



# DIŞ POLİTİKA - FOREIGN POLICY

---

A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute

Vol: XXVIII

2002

Nos:1-2

---

Foreign Policy Institute  
Bilkent University, East Campus, Ankara, Turkey  
e.mail: [fpi@foreignpolicy.org.tr](mailto:fpi@foreignpolicy.org.tr)  
Web Site: <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr>

By its statute and law, Turkish Foreign Policy Institute is not allowed to express views on political matters. Therefore, the views expressed in this publication are solely those of their authors.

<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>A Panorama of Turkish Foreign Policy</b> Seyfi Tařhan	3
<b>Cyprus: Settlement and Membership</b> M. Ergün Olgun	12
<b>1974 Cyprus Conflict in Perspective: Theory and Practice</b> Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner	27
<b>Foreign and Security Policy of Lithuania</b> Giedrius Čekuolis	49
<b>Neighbors Should Be Seen As Natural Partners</b> Arne Olav Brundtland	54
<b>FPI Notes</b>	
<b>Istanbul Spirit: OIC-EU Joint Forum of     Foreign Ministers Meeting</b> Sencar Özsoy	63
<b>Turkey's Relations With Syria</b> Solmaz Ünaydın	67
<b>The Advantages of Greater Clarity to Turkey's Path for Full     Accession to the European Union</b> FPI Working Group	70
<b>Aegean Renewed Turkish-Greek Dialogue</b> Seyfi Tařhan	73

# A PANORAMA OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (SPRING 2002)

Seyfi TASHAN\*

In the course of the past decade Turkish foreign policy has been gradually moving from the realist model of international relations based on absolute national sovereignty and military balance and autarchic economy, towards the liberal model that encourage democracy, human rights, greater integration in the international processes, increased dialogue with neighbors to enhance peace, security and welfare. Although this process has not advanced to a level similar to those of many countries in Western Europe substantial progress is already recorded.

Evidences of the progress are improved multi-dimensional integrative relations with most of our neighbors both in bilateral relations as well within the context of regional international arrangements. Major transformation has occurred in our relations with Greece, even though the chronic dispute desire more compromise on both sides, with Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Iraq (despite Saddam and complex situation in Northern Iraq), and post Ocalan Syria.

In the multi-lateral field we could mention significant developments in Balkans cooperation within different contexts, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Economic Cooperation Organization, MEDA program, D8, not to mention other larger international organizations.

The most important event that shaped the foreign policies of many countries was certainly the events of September 11, 2001 creating new paradigms and priorities in international relations. Turkish foreign policy was also among policies of countries that were affected by the tragedy which brought before the eyes of the world, in almost a

---

\* Director of Turkish Foreign Policy Institute

grotesque manner, the seriousness of the threat of terrorism and its implications for every country of the world.

### *Terrorism*

Fight against terrorism that was considered up to now a low intensity warfare or a soft threat had now become a major hard threat that required an all out war particularly by those countries that suffered most from its impact.

A second implication of the attacks in New York and Washington was that, not only terrorist organizations themselves, but the states that had actually contributed or were prone to contribute to terrorism because of their past actions and future potential had now become targets in the fight against terror.<sup>1</sup>

A third implication was that it would be difficult for the terrorist of one country to be the hero of another country and that there would be a genuine international cooperation in the fight against terror and an agreement could finally be reached on the definition and classification of the terror organizations and the methods of fight against them. This implication was very important for Turkey because most European countries had dual approach against terrorist organizations active in Turkey. While countries like Germany or France had considered the PKK and DHKPC as terror organizations many other countries as well as international organizations had failed to do so and provided asylum and support for their cause. Turkey had hoped that under the newly developed international atmosphere there would be a uniform approach towards all terror organizations in Europe and this hope has not materialized.

A fourth implication was the impact of the fight against terror on the protection and promotion of human rights in the world. Many proponents of human rights in Europe and the world at large were seriously concerned that passive and active measures to be taken to reduce, contain and fight against possible and actual terrorists might impair the codified rights of the individuals and provide opportunities for countries to take measures ranging from further restrictions against asylum seekers, foreign residents and dissidents. This concern has proven to be right as US introduced star chamber courts to try members of terrorist organizations, UK introduced special tough measures against asylum seekers, Russia increased the vehemence against Chechnian fighters for independence and Israel enlarged its fight against Palestinian terrorist organizations to include all Palestinian targets and also continue its settlement building in occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank. Also in Turkey, this new climate may have a retarding effect on some of the reforms needed for strengthening Turkish democracy.

---

<sup>1</sup> Even though it is not shared by other nations the description as “evil axis” of Iraq, Iran and N. Korea and selection of Saddam by the US must be viewed in this category.

In the new international environment, the United States, the victim that suffered most from acts of terrorism had acquired the potential to use its peerless military power to crush terrorist bases abroad also as an added value to defend its national interests. This new status of power<sup>2</sup> described by some as “hyper power” has certainly shadowed and even made problematic the European initiative for the formation of a rapid deployment force as part of the European Security and Defense policy. The new international environment has brought Turkey and US closer since both countries share determination to fight against international terrorism and both have roles and capabilities in a large hinterland around Turkey.

The events that escalated in the Palestinian Israeli conflict since September 11 has left Turkish foreign policy in a dilemma. On one hand the acts of suicide bombers of Palestinian terrorist organizations cannot be condoned in the Turkish public opinion because Turkey itself has suffered from these acts from its own terrorist organizations and mass killing of innocent civilians, despite great sympathy felt over the sufferings of the Palestinians under the hardships long suffered from Israeli occupation, and recent assault by Israel under the pretext of pursuing terrorists as a measure of self defense, their persistent enlargement of settlements in the Palestinian territories of West Bank as well their refusal to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions. On the other hand Turkey feels that it has to maintain good trade and military logistic cooperation with Israel as a result of its national interests. Turkey does not have to defend these relations, which are concomitant with its national interests, with Arab callousness concerning international issues that are of vital interest for Turkey nor with the current discord among Moslem and Arab countries preventing them from adopting a common policy or attitude.<sup>3</sup>

### EU-Turkey Relations

This shared strategic interest and the difference between Turkey several European countries regarding Turkish terrorists have caused a debate on the merits of the Turkish policy aim of joining the European Union. Turkish aspiration to become a member of every European society has been a long standing feature of Turkish polity. Rationalism and modernism were the two main pillars of Kemalism, and successive Turkish governments in modern times have firmly believed that this could most conveniently be achieved only through further integration of Turkey in European institutions.

---

<sup>2</sup> Védérine, Huber, *Le Monde aux Tournant de Siecle, Politique Etranger* Vol.4/99 p. 814

<sup>3</sup> For example the meeting of ICO in February 2002 Kuala Lumpur failed to decide whether suicide bombers were terrorists or not.

Until recent years while Turkey's determination to pursue this 'European vocation' was clear and almost absolute to the degree of idealism. Against the Turkish zest European attitude has been more pragmatic, and dualistic.

During the cold war this was not so apparent because Turkey and Western European members of the Atlantic alliance faced a major threat against their security and even existence and they cooperated under the US leadership. Although European countries had certain qualms about accepting Turkey into the Council of Europe and NATO<sup>4</sup>, once Turkey was in both organizations cooperation was mutually very fruitful to the degree that both Greece and Turkey could be contemplated as future members of the European Economic Community<sup>5</sup>. So long as the cold war continued in all its vehemence the perfect nature of harmony in Turkey's relations with most European countries could continue.

The 1970s were marked by three important events that brought about a debate as to the true nature of relations between Turkey and the West. The most important certainly was the agreements signed between Presidents Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, heralding the beginning of East-West détente that brought about a reluctance among European countries to increase their contributions to common defense efforts despite many pledges they made<sup>6</sup>. This development along side serious and vehement extreme left and right conflict and terror in Turkey have contributed to the creation of an unfavorable climate in civil society relations as well as in the general atmosphere of relations between Turkey and western Europe.

The second event was the oil crisis of 1973 that led European countries to reduce their economic growth and follow regressive policies. The impact of this development on Turkish European relations was that EEC no longer could look upon with favor to the promises it made to Turkey for free circulation of labor and services as pledged in the Association agreement with Turkey. The Association agreement was assuming an *à la carte* character also due to delays in the implementation of Turkey's own obligations. Instead of reaching an agreement with Turkey, on the issues of free circulation of manpower and services and implementation of financial protocols EEC chose to ignore the pledges and acted by fiat.

The third factor was the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. This has resulted in the breaking of the tandem approach towards Turkey and Greece and the latter soon became the more favored nation in Europe and was included in the EEC.

