Corridor was developed as one of the pillar of Turkey's energy

strategy. The Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline, the Shah- Deniz natural gas pipeline (Baku - Tbilisi- Erzurum) are the two components of this corridor.

As is known the British Petroleum has spearheaded the BTC Pipeline with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Unocal, Statoil, Turkish Petroleum Company, Agip, Totalfine Elf, Itochu, Inpex, Conoco-Philips, Delta Hess, BTC delivers oil from Azeri- Chirac- Guneshli Oil field of the Caspian coast of Baku to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan traversing 1.760 km through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.

The BTC oil pipeline has a capacity of 50 million tons per annum (1 million barrel per day). The BTC is the main export route for oil resources of the landlocked Caspian region. Recent developments have made the BTC pipeline even more effective with the signing of an agreement between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to extend the pipeline to Kazakhstan on 16 June 2006. The BTC has become operative on 4 June 2006.

Then, the Baku- Tbilisi- Erzurum Gas Pipeline is added to the Corridor. The Baku- Tbilisi- Erzurum natural gas pipeline (BTE) project entails shipping Azeri natural gas from the Shah Deniz field to Turkey.. BTE, which will have capacity of transporting 16bcm per annum, it became operational on 3 July 2007.

These two major pipelines constitute the infrastructure for oil and gas in Turkey that may also help Europe diversify its energy needs. Turkey is determined to become Europe's fourth natural gas artery after Norway, Russia and North Africa, and thus to become integrated into the European energy network.

Turkey's energy needs already in 1987, made it necessary to buy Russian Natural Gas. This gas was coming through Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria. This prompted Turkey to have direct access to Russian Gas, which was the reason why the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline going under the Black Sea was built.

Let us have a look at the projects under consideration:

- a) The Nabucco Gas pipeline will bring the natural gas originating from the region around Turkey, will go through Turkey and then to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. It was identified as one of the priority projects of common interest under the guidelines for Trans-European energy network, by Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2003. Later it was again identified as one of the priorities for securing and diversifying of the EU energy supplies by the Commission's Green Paper and highlighted by the European Council of Heads of States and Governments of 23 and 24 May 2006.

On 26 June 2006 a Ministerial Conference on Nabucco took place in Vienna. Eu Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and Energy Ministers of Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey agreed to accelerate commercial, regulatory and legal work to build the Nabucco pipeline in the shortest possible time.

- b) Turkey has also been developing specific transport projects for Europe such as the Turkish- Greek- Italian Interconnector Project which became operational on 18 November 2007. The purpose is to transport natural gas of the Caspian through the Turkish national grid to Europe. The Turkish- Greek Inter- connector Project was turned into the Turkish- Greek- Italy Inter-Connector on 4 November 2005. The pipeline will have a capacity of 16 bcm per annum, the Turkish- Greek part of which became operational on 18 November 2007.
- c) Turkey is involved in projects to bring Iraqi natural gas which are mostly located in Northern Iraq. Iraqi natural gas could easily be connected to the Turkish national grid through a pipeline constructed parallel to the Kirkük- Ceyhan oil pipeline using the right of way of the latter.
- d) Turkey is receiving Iranian natural gas through Tebriz- Erzurum pipeline.

Peace Support Operations¹

Hasan Gögüş

Let me start by welcoming our foreign guests to Turkey for this important conference jointly organized by Bilkent University and the Centre for European Security Studies. I am grateful for the opportunity to address this gathering of eminent academicians and senior officials. The subject matter of the deliberations today and tomorrow is a critical issue for the international community as a whole; how to conduct effective peace support operations in the 21st century, at a time of growing demands for international action in the face of instability and conflict in many parts of the world. I am especially pleased that the conference will have the benefit of the presence and active contribution of our friends from Groningen; an ancient city with a university dating back to the beginning of the 17th century.

There has been a substantial amount of academic and policy activity over the past decade to identify the best means for conducting an increased amount of peace support activity with essentially limited military and financial capabilities. Peacekeeping is a delicate and expensive undertaking, requiring a robust mandate, adequate force protection, deployment of scarce military capabilities and sustained political engagement. The major international organizations with specific responsibilities in this area, such as the United

¹ The text of a statement made by Ambassador Hasan Gögüş, Director General, Multi-lateral Political Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the conference on “Peace Support Operations” organized by Bilkent University and CESS of Netherlands on 12-13 November 2007.

Nations, NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have all invested a considerable effort to review and revamp their procedures for executing their respective, and often complementary, field activities.

Naturally, Turkey fully supports these efforts. As Director General, in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for international organizations, I have daily oversight of all UN activities in this respect. We are confident that the establishment of the UN Peace building Commission, the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the formation of a separate Department of Field Support will serve to provide the international community with a higher-quality service. It has been 61 years since Winston Churchill called for equipping the United Nations with an international armed force, in the famous Iron Curtain speech. The world organization certainly has some military clout now; it is conducting 17 operations with more than 100.000 personnel.

Turkey is keen to sustain and enhance her contributions in this respect. The UN's own data, as of September 2007, declares that Turkey is the 25th largest contributor to UN operations, with nearly one thousand troops on active duty, while, in terms of police contributions, we are ranked 14th among UN member states. We are, of course, also taking part in all NATO operations, with some 2.500 troops, and a further 2.750 troops on call in the NATO Response Force. We have commanded ISAF twice, and still have some 1.200 troops in Afghanistan, as well as a Provincial Reconstruction Team. Furthermore, we have supported the development of the European Security and Defence Policy from the outset and taken part in every EU operation to which we were invited. In fact, we are the leading non-EU European ally in terms of contributions to ESDP missions.

I see that there is an impressive congregation of experts here to

deliberate the important topics on the agenda of the conference. Perhaps I should briefly touch upon one of those topics, namely national approaches to peace support operations, as Turkey has collected a considerable amount of experience in this field. As I said, we led ISAF twice; once as a UN operation and again as a NATO-led force. We also currently have nearly a thousand troops in UNIFIL in Lebanon. This body of experience makes it possible for me to make certain observations, especially with regard to political engagement between the peacekeeping force and the host country. This is a critical relationship for the success of any mission, in terms of ensuring force protection for our men and women on active duty in foreign lands, allowing timely exit from the host country and preventing a subsequent recurrence of hostilities.

The first of these observations is that the task of securing and maintaining the trust of our hosts is the most crucial aspect of peacekeeping work. Naturally, military planners will insist on the right mix of combat and support elements and the availability of critical enablers, but without this mutual trust, the endeavor will almost certainly fail in attaining its objectives. Experience has shown that remaining equi-distant to the ethnic and religious groups in the host country is essential. The Turkish military commanders and personnel also avoid any involvement in the domestic affairs of the country. Transparency in dealings with all local leaders, whether in government or not, helps to sustain a constructive two-way dialogue. Full respect for the customs, cultural values and religious beliefs of the local population is also essential.

We would probably all agree that local ownership of the responsibility for peace and stability is highly desirable. However, this will not be possible if local officials, community leaders and military commanders do not have a culture of working together, as is often the case. This may well be due to a lack of trust among those players because of past behavior. The commanding officers of a peacekeeping force will find it easier

to persuade their local counterparts to cooperate with each other and thus facilitate the establishment of a broad-based national consensus in the host country, if they have already won their confidence and respect.

Friendly patrols on foot, rather than an excessive use of armored vehicles driven at high speed, are likely to win the hearts and minds of the population. Sensitive treatment at control posts, for example by ensuring that women are only searched by female officers, is also essential. Joint patrols with local forces or police officers may remove any grounds for suspicion by the population and government officials as to the activities of what is essentially a sizeable and well-armed group of foreigners. Conspicuous display of arms and weapons should be discouraged. Where such simple practices are not followed, the peacekeeping force may quickly resemble an army of occupation.

Regarding the composition of peacekeeping forces, I note that roughly ten percent of uniformed personnel in current UN peacekeeping forces is made up of police officers. This trend should be encouraged further, as the evolving nature of peacekeeping tasks requires a greater amount of conventional police work in post-conflict societies. We should also endeavor to get the right ratio of combat troops and support personnel, as many countries prefer not to provide combat forces or critical enablers like transport assets or intelligence units, which are all in short supply.

As a final remark, I would like to emphasize the need to integrate the political and socio-economic dimension of peace building into our peace support operations, in order to create societies that can sustain peace on their own long after peacekeeping forces depart their country.

Can Turkey be Associated with ENP

Seyfi Taşhan

ENP is an EU policy intending to use the instruments available to the EU to provide a unified approach to neighboring countries of 27 member states. This policy excludes those neighbors of the EU whose eventual membership is already slated. These countries are Western Balkan states and Turkey who are associated with the European Union through different instruments. While South East European Stability Pact is the main source of linkage with Western Balkan states, Turkey, together with Croatia are in the negotiation process for full membership.

A brief conspectus of Turkey's EU bid:

In the case of Turkey another instrument, The Association Agreement, has been in existence since 1963 and some of its terms are implemented through its long standing institution. After a preparatory period of ten years, in 1973 with the signing of a series of protocols Turkey's relations with EEC entered into period of transition to customs union and eventual full membership. During the transition period a number of integration steps should have been taken namely, free circulation of man power and services by 1985, an economic support programme and by 1995 customs union in industrial and processed agricultural goods. Turkey would reduce its customs duties towards EC countries by 1995 to zero and a customs union would come into effect by January 1st 1996. There was very little progress on free circulation of manpower, except for small improvements in the status of Turkish working community already in EU countries. The free circulation of services was not carried by EU and both freedoms remained on paper. Furthermore economic assistance was blocked because of the use of veto right by Greece.

The main Institution of the Agreement, the Association Council was deadlocked and Article 25 of the Agreement for the Settlement of Disputes through arbitration was not operable because it required a decision of the Association Council that could only be taken by unanimity rule. In an effort to break the deadlock Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, according to article 237 of the Rome Treaty. EU recognized the eligibility of Turkey, but postponed the decision. Instead in 1992 the EU decided that time had come for establishing a customs union with Turkey while keeping in mind the Article of the Association Agreement that foresaw full membership of Turkey. While in reality the Customs Union was an automatic outcome of the Association, EU decided it should be part of a separate protocol to be approved also by the EP. The customs union entered into force on January 1st 1996. As Turkey-EU customs union was being developed EU also initiated the MEDA program and Turkey accepted the invitation to participate in this multi-faceted project. However, in December 1995 EU Summit decided that Turkey along with Russia, Ukraine and Southern Mediterranean countries would remain a strategic neighbor of EU closing the door for membership. While Turkey was looking at customs union as a door-opener for full membership EU had apparently been regarding it as the end of the road. Nevertheless, Turkey had still not yet received a yes or no answer to its 1987 application. In the meantime there was a change of attitude in EU because of a large variety of factors and in 1999 Helsinki summit Turkey became a candidate country, to be subjected to the same treatment with other candidate countries. With this decision all other objectives of the Association agreement, except customs union had in effect become inoperative. With its new status Turkey was an odd member of the MEDA, while Malta and Cyprus were slated to become full members Turkey was only a candidate and when membership negotiations were to begin was left in suspense; and the other non EU Mediterranean countries could not aspire to become full members. Eventually, membership negotiations began in 2005 but

the terms of reference contained in a framework document were highly ambiguous. Accordingly, the negotiations would be open ended, opening and closing of chapters would be subject to the unanimous approval of all member states, membership would be subject to the absorption capacity of the EU. As a result of failure of Turkey to give even a *de facto* recognition to the Greek Cypriot administration as the Government of Cyprus¹ 8 chapters out of 35 were closed for negotiations. When a chapter is negotiated successfully it is closed to be re-opened at a later date. One chapter has been closed in this manner. And negotiations on two more chapters were approved in December 2007. However, in a recent speech at the European parliament Mr. Sarkozy has stated that he would prevent opening of five important chapters that would lead to full membership. His attitude and that of the German Chancellor cast serious doubts about the future of the negotiations and membership process. Both leaders speak about a hollow 'special relations or partnership' concept. Considering the already developed EU related *acquis* of Turkey that include customs union, it sounds more intended for domestic politicking than the expressions of visionary leaders. Although, Turkey is a negotiating candidate and it is not possible to see when this process will lead to full membership, as EU says it is in the hands of the Turks, and the Turks say it is in the hands of EU countries, the reality is that unless there is a major violation of human rights in Turkey the negotiation process cannot be suspended because of the framework for negotiations permits suspension only with the recommendation of the Commission and unanimous approval of the Council. It is true that the negotiation process will be a leng-

¹ In 2004 a settlement plan for Cyprus was prepared by UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan foreseeing the establishment of a joint Cyprus government with the participation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot states. This plan was worked out by UN in cooperation with EU and warmly applauded by the international community. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan while the Turkish Cypriots approved it. The result was that Greek Cypriot Government became a full member and all significant improvements of relations between EU and Northern Cyprus was subjected to Greek Cypriot veto

thy one and time frame and bench marks cannot be predetermined unless the international conditions persuade the EU's leading countries to speed up the process.

However, Turkey's involvement in European affairs does not depend only on EU. In fact Turkey, because of its membership in NATO, OECD, Council of Europe and many other European organizations as well as presence of several millions of Turkish citizens living and working in EU countries and its customs union and participation in certain aspects of EU activities such as ESDP, is involved in multi-dimensional aspects of European life.

From the above explanation we observe that the idea of ENP was laid down in the Madrid Summit of December 1995 albeit Turkey at that time was considered also as a neighbor.

Can Turkey fit in the ENP?

Although the accession negotiations have now entered into its third year there are, as I stated above, still some European leaders who insist that a Privileged relations should be established with Turkey to 'anchor Turkey in Europe.'² Therefore, it might be an interesting academic exercise to see if such a linkage could be formed between EU and Turkey within the ENP.

In this respect we should remember that the principle aims of the ENP are to help in the creation of stability and normal conditions in neighboring countries; to support them in their efforts to improve their social, economic and political performances by providing good governance to their people and to support good relations with their neighbors. The Action plans signed with each neighbor country is a bi-lateral exercise while EU also supports multilateralism on a regional basis.

² See the recent statements by the President of France and the leaders of CDP and CSU in Germany

Shared Neighborhood:

Most of the countries that fall under ENP are also Turkey's neighbors and there are some similarities and parallelism in neighborhood cooperation paradigms of Turkey and EU in this respect. As part of its Association agreement and its implementation Turkey has, since 1996, accepted to conform to EU's commercial policies, has signed free trade agreements with EFTA countries (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland), Israel, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Albania and negotiating with the others.

Regional Groupings

Furthermore, Turkey has entered into several multilateral arrangements with some of these countries, namely the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) including Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Most of the Balkan Countries, as well as several EU member countries, Egypt, Israel, Tunisia, EU itself the United States have observer status in this interesting organization. Furthermore, NATO is also interested, several BSEC members are also members of the NATO and the United States has military bases in Rumania and Bulgaria.

EU could contribute to the development of several multinational infrastructure, protection of the environment of the Black Sea itself, and give support to the Black Sea Investment Bank.