---

<sup>4</sup> In 1950 Turkey's first application for NATO membership was rejected. In 1952 Britain on behalf of other European allies tried to include Turkey in a proposed Middle East Pact rather than NATO. See for example: Athanassopoulou, E., *Turkey-Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952* Frank Cass, London 1999

<sup>5</sup> See article 28 of the Ankara Treaty of 1963 establishing an Association between Turkey and EEC.

<sup>6</sup> See: S. Tashan 'Thoughts on Co-existence and President Nixon's Visits to Peking and Moscow', *Dış Politika-Foreign Policy* Vol.2, No.2 pp 68-80.

The negative impact of Greece's membership and its use of veto for every EU decision in favor of Turkey affected the entirety of Turkey's relations with Europe<sup>7</sup> and also had serious disruptive implications for Turkey's internal public order.

In the beginning of 1990s the new conditions that arose with the dissolution of the Soviet Union coupled with the significant reforms in Turkish economy changed Turkey's regional role from a marginal one to that of a central country in a wide region. This encouraged Turkey so much that in 1987 Turkey applied for full membership in EC. One way to increase cooperation with Turkey was to revive the association relationship and give Turkey the hope of one day becoming a member of the Union. The customs union was a significant instrument in this direction. The EU Council meeting in Lisbon in 1992 took a decision for the establishment of a customs union with Turkey in industrial products. While this could have been achieved by a unilateral declaration by Turkey (since EU had already fulfilled its obligation) it was turned into a pompous resolution of the association council that required approval by the European parliament. The cost for Turkey, thanks to Greek threat to veto, was the promise made to accept the principle of having Cyprus as a full member with the first of phase of next enlargement.

It seemed for a while that the ultimate aim of EU in its relations with Turkey was achieved through the partial customs union. A few days before the Customs Union arrangement came into force in December 1995 the EU Council in Barcelona placed Turkey, Ukraine, Russia and the Southern Mediterranean countries into the category of 'strategic neighbors' of EU. This decision was reaffirmed at the EU council in Luxembourg in 1997 although it recognized Turkey as an 'eligible' country for membership and yet slashed all hopes in that direction. The strong reaction of Turkey such as cutting off all political dialogue with EU and the results of German elections that removed from power the Kohl Government that was against Turkey's admission into EU and brought a milder left wing coalition into government paved the way for a revision of the pattern of relations with Turkey at Helsinki summit of December 1999. The final declaration was a masterpiece in 'langages diplomatique'. It declared on one hand Turkey as a candidate for full membership like other twelve countries; said it would give them same treatment but at the same time gave the others a time table for negotiations and in essence asked Turkey to fulfill the so-called Copenhagen criteria and resolve the question of Cyprus and boundary problems with Greece, and threatened that if there was no solution to the Cyprus question it might accept the present Greek Cypriot Government as the Government of Cyprus and include it in the Union, but cautioned that if there is no agreement it would review all relevant conditions. It is quite obvious that the admission

---

<sup>7</sup> Actual freeze in the relation from the European point stayed stagnant from 1981 to 1992 Lizbon summit. From the Turkish standpoint from 1978 to 1987 date of Turkish application for full membership.

of Cyprus into EU where Turkey is not a member is in violation of the 1959-60 agreements<sup>8</sup> and means an indirect Union with Greece. Such a move before an agreement is reached between the two communities will create a legal vacuum in Northern Cyprus and it will be up to Northern Cypriot Turks to determine the future of their country. Such a policy by EU which is threateningly used by EU spokesmen such as Dr. Verheugen or Roman Prodi is being counter-productive in persuading Greek Cypriots adopting a conciliatory attitude in their negotiations with Turkish Cypriots.<sup>9</sup> The threat to have Southern Cyprus as a full member against what Turks believe is a violation of international law; failure to provide a date for the beginning of accession talks with Turkey; occasional loose statements by European politicians challenging the "Europeaness" of the Turkish nation; again occasional irresponsible resolutions of the European Parliament, all give the impression to the Turkish public that EU has a dualistic or haphazard, or ambiguous or no policy on Turkey-EU relations. Turkish public opinion is much disturbed about the current policy of deliberate ambiguity followed by EU Council and Commission and would prefer clarity even at its cost. Otherwise, anti-European forces and the proponents of nationalism and even Islamic regimes as well as third world idealists may erode the majority that favors union with Europe as the soundest way to modernism and rationality in the defense of Turkey's national interests.<sup>10</sup> If the threat by Greece to veto European enlargement process is to lead to membership of Greek Cypriots to full membership it is absolutely clear that this will deal a major blow to the future of Turkey EU relations; and it is highly doubtful if a diplomatic solutions can ever be found to remedy the damage to be done.

There is no doubt that the current ambiguity of EU policy stems not only from Greek attitudes but also from EU's own indecision regarding its future. Those who support the creation of a closer political and economic union envisage a Europe a strong partner in a multi-polar world where Europe will play a global role alongside US, China, et. al. Those who envision such a Europe consider that Turkey should be an active player together with Europe in its wide hinterland in the Middle East and Eurasia. On the other hand the same people would rather see Turkey as a strategic partner rather than as a full member. Their assumption is that Turkey's interests are so similar with that of Europe that Turkey would anyhow play along with Europe even if it is not a full member. The reluctance of Turkey to demand clarity from EU for the past 15 years may be an indication that Turkey is not yet ready for a show down with EU. It is clear, however that if Turkey is not ready for a show-down EU may be expected with its current policy of deliberate ambiguity ad infinitum.

---

<sup>8</sup> See: Maurice H. Mendelson Q.C. "Why Cyprus Entry Into The European Union Would Be Illegal"

<sup>9</sup> See: This has been underscored in numerous statements of Turkish leaders and commentations both in Cyprus and Turkey.

<sup>10</sup> See: The debate ensuing the statement by General Kılınç in Turkish Daily News, April 25, 2002

Another area that continued to create a sour atmosphere in Turkey's relations with the EU was the ESDP. The fact that EU showed a determined attitude to keep Turkey out of the ESDP structures had augmented Turkey's suspicions about the European desire to integrate itself with Turkey in the security and defense domain for the reason explained above. Greece's refusal to accept the compromise solution reached among Turkey, UK and US has been received in Ankara as normal but it is hoped that this objection could be overcome as an internal problem of EU without diluting the essence of the agreement.

### Turkey And Its Neighbors

While raggedness continues in the Turkey-EU-Greece triangle, there seems to be significant developments in bi-lateral relations between Turkey and Greece for some years. For the first time over twenty years, Turks and Greeks have started negotiations on their differences in the Aegean context. Even though the positions of both sides are diametrically opposed in the dispute over the Aegean<sup>11</sup>, the beginning of negotiations by itself may be considered as a good omen. The bi-lateral relations in economy, culture and even such international institutions such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Balkan cooperation structures are developing fairly satisfactorily. For a long time Greek public opinion and media considered Turkey's attempt to improve its relations with countries in South East Europe as an attempt aimed at isolating Greece from the Balkans and the Turkish media and public opinion considered the Greek initiatives as aimed at isolating Turkey from the Balkans. The recent rapprochement between the two countries has reinforced the concept that Turkish Greek common positions in the Balkans would be more advantageous for the people of the region. The presence of Turkish minorities and the obligation of Turkey to help defend their human and minority rights as well as the importance of this region for Turkey's security and economic interests have compelled Turkey to cooperate with other countries in restoring the conditions of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.<sup>12</sup> Turkish investments in Romania and Bulgaria are increasing and Turkey should extend its economic exchanges with and investments in former Yugoslav republics and Albania. If one considers that only twelve years ago we had the worst crisis in our relations with Bulgaria and at logger heads with Greece the return to liberal pattern of relations with these countries should be considered as a boon for the region. This climate of peace and cooperation will no doubt lead to increased mutual confidence and to a real desire to eliminate problems that have long since considered as insoluble.

---

<sup>11</sup> See for details: Arım, R. [www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/)

<sup>12</sup> See for details: Arım, R. [www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/)

Similar auspicious developments are also taking place in the north and east of Turkey. Relations with the Caucasian states and Russia have never been better. Permanent links of vital interests are being established through the construction gas and oil pipelines with Russia and Azerbaijan, trade is developing and security relations are turning into strategic partnerships.

In the multi-lateral track the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative has now become a full fledged organization with its Secretariat, Parliamentary Assembly and Investment Bank.

An exception to these set of developing relations is a foreign policies of the Caucasian state of Armenia. It will be recalled the end of the Soviet Union saw a bitter war between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of conflicting ethnic interests and Armenia occupied twenty per cent of Azeri territory that it refuses to evacuate. The negotiations for a settlement seemed to be possible for a while under the former President of Armenia Ter Petrossian but his downfall from power brought a nationalist leader to power. The new Armenian leadership with the help of Armenian Diaspora seems to be engaged in a non productive foreign policy. While on the one showing an extremely uncompromising attitude towards a settlement on the occupation of Azerbaijan, it is bringing up 1915 events on the agendas of many European parliaments in an effort to register those events as a genocide. This strategy presumably aims at diverting the attention of the world public from the current tragedy of one million Azeri refugees driven from their homes in Armenian occupied lands. Since none of the countries where such parliamentary resolutions are being sought have a cleaner history than Turkey in their relations with other people, be in their homelands or colonies, these Armenian attempts cannot positively or negatively influence Turkey's policy toward Armenia.

Turkey's foreign policy towards the Southern Caucasus issues has been affected by the situation that has developed after September 11 events that have once again drawn attention to the fragile security fabric of the Southern Caucasian region where stability could easily be destroyed by small or large groups of terrorists feeding themselves on inter-ethnic differences. There is no doubt that military assistance to these threatened countries has become a necessity for the United States and Turkey to enhance fight against terrorism.

In the South, the pronounced intention of the United States to militarily intervene in Iraq to change the Saddam regime has been considered by the Turkish government as contrary to Turkey's interests in the region. Nevertheless, the continuation of the current division of Iraq as Northern Kurdish area and Southern Arab one with Turkomans squeezed in both areas is also against Turkey's national interests. If, as it is widely reported the United States will take action against Iraq in the near future Turkey, must take part in the settlement process after the action and must do whatever is necessary to secure such participation; otherwise the current undesirable situation may become a perpetual one.

Syria and Iran are neighbors with which our relation have never been highly warm but mutual interests constantly indicate the necessity of maintaining good relations and whichever country deliberately act against these mutual interests have in the past played a zero sum game and they have been the losers.

### **Conclusion**

Among conservative circles in Europe there is a general belief that Turkey's geopolitics is riddled with multiple vulnerabilities and EU should refrain from taking over these vulnerabilities. The developments of recent years have gone a long way to show that the interstate military confrontation risks are much reduced thanks to the capabilities and policies of Turkey to contribute to regional peace and security. Certainly, these Turkish assets would be highly helpful both to extend Europe's political and economic role in this region and also to reduce soft risks that Europe perceives from this regions thus further contributing to stability in the peripheries of Europe.

# CYPRUS

## SETTLEMENT AND MEMBERSHIP\*

*M. Ergün OLGUN\*\**

Given the fact that direct talks in Cyprus have been continuing for the last five months, the timing of this Debate gives us an opportunity to take stock of the Turkish Cypriot commitment to resolution and also of the threats and opportunities facing the negotiating process.

I will address the above issues in response to nine key questions that I will pose.

### **Question 1: What Is The Turkish Cypriot Vision For A Comprehensive Settlement?**

Turkish Cypriots view a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus as the inescapable necessity for promoting peace and stability not only in the island of Cyprus but also in the region. To this end, Turkish Cypriot proposals foresee the establishment of a new partnership, say the “Partnership State of Cyprus”, through a Founding Agreement to be signed by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot polities as its Co-founders. The new “Partnership State of Cyprus” will have effective legislative, executive and judicial functions and institutions, and will possess single international personality. The “Partnership State” will reflect and recognize the equal status of its Co-founders.

Both Co-founder States will support the membership of the new “Partnership State” in the EU, subject to approval in separate referenda and to the maintenance of the balance between Turkey and Greece vis-à-vis their relations with the “Partnership State”.

The “Partnership State” will be sovereign as per the competence and functions assigned to it by its Co-founders and as defined in the Founding Agreement. Residual powers will rest with the Co-founder States. Consequently, while the Co-founder States will retain a layer of sovereignty in the form of residual powers, one layer of sover-

---

\* Europe-Turkey Foundation and Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Conference-Debate; 03 June 2002, Venue: European Parliament

\*\* Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

eignty will be assigned to the "Partnership State", and another layer transferred to Brussels as a result of accession to the EU.

Among others, the competence and functions of the Institutions of the "Partnership State" will include external relations, EU relations and Partnership economic policy and finances.

This vision is in line with the Secretary General's statement of 12 September 2000 where he has confirmed that the objective of the negotiations is to bring about "a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace, security and prosperity on a united Island." The highlight of the Secretary General's statement was that:

"In this spirit and with the purpose of expediting negotiations in good faith and without preconditions on all issues before them, I have concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions."

I would like to confirm again that the purpose of the Turkish Cypriot side in the negotiations is not the establishment of two separate sovereign states, as conveniently presented by many Greek Cypriot political leaders, but the mere transformation of the two existing polities on the island into Co-founder States in favor of the new "Partnership State of Cyprus" to be created by them.

### **Question 2: What Will Happen To The Turkish Republic Of Northern Cyprus And The Republic Of Cyprus?**

The question confronting the two equal parties in Cyprus is how to make the new "Partnership State of Cyprus" out of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

The answer to this question must make sure that in bringing into being the new "Partnership State of Cyprus" the equal status and legitimacy of its co-founding parties is explicitly recognized and respected and that under it, neither side is allowed, directly or implicitly, to extend its will, legitimacy or sovereignty over the other. It follows, therefore, that the new "Partnership State" cannot be the continuity or be seen to be merely an extension of either State that currently exists on the Island. This necessitates state succession.

International law describes state succession as the replacement of one State, or States, by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory in conformity with international law. When this happens, a former State, or States, becomes extinct in whole or in part and a new State comes into being.

International law distinguishes between a mere change in government, constitution, regime, flag, national anthem or ideology and the rarer occurrence of state succession. Since the exercise in Cyprus is not the incorporation of one of the parties into the existing international legal personality of the other, the critical question is how to facilitate the establishment of the new "Partnership State of Cyprus".

In view of the current political asymmetry between the two polities in Cyprus as regards international recognition, the first step that needs to be taken is the equalization of the status and legitimacies of the two prospective Co-Founders of the new "Partnership State". This may be done in various alternative ways. One way is through mutual recognition. The second way is for the Security Council to recognize the TRNC as one of the equal constituents of the new "Partnership State" in the process leading to the signing of the comprehensive settlement. A third way is to constitute the new "Partnership State of Cyprus" out of what the Greek Cypriots call the RoC and what the Turkish Cypriots call the TRNC, through the transformation of both into Co-founder States in favor of the new Partnership State. Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci in the recent CEPS publication titled "Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean" put forward a somewhat more drastic version of the third alternative by suggesting that "... when all matters of substance are agreed in a single text, this would be signed by the two Leaders, implying equality of the two parties to the agreement; however, this act would also proceed to dissolve both the RoC and the TRNC in favor of the new Cyprus".

Once agreement is reached in principle between the two Co-founders on the legal procedure that will need to be followed, the following specific issues would need to be addressed:

- Agreement on the validity of the statutes, laws, regulations, rules and contracts of both parties to the extent that these are not inconsistent with the Founding Agreement;

- The determination of the common Treaty obligations and memberships in international organizations which will apply to the new "Partnership State" from the baskets of the RoC and of the TRNC;

- The distribution and settlement of public assets and liabilities of the two parties;
  - Settlement of the property issue;
  - Settlement of the citizenship issue and of other acquired rights.

Although issues of sovereignty and state succession are very complex and sensitive, the international community must ensure more orderly and less violent transitions

of sovereignty in instances of state succession by weighing the competing concerns and interests of those involved with the needs of international peace and stability. This need has now turned into a necessity in Cyprus where negotiations are in progress for the establishment of a new partnership state, in practice, between the two existing separate polities based on their sovereign equality as its co-founders, and where, there is no longer any likelihood that the party that has unjustly been treated as the sovereign by the international community so far (the Greek Cypriot side) will be able to reassert control over the other party (the Turkish Cypriot side).

### **Question 3: What Kind Of Institutions And Competences Will The New "Partnership State" Have?**

What is found in Cyprus is the special case of a failed partnership State established by agreement between two ethnically distinct peoples and guaranteed by three Guarantor Powers under international Treaties.