Black Sea and the riparian countries have gained importance especially because of the increasing tanker traffic and pipelines. There are pipelines bringing Caspian and Middle Eastern supplies to Europe, i.e. the new Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipeline, and projected NABUCO pipeline, Iran-Turkey pipeline and Baku-Tibilisi-Erzurum pipeline, link Turkey's neighbors to Europe. To this we must add Baku- Tibilisi- Ceyhan and Samsun-Ceyhan(under construction), Kirkouk-Ceyhan oil pipelines that

bring Caspian, and Middle Eastern oil to the Mediterranean. There are other pipeline projects in the Black Sea that are of interest to Europe passing through Ukraine and Rumania to link Russian gas to Europe through another route. Another cooperation institution is no doubt the MEDA program; it seems that when the program was initiated in 1995 EU wanted Turkey to participate in this program, as an alternative to membership in EU. As Turkey has been adamant in keeping its membership prospects open it remained as an odd member in the MEDA program together with Israel. Although twelve years have elapsed since its initiation MEDA has not been able to fulfill its objectives particularly in respect to security, stability, cooperation and good governance in the basin. The enlargement of EU has introduced new members some of whom have little real interest in the Mediterranean. It may be necessary, therefore, for Mediterranean countries to gather around an all Mediterranean Council to address these issues. In any event conditions and problems of Turkey had little similarities with the Southern members of MEDA. Turkey's scale of economy, democratic regime, long established and traditional government structures and civil society, democracy and secularism were comparable to most of EU members'. It is probably because of these reasons that Turkey had little difficulty in conforming to Copenhagen criteria and begin the accession negotiation process.

Another regional organization to which Turkey is a member extends from Turkey to the East, that is the Economic Cooperation Organization, included originally Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and it now covers Azerbaijan and several central Asian countries. This organization supports common infrastructure projects and also provides customs facilities to promote trade³. It is remarkable to ponder if EU can associate itself with this regional organization, for the time being as part of its global policy and eventually within its ENP system when Turkey be-

³ ECO is the successor organization to the RCD and the customs facilities granted in that organization continue because of a reserve included by Turkey during the signing of the protocol establishing customs union between Turkey and EU.

comes a full member.

Turkey as Role Model:

With respect to Turkey's neighborhood policies the similarities with ENP is not only confined to developing free trade relations with Turkey's neighbors but also to other areas such as developing reforms and good governance in these countries. Turkey's calls for reform in these countries that also cover several Arab countries are received with greater appreciation than those demanded by EU; as these demands in many countries are abhorred as reminiscent of neo-colonialism. In fact in those neighbors of Turkey that do not enjoy democratic regimes carrying out reforms at foreign behest are generally abhorred by the authoritarian governments as interference in their domestic affairs either as genuine interference in their sovereign powers or as a ruse to perpetuate their hard fist rules. (This attitude is also pervasive in many ENP countries). However, the reforms already carried out by Turkey and the excellent results achieved in the past 84 years of the Turkish Republic are followed with empathy in many Middle Eastern countries. As a result Turkish initiatives, both as political facilitator in areas of crisis, as economic donors in times of disaster, as an investor for their infrastructures and industry are welcome not only in ENP countries but also some of the Stability Pact countries in the Balkans.

Turkey as a Neighborhood 'facilitator':

Turkey takes part in many international efforts to create a peaceful environment in its region. In the Southern Caucasus, it takes part in the Minsk group of OSCE trying to solve the current conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and has organized several bi-lateral meetings between Azeri and Armenian leaders; and despite the fact that Turkey has no diplomatic relations with Armenia it has promoted the membership of that country in BSEC; tens of thousands of Armenian workers find employment in Turkey. In the Middle East Turkey has partici-

pated in many of the peace search efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the participation in the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1948 along with the US and France to the meeting organized in Ankara in November 2007 between Palestinian President Abbas and the Israeli President Shimon Perez. Turkish troops are part of the Unifil II in the Lebanon and in many other parts of the world⁴.

There are two countries which are adjacent neighbors of Turkey that makes Turkey a vulnerable country in the eyes of several European commentators. It is true that the fundamentalist regime in Iran as well as its resolve to develop a nuclear arsenal has caused great worry in the EU countries and US as a possible threat to peace in the region. However, although Turkey is adamant in its respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it believes that through negotiations and other measures that United Nations may decide to take, Iran may be persuaded to fully cooperate with IAEA. In this respect Turkey's powerful military establishment provides an additional insurance. Iran's fundamentalist zeal is also not seen as a serious threat to Turkey because for the past 84 years of secular Republican system and its well established institutions and constitution it not vulnerable to such fundamentalist zeal.

Regarding Iraq, the turmoil that followed US occupation seems now in the process of calming down and the US and Iraqi factions seem to have begun to realize that Iraq should stay united, and sectarian and ethnic differences should not be the dominant factors in shaping the future of Iraq. The US and Iraqi authorities are now cooperating with Turkey to terminate the existence of PKK terror encampments in Northern Iraq.

Turkey's EU neighbors:

In discussing Turkey's neighborhood I have to make a reference

⁴ Turkish troops serve as peace keepers in Afghanistan under NATO as ISAF and under ESDP in Bosnia as SFOR and Kosovo as KFOR, in addition as military monitors in several places such as, Georgia, Israel and Northern Iraq.

to Turkey's relations with her EU neighbors namely Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania.

The last two new member countries have a traditional relationship pattern with Turkey which may be expressed as liberal in many senses. In Bulgaria there is a Turkish minority of around one million that is more than ten per cent of the country's population. Except several cases of hostility by some extreme nationalist Bulgarian elements and institutions, Bulgarians of Turkish origin are a well established and well integrated Community in their country and they take part in the national and local administrations.. A significant number of the members of this Community carry two passports- Turkish and Bulgarian-and they form an economic, social cultural bridge between the two countries. In the case of Romania, Turkish companies have many sound investments in that country with which we practically have no bi-lateral problem.

With respect to Greece, our relations are based on both the realist and liberal paradigms; while we have almost excellent trade and cultural relations it has always been difficult to resolve the existing disputes in the delimitation of the continental shelf, territorial waters and air space in the Aegean sea, and from time to time a small accident may explode into a major crisis between the two countries. Nevertheless, in recent years Greece seem to support Turkey's membership in the European Union.

As regards Cyprus we have a serious problem. While Turkey and Cypriot Turks have demonstrated their willingness to accept a United Nations plan prepared in consultation with EU, the Cypriot Greeks have rejected the plan in the knowledge that they would any way become a member of EU and have the opportunity to block or slow down the progress of Turkey's accession process. This has unfortunately come true.

Conclusion

I have tried to outline the relationship patterns and problems of Turkey with its neighbors. In many areas they show a similarity

with overall lines of ENP, but also reflect differences that arise because of geography and regional characteristics of countries involved. It is clear however, that as Turkey's integration with the EU progress, the main lines of Turkey's policies will become more harmonious with the principles of ENP as the difficulties with neighbors will be attenuated within overall framework of European structures as Turkey participates in the inner workings of EU in an integrative manner.

In 2004 a settlement plan for Cyprus was prepared by UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan foreseeing the establishment of a joint Cyprus government with the participation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot states. This plan was worked out by UN in cooperation with EU and warmly applauded by the international community. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan, while the Turkish Cypriots approved it. The result was that Greek Cypriot Government became a full member and all significant improvements of relations between EU and Northern Cyprus was subjected to Greek Cypriot veto.

Power Race in Asia and Turkey's Asia Policy

Seçkin Köstem

The geopolitical importance of Asia has been manifestly growing with the new conjuncture that started to be built after September 11. The US operation to Afghanistan was the first indicator of a great competition between the only global actor, the USA; the heir of a former superpower, Russia; and a new but a very strong state in Asian politics, China. Asia will continue to be the area of rivalry between major powers in the foreseeable future considering the existing conjuncture. Alliances against common threats may continue to be set up but it is a fact that each of these countries will continue its struggle to remain or become a global actor in world politics by trying to shape the world around it.

The US, being the only global power today made its first step into Asia and is determined not to take that step back in the near future. Russia, as it has done since 1991, is aiming to reach its once-existing status in world politics by using its influence in post-Soviet region, by setting alliances and most importantly by trying to form hegemony in energy. China on the other hand, being the most rapidly developing country in the world, considers moves of the US in the Middle East and Eurasia as parts of a policy of stopping its growing power. Besides these three powers another newly emerging regional power, India is trying hard to have a say in Asian politics as part of its strategy to become a global actor in the future.

Turkey's Asia policy, which has been reshaped since the end of the Cold War, will both cause challenges and provide opportunities within this conjuncture. It is easily noticeable that the excitement that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union could not be enough to make Turkey a major actor in the post-Soviet area. However, Caucasus and Central Asia continue to be regions of strategic importance for Turkey.

So, some questions appear unresolved. Can the power of the US power in the region that was physically felt in the region with the Afghanistan operation be permanent given the recent developments in South and Central Asia? Will Russia gain back its global power that it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union? Can China transform its economic growth into a leadership in Asian politics? What can India do to become more powerful given its relationships with these powers? Finally, what is the position of Turkey in the power race in Asia and how should Turkey approach Caucasus and Central Asia?

This paper tries to analyze the competition in Asia for power between the countries involved in recent years, Turkey's policy towards Caucasus and Central Asia and find some clues for possible answers to these questions.

The US

The US having remained the only global power after the collapse of the Soviet Union turned its eyes to Asia after a short time. The end of the Cold War offered the US a new great area of influence. Thus, the 'superpower' decided that the post-Soviet region provided a great opportunity to replace its dominance with that of the former USSR. This would also be a good step to approach China. It is seen that the US considers that the way to sustain its global dominance in world politics is to win the power race in this continent. By this way, the control of the 'Heartland' of Halford Mackinder will also be provided¹. The particular regions where the US has concentrated to prepare the grounds for possible future developments appear as the Caspian Region and Central Asian countries. The fact that the 'the axis of evil' consists of three Asian countries also indicates the geography the US will have to deal with the most in the near future. The US, which carried

¹ M.Seyfettin Erol and Çiğdem Tunç, "11 Eylül Sonrası ABD'nin Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Orta Asya", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 9, Nr. 3, Autumn 2003, p.6

the Iran nuclear issue to the agenda of international community after Afghanistan and Iraq operations, is trying to show that its influence in Asia will be permanent although it is the only Trans-Atlantic state within the power race. Moreover, if Pentagon's report released on February 2006 which assumes that China will be the only rival of the US in the future² is taken into consideration, it is evident that the US does not want to stay behind in this race.

September 11 and the US Strategy towards Asia

International issues in the early 21st century have been mainly shaped by the terrorist attacks against the US in September 11, 2001 and its response to them in Asia and the Middle East. The US has been established in Asia with both operations to Afghanistan and Iraq and does not appear to leave the region very early despite the debates on whether the US armed forces in Iraq should be sent back home. The current problem about Iran's nuclear problem is another indicator that the US, being the only genuine global actor of contemporary world will not just watch what is going on from Washington but will try to be as much active as possible in Asian politics.

After 9/11, international community had to agree that global terrorism had become one of the most threatening factors against national, regional and global security. Therefore, the 'operation freedom' in Afghanistan was highly supported not only by NATO members but also by one of the major policy makers in Eurasia, Russia³. Another emerging regional power China did not voice against the operation to Afghanistan since Islamist-separatist movements were also perceived to be a

² "Pentagon: Yeni Yüzyılda En Büyük Rakibimiz Çin". www.zaman.com.tr 05.02.06

³ Reşat Arım, "Towards A New International System", *Contemporary Issues in International Politics*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 2004, p.55

serious danger for its internal security. Therefore, the US was sure that its moves in the Eurasian chessboard would be of strategic gain for it. The Russian-American partnership against international terrorism was concerned as a start of a new international order that would give way to the continuation of American dominance in world politics⁴. Afghanistan would be a gateway to Central Asia; a region where Russian influence has not yet been erased since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its invaluable strategic position between India, Pakistan, Iran and China was also very attractive. Thus, the US presence in the region would be guaranteed with military presence and regime change in Afghanistan. The opening of Afghanistan, as US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher put it, has transformed it from an obstacle separating Central Asia from South Asia into a bridge connecting the two. Furthermore, President Bush behaved in a quite realistic and pragmatic way getting the support of the authoritarian Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, which was already looking for opportunities to bloc Russian dominance and prevent an Islamist revolt headed by the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan⁵. The two countries soon became “strategic partners” as declared by both Bush and Karimov. This partnership was strengthened in October 5, 2001 as the US had the right to the base in Karshi-Khanabad. Another strategic gain of the US in the region would be the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Russia and China did not seem to oppose the moves of the US and this agreement paved the way for the claims that the US would from now on be the only power in world politics since Russia and China decided to join the Western liberal-democratic bloc. However, this looked like the silent wait of giants.

One fact was missed in predictions about the future developments about US-led anti-terrorist activities. Russia and

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Nermin Güler, “11 Eylül Sonrasında Rusya ve ABD Arasında Özbekistan”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 7, Nr. 3, Autumn 2001, p.193

China were the Asian powers that did not support the Iraq war. In addition, the stronger opposition came from France and Germany, partners of the US in NATO. The three years of US presence in Iraq could not provide stability and democracy in the country although there have been elections and a referendum.

The Iraq operation is mainly considered as a part of the Greater Middle East Project that aims to 'democratize' over twenty countries from North Africa to Central Asia. Another strong idea discussed among scholars is that one of the long term goals of the operations conducted against terrorism is to benefit from the rich energy resources. Therefore, The US would reach the energy line in Caspian Region and Central Asia more easily and thus acquire a better position within "the New Great Game" taking place for the natural resources of the region. Moreover, it is claimed that the moves of the US in Central Asian chessboard would be a great basis for better observing the developments in South Asia⁶.

Actually, the US had already been making efforts to be involved in Eurasian political agenda. Many countries from the former Soviet bloc joined the Partnership for Peace program of NATO that was established in 1994. The support for the establishment of GUUAM was also significant for the US. This way, US could have a stronger voice in the post Soviet region and balance the Russian influence. GUUAM, which comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia, aimed to form a strong economic alliance by helping the economies of the members to be integrated into world economy and decrease the Russian pressure on each of them.

By the year 2003, some developments in Eurasia caused the emergence of an impression that the US was on the right track on its aim of democratizing the countries that are governed by

⁶ Relations between the USA and India will be further discussed under the title 'INDIA'.

authoritarian regimes. The first example was Georgia. The ex-communist Shevardnadze had to leave his presidency to the liberal Saakashvili, who had received his education in the US. Although it was claimed that there was no direct involvement of the USA in the 'Rose Revolution' process, there is no doubt that this revolution turned the direction of Georgian foreign policy from Russia to the West. This first reaction against the rule of Russian-backed leaders was followed by the 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine in 2004. As a result, the first two letters of GUUAM, Georgia and Ukraine had changed their axis of politics with soft revolutions. The country that seemed to benefit in the short term out of this was inevitably the USA. The declared aim of the Ukrainian president Yushchenko to become a member of the EU and the efforts to make it also a NATO member have manifestly made the US advantageous.

Although things seemed to be going quite well for the US, its influence in Central Asia that began to be felt very highly after the regime change in Afghanistan did not last long. The decision of Islam Karimov that the US troops should leave his country "in six months" damaged American interest in the region very much. The authoritarian Karimov was exposed to serious criticisms and warnings of both the US government and human rights groups after his attitude towards the unrest in Andijan in spring 2005. After this event, Karimov being worried about losing his authority ended the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the US. Furthermore, Uzbekistan decided to cut its ties with GUUAM in May 2005. It is a big wound for the US to lose a country with such a geostrategic importance in Central Asia.