In terms of background, the desire of the Greek Cypriot Co-founder to unite the island with Greece resulted in a long and violent history of bi-communal conflict that, following an unsuccessful attempt at sharing power in the partnership Republic of Cyprus from 1960 to 1963, culminated in the usurpation of the title of the partnership Republic by the Greek Cypriot Co-founder Partner. The events which followed eventually led to the emergence of two centers of political authority in Cyprus exercised in two separate territories.

It has to be borne in mind that on 4 July 1992, the EC Arbitration Commission found that the federal institutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were incapable of functioning as originally designed in the Yugoslav Constitution and that the SFRY should therefore be considered to have dissolved and ceased to exist. The Arbitration Commission also found that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) could not be considered to be the continuity of the SFRY. This resolution of the EC Arbitration Commission must have a bearing on the Cyprus issue which is also the case of a partnership that has become incapable of functioning as originally designed in its Constitution.

Today, there exists no shared institution between the two polities and the Greek Cypriot South, which purports to be the sole legitimate authority for the whole island, continues to impose political, economic and social embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot North. On and off negotiations have continued between the two equal parties for over thirty years in order to find a mutually acceptable resolution that would enshrine some form of new Partnership State. Unfortunately, these negotiations have been continuing in the shadow of a deep crisis of confidence between the two parties, and more recently in the shadow of the EU enlargement timetable. Decades of negotiations have regretta-

bly not yet yielded a common vision that could act as a blueprint for the new partnership State. In the same vain, the two sides do not have overarching common security and economic interests which could be instrumental in forging a new partnership arrangement.

The bitter and violent experience of Cyprus demonstrates well the difficulties and dangers of bi-ethnic partnerships. Ivo D. Duchacek points out in his article "Dyadic Federations and Confederations" that:

"The distinctive feature of a confrontation between only two communities is that it takes place within a rigid framework in which the two communities have no opportunity to alter their power relationship by *internal* coalition-shifting. They tend to confront each other within a rather narrow alley that endows their bargaining or frontal conflicts with a zero-sum quality. Loyalty to a common foundation of legitimate authority is absent. Links with external supporters, groups, or states may, of course, alter the internal balance or imbalance, but such links bring another explosive issue onto the political scene -that of foreign interference and possibly a reactive counter-intervention."

On the basis of this analysis, Duchacek concludes that:

"A majoritarian mode of making decisions and establishing political authority does not fit bi-communal configurations in which, except for the rare possibility of out-breeding the numerical majority, one side views itself as a permanent minority facing a permanent majority. Thus, for example, Turks on Cyprus ... can hardly be expected to place their fate and trust in the rules and consequences of simple, democratic, majoritarian voting."

It is concerns and considerations such as the ones mentioned by Duchacek that are shaping Turkish Cypriot proposals, particularly on relationship and process issues.

According to Turkish Cypriot proposals, while the agreed arrangements on the substantive issues such as property, security, territory and EU membership would be final, a more evolutionary approach should be adopted for handling relationship issues like the competences, institutions and decision-making mechanisms of the "Partnership State". Rotation of key positions and consensus decision-making arrangements would be the key pillars for translating into practical terms the equal status of the two parties in an evolving new Partnership State.

Accordingly, the Turkish Cypriot side has proposed a presidential system where executive authority shall rest in the Presidency and the Partnership Council (similar to a Council of Ministers) which will include five members from each Co-founder State designated by each President.

The two Presidents will be elected through the respective constitutional processes of the Co-founder States and each will act as the President of the "Partnership State" on the basis of annual rotation. This, I believe, will be the first yet a future-oriented constructive step in promoting a sense of joint responsibility and allegiance to both the "Partnership State" and the Co-founder States.

The Partnership Council, the next foot of the executive branch, will have all the necessary powers needed for the smooth functioning of any executive branch. The crucial role of the Partnership Council will be the execution of the competences and functions assigned to it through the Foundation Agreement and the coordination of the policy preferences of the Co-founder States especially as regards mixed competences. Joint Partnership Departments including the External Relations Department, the European Union Relations Department, the Economic Affairs Department and the Coordination Department will ensure that the "Partnership State" Government exercises its assigned competences and functions. Decisions in the Council will be taken by consensus and Department Secretaries/Ministers will rotate between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members of the Partnership Council on an agreed equal basis.

Just like any other State, the "Partnership State" will have the capacity to exercise legislative functions. The Joint Parliamentary Council, which will be composed of eighteen members from the Assemblies of each Co-founder State, will be duly elected on the basis of the relevant procedures of each. Decisions will be taken by separate majorities. Again, the Presidency of this legislative organ will be by rotation on an annual basis. Hence, all processes requiring legislative acts will be referred to the Joint Parliamentary Council. The Council will have an agreed dead-lock resolving mechanism.

The judicial organ of the Partnership will be the Court of the "Partnership State" which shall not only deal with disputes arising between the Co-founder States and the "Partnership State" but also all matters falling exclusively within the competence of the "Partnership State" and disputes between the Co-founder States, their respective citizens and issues arising from the conflict of laws both between Co-founder States and between the "Partnership State" and Foreign Governments or international organizations. The Court will reflect the bi-national character of the Island and will be composed of two Turkish Cypriot and two Greek Cypriot Judges.

To facilitate systemic evolution as trust and confidence builds up and as the institutional capacity and culture of cooperation of the new State is enhanced, the Basic Law of the new partnership would allow through its in-built review mechanism for successive amendments and improvements in the makeup and functioning of the new State.

The immediate challenge that the two sides are currently facing in the negotiations is in finding a way to exit from their existing conflict habituated confrontative relationship into the desired cooperative/integrative relationship. This necessitates the development of a strong sense of mutual interests and, together with this, mutual respect. Efficiency and cost concerns regarding the initial institutions and functioning of the new State should be considered secondary to the overwhelming task of transformation.

To start the needed transformation and evolution, the Turkish Cypriot view is that the legitimacies of the two polities should be equalized, to be followed with the assignment of only those essential competences and functions that are necessary to start the "Partnership State". The initial focus should be more on the coordination of the policy preferences of the two parties rather than idealist or cost-efficiency linked designs.

#### **Question 4: Can Cyprus Benefit From The Bi-Ethnic Experience Of Belgium As An EU Member State?**

Belgium is a bi-ethnic society with multi-tier government structures linking a two-tier bi-ethnic system with a third-tier, the EU. Belgium is also an advanced democracy with an evolving system of governance. There is no legal hierarchy between the two levels of government, meaning the center and the components. Belgian regions are increasingly becoming subjects of EU institutions (in the Commission, for example) in their areas of competence. The leader of the Belgian delegation comes from the center or the component governments depending on which level of government the competence that is under discussion lies. The system is supported by sector-specific coordination committees. Rotation and consensus decision-making mechanisms characterize the Belgian system.

Practically, all these features can be applied to the bi-ethnic "Partnership State of Cyprus".

Let us take the case of EU relations. In Belgium, it is the central coordinating body of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate for the Administration of European Affairs which is responsible for EU affairs. It calls regular meetings with the representatives of the Communities and Regions.

The Turkish Cypriot side, for its part, has proposed the establishment of a European Union Relations Department which would be separate and at the same level as the External Relations Department.

The position of Belgium on a policy to be argued within the Council of Ministers of the European Union is decided by consensus. If no consensus is reached, the matter can be referred to the Inter-Ministerial Conference on Foreign Policy. If no agreement is reached or in urgent cases, the representative in the Belgian seat on the Council of the European Union 'may on that occasion only adhere "ad referendum" to the position most likely to address general interest'. Belgium's final position will then be notified within three days after the matter is resolved internally. The two parties in Cyprus can agree to apply the same procedure for decision-making vis-à-vis the EU.

In Belgium, representation before the EU is determined by the topic under discussion. In matters falling under the full/partial competence of the Community or Regional Governments, they will have the ability to represent Belgium before EU institutions. The same principle applies to representation in international organizations. Again, in the case of Cyprus, the same logic and practice can apply as regards representation at EU institutions and international organizations.

Cyprus can also benefit from the way Belgium runs its international relations. Although the general power to coordinate international relations, including the signature of treaties, lies with the Federal Government in Belgium, and international Treaties become effective only following approval by the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Treaties falling within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Communities and Regions, including cultural affairs, education, personalized services, and the use of languages, and the Treaties falling within their exclusive or partial jurisdictions including land use and planning, the environment and water policy, rural redevelopment and nature conservation, housing, agricultural policy, economic policy, energy policy, subordinate authorities, employment policy, public works and transport, are concluded by the Regions/Communities' Governments and approved by their Councils.