The US, whose troops had to leave the Karshi-Khanabad base after the note of Islam Karimov in July 2005, could not tolerate any other losses in the region. Therefore, it has cancelled or at least delayed its warnings and desires about democracy. The indicators of this are the elections in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that were held in 2005 and the invaluable position

that Bush administration gave Kazakh President Nazarbayev during 2006.

US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's visit to Kazakhstan in October 2005 is very important in order to understand how the US has reshaped its foreign policy towards Central Asia as it lost Uzbekistan and Sino-Russian influence in the region has increased recently. Condoleeza Rice defined Kazakhstan as the "regional model" and praised it for its successful level of development since gaining independence in 1991. This was the first serious official indicator that the US was looking for a new ally in Central Asia. It should be noted that Kazakhstan is not as democratic and free as the US would desire it to be, however the US has no other options than ignoring the undemocratic situation in Kazakhstan in order to secure a better strategic place in the region. From then on, Kazakhstan has been regarded by the US as "a true leader" in Central Asia. Dick Cheney's visit to the Central Asian "leader" in May 2006 and Nazarbayev's visit to the US in September 2006 strengthened the "strategic partnership" between the two countries. Kazakhstan is important for the US also since it possesses vast natural resources. The US supports establishing new pipelines through new energy transportation routes because it believes that diversification of energy transportation routes will increase stability and its own energy security⁷. Therefore, Kazakhstan is encouraged to realize flow of Kazakh oil through BTC pipeline and Kazakh gas through a trans-Caspian pipeline. However, although both leaders stress that the two countries are strategic partners, it does not seem likely that the US will be able to bring Kazakhstan into its orbit since the latter follows a very successful balancing policy between Russia, China and the US.

The most important development after Rice's visit to Kazakhstan was that the US Department of State reorganized its South Asia Bureau to include Central Asia. Formerly,

⁷ Richard Boucher, "U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities".
www.state.gov 26.04.06

Central Asia was under the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. This new “Great Central Asia” policy primarily aims to give South Asian states access to the vast and rapidly-growing energy resources in Central Asia⁸. This policy finally aims to break the growing Chinese influence in Central Asia by supporting India’s desires to become a regional leader, decrease Russia’s control over Central Asian energy resources and transportation routes, increase Afghanistan’s economic welfare and hence make the US the dominant power in Asian politics.

As Boucher mentions, the objectives of the US in Central Asia are “ambitious”, but it cannot afford failure anymore. The US has made a strategic mistake by thinking that its influence had increased in Eurasia with the support of the Central Asian countries to operation freedom and with the soft revolutions. This caused the US to lose Uzbekistan. Furthermore, it seems that the US could not predict the future counter moves of Russia and China in the future which did not oppose the Afghanistan operation. The US, thinking that the activity area and the unifying power of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was diminished as it was aimed at Central Asia⁹, could not predict also that its own moves would result in the strengthening of the organization. It is claimed that the activities of Russia and/or radical Islamic groups will increase in the region in the absence of the US. It is also considered that the US, losing so much time and power in Iraq overlooked the developments in Central and South Asia. In addition to this, it is manifest that Russia-China partnership will not welcome further efforts of the US to shape the region alone. So, the US will have to increase its influence in countries that are of strategic significance to it and are in the main energy routes. However, this will not be easy if the chaos in Iraq, the opposing voices coming from Central Asia and China’s becoming the

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Erol, op.cit. p.12

center of power in Asia rapidly are together taken into consideration.

Russian Federation

Russian Federation, which passed through a stage of convalescence for a short time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, seems to have become a center of power again for its neighborhood region especially with the latest moves of President Vladimir Putin. Russia, with the aim of reestablishing its influence in the region after 1991, has signed many agreements, settled partnerships and by this way tried to control the newly independent former Soviet region. The reason behind these efforts is Russia's goal to become a super power again and lead the world from today's unipolar structure to a multipolar one. However, it is manifest that the US is the only global power in terms of economy, military and political influence. Therefore, Russia will behave more carefully in the near future and try to increase its influence in its former area of sovereignty. As a result, relations with the US seem to have softened in the last few years. However, it is an inevitable fact that Russia will try to look for opportunities to take the US, which has formed grounds to locate itself to the region after September 11, off from its 'near abroad'. Putin, who made the cooperation with China to come to a level that it had never been so high before, also continues his support for the authoritarian leaders of the region¹⁰. Furthermore, energy policy that has become evident in the last period is one of the strongest- perhaps the strongest- means of Russian foreign policy. According to all these, Vladimir Putin seems to be following a "multi-vectoral" foreign policy just as he mentioned in 2004¹¹. The aim of this multi-vectoral foreign policy is to make Russia

¹⁰ Sino-Russian relations will be analysed under title 'CHINA'

¹¹ Sergei Karaganov, "Russia and the International Order", *What Russia Sees*, Eds. Dov Lynch, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005, p. 40

advantageous in fields that are of priority for itself in a peaceful way.

The Near Abroad

Fifteen independent states emerged in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Commonwealth of Independent States, which was founded in December 1991 with the participation of the former Soviet states except Georgia¹² and the Baltic countries, have always been of strategic importance for Russia. Russia has got a certain and clear influence on the community's establishment and gaining an identity¹³. The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, which was renewed in June 28, 2000, gives a great importance to regional priorities. So, the 'Near Abroad' doctrine that was accepted in 1993 indicates what kind of a roadmap Russia should follow in its relations with the former Soviet republics that remained out of Russia's borders. Russia, being determined since 1993 that Central Asia, Caucasus, Ukraine and Belorussia are former parts that belong to it, decided that the main goal is not to make these regions and countries be separate from it. It has made its strategy towards the region more understandable since that time.

September 11 and Russian-American Relations

It can be said that important changes have started to take place in Russia's near abroad mainly after the US established itself in Asia.

The first one of these changes was the unexpected rapprochement between Russia and the US¹⁴. At this level, cooperation against the emerging threats in the changing world order was important. Putin, giving a green light to the US on cooperation in battling with terrorism, connived at the super

¹² Georgia also became a member in 1993.

¹³ Sinan Oğan, "Demografinin Gölgesi Altında Rusya-Kazakistan İlişkileri", Avrasya Dosyası, Vol. 7 Nr. 4, Winter 2001-2002, p.133

¹⁴ Arım, op.cit. p.54

power's establishment in the region. This rapprochement caused comments that Russia and the US from then on would behave like strategic partners for the solutions of regional and global problems. Furthermore, it was a serious development for Russia that the countries in the region, which desired to protect themselves from the Russian dominance in economy and security, gave support for the Afghanistan operation.

The aim of the US to shift its geostrategic priorities to Eurasia in the 21st century and its plans on this direction causes political problems for the Russian elite. Other changes that Russia was dissatisfied with were, of course, the replacement of the former Soviet or pro-Russian leaders in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia with 'supporters of democracy'. Russia, according to many experts, could not keep its effectiveness in its near abroad and had to leave its place to the US as a result of the 'rose', 'orange' or 'tulip' revolutions. Yet, it was certain that Russia would not keep on being silent after these changes.

The rapprochement between Putin and Bush consists of an obligatory togetherness that both of the countries used in order to minimize threat perceptions and follow the aims that carry priority. For instance, Russia wanted to become advantageous in the Chechen problem by benefiting from the process that the US started under the name of 'battling terrorism'. With this unexpected rapprochement, Putin actually aimed to prepare the base for his future moves. As a matter of fact, the US could not get the support that it had expected from Russia in the Iraq war and Russia took action in order to regain the power that it lost in the former Soviet region.

Russia actually did not oppose the Iraq war very seriously and waited to see the reactions of France and Germany, who are the allies of the US in NATO. One can conclude from this that Russia acted rationally and put its relations with the US into order. Then, it started especially after 2003 and tried rapidly in 2004 to implement the policies that would enable Russia to

regain control in the near abroad in the near future¹⁵. The positive reappraisal role of Russia in Central Asia was strengthened with the signing of strategic partnership declaration with Uzbekistan in 2004 and the fact that Russia will unhesitatingly and undoubtedly support the authoritarian regional leaders whenever the threat of civil unrest emerged¹⁶. The strategic partnership Uzbekistan formed with the US did not last long and the country was forced to enter into Russian protection again because of the warnings of the West about the infringements of democracy. After the Andijan events in May 2005, Uzbekistan turned its face to Moscow almost completely. Russia has been the biggest power to support the country, which was isolated by the West, after the events. The relations between the two have reached such a positive level that it had never been so in the past. Russia and Uzbekistan conducted a joint military exercise in September 19, 2005. Furthermore, Russian Gazprom Company signed a large deal in Uzbekistan on September 27, 2005¹⁷. The security agreement that Putin and Karimov signed together in November 14, 2005 is the most important development between Russia and Uzbekistan in the last years. Moreover, Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community that is led by Russia on January 25, 2006. The joining of Uzbekistan to this organization, which consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belorussia and Russia, have paved the way for comments that Uzbekistan had sworn to be under Russian command¹⁸. Finally, in August 2006, Uzbekistan signed the agreement that made it a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member again after 1999, in which it had decided to withdraw from membership.

¹⁵ Strategic Survey 2004/5, Routledge: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p.156

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Gürol Kırac, "Kerimov İzole Ediliyor, Moskova Memnun", Cumhuriyet Strateji, 17.10.05, p.20

¹⁸ Natalya Melikova and Konstantin Sardovski, "Kerimov'dan Rusya'ya Bağlılık Yemini", www.turksam.org, 27.01.06

These developments in security and economic issues indicate how fast Russia benefits from the decreasing influence of the US in the region. Russia is preparing the correct substructure to regain its power in the 'near abroad' and making the correct moves at the first necessary opportunity.

Stronger Organizations in the Near Abroad

Despite Russia's efforts to increase its influence in the entire former Soviet area, it is manifest that it cannot reach the objective that it desires. Georgia and Ukraine seem to be the two countries that Russia have lost in the near abroad with the 'democratic' revolutions. Russia, being aware that it has lost its former influence within the CIS, turns towards more realistic formations. The CIS is no more totally under Russian control with rapprochements of some members to the West and the aim of some members to join the NATO. Because of this, it is understood that Russia will try new unions or organizations with more loyal countries instead of trying to control all the CIS¹⁹. With the developments in the last years, it has become clear that Russia will try to do this through the Collective Security Treaty Organization and/or the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC).

One of the means that Russia developed in order to control the countries in its near abroad is focusing on security issues²⁰. There are still Russian military bases in many countries that consider that the maintenance of their security, to a certain extent, depend on the Russian presence in the region. These countries are Armenia, Belorussia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldava and Ukraine. Russia has started to make moves in order to make its influence be felt by the CIS countries, especially after the US increased its power in the 'near abroad'

¹⁹ Sinan Oğan, "Sovyetler Birliği'nin Mirası BDT Dağılıyor", www.turksam.org, 29.12.05

²⁰ The Collective Security Treaty was signed between Russia and eight other former Soviet republics in May 1992. In 2003, the treaty was transformed into the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

after September 11 with its military presence and the colored revolutions. It can be said that Russia has been successful in this direction.

It is understood that Russia's perception of national security does not only include Russian Federation's internal security, but also the territories of the countries in the near abroad²¹. CSTO that has been operating since September 2003 is very important for Russian and Central Asian security. Russia is trying to transform the CSTO into an effective organization that is perceived as a strong international and multi-functional body²². Russia gained an air force base in Kant of Kyrgyzstan in 2002 just 50 kilometers away from the US base in Manas. Moreover, if the fact that Russia has gained another military base in Tajikistan in 2004 is taken into account, it will be realized that Russia has been trying to settle bases nearby the regions where there is American military existence. The Organization has got stronger with Uzbekistan as a new member after the decision taken in last August. Becoming a member of the CSTO in August 2006, Uzbekistan made the change in its foreign policy that has taken place within the last two years more clear. Uzbekistan's membership in both the EEC and the CSTO is a success of Russia against the US in Central Asia. Furthermore, it seems that Putin has followed a very clever strategy on Kyrgyzstan by not letting this country follow a US-oriented foreign policy such as Ukraine and Georgia after the Tulip Revolution in March 2005. Kyrgyz President Bakiyev made his first official visit to Russia in April 2006 and the two leaders agreed on the expansion of the Russian air base in Kant. Moreover, two countries held joint anti-terrorist drill in October 2006 inside Kyrgyz borders.

²¹ Osman Metin Öztürk, *Rusya Federasyonu Askeri Doktrini*, Ankara: ASAM, 2001, p.36

²² M K Bhadrakumar, "Russia's Search for Collective Security". www.atimes.com, 31.05.06

Further steps could be taken about organizing common Russian-Central Asian military forces. These troops may become the Peace Force of the CSTO and some plans can be made to prepare the troops for peace operations in Asia mainly against Islamist movements. There are already some efforts of Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov to make CSTO take part in the security of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Putin said on January 31, 2006 that Uzbekistan should not be let become another Afghanistan²³. These words indicate how serious the security concept of Russia towards the region is.

The second initiative through which Russian influence in the near abroad has been increasing is the EEC. The fundamental goal of EEC is to reach a customs union by the end of 2008. The second concrete goal of EEC is to create a common energy market between the member states. There is no doubt that the second goal can be best understood as a part of Russia's policy of energy hegemony that has become manifest in the last two years.

It is becoming clearer that EEC and CSTO are mutually reinforcing. It is even claimed that the CSTO will be transformed into the politico-military wing of the EEC²⁴. As a result, Russian strategy on these two organizations should be carefully observed in order to make predictions about the future of Russian influence in its near abroad.

Energy: Strategy for Becoming a Leader

Russia has been looking for ways to become a more effective actor in both regional and global politics since 1991. Russia, having understood that it no more possesses the strategic importance of the Soviet Union with the end of the Cold War, chose energy as the means to become a regional and then a global leader again. Actually, it had to choose energy. As

²³ "Uzbekistan Must Not Become a Second Afghanistan", en.rian.ru/russia/20060131/43266722.html, 31.01.06

²⁴ M K Bhadrakumar, "Moscow Making Central Asia its Own", www.atimes.com, 25.08.06

Vladimir Putin stated on December 22, 2005 at the Russian Security Council meeting, the only area in which Russia can become the leader of the world in the short and medium term seems to be energy²⁵. The Ukraine gas crisis have justified how much Russia is important for Europe and Turkey as well as its near abroad. After the crisis, a view occurred throughout the world that Russia uses energy as a means to impose its own policies. Georgian President Saakashvili's claims after a pipeline problem that Russia uses energy as a political card should also be taken into consideration²⁶. Therefore, any kind of development that Russia intentionally or unintentionally causes has great effects on the region.

Putin's declaration that world-standard prices should be demanded from the former Soviet republics, which buy the Russian gas for very cheap, will either make these countries remain at Russian axis or cause them to turn their faces to different powers. Russia can provide strengthening of the already advantageous position of Gazprom in Uzbekistan in return for political protection to Islam Karimov²⁷. One of the last ports where Russia is playing the energy card on the Eurasian chessboard is Turkmenistan. With the Russian-Turkmen cooperation, Russia has aimed to be advantageous towards Ukraine, which causes discomfort in energy. As it can be remembered, Ukraine had to increase the amount of the Turkmen gas that it bought during the gas crisis in last December 2005. Putin is claimed to have demanded from Niyazov that Turkmenistan will not become an alternative for Ukraine during Niyazov's visit to Moscow in January 23²⁸. Furthermore, it appears that Niyazov did not approve the

²⁵ Victor Yasmann, "Russia: Is Georgian Gas Crisis Evidence of Moscow's New Energy Strategy?", www.eurasianet.com, 24.01.06

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Sergei Blagov, "Russia's Move on Energy Chessboard", www.atimes.com, 04.02.06

²⁸ Sergei Blagov, "Deal With Turkmenistan Enhances Russia's Position in Central Asia", www.eurasianet.com 24.01.06

construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which is desired by the West since it would disturb Russian interests in the region. The pipelines that were decided to be built between Russia and Germany, Russia and Greece, and the Blue Stream project with Turkey also provide Russia a very large area to use its energy card.

There is still debate on the Siberia pipeline with China. It is guessed that the topic of the talks between George Bush and Hu Jintao during Bush's visit to China in November 2005 was Russia²⁹. Hence, Putin's visit to Japan during the same days is not a coincidence. Japan is another country which wants to bring Russian gas to its borders with a pipeline passing through Siberia. Energy cooperation was the most important topic of Putin's visit to China in March 2006. Two sides signed important documents that are focusing on exportation of Russian natural gas to China.

As it is seen in these examples, Russia prefers to be fast in the energy politics. With petroleum and natural gas agreements, many countries from Central Asia, East Asia, Black Sea region and Europe have engaged their energy politics to Russia. Some of these countries have taken the support of Russia against the West. If it is considered that especially Central Asian countries are satisfied with Russia's policies, it can be said that it will be easier for Russia to increase its control on the countries in the region and its importance in global scale.

China

China, whose economy became the fifth biggest after the US, Japan, Germany and Great Britain with a growth rate of 9.9% in 2005, seems to sustain its economic success in the foreseeable future³⁰. China, profiting from the effects of globalization, has

²⁹ Barış Adıbelli, "Rusya Doğuda da Fırtına Koparıyor", Cumhuriyet Strateji, 16.01.06. p.31

³⁰ Chinese economy grew by 10.7% in 2006, which was the greatest since 1995.

become one of the most influential powers in Asia in recent years. China, by taking part in cooperation organizations in the continent, tries to observe and play a major role in almost any kind of developments in Asia. According to a report of the Pentagon issued in February 2006, China will be the only genuine rival of the US in the future in global scale³¹. In fact, China seems to become a global power within the next decades if its economic development and military activities are taken into consideration.

China, being one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, is very sensitive about security issues around it. Having delayed its territorial disputes with India and solved them with Russia, China has had the opportunity to develop quite good relations with its neighbors in recent years. Therefore, it can be said that China is trying to prevent any kind of events that would slow down its economic growth, endanger its security and consequently detain it from becoming a global power.

The common view is that China's possible access to a significant place in global politics will not be a development that would be desired either by the US or Russia. However, China is eager to show that it is able to affect international decisions such as the Iran nuclear dispute and fight against terrorism. It was declared in the 16th congress of Chinese Communist Party in November 2001 that, China just like Russia is not pleased with today's unipolar world and that a multipolar world would provide the most suitable conditions for regional and global security³². For now, Russia and China are aware that they cannot alone undermine the dominance of the US in world politics and thus these two powers are in a conjunctural partnership. Undoubtedly, China has a great

³¹ Breffni O'Rourke, "China: US Concerned By Beijing's Defense Posture", www.rferl.org, 09.02.06.

³² Qimao Chen, "Çin'in Yeni Güvenlik Anlayışı ve Politikası", Çev.Duygu Ergen, *Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin*, Eds.Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü, İstanbul: TASAM, 2005, pp. 55-64

significance for Southeast Asian countries. China also established quite positive relations with the Central Asian countries because of its threat perceptions and growing need for energy in the last few years. This way, China can have a greater say in Asian politics.

China, thinking that problems in Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran should be solved by an Asian power, aims primarily to reach leadership in Asia. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is used as a means to enable this aim, has also been increasing its importance and influence in the last few years.

Recent Moves: Energy, Security and Regional Leadership

It is evident that China will need more energy support in the 21st century in order to continue its efforts to become a super power. According to the International Energy Agency, China will have to increase its oil imports from 1.9 million barrels of today to around 10 million barrels a day in 2030³³. China, acquiring the 65% of its oil from the Middle East perceives the presence of the US in the region especially in Iraq as a threat. Therefore, China's desires that the role of the UN in reconstruction process of Iraq should increase and that the use of Iraq's natural resources should be left to administration of Iraqi civilians is likely to strengthen³⁴. That's because China considers the issue both in terms of energy security and about its rising position against the US.

China, trying to decrease its dependence on the Middle East in terms of energy has turned its direction to Central Asian resources in order to diversify its energy imports. The most important country in this region for China, for now and in the short term will be Kazakhstan. Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought Kazakhstan's PetroKazakhstan in

³³ Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, "Çin Ortadoğu'ya Yöneliyor", Cumhuriyet Strateji, 06.02.06, p.22

³⁴ Çağdaş Üngör, "Çin'in Ortadoğu Politikası", *Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin*, Eds. Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü, İstanbul: TASAM, 2005, pp. 149-161

October 2005 for a 4.2 billion price. Moreover, it is of strategic significance for China that the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline of around 1000 kilometers that will deliver Kazakh oil to China was inaugurated in 15th December, 2005. By this way, China can also develop better relations with Kazakhstan which has taken strong steps to become the leader of Central Asia. Turkmenistan is the second most important Central Asian country for the future energy plans of China. During Turkmen President Niyazov's visit to China in April 2006, two countries signed an energy deal of 30 years which will enable the flow of 50 billion cubic meters per year of Turkmen gas to China starting from 2009³⁵. Indicators make it clear that China will replace Japan as the number one oil importer within the next few decades. Hence, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in particular, will increase in the near future.

It will also be one of the possible developments that China will pay more attention on growing its strategic influence in Central Asia, the door that opens the road to the West for it³⁶. There are several identifiable reasons that make Central Asia and the states that are involved within the so called region inevitably important for China's future in terms of its threat perceptions. The problem of Uighurs in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region or Eastern Turkestan as the region is historically named and the possible help that can be given for Uighur separatists from Central Asian countries are strong enough to make China afraid of the developments around its Western borders. Secondly, The Manas Base of the US in Kyrgyzstan is very close to the Chinese border. It is even claimed by some analysts that China can join the base race in Central Asia that now takes place between Russia and the US³⁷.

³⁵ Ahat Andican, "Çin Satrancında Orta Asya", *Avrasya Dosyası, Türk Dünyası-Çin Özel*, Volume 12, Nr. 1, 2006, S.20

³⁶ Stephen Blank, "China Joins the Great Central Asia Base Race", www.eurasianet.org, 16.11.05

³⁷ Ibid

Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Laos, India and Pakistan just after the APEC Summit in Vietnam in last November is another signal that China is seriously trying to increase its influence in the continent.

An important issue that enabled China to raise its voice in global politics because of its right to veto in the UN Security Council is the Iran nuclear problem. Although it seems that China agreed to act with the other veto holders according to the report that was issued from the IAEA, losing a major ally in Asia will be very costly for China. China provides 14% of its oil from Iran and there are strong ties between the two countries in both industry and commerce. What is more important is that a possible attack of the US to Iran would be a highly undesired situation since Iran and its neighboring region is inside the national interest and security perception of China. China is acting according to the existing conjuncture now, however claiming that China from now on can be persuaded in issues like this easily or that it will side with the US may be a very early mistake.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: An Anti-American Bloc?

There is a noticeable increase in the efforts of the states that claim to become the superpowers of Asia in the future to base their actions on an international or a regional cooperation organization. At this point, SCO possesses a quite significant position in Asian politics. The organization, which is observed to be standing on its feet with initiatives of China, is also preparing the basis for the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. The forum called the 'Shanghai Five' was founded in April 1996 with the participation of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to find a permanent solution to territorial disputes between China and the former Soviet republics. It is no secret that the fundamental goal of the organization, which transformed into the SCO in 2001 with the membership of Uzbekistan, is to reduce the US influence in Asia and make the countries of the region side with Sino-

Russian partnership against the US. In April 1996 moreover, Russia and China for the first time declared their “strategic partnership”, which has been strengthened through the SCO for the last 11 years.

Both China and Russia has interests on both the organization and the region. China aims to reach the energy resources of the Caspian Region, approach the Middle East, widen the markets of Chinese commodities and finally form an economic hegemony in the region. On the other hand, Russia’s membership in a more coherent and stronger SCO carries many advantages. If the organization can get more mature in the next five or ten years, global policy makers will begin to think of Russia not as a single player, but as a partner in a large economic and political bloc with growing influence in world politics³⁸. The common aim is to reach a multipolar world. It has also been aimed to use the SCO to end the rivalry and the threat potential between China and Russia.

It is understood from the declaration on the establishment of the SCO that the fundamental mission of the organization is to function as a regional security mechanism³⁹. Firstly, China has solved its territorial disputes with Russia and the other member neighbors. Secondly, the organization has been a means to stop the support that is assumed to be given for the separatist Uighur groups from Central Asian countries. Just like China, Russia also has tried to find regional support for the Chechen problem by using the SCO. It is, thus, noticed that Russia and China have come to terms on Islamist/separatist movements.

Islamist movements are a threat also for the Central Asian countries. Moreover, the organization is a good way for the Central Asian member states of balancing the Russian influence on their security, economy and foreign policy with another

³⁸ Yevgeny Bendersky, “Russia in the SCO”, www.eurasianet.org, 07.11.05

³⁹ Gökhan Telatar, “Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü: 21.Yüzyılım Bölgesel/Global Çekim Merkezi”, *Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin*, Eds.Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü, İstanbul: TASAM, 2005, pp.163-229

power. The establishment of a center for anti-terrorism in Bishkek (moved to Tashkent in 2004) and a permanent secretariat, the decision on a common flag for the organization and the growing cooperation among the members in regional security has paved the way for views claiming that a NATO-like organization is emerging in Asia⁴⁰. The importances of SCO for Russia and China have increased after the September 11 since these two powers were afraid of losing their influence in the region. The fact that there is a serious emphasis on anti-terror activities within the organization is an indicator that Russia and China are both trying to give a message to the US and to receive the support of the international community. By this way, it will be shown that the US and its allies are not/will not be the only center dealing with terrorism, which has become a global issue.

The Anti-Americanism in SCO has reached its top level in the Astana Summit in July 2005. At the summit, it was demanded from the US to set a calendar to leave the bases on "SCO lands". It is interesting and important to see that the countries, where there exist US military bases, are named as "SCO lands"⁴¹. As a result, the US had to leave the base in Karshi-Khanabad of Uzbekistan after that decision.

SCO has become the biggest regional organization of Asia with Mongolia (2004), Pakistan, India and Iran (2005) getting the observer status in the organization. Also, it is important that the population of the territory it covers, if the observers are included, reaches 3 billions.

The China-Russia military exercise named "Peace Mission 2005", which was conducted in August 2005, is a clear warning to the US. With this exercise between the powers of the SCO, the message that the security and stability of Asia can only be provided by Asian powers was sent to the US⁴². The

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Ibid

⁴² İlyas Kamalov, "Şanghay Ekseni NATO'yu Dengeleyebilir mi?" Stratejik Analiz,

assumption that the common operation in the exercise was done with the 'authorization of the UN' can be considered as another warning for the US⁴³. With Peace Mission 2005, it was also aimed to make the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia, who are afraid of experiencing serious unrests within their borders further trust the Sino-Russian partnership. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, the six member countries of the organization will conduct joint anti-terror exercises inside Russian borders in 2007⁴⁴. It was later announced by Russian officials that the CSTO will also join the "Peace Mission Rubezh 2007". This will be another manifestation of strengthening Russian-Chinese strategic partnership which is directed against presence of the US in there area of interest.

According to experts, the June 2006 summit once more justified that the SCO operates on the basis of strong opposition to the United States in the regional geopolitical contest. The Declaration on the 5th Anniversary of SCO, not interestingly, puts emphasis on international law, the capability of the United Nations on global issues and double standards implemented by the US. Moreover, a clear warning is made to the US by emphasizing that democracy should not be exported and diversity of civilization and model of development should be respected.

SCO now has got two members who are also members of the UN Security Council. If India and Pakistan also increase their status to permanent membership, the number of nuclear weapon holders in the organization will be four. Despite all the positive developments in SCO in recent years, it is not clear to see whether the organization will be a basis of partnership for the nuclear powers of today and super power candidates of the future or this togetherness will end up early.

Nr. 70, January 2006, p.13

⁴³ Sinan Oğan, "Rus-Çin Ortaklığı ABD'yi Zorluyor", Stratejik Analiz, Nr. 66, October 2005, p.14

⁴⁴ "Shanghai Group to Hold Anti-Terror Exercises in 2007", www.globalsecurity.org, 26.04.06

It is difficult now to guess how much the partnership between China and Russia that was formed against common threat of the US will endure. However, it is manifest that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has reached a bigger capacity and power than was aimed in the beginning. That is because the security problems in the region were so serious and the USA located in Asia with the war against terrorism.

There are also strong claims that the SCO was established by Russia and China in order to control each other's growing capabilities. According to this view, it will be possible that these two powers form strategies on their ways to become a global power that threaten the other. This can really be one of the aims of the two countries, but it is evident that the SCO is mainly targeted against the influence of the US. If the decisions that the organization has made and the implementations up to now are taken into consideration, it seems that the future of SCO is very highly dependent on the actions and capabilities of the US.

India

India's economy has been growing very fast in recent years and it seems that it will keep this growth in next years. Indian economy grew above 8 % in years 2003 and 2004 and it is estimated that a growth of around 7% will be achieved in 2006 similar to that of 2005⁴⁵. The role of India in Asian politics will inevitably rise in the near future since it is both economically growing and it tries to strengthen its military, economy and nuclear capability with serious agreements with Russia and the US. If its desire for a multipolar world is also taken into consideration, it can be said that India will become more popular in regional agenda. India's ties with the US and Russia will make its position much more strategic within the power race in Asia. Traditional Sino-Indian rivalry is another issue that will become more critical in next few years.

⁴⁵ "Indian Economy Overview", www.economywatch.com

There has been an observable softening in the relations between the USA and India in recent years. It was justified in President Bush's visit to South Asian countries in early March 2006 that the geostrategic significance of India for the US is very high. The nuclear deal signed between Bush and Singh during the visit will help politically cement the US-India strategic relationship viewed as critical for ensuring America's strategic and economic strength in the region in the near future⁴⁶. On the other hand, the deal will enable India to develop its nuclear arsenal easily without restriction. The rise of China as economic and military superpower will eventually challenge American global dominance⁴⁷. Therefore, an investment in India's future will be indispensable to the US. This is accepted to be the fundamental reason why the US overlooks India's efforts to enhance its nuclear program although it has not even signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is also another important indicator of India's potential aggressive foreign policy that is by some estimates the world's biggest arms importer⁴⁸. India has strengthened its defense systems quite seriously with agreements with the US on air missile systems, F-16 aircraft and other sophisticated army equipment⁴⁹.