Consensus decision-making also applies in the conclusion of international Treaties by Communities or Regions because the Community or Regional Governments concerned must inform the federal Cabinet that negotiations have been entered into, giving the Cabinet thirty days to notify its objections to the proposed Treaty, which can lead to the suspension of negotiations only in limited circumstances. The matter is then referred to the Inter-Ministerial Conference on Foreign Policy which consists of the relevant ministers of the federated and federal Governments for consensus decision-making.

International Treaties falling within the "mixed jurisdiction" category, which are those crossing areas of federal, Community and/or Regional jurisdiction, must be as-

sented to by all the legislative assemblies concerned, federal and federated alike. The withholding of assent by any one of those assemblies will effectively prevent the federal Government from ratifying the treaty.

Even though the decision to recognize foreign States and maintain diplomatic relations with them lies with the King, this does not prevent the Communities or Regions to establish their own foreign representatives, including economic or commercial attaches.

The Turkish Cypriot side has proposed a similar model whereby the External Relations Department of the "Partnership" will be assigned such powers that will allow the "Partnership" to conduct external relations, including representation in regional and international organizations, yet allowing the Co-founder States to retain their respective right to enter into agreements and relations with foreign governments and regional or international bodies in their areas of competence.

There will also naturally be major differences with the Belgian experience. While the Belgian regions and communities have acquired powers through devolution, there will be no regions or communities in the case of Cyprus but co-founder states of the new "Partnership State".

#### **Question 5: How Can The Property Issue Be Sustainably Resolved?**

In view of the Population Exchange Agreement of 1975 and the 1977 High Level Agreement entrenching bi-zonality as a principle in a comprehensive settlement, the Turkish Cypriot side has offered to settle the property issue on the basis of global exchange of property and/or compensation.

Over the years, the Turkish Cypriot party has called upon the Greek Cypriot party to resolve this humanitarian matter by establishing a Joint Property Claims Commission. Due to Greek Cypriot intransigence on this matter, and the tendency of the political leadership to use the property claims issue as a political tool, the Turkish Cypriot party has taken its own measures to resolve its own part of the problem. The TRNC Assembly has accordingly passed the Equivalent Property Law in 1977 which provided for the assessment of Turkish Cypriot properties left in the South, in exchange of which Turkish Cypriot property owners would receive title deeds for equivalent Greek Cypriot properties left in the North. This application in the North can be viewed as the first prong of the needed steps that can be taken for the global exchange of properties if the Greek Cypriots were to reciprocate in similar fashion and agree to establish a Joint Property Claims Commission to facilitate the needed transactions. In this way, all titles of such properties can be exchanged on a global basis between the Co-founder States, assessed on the agreed market value of the respective properties.

In our view, restrictions must apply with regard to property ownership and settlement if the principle of bi-zonality is to be respected. Greek Cypriot proposals on property issues advocating such as, inter alia, the right to return, will not only undermine a settlement and disturb the existing social fabric of the North, but also create new refugees. The restitution of properties, which Greek Cypriots want, as a right, would invalidate all that has been done under the Equivalent Property Law, which in itself will create unprecedented legal complications. Those who would be affected by any change in the practice of the Equivalent Property Law (and they are many thousands in numbers) would undoubtedly form a very strong lobby against a settlement that would include property restitution.

Given the fact that this issue has been exploited for many years, one example of property restitution will set precedent for others, opening a Pandora's Box!

The Turkish Cypriot proposal is aimed at putting this issue to a speedy conclusion, to prevent further politization and polarization, and to prevent Cyprus from continuing to be a property lawyers' paradise.

#### **Question 6: How Can The Territorial Issue Be Resolved?**

The Greek Cypriot expectation is that as part of a comprehensive settlement the Turkish Cypriot side will have to concede some territory to them through border adjustments. Although the negotiations on territory will be tough, it has to be recognized that, if as a result of the process of give and take any territory is to be ceded, this will be much limited due to the vast political, economic, psychological and social problems it would otherwise create for the Turkish Cypriot side.

Following an agreement, a technical document containing the precise map of the boundary outlining the respective territories of the Turkish Cypriot Co-founder State and the Greek Cypriot Co-founder State has to be annexed to the Foundation Agreement establishing the new "Partnership State".

The determination of the boundary between the two Co-founder States will have to be discussed on the basis of objective principles and criteria to be agreed by the two parties. Some criteria have already been established at the 1977 High-Level Agreement. The Turkish Cypriot side has suggested that the delineation of the border and the territorial adjustment be guided by the following principles and criteria:

- Economic viability and productivity;
- Land ownership;
- Non disturbance of established patterns of economic and social interaction (such as employment, economic activity base, foreign earnings etc.);

- Preservation of the water resources available to each Co-founder State;
- Not to affect the coastal area of either Co-founder State or their territories adjacent to the Sovereign Base Areas;
  - Not to affect the airports and ports of either Co-founder State;
- Maintenance of an equilibrium between the Co-founder States and to avoid major discrepancies;
- Avoidance of enclaves or cantons on the territory of either Co-founder State.

The Turkish Cypriot proposal is that the border between the two Co-founder States will be open to the movement of people through designated entry points. Only those who were involved in acts of violence or in advocacy of or incitement to violence and/or hatred against the people of the other Co-founder State will be prohibited from benefiting from this freedom. Because each Co-founder State will have its own laws and regulations relating to its areas of competence, in practical terms, the border will delineate the territories on which the respective laws and regulations of each will apply.

The Turkish Cypriot position is that this issue must be resolved at the very end of negotiations. To date, despite the agreed principle of secrecy, there have been numerous leaks to the press. On a sensitive issue like territorial adjustments which deeply affects individuals and families, any leak could lead to resistance to change and the disruption of the negotiation process.

#### **Question 7: Has Any Progress Been Made On The Security And Guarantee Issue?**

Although the subject of Security and Guarantee is one of the most important issues which must be tackled within a comprehensive settlement, it is also one of the least difficult to deal with because it is mostly regulated by international Treaties. All sides accept that the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance are valid.

Security and Guarantee cannot of course be de-linked from what is being secured and guaranteed. There is thus a reluctance to finalize this chapter before the framework of issues including the competences and institutions of the new "Partnership State", the status and relationship of the Co-founder States vis-à-vis the "Partnership State", and how the sovereignty and state succession issues are agreed upon.

But, because of the agreement of the parties in starting the face-to-face negotiations that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", the two sides have made some progress on this issue by provisionally agreeing to discuss it independently from the other issues, until the subject is taken up with the three Guarantor Powers and a final comprehensive agreement is in sight.

Because of the blackout at the talks, I cannot disclose what progress has been made on this issue, but I can tell you what the Turkish Cypriot side wants to see in the Security and Guarantee provisions of the comprehensive settlement:

- Under the Treaty of Guarantee, the three Guarantor Powers, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, to be the Guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the new "Partnership State" and also the new state of affairs established by the comprehensive settlement signed by the two Co-founder States;

- Under the Treaty of Guarantee, the three Guarantors to extend their guarantee to the territorial integrity, constitutional order and security of the Co-founder States;

- An agreed equal number and equipment of Turkish and Greek forces to be stationed in the Turkish Cypriot Co-founder State and the Greek Cypriot Co-founder State respectively under the Treaty of Alliance;

- The dissolution of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot military forces, including reservists, and the removal of their arms and equipment from the island;

- The demilitarization of the "Partnership State" without prejudice to the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance;

- Both Co-founder States to have an internal security/police force to be responsible for the protection and enforcement of internal security and public order in their respective territories;

- The "Partnership State" to have a Joint Investigation Agency composed of a police element to facilitate cooperation between the two security/police forces and help in the investigation of violations, where necessary;

- UNFICYP to be assigned with a new mandate by the Security Council, with the consent of the "Partnership State" and of the Co-founder States, to monitor and verify compliance with the security provisions of the comprehensive settlement;

- The security provisions of the comprehensive settlement to be implemented in agreed stages to be guided by the principle of avoiding potentially destabilizing imbalances;

- The "Partnership State" and the Co-founder States not to become part of any international military arrangement or alliance, or become part of any military operation;

- A Monitoring Committee to be established composed of the representatives of the three Guarantor Powers, the "Partnership State", the Co-founder States and UNFICYP to coordinate and oversee the monitoring and compliance functions regarding the security provisions of the comprehensive settlement.

- A Ministerial Committee to be set up composed of the relevant Ministers of Turkey, Greece, the new “Partnership State of Cyprus” and the two Co-founder States to meet at agreed intervals in order to consult and cooperate for the preservation of peace and stability within the framework of the comprehensive settlement.