It was mentioned earlier in this paper that the US has reshaped its foreign policy towards Central and South Asia. The nuclear agreement signed in March and the reshaping of US foreign policy towards the region last year together mean that The Bush administration is committed to support India to become a "major power". India's importance for the US was reassured in early December as the US House of Representatives approved the Indo-US nuclear cooperation bill.

⁴⁶ Mary Beth Nikitin, Wolfstahl, Jon, "The India-US Atomic Balm", www.csis.org, 03.03.06

⁴⁷ Simon Long, "India's Hour", *The Economist: The World in 2006*, p.65

⁴⁸ "India and America: The Great Indian Hope Trick", *The Economist*, February 25-March 3 2006, Vol. 378, Nr. 8466, p. 26-28

⁴⁹ G Parthasarathy, "India in the Emerging World Order", www.india-newsbehindnews.com, 24.03.05

Although the relations are good now, the US is manifestly dissatisfied with India's ties with Iran. American-Indian interests intersect at anti-terrorism and the stability of Persian Gulf but the fact that India has sustained its energy cooperation with Iran just like China is problematic for the US. It is claimed that the US will help India more on nuclear energy in order to make it give up the Iran-Pakistan-India oil pipeline project⁵⁰. Furthermore, Pakistan's becoming a de-facto ally of the US on anti-terrorism after September 11 may push India away from it. It should also be taken into account that the tolerance of the US for Indian nuclear plans may push Sino-Pakistani nuclear ties and thus negatively affect the balance of power in the region, which would result in an increase the possibility of a friction between China and the US.

Geopolitical struggle in Central Asia stands to become more complicated as India has moved to establish an air base in Ayni in Tajikistan⁵¹. The Ayni base is a clear manifestation of Indian Central Asia policy that has become more apparent in the last one year. Moreover, accession to Central Asian energy resources is vitally important for India. The energy resources of the Caspian Sea and especially the Trans-Afghan pipeline project, which is planned to deliver Turkmen gas from Afghanistan to India is of strategic significance to India. The threat of Islamic terror is another issue why India has to take care of Central Asia. It appears that it will have as much support from the US as it can in its Central Asia policy since the US tries to balance the increasing Russian-Chinese influence in the region with a new but a major power.

India's relations with the traditional ally Russia is as good as it was in the past. In January 2007 Russian President Vladimir Putin made his fourth his visit to New Delhi since taking office.

⁵⁰ Cavid Veliev, "ABD-Hindistan Nükleer İşbirliği", Cumhuriyet Strateji, 01.08.05, p.17

⁵¹ Stephen Blank, "India: The New Central Asian Player", www.eurasianet.org, 26.06.06

On the other hand, India's only partner in defensive matters is not the US. Russia is India's largest military partner since the Cold War times. According to a statement from Russia Ministry of Defense, the officials of the two countries are working on a defense agreement of 10 billion dollars⁵². The energy cooperation between the two partners will also continue. One item on the agenda for Putin's visit, Indian officials have said, is a proposed India-Russia joint venture to explore for oil in Siberia⁵³. Furthermore, India's becoming an observer of the SCO and the declaration that the year 2008 will be celebrated as the year of Russia in India are important developments. The Indian-Russian cooperation has to continue as long as both countries need the diplomatic, military and economic support of each other.

Sino-Indian relations are not as positive as India's relations with the US and Russia. Since the Cold War, these two countries have perceived each other as a threat. China's energy and military cooperation and partnership with Pakistan have been disturbing for India. Therefore, it is thought that the only way for India to be respected by China is to accelerate economic growth and provide the modernization of military⁵⁴. On the other hand, although there is a tension between India and China, the growing interdependence in economy forces these two to cooperate. China will be the biggest commercial partner of India in the next few years. The commercial capacity between the two countries is expected to reach 15 billion dollars in 2007⁵⁵. India's becoming an observer in SCO is important also for China. There has also been important progress in solving the Sino-Indian territorial dispute. As a result, there are both

⁵² "Russia to deliver multiple launch rocket systems to India", en.rian.ru/world/20060123/43143328.html, 23.01.06

⁵³ Somini Sengupta, "Putin Visit to India Highlights Enduring Alliance", www.nytimes.com, 24.01.07

⁵⁴ G Parthasarathy, "India in the Emerging World Order". www.india-newsbehindnews.com, 24.03.05

⁵⁵ Cavid Veliev, "ABD-Hindistan Nükleer İşbirliği", *Cumhuriyet Strateji*, 01.08.05, p.18

positive and negative aspects of the relations between India and China. It can be said that these two powers will not easily determine whether the other one is a partner or a threat for itself.

India's membership in the SCO can be good for itself since that will enable it to join the Russian-Chinese partnership in Asian politics. India may consider that it has to join this strategic alliance in order not to be away from developments in the region. India will try to benefit from the Sino-Russian strategic alliance in Asia, but it is too difficult to claim that the once expected Russia-China-India strategic zone can come into existence in the near future.

India, having benefited from American foreign policy towards South and Central Asia especially after September 11, has enlarged its strategic area of interest to Western and Central Asia⁵⁶. Indo-Russian alliance is another factor that increases the possibility of success for India. Consequently, in the near future, India will try hard to gain an important position in entire Asian and global politics. This can be noticed from its multi-dimensional and ambitious foreign policy.

Turkey

Turkey's relations with Asia are mainly focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia that are together preferred to be called Eurasia. In the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey endeavored to expand relations with the newly independent Turkic-speaking states of Caucasus and Central Asia. As it is stated in the website of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the independence of Central Asian countries gave Turkish Foreign Policy a new dimension⁵⁷. On the other hand, the concept of a 'Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to

⁵⁶ Erkin Ekrem, "Himalayada Buluşmak", Avrasya Dosyası, Vol. 9, Nr. 3, Autumn 2003, p.71

⁵⁷ "Türkiye-Orta Asya Ülkeleri İlişkileri". www.mfa.gov.tr

the Chinese Wall' started to be used by politicians and experts especially during the early 90s. It is considered that the main aim of Turkey was not creating an alternative for the West, but strengthening Turkey's political position against it by acquiring new brother nations in Eurasia⁵⁸. By this way, Turkey could have felt stronger in Western structures. Therefore, with its secular-democratic structure, Turkey tried to be a model for the Turkic states and the others in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey helped the Turkic states to strengthen their administrative, political, educational and security structures. Nearly 20 thousand students from the Caucasus and Central Asia have studied in Turkey since 1991. Furthermore, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TİKA) was established in 1992 mainly to provide technical assistance to these countries. Heads of State Summits of Turkic-Speaking Countries were held eight times from 1992 to until 2006. Turkey also enabled these newly independent states to join international organizations and programs such as the Council of Europe, ECO, OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace. As for financial support, the Turkish Eximbank extended important amounts of loans to companies doing business in the region⁵⁹.

However, Turkey's attempts to expand its influence in the Turkic World could not be as successful as it was desired. The reasons of this can be given as follows; most importantly, Turkey lacked the financial means and resources to play a substantial economic and political role in the region⁶⁰. It should also be mentioned that Turkey lacked the sufficient academic infrastructure to deal with the newly emerging reality in the East just after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also, the internal developments and traditions peculiar to each of the newly

⁵⁸ Sedat Laçiner, "Orta Asya ve Türkiye", USAK, www.usak.org.uk, 17.05.05

⁵⁹ Reşat Arım, *Foreign Policy Concepts Conjunction, Freedom of Action, Equality*. Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü. 2001. p.75.

⁶⁰ Anar Somuncuoğlu, "Türkiye Kapsamlı Strateji Geliştirmeli", Cumhuriyet Strateji, 04.12.06, p.12

independent states caused them to think that the secular democratic Western model, the so-called 'Turkish Model', was difficult to implement and consequently Turkey may have lost its attraction. Similarly, Turkey may not have possessed the initial excitement towards the region in the late 90s. Moreover, within few years after gaining independence, the Turkic States attracted attention of major powers such as the US, China and the Russian Federation; and that of other regional powers such as Iran and India. This increase of attention from other states gave the Turkic states a chance to widen their foreign policy perspectives and caused Turkey to have a smaller say in regional politics.

Moreover, it became clear within some years after the Turkic states became independent that the expectations of Turkey and those of these states hardly overlapped. The romantic discourse that became very serious among Turkish politicians and public opinion was seen to be insufficient in order to strengthen the ties with those states. So, it was understood that a strategy which is not basically aimed at national interest could not become successful.

Finally, the Russian influence in the region has shown that these countries had to cooperate with Russia more than with Turkey. Russia having recovered itself from the effects of the peaceful divorce, became the dominant actor in regional politics with the 'near abroad' strategy after 1993. The Russian population in these republics, strong economic ties and the dominance of Russian language helped Russia to keep its influence in Central Asia and Caucasus. Russia's threat perceptions about Turkey's new role in the region were also effective on both Turkey and the Turkic states. Such a perception that Turkey desired to become the 'big brother' of the new independent states occurred among the leaders although Turkey did not follow such a policy. Furthermore, one of the most important obstacles that has prevented and still continues to prevent Turkey from having more fruitful relations

with the Turkic states is that these countries are still led by autocratic leaders who take their powers from former Soviet structures. For this reason Turkey has had difficulty in choosing between these regimes and the democratic opposition⁶¹. These former Soviet structures have inevitably made the Turkic states dependent on Russia to a certain extent.

Although the economic indicators say that the commercial relations have been rapidly growing in the last few years, they are not at the level that Turkey needs in order to have a greater say in Eurasian politics. Turkey's commerce with Central Asian countries could reach a total of 1.7 billion dollars in 2004.

One dimension which increases the geostrategic significance of Eurasia for Turkey is energy. Turkey, having learnt a lot from the Ukraine gas crisis of December 2005, will have to try harder to decrease its dependence on Russia and increase diversity in energy supply. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline that was inaugurated in May 2005 carries strategic importance for Turkey not only for energy but for political cooperation between Turkey and the countries involved. It is manifest that the BTC, as well as the gas pipeline projects with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would enable the newly independent post-Soviet states decrease their dependence on Russia and strengthen their ties with Turkey. It has also been an accelerating factor for Turkey's aim of becoming an energy terminal between Caspian region and Europe on which there has been evident support of the US. As the former President Demirel mentions, the BTC could not be easily realized without the support and help of the US⁶². It appears that Turkey will focus more on the Caspian region because of the growing importance of energy security.

⁶¹ Gökçen Oğan, "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikasının Açmazları". Stratejik Analiz, Nr. 77, September 2006, p.43

⁶² Süleyman Demirel, "BTC Siyasi Kararlılığın Ürünüdür", Stratejik Analiz, Nr. 62, June 2005, p.20

Another important issue is the democratic development levels of these countries. If it is considered that the administrative structures have recently been getting stronger, waiting for serious democratic developments in the near future will not be a realistic approach. Thus, Turkey should both encourage the strengthening of democracy in the region and avoid harming the relations causing serious reactions of the present leaders. This does not mean that Turkey should support the authoritarian and even autocratic leaders but it should avoid being ignored in the region. Furthermore, it would be a sound policy trying to give up the leader-based policy towards these countries and giving more weight to relations with the civil society. Such an approach will enable Turkey to strengthen the cultural ties with the peoples of the region and decrease any negative effect emerging from possible “colorful revolutions”, changes in administrative structures or political crises with the present leaders⁶³. Civil society ties can help the strengthening of democracy and the consciousness of citizenship within the Turkic countries. If another state tries to increase such ties, it can be perceived as part of a strategy to establish hegemony in the region; however Turkey’s historical and cultural ties can prevent the emergence of such misperceptions.

The 10th Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation Meeting in September 2006 and the 8th Turkic-speaking States Heads of States Summit in November 2006 helped a renewal in mutual relations. However, the facts that Uzbekistan did not attend the summit and that Turkmenistan has not been represented by its president in the summits since 2000 are serious challenges for Turkey’s regional policy. The summits should be carried on in the following years and all the leaders should be persuaded to attend. Although these summits do not seem to possess an

⁶³ Such a crisis can be claimed to be present nowadays between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan did not attend the Turkic Summit held in Antalya in November 2006 since Turkey has not supported Uzbek President Karimov after the bloody Andijan events.

important instrumental significance for Turkish foreign policy now, they can play a role for Turkey's future prestige.

Trying to act according to the results of today's conjuncture may be a good strategy for Turkey to be followed in the short term. It is seen that Russia, China and the US have focused on the security problems in the region since they also affect their own securities. So, Turkey can try to increase cooperation in anti-terrorism with the Central Asian countries by providing them information, economic and military support. Turkey's own experience on internal security can be beneficial also for the Turkic countries.

It is unclear whether the 21st century will be a Turkic century as the 8th President Özal claimed; however it is manifest that there has been a great deviation from this pronounced goal, which obviously could not be realized. In fact, that will be of no use for Turkey to develop such an ambitious and groundless discourse. Instead of envisaging the 21st century as belonging to Turks, Turkey should follow a realistic, rational and well-designed strategy by evaluating its economic capacity, cultural and historical ties with the region, the domestic situations inside the states that are within Turkish domain of interest and Turkey's relations with Russia as well as ongoing Russian influence in the region. Although it does not seem possible that Turkey can join the competition between major powers in the Caucasus and Central Asia, still it has a potential of affecting the future of the region. Romanticism emerging from Turkey's historical and cultural ties with Central Asia and Caucasus should be balanced with a realistic foreign policy strategy based on national interest and the Caucasus and Central Asia should continue to be considered as two regions consisting of states equal to Turkey. Such a strategy can also give Turkey the opportunity of playing the Eurasian card in the Balkans, the Middle East and Cyprus.

Conclusion

Asian politics seems to have much more significance than ever for the world in the foreseeable future. Growing competition between major powers will shape the continent very much. There will be both cooperation and rivalry between both small and great powers. The USA, being the only global power, will have to pay more attention to the processes in Central, South and East Asia. It is a significant question to be answered whether the USA will try to encircle China in order to have a permanent power in the continent just as the latter claims or be more tolerant to the acts of the future's superpower. Russia on the other hand will try to benefit from each failure of the USA in Asia and become a superpower again by using energy as a political instrument. The new star of the 21st century, China, having left the territorial disputes aside, will concentrate on transforming its economic growth to a leadership in world politics. The strategic partnership between Russia and China, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be very important for the security, economic and political issues in the continent. India, another emerging power in Asia, will also try to gain a safe position within the competition and will be more prestigious than ever. Fight against terrorism; struggle for finding reliable allies or "strategic partners", decreasing factors that threaten national security and energy security will be the common goals all the mentioned states will continue to pursue. Within this conjuncture, Turkey, being a country that has historical, linguistic, religious and ethnic connections with especially Central Asia and Caucasus should support the development of democracy in the region, stiffen its energy security, and develop civil society ties with the region.

Inclusion of The Migrants: Nationalism Versus Constitutional Patriotism

Elif Tuzlakoglu

Introduction

“Nation-Building as development means the extension of an active sense of membership to the entire populace, the secure acceptance of state authority, the redistribution of resources to further the equality of members and the extension of effective state operation to the periphery”.