### **Question 8: What Are The Obstacles For Settlement?**

First of all, the 1960 constitutional order, and with it, the political balance of power and the mutual political interdependence between the two parties in Cyprus, have been destroyed as a result of the violent usurpation of the title of the partnership Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot co-founder partner in 1963. This development, coupled with the indifference of the international community, has allowed the Greek Cypriot side to use its unjustly acquired advantage against the Turkish Cypriot people. This has destroyed the cooperative relationship and trust between the two co-founder peoples of the 1960 partnership Republic.

More than three decades of negotiations on the Island have not led to a new power-sharing deal because of the absence of any real hurt or pressure against the political power monopoly of the Greek Cypriot side. The Greek Cypriot side has instead focused on the further consolidation of their power both in Cyprus and internationally.

In 1994-1995, with the help of Greece, the Greek Cypriot side succeeded in persuading the European Union to accept its unilateral and unlawful application for membership as a valid application for “Cyprus” and the treatment of the Greek Cypriot side as the sole interlocutor for the whole island. This has worsened the political asymmetry in favor of the Greek Cypriot side and further destroyed the needed political interdependence essential for preparing the ground for the establishment of a new partnership.

In particular, the European Union’s removal of conditional incentives to the Greek Cypriot side since 1994 – 1995 has seriously reduced their incentives for compromise. As also stated by Nathalie Tocci of CEPS in a recent paper titled “Cyprus and the European Union: Catalyzing Crisis or Settlement?": *“Given the RoC’s increased power within the Union post membership and the absence of EU conditionality regarding the settlement of the conflict, the Greek Cypriot leadership should rationally bid for time and await EU membership before pushing for a settlement.*

All these have undermined the efforts of the UN to help facilitate a mutually acceptable new partnership arrangement between the two parties based on their equal status.

If there is no immediate economic and political hurt or a sense of urgency on the Greek Cypriot side, the question arises as to why the Greek Cypriot party now sits at

the negotiating table today, supposedly seeking a mutually acceptable settlement. This could be because of the following reasons:

- The Helsinki European Council had concluded that although a political settlement will facilitate the accession of “Cyprus” to the European Union, this would not be a pre-condition; though in doing this “the Council will take account of all relevant factors”. The Greek Cypriot side could pretend to be negotiating “magnanimously” in order to persuade both the UN and the European Council that they have done whatever is possible but that regrettably their efforts were not enough to overcome Turkish intransigence.
- Within the context of a “suitable” settlement, the Greek Cypriot side could aim at achieving intermediate objectives like getting territorial concessions, establishing the principle of restitution of properties, Turkish troop withdrawals, and problemless EU accession of the whole Island. Beyond these intermediate objectives, the Greek Cypriot side has until now not even debated the subject of common interests with their future Turkish Cypriot partners.

In the absence of trust and confidence, durable mutual interests, and a high degree of diversified interdependence, it is unlikely that a new partnership in Cyprus will be sustainable.

### **Question 9: What Win-Win Value Would The Resolution Of The Cyprus Issue Create?**

Surely, both peoples in the Island have a lot to gain from a mutually acceptable resolution.

For Greek Cypriots, the benefits would be mainly in the fields of security, stability and economics. Cyprus is only 40 miles away from Turkey and is more than 600 miles away from mainland Greece. The existing antagonistic relationship with the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey is giving Greek Cypriots a strong sense of insecurity. A mutually acceptable settlement would leave no ground for this concern. A resolution would, at the same time, provide for mutual access to each other’s economies and societies, including the vast opportunities that the Turkish economy and market would offer. Moreover, the added stability and synergy would help develop the island as a focal point to serve the entire region with the experience at its disposal in dealing with cross-civilization and cross-culture issues. A settlement in Cyprus would also result in the closure of the terri-

torial, property and missing persons issues which have haunted Greek Cypriot society for decades. Greek Cypriot political culture has for a long time been preoccupied with Hellenism, pan-Hellenism and a Hellenistic state in Cyprus. The establishment of a "Partnership State" could open the door for post-modern integrative relationships to take hold in Cyprus, the way this is happening in the broader European context.

For Turkish Cypriots, resolution in Cyprus would mean an end to their four-decade long imposed isolation. It would also mean the re-recognition of their equal status and sovereign equality as one of the two constituent peoples of the Island. At the same time, resolution would provide the Turkish Cypriot people with equal opportunities to benefit from their human and material resources and potential. It would mean an end to the siege that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people and their economy, thus terminating the state of limbo.

The achievement of a voluntary settlement in Cyprus also would:

- deepen Turkish-Greek détente which has started with the unfortunate earthquakes which left thousands in pain;
- strengthen the pivotal role Turkey and Greece can jointly play in the region;
- assist the Turkish-European convergence process; and
- foster regional security and stability.

From the global perspective, most important of all, a viable partnership arrangement will bring together two "civilizations" on a cooperative, not clashing basis. In other words, in the post-11th September 2001 era, we have the historic chance of establishing a model for sustainable peace between these two civilizations. At a time when we are seeking remedies against threats posed by state and non-state actors such as terrorism, the transformative strategies followed and the partnership arrangements reached in Cyprus could assist others in designing models and coping with the sources of social conflict and its ramifications.

The EU will also be among the primary beneficiaries. The resolution of the Cyprus issue would not only facilitate smooth EU enlargement but also contribute tremendously to Europe's own security and stability needs, and to its Mediterranean policies. A comprehensive settlement that maintains the balance between Turkey and Greece vis-à-vis their relations with Cyprus will also foster EU-Turkey relations. A Turkey in the EU, in the same club as the two other Guarantors Greece and the United Kingdom, would be the strongest safeguard for systemic security and stability in the island and in the region.

# 1974 CYPRUS CONFLICT IN PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND PRACTICE\*

Binnur ÖZKECECI-TANER\*\*

## A. ABSTRACT

Various conflicts in Greek-Turkish relations are not only disturbing but are also far from resolution. Of a range of issues over which Greece and Turkey have quarreled during the last half-century of the 1900s, none, however, has had as profound, damaging and prolonged impact as Cyprus.<sup>13</sup> The stake of each country in the island has been so high that both countries have periodically threatened to use force to protect their individual interests. Indeed, both resorted to arms in Cyprus in 1974, somewhat simultaneously. Greece initiated a coup against the Makarios regime and Turkey, in reaction, intervened to keep the island from being controlled from Athens. These two particular incidences, Greek coup against Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish military intervention, form the main themes of this paper, although the analysis of this intervention would be incomplete if the events leading to these events remain unexamined. The first part of this paper addresses the questions regarding the nature of the conflict and how the conflict was seen from the perspectives of each participant to the conflict in order to set the stage for further analysis of the incident. In the second part of the paper, an attempt is made to understand the actions of each party by utilizing two different approaches to foreign policymaking: Joe D. Hagan's (1994) framework which emphasizes the importance of domestic factors in foreign policymaking will be examined in the case of Greece while Michael Brecher's theoretical model with an emphasis on *psychological environment* of foreign policymakers will help us understand the Turkish foreign policymaking in 1974. The final part of the paper argues that despite the usefulness of these

---

\* A slightly shortened version of this paper was presented at the METU Conference on International Relations, 3-5 July 2002 Ankara, TURKEY.

\*\* Binnur Ozkececi-Taner is a Ph.D. candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs in Political Science. She is also a research associate at the Global Affairs Institute.

<sup>13</sup> Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean with an area of 3,572 square miles, lying 42 miles south of Turkey, 77 miles west of Syria, 300 miles north of Egypt, and approximately 600 miles southeast of Greece. Because of its strategic location on the main routes between Europe and Asia, Cyprus has long been the focus of political conflict and cultural interaction. New York Times, 16 July 1974.

two approaches, an additional framework needs to be incorporated into the analysis, which emphasizes the role of decision-units at the time. The paper concludes that without an understanding of what the ultimate decision-unit is and how that decision-unit makes its decision regarding a foreign policy matter any foreign policy analysis will at best be incomplete and at worst misleading.