CH. Joppke- Nation Building after World War II

This paper endeavors to discuss the possible methods to provide the inclusion of the migrants and to reinterpret them as a legal category. The analysis starts with the assumption that the nation states are the main reference points in creating the identities. Despite several steps towards supra-nationalization, nation state is still far away from losing its power. Hence the possible methods on including the migrants should be assessed by taking into consideration the notion of nation state.

Second assumption is that the notion of nation state has been constructed by the ideology of nationalism. Hence the hypotheses of modernist authors like Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, whom specialized on nationalism, are given to predicate our assumption on stronger grounds. The ideology of nationalism oversees the existence of different identities. The research question of this paper has been developed at this point. The paper seeks to find out whether the constitutional patriotism can complete the gap that the nationalism left on the grounds of including the migrants. Nationalist discourse tries to create a unity by abolishing the existence of different identities in a given society, whereas constitutional patriotism seeks to recognize the divergent identities and create the discourse of common values of personhood which are to be

protected by a constitution. After the discussion of the constitutional patriotism based upon Habermassian conceptualization, an emphasis on postnational model is made because the constitutional patriotism and the postnational model are interconnected. The hypotheses and assumptions of each ideology are given and it is discussed whether they can present a valid model for the recognition of the migrants as a different category rather than absorbing them in the society. In other words it is tried to find out whether the universalistic- liberal categories, introduced by postnational model and constitutional patriotism, suffice to transcend the protonational links that the nationalist ideology creates. Shortly, the analysis is based upon the controversy between nationalism and constitutional\patriotism or between the protonationalism and postnationalism. The legal steps upon creating a common European identity are also included and discussed in that analysis.

2. Identity Construction within the Framework of Nationalism

2.1 Preliminary Considerations: Theoretical Bases of the Construction of the Identities

In this paper it is presumed that the identities are not the products of the natural processes. On the contrary they are human artifacts produced gradually and influenced by the historical background of the European civilization. In macro level the European identity has been based upon the construction of the European Union.¹ In other words the main reference point for the legitimization of the construction is per se the European Union today. However the modus operandi of this construction derives from the modernization. The modernist philosophers like Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson contend that nationalism creates the nations, so that the notion

¹ Dirk Jacobs, Robert Maier, “*European Identity: construct, fact and fiction*”, in <http://users.belgacom.net/jacobs/europa.pdf>, pp.1, (date of accession: 01.03.2007) , also published in: Gastelaars M, de Ruijter (eds), *A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity*, Maastricht, Shaker

of nation has merely a fictional meaning rather than being an eternal and a natural formation, contrary to the rhetoric of the ethno- symbolists.² In other words nationalism is the main reference point in fabricating the identities.

2.2 Ernest Gellner: Nationalism on the Basis of Industrial Society

Ernest Gellner contends that nationalism does not correspond to the revival of the conscious nations. On the contrary nationalism invents the non- existing nations.³ It would merely be a legend to classify the nations on the grounds of divine and natural formations. Nationalism sometimes reshapes the existing cultures, sometimes per se creates the nations and often demolishes the existing cultures. ⁴ Gellner defines nationalism as a principle that presumes the coincidence of the political unit with the cultural unit. ⁵ Nationalism would not occur in the pre-industrial society because in that sort of a society cultural heterogeneity would have been the main reference point contrary to the homogenous cultural assumptions of both nationalism and the industrial society. In addition to that, in pre- industrial society, the people were conferred an ascribed status, meaning that the people can not alter their status regarding to their merit or social necessities. In other words culture replaces the structuring, rather than supporting it. In modern ages a high culture (Hochkultur) dominates the entire society and defines the society indeed with the support of the political unit.⁶ After the increase on horizontal and vertical mobilization

² Ethnoscymbolism: they see today's nation states as the continuation of the former ethnical communities. Accordingly nations represent the sum of the experiences of the historical members and ancestors. The well-known representatives of this approach are Anthony Smith, John Armstrong and John Hutchinson.

³ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, pp.160

⁴ *ibid*, pp. 168

⁵ İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu, *Söylem ve Olgu Olarak Ulusçuluk (Nationalism as a Discourse and Fact)* unpublished phd Thesis, University of Istanbul ,the Institut of Social Sciences, 1998)

⁶ Umut Özkırımlı, *Milliyetçilik Kuramları(Theories of Nationalism)*, İstanbul, Sarmal, pp.153

as a consequence of modernization, the necessity for homogeneity directly increased. Nationalism could be the mere solution to govern the entire heterogeneous population. A kind of a wrong consciousness is created via nationalism to manipulate the citizens. The power of lords in feudal ages is replaced by the power of nationalism in the modern era.

2.3 Criticisms towards Gellner and his Approach on Nationalism

There are indeed several criticisms towards Gellner's approach on nationalism and the industrial society. The first criticism towards Gellner's theory is - I would also mostly share - that his theoretical approach upon nationalism would be too functionalist. Gellner endeavored to define nationalism depended upon its consequences. In other words he favored a linear and retrospective approach and defined nationalism as one step forward to the formation of the industrial society. ⁷In the second criticism it is contended that the relationship between nationalism and industrialization in Gellner's theory would be wrong and there exists several

roots of nationalism in the pre- modern era. For instance Elie Kedourie contends that nationalism germinated in the German-speaking areas in pre-modern ages and Kitching makes similar assumptions for Great Britain. ⁸ This criticism stresses the retrospective point of view of Gellner. Gellner believes that even the signs of nationalism had not existed in pre-modern era. However the entire modern ideologies are inspired from the ancient régime. The conjuncture in ancient régime reasoned the rise of those modern ideologies.

The third criticism concerns his assumption that nationalism would lose its significance in a modern society. This assumption is the consequence of the linear relationship between nationalism and industrialization. Especially the ethno-symbolist author Anthony Smith shows dissent over this approach. Ac-

⁷ *ibid*, pp.159-160

⁸ *ibid*, pp. 161-162, also see Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, IV.Addition

According to Smith nations are natural formations and nationalism is merely the product of this natural process. Thus nationalism would always exist to legitimize the national formation, which is called the nation. ⁹ This is the aspect of ethno-symbolists. Moreover a modernist criticism can also be created concerning this assumption.

The modern ideologies serve as aims, rather than means. In many circumstances they can play some practical roles. However in their core they are created to influence the society, even manipulating them in many circumstances. That is why there is no ground to contend that nationalism loses its power as soon as the industrialization dominates as the total system.

Additionally the contemporary ethnic- nationalist movements illustrate that nationalism is still dominant in our society.

2.4 Eric J. Hobsbawm: The Invention of the Tradition and the Protonational Elements

Hobsbawm does not assess nationalism as merely a part of modernization. On the contrary he emphasizes on protonational elements and endeavors to include the traditional origins of nationalism. ¹⁰ This approach is the most favored positioning in this paper. I will contend further in the paper that those protonational elements are used to exclude the migrants in the society. The migrants are forced to identify themselves as being a party in the society by integrating themselves to those protonational elements of the majority. Hence some alternative approaches arose to challenge this exclusion. In other words protonationalism is replaced with postnationalism by some authors as an alternative to this exclusion. Hobsbawm stresses that the

⁹ *see* Anthony Smith, *Ulusların Etnik Kökeni (Ethnic Origins of Nations)*, translated by Sonay Bayramoğlu - Hülya Kendir, Ankara, Dost, 2002 the original version: Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1988

¹⁰ İnci Özkan Kerestecioglu, *op.cit.*, pp.37

notion of nation is an historical fact and nationalism is the child of the double evolution- the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. 11

Hobsbawm points out that nationalism activates the pre-existing collective emotions and harmonizes them with the modern state and the nation 12. Nationalism could really be expanded vertically by the assistance of the protonational elements which binds the societies with their pasts. None of the protonational elements (language, ethnicity, religion, sacred icons, and an emotion of belonging to a political unit) can alone create the nation. In a social context where modern state and nationalism arise, they become the elements of the nation. 13

Language is one of the most significant protonational elements that Hobsbawm refers to. In nationalist rhetoric national language is identified with the mother tongue. However national language is merely a fiction and in some cases it is de facto invented. It is merely a standardization of the divergent expressions or dialects. Another proto-national element is the ethnicity. This rhetoric presumes that the members of the nation derives from the common race, origin or/and blood. However the emotion of ethnical belonging is cultural rather than biological today. Additionally, the eugenic instances and social Darwinist approaches in post war era showed that the biological approach upon ethnicity is inhuman. Thus the ethnicity undertakes a functionalist role in the nationalist theory by making a distinction between "we" and the others. More concretely it is the distinction between the native and the migrant in this case. The third proto-national element is the religion. Hobsbawm entitled

¹¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *Devrim Çağı(The Age of Revolution)*, translated by Bahadır Sina Şener, Ankara, Dost yayınları, 1998, pp. 264) the original version: Eric J.Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, Vintage, 1996

¹² Eric Hobsbawm, *1780den Bugüne Milletler ve Milliyetçilik(Nations and Nationalism since1780)*, translated by Osman Akınhay, İstanbul, Ayrıntı, 1990, pp. 65 the original version: Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Pres, 1990

¹³ İnci Özkan Kerestecioglu,*op.cit*,pp.39

the religion as the paradoxical cement of the modern era. ¹⁴ Religion binds the people who have scarce or no common features. In many instances it can even transcend the effect of ethnicity in manipulating the masses.

Nationalism uses sacred icons like symbols and rituals (both in a divine and secular sense) to construct an imagined community. The national flags and the importance granted to them, rituals like adoration ceremonies illustrate the usage of sacred icons in modern nationalism.

The emotion of belonging to a political unit represents the most effective and decisive proto-national element. The reference points represented by this element are the belief of belonging to an historical nation and having a certain state tradition.

According to Hobsbawm, nationalism would have success as far as it activates those proto-national elements. Hobsbawm further stresses the process of the invention of the tradition.

This invention process is the consequence of the social engineering accomplished by the technocratic elites or the bureaucracy. The requirement for the invented traditions can merely be explained by the paradox and the contrast between the dynamic and mobile feature of the modern societies and the effort of rendering some parts of the social life stable and unchangeable.

2.5 Criticisms towards Eric J. Hobsbawm

The criticisms towards Hobsbawm are substantially addressed by ethno-symbolists. Ethno-symbolists stress that he could not determine the emergence time of the national consciousness. Additionally, he ignores the continuity of the ethnical cultures. He cannot explain the patriotic emotions of the citizens, he can not even unfold why the citizens die and sacrifice themselves for the sake of their nations. Finally he adopted a reductionist approach by giving mono-causal explanations such as granting proto-national elements a functionalist role. Ethno-symbolists

¹⁴ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *op.cit*, pp.86-87

assert that the elements like language, rituals, icons, symbols and the religion are the sine qua non for the nations, rather than satisfying a functionalist role. 15

The criticisms stressed above derive from another school-ethnosymbolism which contradicts with the modernist, constructivist approach. Hence this paper does not support or favor any of the critics emphasized above. The paper submits the fact that the rituals which bind the nationals are consciously invented and this invention is the result of the social engineering process.

2.6 Benedict Anderson: *The Imagined Communities*

The definition of the notion of nation made by Anderson enjoys the following features:

Nation is an imagined, political community. It is indeed an imagined community which enjoys both sovereignty and limitations. 16 They are imagined because the members of the nation survive within the minds of the other members, even though they do not even know each other. Hence a construction process occurs in this point. 17 Additionally, nation is imagined limitedly because the existence of the members of other nations should be taken into account. It is also imagined as sovereign. 18 Finally nation is imagined as a community in spite of the inequality and exploiting relations existing in the nation, nation is always imagined as deep and horizontal companionship relations. 19 This fact corresponds to the brotherhood (fraternité) principle introduced by the French Revolution. In other words

¹⁵ Umut Özkırımlı, op.cit, pp 141-146

¹⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler, Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*, (Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism) translated by İskender Savaş, İstanbul, Metis, 1993, pp.20. the original version: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991 (revised addition)

¹⁷ *ibid*, pp.20

¹⁸ *ibid*, pp.21

¹⁹ *ibid*, pp.22

Anderson contends that nation and nationalism are special cultural artifacts. Nationalism is related to the cultural systems born in it. The most significant system in that context would be the religion and the nobility. Those systems evolve and change into another systems and structures. What stable is as follows: The cultural systems dominate over the political ideologies on the development of nationalism. For instance, nationalism is influenced by the religion but could only arise within the secular systems just after the abolishment of the religious systems. Inclusion of the Migrants: Nationalism versus Constitutional Patriotism.

As it is pointed out above Anderson evaluates nation as a cultural artifact. However this approach is seen as reductionist by same authors and it is asserted that Anderson ignores the role of the political units and developments.

Second criticism points out that Anderson errs by contending that nationalism arose in a society whereas religion loses its value and importance. Critics contend that nationalism can not replace religion; rather they compromise in some cases.²⁰ They add that religion is indeed a very effective weapon to manipulate the population in a given territory. Religion reinforces the ethnicity weapon where this weapon does not have enough power.

In spite of some differences in their own theories, they mainly belong to the same school -the modernist school- which favors the functionalist /constructivist approach. They point out that nations are invented by nationalism. In other words identities are the fictions which are constructed for the legitimization of the existing systems and the status quo.

3. European Identity and the Alternative Considerations

3.1 European Identity and the Contributions of the Migrants on the European Identity

²⁰ Umut Özkırımlı, *op.cit.*, pp.177-178

The European identity constructed itself over the shoulders of modernity. However it gradually eluded itself from some dogmas of modernity like determinism and totality. Ironically this new identity is also immanent to modernity; merely a more hybrid structure is formed in that context. Thus a compromise on “unity in diversity” in European context should be reached. Europe indeed constitutes a very complex identity which comprises conflicts and uncertainties.²¹ Hence common values like liberal/representative democracy, rule of law, protection of Human Rights were constructed to reconcile the entire contradictions and ambiguities within Europe. The values like democracy, rule of law and universal human rights have been legitimized by the establishment of Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 within the European Union. Those criteria are formed to harmonize the European precedents and set them as vital criteria for the candidate states.

Despite the fact that so many authors evaluate those criteria as the universal criteria legitimizing diversities, this paper contradicts this point. For instance the notion of democracy implied in those criteria is mainly the liberal/representative democracy. The 2500 years adventure of democracy has always been in accordance with the capitalism. However in 1917 a new concept, namely the socialist democracy arose. Bolsheviks did not adopt the vision of the representative democracy, on the contrary they favored Jean Jacques Rousseau’s concept of general will (*la volonté general*) meaning that the will of the public is the sum of the will of all people within the state.²² Here it is not discussed the advantages, disadvantages and the detailed hypotheses of the both democracy visions. This transcends the borders of our analysis. The main point is that the democracy vision exacted from the liberal European Union (EU) states to post-Soviet

²¹ Dirk Jacobs, Robert Maier, *op.cit*, pp.1-4

²² Leslie Lipson, *Demokratik Uygarlık (Democratic Civilization)*, translated by H. Güllalp, T. Alkan, Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası, 1984, pp. 9-2 original version: Leslie Lipson, *Democratic Civilization*, Oxford U.P, 1969

states is not the unique universal democracy model. In other words the total European Identity pretends to replace universal values and reformulates/assimilates the existing values belonging to others. The most difficult transformation is indeed of the migrants who stems from divergent ethnical background. A construction of an identity requires a sort of an ethnification.²³ In other words demos is constructed on grounds of ethnicity. However during the fabrication of the European identity the migrants are integrated to the new legal order created by the nomenclatura of the Europe via certain legal documents. Those documents are mostly signed during the post war era, which are encouraged by the efforts of the United Nations(UN). UN adopted two main human rights documents, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights²⁴ and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights²⁵. Additionally United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was founded to deal with forced migration issues and internal displaced people. The former conventions based upon human beings, not Inclusion of the specifically upon migrants. However their inclusiveness and their call for non- discrimination rendered them noteworthy for migrants.