## PART A

### 1. Events Leading To 1974 Military Intervention: Nature Of The Incident And Chronology

General literature on the Cyprus conflict agrees that the roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the 1950s when Greek Cypriot and Greek aspirations to achieve *enosis* -unification with Greece- took the form of a violent campaign against the British colonial rule as well as the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>14</sup> The culmination of the diplomatic efforts in order to stop violent clashes in the late 1950s on the island were two distinct yet interlinked Treaties, which formed the basis of “state of affairs” in Cyprus. The *Treaty of Establishment* 1) gave Cyprus its independence from Great Britain, 2) defined the territory of the “Republic of Cyprus” and 3) contained a preamble expressing the commitment of all the parties to the “maintenance of the status of the two communities by declaring their desire to make provision to give effect to the Treaty made by the representatives of the two communities.”<sup>15</sup> Under the *Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance*, on the other hand, the three guarantor powers, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, assured the continuation of the existence and maintenance of such “state of affairs”, as well as the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.<sup>16</sup>

Uneasy years, however, followed the establishment of the Republic. On December 3, 1963, Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus and leader of the Greek Cypriot community on the island, announced a proposal to revise the Cyprus Constitution, which was based on the above-mentioned treaties so as to “effectively eliminate provi-

---

<sup>14</sup> The island was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1878. In 1878, Turkey agreed to assign Cyprus to Britain to occupy and rule, though not legally possess it. The island was annexed by Britain in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire and Britain became enemies during the First World War. In 1945, the new Labour government in Britain gave Cyprus its self-autonomy, but this had to be abolished when the Greek Cypriot side demanded unification with Greece. On 15 January 1950 the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church held a plebiscite in churches, when an overwhelming majority of Greeks voted in favour of *enosis*, unification with Greece. For further information on this issue, see Kramer, Heinz, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2000; Bahçeli Tözün, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1990. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

<sup>15</sup> Necatigil, Zaim M, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*. Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 15-20.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15-20

sions designed to give special protections to the island's Turkish people."<sup>17</sup> Few days after Makarios's announcement, fighting broke out between members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. On March 4, 1964, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) recommended the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus.<sup>18</sup> Prior to the arrival of the UN peacekeepers, however, Turkey had, on March 12, threatened to use force to protect the Turkish Cypriots from massacre, relying on the *Treaty of Guarantee* as a basis for its action. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously called on all states to refrain from action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus; *Turkey decided not to intervene*. Again in June, Turkey began serious planning to take military action. The United States, in response, strongly pressured Turkey not to take any action. President Johnson, in a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet İnönü, not only stressed the illegality of an invasion but he also threatened a withdrawal of military aid if an action took place.<sup>19</sup> Again, *Turkey's decision was "no intervention"*. The situation in Cyprus, however, did not improve markedly, even with the existence of the United Nations peacekeeping forces on the island. On the contrary, tension and violence continued for the next three years; even more organized violence recurred in November 1967.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus: 1958-1967*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. p. 39-45.

<sup>18</sup> Undersecretary of State George Ball sought to persuade Papandreou and Makarios, as well as İnönü, to accept a NATO peace-keeping force on the island rather than allow the issue to be brought into the multilateral arena of the United Nations, where the Russians would play a role in the settlement. For Makarios, who professed a policy of nonalignment and wanted particularly to keep his lines open to Russians, it would have been totally unacceptable to submit it to a NATO solution. Stern, Laurence, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. Times Books, 1977.

<sup>19</sup> On June 5, President Johnson, in a sharp letter to Premier Ismet İnönü, wrote that NATO agreements did not allow member states to wage war on each other; furthermore, he cautioned Turkey of the possible consequences of potential direct Soviet involvement in the conflict between Turkey and Greece.

"I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies... I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of the United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances." Salih, Halil Ibrahim. *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism On A State*. The University of Alabama Press, University, Alabama. 1978. Appendix G.

<sup>20</sup> On November 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup>, the Turkish Parliament and Senate met in a special joint session and authorized government to use the Turkish Armed Forces if circumstances required it.<sup>20</sup> In spite of this, however, Turkey responded to the events by delivering an ultimatum only to Greece on November 17<sup>th</sup>, threatening to invade Cyprus if the ultimatum was not satisfied and also to invade Greece if Greece resisted the military action.<sup>20</sup> This ultimatum led to intense diplomatic activity,<sup>20</sup> though the target this time was Greece although Turkey was the one, threatening the use of force. Greece and the Greek Cypriots agreed to stop violence and withdrew their troop in early December. By

The relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus, on the other hand, began to sour surprisingly following the ascent to the power of the regime of the colonels on April 21, 1967. As it will be elaborated in the second part of the paper, the Greek government came to favour partition of the island between its Greek and Turkish communities with the Greek portion to be united with Greece, whereas the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios was in favour of making the whole island belong to the Greek Cypriots only. The Greek Cypriot leader did not hide his preference for constitutional monarchy in Greece as opposed to the junta. Makarios, in addition, not only began to overtly shelter opponents of the Greek military dictatorship but he also worked in alliance with leftist parties found objectionable by the Greek government. In these circumstances, the Greek junta began a campaign of subversion against Cyprus no later than 1970<sup>21</sup> both through the church and the underground organizations. Their aims were to agitate public opinion against Makarios and to bolster the struggle for *enosis*. The regime also moved toward open confrontation with Makarios at the political level.<sup>22</sup>

In an reckless challenge to the junta in Athens, however, Makarios sent a letter, which was directed to the Greek President Phaedon Ghizikis in July 3, 1974. Makarios wrote:

“More than once I have sensed and on occasions almost felt, the invisible hand stretched out from Athens seeking to destroy my human existence... It was a profound grief that I have to set out to you certain inadmissible situations and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek government as responsible... The tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriots are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread, in order to be absolutely clear, I say that the cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activities of the EOKA-B terrorists... It is also known, an undeniable fact, that the opposition Cyprus press,

---

winning major concessions from the Greeks, the Turkish government was able to justify its decision *not to intervene*.

<sup>21</sup> In 1970, the first serious assassination attempt was launched against the Archbishop. In September 1971, the Papadopoulos regime began to mount a new campaign to unseat the government of Makarios. General Grivas returned to Cyprus from Greece and proceeded to found an organization called the EOKA-B, named after the group he had headed in the terrorist campaign against British colonialism in the 1950s. His target this time was the independent Cypriot government headed by the Archbishop Makarios. See Stern.

<sup>22</sup> On February 12, Papadopoulos issued a letter to Makarios, presenting him with a series of ultimatums: he must take strong action against the Communist Party; he was to form a government of “national reconciliation that recognized Greece to be the centre of Hellenism; he was to fire Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou, whom the regime considered too leftist and *antienosis*. On February 14, during a raid on EOKA-B, the intelligence service found detailed plans for a coup that was timed to come off within twenty-four hours. Makarios’s security forces struck at all the staging points of the coup. In July 1972, the intelligence service of Cyprus intercepted plans for another more ambitiously scaled attempt to overthrow Makarios this time code-named “Operation Apollo.” Through preemptive strikes by the government’s tactical police about a week before the planned attack, as well as the publicizing of the Apollo scheme, another coup was foiled by the Archbishop. Stern. p. 77-103

which supports the criminal activities of EOKA-B and which has its source of financing in Athens, receives guidance and policy line from those in charge of the General Staff Office and the branch of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency in Cyprus.”

The response to this daring letter was to come on July 15, when the Greek Cypriot National Guard ordered by the Ioannides junta overthrew President Makarios in a bloody coup,<sup>23</sup> and appointed in his place Nikos Sampson, a Cypriot known for his anti-Turkish sentiments.<sup>24</sup> According to a Turkish diplomat interviewed by Birand (1975), “the golden *opportunity* had finally come, ... The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We could no longer be scared off by threats of the Soviet bogeyman.”<sup>25</sup>

The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was under pressure to act swiftly in order to prevent Greece’s seizure of Cyprus through *enosis*. However, Ecevit, was not in favour of *unilateral* action in the first instance. Instead the Prime Minister hoped to persuade Great Britain to fulfill its obligations under the *Treaty of Guarantee* and join Turkey in a military operation. On July 17, Prime Minister Ecevit flew to London where he asked the British officials to join Turkey in a joint military action against the Greek junta’s forces in Cyprus. However, the response by the British Prime Minister Wilson and Minister of Foreign Affairs Callaghan was negative. The British officials justified their decision by stating that such an involvement would destroy Great Britain’s usefulness as a good broker in reaching an eventual solution. Ecevit later asked whether the British would be willing to make their bases available as staging areas for the Turkish forces; the answer again was negative.