The first attempt at the European level corresponds to the European Convention on Human Rights²⁶ adopted by the European Council in 1950. Article 14 of this Convention provides that "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority (...). Article 4 of the European Convention on

²³ Dirk Jacobs, Robert Maier, *op.cit*, pp.3

²⁴ UN Document General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) A/63/6(1966), 999U.N.T.S 171, entered into force 23.III.1976

²⁵ UN Document General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) A/63/6(1966), 993U.N.T.S 3, entered into force 3.I.1976

²⁶ also known as Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by Protocol no:11), ETS No:005, Rome, 4.XI.1950, entered into force in 3.IX.1953

Establishment 27 of the Council of Europe provides that “Nationals of any Contracting Party shall enjoy in the territory of any other party treatment equal to that enjoyed by nationals of the latter party in respect of the possession and exercise of private rights whether personal rights or rights relating to property.” Further, Council of Europe adopted in 1961 the European Social Charter which is later revised in 1996.²⁸ The aim of this Charter is to safeguard the social rights of the citizens of the signatory states and improve their living standards and social well-being. The provisions introduced mainly are the right to work; just conditions of work; safe and healthy conditions; fair remuneration; organize; bargain collectively; of children and young persons to protection; employed women to protection of maternity; to vocational guidance; vocational training; protection of health; social security; social and medical assistance; benefit from social welfare services; of persons with disabilities to interdependence; social integration and participation in the life of the community; of the family to social, legal and economic protection; children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection; to engage in a gainful occupation on the territory of other parties and of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance. Article 19 of the European Social Charter granted migrants right of information, medical support, social assistance, safe and just working conditions and remuneration, security, family reunification, speaking in their mother tongue.

The most detailed legal codifications concerning migrants exist in the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union. Article 2/3 of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)²⁹ introduces the concept of the European citizenship, meaning that any national possessing the nationality of any Member State automatically holds the nationality of the other states. This con-

²⁷ ETS no: 019, Paris, 13.XII.1955, entered into force 23.II.1965

²⁸ ETS no 163, Strasbourg, 3.V.1996, entered into force 1.VII.1999

²⁹ Consolidated Version Official Journal: C-325 of 24.12.2002

ceptualization blurs the stabile linkage between the territoriality and citizenship. Since centuries the citizenship has identified itself within the limits of the given nation. For the first time in history this conceptualization got rid of the frontiers of the nation state. The separation between nationality/territoriality and citizenship invoke to a re-conceptualization of citizenship as extraterritorial. 30

Similarly and accordingly the status of migrants are reformulated due to the fact that the linkage between ethnicity and citizenship has been undermined. As far as the territorial limits are demolished, the migrants in different nation states launch transnational networks. They accomplish those networks on the grounds of several identity descriptions. These networks lead to the establishment of a transnational community as a new model in Europe. They are constructed upon common identities and common cultural, political, ethnical and geographical references.³¹

In spite of the fact that transnational networks are de jure promoted with the Maastricht Treaty, they de facto do not work properly. Those legal codifications arose from the requirements of a nation state. It merely blurs the frontiers that the nation-state has built, nor did it challenge its supremacy and existence. The modus operandi of this system derives from the nation-state; supranationalism is mainly excluded in this praxis. Hence new models are introduced by some authors. For instance, Habermas invented the concept of constitutional patriotism, while by his follower Marc Jean Ferry conceptualized a postnational citizenship model. Those two terms are terminologically interconnected and not challenge each other.

³⁰ Riva Kastoryano, “*Transnational Participation- Immigrants in the European Union*”, in <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/riva.pdf>, pp.1 (date of accession: 01.03.2007)

³¹ *ibid*, pp.3-7

3.2 Jürgen Habermas: *The Constitutional Patriotism-Cosmopolitanism*

Habermas redefined the European nation-state, sovereignty, the past and the future of the state nationality due to his conceptualization of the constitutional patriotism.³² The achievements of the nation state is indisputable, the sovereign states system established in Westphalia Treaty in 1648 developed itself on the shoulders of territoriality and sovereignty. However today's status quo has undermined this system. Habermas has announced the establishment of the democratic ideals for the entire Europe, but those ideals can merely be achieved by a new democracy model, namely the cosmopolitan democracy. Cosmopolitan ideals could replace the ideals of nationalism because it respects the cultural, ethnic and political differences and includes them as a legal category. He adopts a Kantian approach by contending that the citizens of a particular nation-state should see themselves as the citizens of the world. ³³ Janus paradigm ³⁴ can be used to explain the challenge between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Nationalism justifies itself on the grounds of ethnic nationality, where as cosmopolitanism favors liberal and civic values. The existing system comprises the both features of those ideologies just like the

³² see Jürgen Habermas, *Öteki Olmak, Ötekiyle Yaşamak- Siyaset Kuramı Yazıları (The Inclusion of The Other-Studies in Political Theory)*, translated by İlknur Aka, İstanbul, YKY, 2002 English version: Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000 (reprint edition)

³³ Craig Calhoun, “Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Interests, Identity and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe”, forthcoming in: Pablo De Greiff, Ciaran Cronin (eds), *Transnational Politics*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

³⁴ for the original usage of Janus Paradigm see Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, London, Verso, 1997 he uses this paradigm in order to point out the two faces of nationalism: one looking to the past and referring to the old values and the other looking to the future, seeking for the continuity of the nation. I tried to adapt this paradigm to the controversy between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Janus-the Roman god of doorways and passages with its two faces looking at the opposite directions.

Habermas endeavors to neutralize the ethnic nationals not only by means of law, but also by means of solidarity. ³⁵Referring to George Konrad; "Solidarity is a reference to society's spontaneous cohesion, independent of the state, organizing from below and easily driven underground". ³⁶In other words solidarity, which is independent from the state, can readily transcend the frontiers of the nation-state and contribute to the constitutional patriotism project. Beside the consensus between legality and solidarity, Habermas refers to the significance of the democratic political culture. The democratic political culture can merely be achieved by acculturation and this correspondingly leads to the achievements of the principles of constitutional democracy which are the democratic principles of inclusive collective self-determination and human rights. Accordingly the protonational elements referred by Eric Hobsbawm are replaced by the Habermasian liberal democratic norms and the ethnic link is replaced by the civic binding. ³⁷Habermas does not overlook the role of ethnical elements for the conduct of the political and social relations in a society. However the role he granted to ethno-cultural norms in a pluralistic society is not very appreciable. He merely contends that the liberal-civic principles should be interpreted by the society; the ethos created in that society and the *raison d'etre* of that society mainly influences the way the liberal norms are interpreted. Thus constitutional patriotism was granted a particularistic dimension which is rather recessive, compared to its universalistic dimension.³⁸

³⁵ Craig Calhoun, *op.cit*, pp.3-7

³⁶ George Konrad, "Anti- Politics", John Allen, Paul Lewis, Peter Braham (eds.), *Political and Economic Formations of Modernity*, Open University Blackwell, Polity Press, 1992, pp. 56-58(Reading B)

³⁷ Clarissa Rile Hayward, "Constitutional Patriotism and its Others", in: http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/intranet/poltheory/Constitutional_Patriotism.pdf (date of accession:01.03.2007)

³⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *op.cit*, pp. 111-113

Every theory constructs itself on the shoulders of one or more theories. As pointed out above the “other” of the constitutional patriotism is the nationalism. However Habermas adopted the Reductionist approach by equating nationalism with ethno-nationalism. There exists a clear distinction between ethnos (the ethnicity) and demos (the public, das Volk). However ethnic-nationalism demolishes this distinction. This concept on the one hand refers to inter-ethnic relations or pre-politic strain communities and on the other hand to nations. Thus it is emphasized that the ethnical communities are more natural and evolutionary older in comparison to the nations. This creates the core of the ethnical based socialization which is depended upon cultural identity. The members of this community see themselves as a fully extended family. ³⁹ Habermas evaluates nationalism solely with this dimension and neglects the role of nationalism in the construction of the democratic society. The appreciable efforts of Habermas on the formulation of the constitutional patriotism afterwards have led to a division into two variants, namely the thin constitutional patriotism and thick constitutional patriotism. The former introduces the system favored by Habermas , which evaluates the constitutional patriotism as an attachment to universal liberal norms which is contained in the national constitutions. Those values are filtered by the cultural values of the nation. Thus it is to a certain extent reflected from the peculiarities of a particular nation. ⁴⁰ Thick constitutional patriotism has stuck to liberal universal principles, overlooking the peculiarities of different identities. In other words the universal principles of the liberal democracy, human rights and the rule of law should be sufficiently thick to function as the cement of the entire communities and nations. Contrary to thin consti-

³⁹ *ibid*, pp.38

⁴⁰ Mattias Kumm, “*Thick Constitutional Patriotism and Political Liberalism: On the Role and Structure of European Legal History*”, German Law Journal, Vol:6, No:2, 1 February 2005, pp.319-321

tutional patriotism, thick constitutional patriotism has created on historical narrative a myth to justify the existence of those common European values.⁴¹

The narratives are rooted upon the moral principles of Enlightenment and inspired by Kant due to his idea of the totality of the world history. Shortly, similar to nationalism thick constitutional patriotism has created its own myths. The main difference is that constitutional patriotism constructed itself upon rational myths stemming from Enlightenment, whereas the nationalist discourse stems from primitive, pre-political myths. The entire modernity Project serves as a political discourse and a national myth for the thick constitutional patriotism.

Those rational myths are inspired by the medieval divine institutions of Europe which constructed the political culture of the entire Europe. Every innovation derives from old values, meaning that the innovations possess the signs of the old values. Denying this reality would correspond to a retrospective point of view, which it is intended to refrain from in this paper. Enlightenment comprises the medieval values like human dignity, secularized the existing values of Christianity or reformed them. However the thick constitutional patriotism built a linkage between the entire European civilization and the Christianity. The Christian heritage would be the basis for achieving the political ideal of equal citizens conceded with civil-liberal rights.⁴² Thus the divine European History is transformed to European legal history.

3.3 Criticisms towards Habermas and Constitutional Patriotism

Constitutional patriotism favors the application of liberal, modernist values to the entire society in order to integrate the different identities or include the others to the society. It is pre-

⁴¹ *ibid*, pp.324-325

⁴² *ibid*, pp.326-329

tended that there exists an absolute consensus on what the universal values correspond to .

However he is trapped into reductivism by contending that liberal democracy, rule of law and universal norms of human rights can be applied in every single society. This is indeed the determinist point of view of modernism which is criticized by contemporary thinkers. In other words the application of those values to every single society would not always bring good circumstances to the society.

The followers of the modernist school (also known as the school of political development) in 1960s like Karl Deutsch, Pye, Lerner, Apter stressed that those liberal/modernist values should be transferred to the third world countries in order to democratize them. In other words a modernist revolution stemming from top to bottom is modeled by those modernist authors for the third world countries. Habermas applies the similar model to the core of Europe to include the others to the society. He ignores the sui generis characters of the others. It should be admitted that he adopts a softer model compared with thick constitutional patriotists. In his model the universalistic values should be interpreted by the values of the entire society. However he does not find a reply to the following question: Whose values should be interpreted as the universal values; the values of the majority in the society or the values of the divergent groups are also included? If the values of the divergent groups are also taken into account, what sort of a compromise is going to be reached in the society?

Unfortunately Habermas leaves these questions unanswered. Some assumptions can be extracted from his writings concerning public sphere. I will not comprehensively explain the Habermasian public sphere; it is not included in this paper. Shortly, according to him public sphere is the center area where the public opinion is based upon. In this conceptualization he refers ratio and popular consent based self-government principle, so that the relationship between democracy and legal state is radicalized. He stresses that the divergent wills of the differ-

ent groups are negotiated at the public sphere. 43 Habermas merely points out the negotiation process of the divergent general wills but he leaves questionable by which means to achieve it. This gap on this theory can lead to the oppression of the majority over minority.

Contrary to Rousseau; Habermas contends that the general will can only be constructed as a result of the bargains of the divergent wills. Rousseau contends that the general will is the sum of the wills of the divergent wills. The gap on Habermas' theory leads to the application of the Rousseau's theory on the public sphere, so that there is no sufficient protection upon the migrants to represent themselves in the society.

Second, constitutional patriotism justifies itself upon its other-the nationalism. Habermas ignores the significance of nationalist imaginaries for the evolution concluding with the establishment of a democratic society. 44The ideology of nationalism is the child of modernization. Like the other ideologies born in nineteenth century nationalism contributed to the formation of a modern nation state. The challenge between protonational elements and the democratic liberal values is the modus operandi of the formation of a modern nation-state.

Solely the ideology of nationalism could trigger this challenge. Besides, we can not overlook the continuing power of nationalism. In many circumstances nationalist solidarities replace constitutional solidarities. 45

Habermas equates nationalism with ethnic- nationalism by ignoring other features of nationalistic identity. This is the other reductivist approach that Habermas adopts.

Nationalism harmonizes the entire religious, linguistic, ethnical, political elements while creating its own myth. The severe instances of ethnical nationalism in the history like in the Third Reich do not reason the abolishment of the other nationalist elements. In other words political discourse of nationalism is

⁴³ Meral Özbek, *Kamusal Alan (Public Sphere)*, Istanbul, Hil, 2005, pp. 39-

⁴⁴ Craig Calhoun, *op.cit*, pp.6

⁴⁵ *ibid*, pp.5

not merely ethnical; it is supported by a collective formation of culture. 46 For instance nationalist discourse is constructed upon collective-action, such as the rituals like the taking of the Bastille as the symbol of French Revolution; this date is celebrated as “Fête Nationale” (National Day) of the Fifth Republic of France. 47

Constitutional patriotist approach needs a strong positioning to social solidarity. However his tendency on relying on solidarity is problematic. He treats cultural similarity as a basis for solidarity which functions as to motivate the nationals. Referring to Craig Colhoun's criticisms and regarding to Habermassian solidarity approach; cultural solidarity as the sole basis for solidarity would be rather a mono-dimensional positioning. Functional integration, social networks and mutual engagements are also necessary besides cultural similarity to create a notion of solidarity in a given society. Besides, the Habermassian culture rhetoric is questionable. Habermas treats the culture as the pre-historical, pre-political and stabile myth created by the ethnic nationalists and which is dominant in the minds of the national. However culture indicates a dynamic, continuing, developing re-formation process; it is subject to continuing reproduction. 48 Hence the Habermassian conceptualization of solidarity is not only insufficient but also in its core misleading.

Thick constitutional patriotism pictures a sharper and total European identity compared with the model introduced by Habermas. Thick constitutional system endeavors to establish a uniform, total and homogenous European identity, other than harmonizing the diversities. The paper endeavors to find a cogent reply to the following question: Can the migrants be included in a given society without being assimilated with the framework drawn by constitutional patriotism? However the thick constitutional patriotism absorbs those diversities. The migrants coming to Europe do not always stem from Central

⁴⁶ *ibid*, pp.7

⁴⁷ *ibid*, pp.28

⁴⁸ *ibid*,pp.11

Europe; they frequently originate from the so-called Third World Countries, who share totally different values. Constitutional patriotism endeavors to frame its ideology on the grounds of legality.

Nevertheless a myth is created by thick national patriotism, which is totally unfamiliar to most of the migrants coming to Europe. Moreover, legal values should not be depended upon myths. Legality is favored by constitutional patriotism because of its assumption of nationality. Hence there exists a dilemma in the formulation of that ideology. An emphasis on Christianity is the most salient myth created by the thick constitutional patriotism. In that sense there have been several debates whether to refer to Christianity in the European Constitution. In the existing version of the draft constitution there has been no direct reference to Christianity. On the Contrary, a thinner approach is adopted by referring to the common values which is found more preferable in this paper. Religious myths would destroy the universal and cosmopolitan ideals favored by cosmopolitan patriotism. This is the main dilemma that the thick cosmopolitan patriotism gets through.

In the following chapter postnationalism will be discussed. Postnationalism is the sine qua non of the entire constitutional patriotism project. It goes one step forward in its assumptions and refers to the creation of the universal personhood. However each complete and justify each other's ideological rhetoric.

3.4 Postnationalism: One Step Forward in the Cosmopolitanist Project

Postnationalism, the sine qua non of the constitutional patriotism, constructs a framework in examining the interaction between national identity and the European identity. It conceives of an identity in which the notion of identity flees from the burden of the national references. It depends upon undermining the existence of the nation states. It stresses that the nation

states are no more the sole reference point for the existence of democratic systems and practices.

The implementation of democratic practices could merely be possible by means of supranationalism. In that supranational system the main values of European identity are the following: Cosmopolitanism, supranational democracy, European legitimacy and the accountability. 49 The postnationalist rhetoric can be pictured as follows:

Nazis were bloody ethnical nationalists, they went on Holocaust, Milosevic's war policy depended upon ethnical cleansing, there was a mass extermination of Tutsis by Hutu in Rwanda. Why should we base our future upon this bloody ethnical rhetoric? Can't we transcend the borders of the nation state?

Referring to this rhetoric some academics in and outside Europe imagined a post national citizenship model. The contributions of a French academic Jean-Marc Ferry are indeed very considerable. His starting point on formulizing his theory was to base upon Habermassian European constitutionalism. According to him, the sole way to get rid of the ethnical-cultural burdens of the nation state was to rely on a European constitution which is defined upon civic terms. Ferry adds that the *modus operandi* of the postnationalist imaginary is to overcome the nationalist rhetoric so that political unity and cultural diversity would harmonize as in the European space. 50

I would like notably to refer Yasemin Soysal -a Turkish originated American sociologist- for her appreciable emphasis on migrants in a so-called postnational system. European Union has created a new legal order, where the states and nationals can invoke the EU law for the national court judgments which are not compatible with EU law. This system can be entitled as multilevel constitutionalism. Soysal applies the similar legal system for the citizenship issues and introduces a new model of

⁴⁹ Muriel Rambour, "References and Uses of Postnationalism in French and British Debates on Europe" in http://www.tamilnation.org/oneworld/post_nationalism_rambour.pdf, pp. 1-4 (date of accession:01.03.2007)

⁵⁰ *ibid*, pp.6

citizenship where the citizenship rights are not formed upon the basis of nationality. This formation leads to a formation of a universal personhood, where the use of citizenship rights is not limited to a certain nation state. 51

The notion of citizenship has experienced an evolutionary period and its meaning has extended over time. Citizenship corresponds to a right to contribution to the political discourse and action in a given society. Terminologically the word politics stems from the ancient Greek word *politēs* which mean citizen. Till the abolishment of the feudal system, citizens were the noble men. Gradually all men acquired the right of citizenship. It was not till the twentieth century that the women were included to the definition of being a citizen. The most difficult step towards extending the meaning of citizenship is to include the others –the migrants- without assimilating them. The ancient Greek's *metoikos* (foreigners) are shifted into migrants today. Even in Athen's democracy *metoikos* was deprived of the political rights. Thus Soysal introduces a postnational system where the political contributions of the migrants are safeguarded.

According to Soysal the domination of the postnational system derives from the changes occurred in international system. The sovereign states system established by the Westphalia Treaty is undermined when the interdependence and connectedness of the states increased.

Such of a status quo reasoned the emergence of the transnational political structure. Nation state remains to enjoy the monopoly of conducting political actions, however the parameters of those actions are now determined at the global level. 52 This evolution leads to the construction of the postnational model, where the nation state totally loses its monopoly over public functions. Soysal assumes that postnational citizenship model

⁵¹ Yasemin Soysal, “Towards a Postnational Model of Membership”, Gershon Shafir (eds), *The Citizenship Debates*, Minneapolis/ London, University of Minnesota Press, pp.189

⁵² *ibid*, pp. 188-197

oversees the migrants as a legal category. The migrants claim their own specific rights stemming from the universal human rights. The most significant step towards that project is the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights by the signatory states of the European Convention of Human Rights. Not only the States but also individuals directly appeal to the Court. This is the unique system, in which the individuals directly invoke the international human rights law. By that means decisions on immigration and family reunification were frequently given by the Court as a result of the applications from the migrant families. European Court of Justice (ECJ) also introduces a similar system. The main difference is that the individuals can not directly appeal to the ECJ, they can merely apply to the national court to invoke the EU Law. However ECJ judgments on human rights issues are very noteworthy, European Convention on Human Rights has been quoted several times not only on ECJ Judgments, but also on constructing the general principles of the EU Law. 53

Moreover, according to Soysal at the international level there exists a consensus on rendering the rights of migrants an inalienability status. Thus a right of personhood is achieved via the exception of migrant rights as an inalienable part of human rights. Soysal bases this argument upon the human rights discourse. The human rights discourse comprises the entire cultural rights and this leads to the introduction of the multicultural project. Multiculturalism represents a particularistic characteristic but those particularistic rights are ironically preserved at the international level for the accomplishment of the postnational project. 54

To sum up, the legal regulations at the international level replaces the nationalist myths for the construction of a universal personhood. Nationalism equips the nationals with the same identity, value, language and identity. As a contrast postnation-

⁵³ *ibid*, pp.190-202

⁵⁴ *ibid*, pp.202-204

alism creates a universal identity comprising multicultural characteristics.

3.5 Postnationalism: The Solution for the Inclusion of the Migrants?

The approach of the postnationalists for the inclusion of the other identities is rather optimistic. This paper agrees on many of the assumptions of the postnationalist project such as on the increasing role of the International Community and Human Rights Conventions. However this paper dissents on the assumption that those regulations are sufficient to undermine the protonational references. In spite of the supranational steps of the European Union, the main sovereign power is still the nation state. We can not ignore the increasing role of nationalism for the construction of unity at the nation state level. Nationalist discourse have not lost its importance, rather it has increased it. Moreover, the existing regulations at the international level do not suffice to create a universal personhood. Human rights discourse comprises the recognition of cultural rights which is the sine qua non of the migrant rights. However this discourse is neither de facto nor de jure justified at the international level. It is not de facto justified because even the judgments of the International Courts do not represent a coherent trend and their applications are left to the signatory states. In other words it is within the discretionary power of the signatory states to grant the migrants rights compatible with the Human Rights Conventions. Moreover, solely the migrant populations living in the territory of the signatory states could claim rights. The migrants residing in a non- signatory state of a particular human rights or migrant rights convention can not enjoy any of the rights granted to them at the international level. So that the protection of the migrant rights at the international level are not as exclusive as it is assumed by postnationalists.

It is not also de jure sufficiently justified at the international level. The codification of the human rights at the international level is indeed in a very advanced level. However there is no specific convention on migrant rights. There exists some provi-

sions in many conventions or corpus of human rights is referred to render migrant rights an inalienable human rights status. However those developments are not sufficient in this status quo.

The mere specific legal document concerning migrants in the European space is the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. ⁵⁵This Convention is one of the most important documents for the Council of Europe where it directly refers to the treatment of aliens in a territory of a Member State of the Council of Europe. ⁵⁶ The aim of this Treaty is to grant the migrant workers right to education, employment and access to various social facilities demolish the disparities and provide an equal access to all those social benefits.

Additionally, the accomplishment of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality is also aimed by this Convention. ⁵⁷ The convention consists of six chapters, namely the definition of a worker; recruitment; social and economic rights including family reunification; return home; relationship with bilateral and multilateral agreements and housekeeping. The adoption of this Convention is indeed a very important step forward to create migrant rights as a legal category. However it is limited to migrant workers rather than addressing the entire migrant population. Besides, the rights conferred here are very far away from achieving the protection of migrant rights at the international level. In other words recognition of the diversities and conferring the migrant's universal rights can not be achieved in such an international system. The legal framework created at the international level should be more vigorous and effective to achieve the universal personhood.

⁵⁵ ETS No: 093, Strassbourg 24.XI.1977, entered into force in 1. V.1983

⁵⁶ Elspeth Guild, “*The European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977)- An Analysis of its Scope and Benefits*” ,in http://www.coe.int/T/E/Social_Cohesion/Migration/Documentation/Publications_and_reports/Reports_and_proceedings/CDMG%20_99_11e.pdf , March 1999, (date of accession: 10.03.2007)

⁵⁷ *ibid*, pp.8-10

4. Conclusion

This research paper endeavored to find a reply to the following questions: How can we achieve the inclusion of the migrants to the given societies, especially to the construction process of the European identity? Are constitutional patriotism and the post-national model the valid solutions for the achievement of the inclusion project? With this framework, it is endeavored to adopt a critical approach upon those models. The main assumption of this paper was that the entire identities have been constructed, every single group in a given society create their own myths. Thus a reference was made on the authors who referred this assumption as a starting point. Those authors wrote on nationalism, which is "the other" of the constitutional patriotism. Ernest Gellner, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson contend that the nations and nationalism are the products of social engineering. They are the consequences of the human artifact and acquire their legitimacy from the proto-national elements such as language, religion, sacred icons, a feeling of belonging to a certain political unit. In order to transcend the limits of those elements and create a total, legal based European identity to include the others; so many legal regulations were made. Consequently, the migrants living in the European countries created transnational networks which are rather weak. It is tried to find out whether constitutional patriotism can further this weak step and constitute a universal personhood model. Constitutional patriotism has two variants, namely the thick constitutional patriotism and the thin constitutional patriotism. Thick constitutional patriotism replaces nationalist myths with European myths and creates a total European identity. Thin constitutional patriotism is the model that Habermas adopted which presumes that the universal values should be filtered by the peculiar characters of the communities. However there is a gap upon how to filter those values. Accordingly an emphasis on postnationalism was made. The aim of this theory is to create

post-national personhood. The ideology of constitutional patriotism and postnationalism are interconnected. They both endeavor to create a universal personhood depended upon legal framework, especially upon the constitutionalisation of Europe within the framework of the liberal and universal values.

However this legal framework establishment does not introduce a sufficient protection for the recognition of migrant rights. The reason is that the nation state still enjoys discretionary power over the recognition of the entire human rights conventions. The postnational theory can merely succeed when the nation-state loses its supremacy. However in this status quo this does not seem to be a very realistic assumption.

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Our Conferences 2007

Turkish-German Conference

A conference was organised in Berlin on June 15th 2007 on Turkey's Neighbourhood and European Security- A Turkish-German Dialogue conjointly by the The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) and The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

Following opening remarks by Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, DGAP and Seyfi Taşhan, President, FPI, the following questions were discussed in 3 panels.

- 1) Regional Security in Turkey's Neighbourhood
- 2) South East Europe. Energy Security
- 3) Turkey and the EU

Also a Public Session was held to discuss Turkey's political and economic outlook.

In the First Panel, the policy of Turkey with regard to the Balkans, Caucasia, Cyprus, Greece and Iraq were explained by the Turkish participants.

In the Second Panel, the convergence between the energy policies of Turkey and EU was discussed.

The Third Panel dealt with the Turkish negotiations with EU.

In the Public Session, the Turkish participants gave detailed information on the political outlook and the economic development in Turkey.

Turkey- Japan Roundtable

During the first think-tank meeting between the two countries, security issues, terrorism, energy and relations between Turkey and Japan were discussed. At the beginning of the Roundtable, it was pointed out that the world had changed greatly since the 9/11 attacks and that Turkey and Japan were in similar positions with respect to growing threats. Whether it is possible to talk of an international order and whether there is a multipolar world were the questions addressed. It was also said that post-Cold War expectations had not materialized. H. E. Nobuaki Tanaka, the Ambassador of Japan in Ankara delivered a key-note speech at the Roundtable.

On security issues Turkey's and Japan's neighbourhoods were scrutinized. Conflicts in the Middle East, Caucasia, the Black Sea region and Central Asia were addressed. It was pointed out that the conflicts in the Middle East were interrelated. The question of Turkey's reaction to PKK terrorism also came up. It was explained that the transformation in Turkish foreign and security policy could be called a mixture of neo-realism and liberalism. Examples of this policy in the region surrounding Turkey were also given. Japan's neighbourhood was explained, mainly through developments arising from ASEAN's conference diplomacy. Japan-China disputes and Japan's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ASEAN countries were also introduced. There appeared a convergence of views between the two delegations with respect to growing threats in the world.

Terrorism was the subject of another panel discussion. The basic characteristics of terrorism and the potential for terrorism in Turkey's neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, was explained in detail. Worldwide terrorism has also affected Turkey, since all terrorist organisations have international connections and Turkey has had to learn to deal with it in a holistic manner. The causes of the rise of radical Islamic movements in the Arab world were also taken up with a look into the nature

of their formation.

Energy issues were examined with a focus on Turkey's situation. Particular emphasis was given to the potential of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. The interest of Japan in the area was also highlighted. The participation of a Japanese oil company representative brought a practical dimension to the discussion. During the debate, information on the energy situation around the world, in the region, in Japan and in Turkey was furnished. The emerging picture was that Turkey was an energy transit hub with oil and gas pipelines criss-crossing the country. The European Union's energy policy was also taken up. Nuclear development and non-proliferation issues were discussed, particularly with respect to the activities of certain countries. Attention was drawn to the dangers facing the non-proliferation system.

Relations between the two countries were an important part of the Roundtable. There was general agreement that the two countries should further cooperate in facing challenges, particularly with the international situation still evolving. Economic exchange was deemed of paramount importance. In this area the Turkish side pointed to the trade imbalance between the two countries as well as to the insufficient direct involvement of Japanese firms in Turkey. There was a discussion on measures to remedy the situation. A Japanese trading company representative noted the importance of attracting Japanese investments that boost Turkish exports and of adopting international standards for infrastructure tenders.

Cultural exchange was seen as a major supporting factor in the relationship. The present level of cultural relations, tourism and exchange programmes is quite advanced, but the participants from both sides expressed their desire to see these activities further developed. The information provided by the President of the Japan-Turkish Foundation, particularly concerning future projects, was received with enthusiasm.