During the same period, Joseph Sisco, the US representative also had a talk with Ecevit before Ecevit flew back to Ankara on the 18<sup>th</sup> of July. Ecevit, frustrated with the

---

<sup>23</sup> Halil Ibrahim Salih states that the coup had actually beGün on the evening of July 14, when “Athens clandestinely sent to Cyprus about one hundred more army officers on an Olympic Airlines Boeing 727. Besides the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the 950 Greek soldiers based on Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance also took part in the coup.” Halil Ibrahim Salih. *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism On A State*. The University of Alabama Press, University, Alabama. 1978, p. 88

<sup>24</sup> On July 13, Cyprus intelligence monitored Greek military traffic indicating that there would be a serious development the following Monday. Ironically, however, on July 14, the CIA station in Athens dispatched its message to Washington, suggesting that Ioannides had backed off from his coup intentions. The assumption after the coup was that Ioannides had deliberately misinformed his CIA contacts in order to be sure that there would be no last-minute intervention this time by the Americans or British. *Stern*, p. 97.

<sup>25</sup> Birand, Mehmet A., *30 Sıcak Gün* (30 Hot Days: An Account of Turkey’s Intervention in Cyprus in 1974). Istanbul, Milliyet Publications. 1975. p. 55

response he received from the British officials, made it very clear to Sisco that unless the Greeks were willing to meet the terms - immediate withdrawal of the Greek officers and the replacement of Nicos Sampson, Turkey would have to carry out its responsibilities as a guarantor power. Otherwise, Ecevit simply told, the Turkish army would intervene in Cyprus. Sisco promised Ecevit that he is going to bring a response from Athens and wanted Ecevit not to take any action before he hears from Sisco. Ecevit, upon arriving in Ankara, went directly to a meeting of the Turkish cabinet and military commanders, where he informed Turkish officials that he was awaiting a reply from Sisco the next evening.<sup>26</sup> On July 19<sup>th</sup>, in the afternoon, Sisco met with the Greek junta leader Ioannides, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Gregorios Bonanos, and Prime Minister Androustopoulos, when he told them that the Turks were serious this time and asked them whether the Greek government was prepared to take necessary steps in order to begin a resumption of talks between Turkey and Greece. The junta did not accept the demands made by Turkey and the junta leader Ioannides made it very clear that there would be no concessions made to the Turks.

At midnight on July 19<sup>th</sup>, the Turkish National Security Council had met again and given the green light to the military operation. The cabinet also met for the last time, which was, according to Sisco and his aides, the last chance to forestall the military operation. At about 4:00 A.M. on July 20<sup>th</sup>, Ecevit received Sisco and the American Ambassador and informed them of the collective decision to intervene. The decision was no surprise. In their last meeting, Sisco recalls, Ecevit told Sisco that the Turks did not want to repeat the mistakes of history, of 1964 and 1967:

“The United States and Turkey both have made mistakes – the United States by preventing Turkish military action and Turkey by accepting it.”<sup>27</sup>

At 5:45 a.m. on July 20 1974, Turkey began to land troops on Cyprus.<sup>28</sup> In response to Turkey’s offensive, the Greek government of Ioannides announced that

---

<sup>26</sup> The last two-three days in Turkey had also witnessed a public cry for intervention in Cyprus. The Turkish press was exhorting Ecevit to go to Cyprus. There was a huge public criticism at the delay in making the move whose time had never been so opportune. Leftist student demonstrations were carrying signs through the streets of Ankara that said of the Sisco mission: “Sisco-fiasco.” Cumhuriyet, 19 July 1974.

<sup>27</sup> Birand. Also see Bahçeli

<sup>28</sup> At 6:30 AM, the Turkish Prime Minister went on Turkish National Radio to announce the decision the government made:

“The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and the sea. Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. Meanwhile I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly to the United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have the dispute settled through diplomatic methods.”

Greece would begin preparing a “general mobilization of its armed forces.”<sup>29</sup> On Sunday, July 21, the Greek Chiefs of Staff assembled, when one of Ioannides’s closest aides, Colonel Loukoutos told them that a decision was taken to attack Turkey on all fronts: Cyprus, Thrace, everywhere.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, the representatives of the United States and Great Britain were trying to get parties accept a cease-fire. After several attempts Sisco persuaded the Turkish government agree to a cease-fire at 2:00 PM on July 22. Sisco, after hearing from the Turkish side, contacted with the Greeks. Although it was not very clear whether the Greek junta leader Ioannides accepted the decision to cease-fire or not,<sup>31</sup> the naval Chief of Staff Arapakis responded affirmatively to Sisco and the cease-fire was proclaimed for 2:00 P.M the next day. When the decision to cease-fire was communicated to Ioannides, he ordered aides that cease-fire was unacceptable; orders had already been issued. To his surprise, several officers, including the Air Chief of Staff, responded him saying that no action could be taken at this moment, which for the first time made it clear to Ioannides that the power he once had had disappeared. The Greek President interrupted the discussion and said that it is not a time to quarrel since the country was in danger. Following that event, the Greek President Ghizikis asked the former premier Constantine Karamanlis to return from his “self-imposed” exile and form a new civilian government. On July 23, the junta was replaced by a civilian government and on the same day, Nicos Sampson of Cyprus resigned as the president of Cyprus, disappearing as quickly as he had arisen on command from Athens. He was replaced by Glafcos Clerides, the speaker of the House of Representatives, which, according to the Prime Minister Ecevit, would become a harbinger of the beginning of a new era for peace in the region. Given the new government in Athens, and the placating mood of the Turkish government, the conference on Cyprus began on July 25, 1974, in Geneva.

## 2. Positions Of The Two Motherlands: Justifications For Actions Taken

*“Alongside the traditional and Realpolitik considerations in international relations, there are always obligatory psychological-often unconscious- issues that are,*

---

Radio Ankara, July 20, 1974 in Theodore A. Coulombis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle. 1983, p. 83, also quoted in James Meyer, *Policy Watershed: Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Intervention of 1974*. WWS Case Study 3/00. <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases>

<sup>29</sup> Meyer, p. 1

<sup>30</sup> Surprisingly, Army Chief of Staff responded negatively, by saying that he was not ready to enter in an ‘aggressive war,’ although he was ready for defense. Others followed the suit and began to voice reservations about the decision being imposed on them by Ioannides. Some of the officers also told the Colonel that an air attack on Turkey would be unwise and fruitless.

<sup>31</sup> The domestic situation in Greece during this period was very volatile and this issue will be further elaborated in the second part of the essay.

*in effect, tainted with irrationality...Economic, political, historical and military events can, at times, become so psychologized and so 'stubbornly fixed' in the minds of the participants that without an understanding of the large group psychology that contaminates them, it might be impossible to establish newly chanelled approaches toward finding solutions.*"<sup>32</sup>

Given the history of the Turkish-Greek relations, one cannot but agree with Volkan and Itzkowitz's (1994) statement regarding the role of psychological determinants of policy-making. In addition to the political and security interests of both Turkey and Greece, socio-political factors affect the relations of the two countries in a very considerable extent: both Turkey and Greece have made policies towards each other with the historical legacies in mind; perceptions so loaded with historical enmities play important roles in bilateral relations and it is accepted by most of the populace of both sides that their self-identification is very much related to the identity of the 'other.' As indicated by Bahçeli in his book, Greeks tend to view Turks as crude and barbaric, whereas Turks consider Greeks as untrustworthy and treacherous.<sup>33</sup> In other words, the images on both sides reproduce past resentments and bitterness. Thus, the Cyprus case is a perfect example in Greek-Turkish relations, where the interplay of political and security interests with psychological factors could easily be evinced.

In the first place, Cyprus was and still is an island involving both Turkey's and Greece's vital national and strategic interests. Therefore, both sides are deeply committed and sensitive to developments on the island. The existence of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island has further made Greece and Turkey view their interests in Cyprus as a national imperative, meaning both countries, or 'motherlands' have made it sure that their respective communities are best represented and given better choices and opportunities in national as well as international affairs. In this sense, both Greece and Turkey undertook an effort to shape the fate of Cyprus, as witnessed by the coup against Archbishop Makarios and Turkey's military intervention as a response.

Both the nature of the Cyprus conflict in general and that of 1974 events were perceived and acted upon by the two countries differently. The two countries did not – still do not- even agree on the roots of the conflict nor did they have any consensus on how *the Treaties of Establishment and of Guarantee* should be interpreted. For the Greeks, the Cyprus problem in effect started with the Turkish military intervention of 1974, while Turkey argued that the Greek Cypriots and Greece had regarded the establishment of the partnership Republic as a temporary setback in their ultimate aim of uniting

---

<sup>32</sup> Volkan, Vamik D. and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict*. Huntingdon, Cambridge-shire, UK: Eothen Press. 1994.

<sup>33</sup> Bahçeli, p. 1

the island with Greece, and attempted to destroy both the internal and the external balances created by the 1960 state of affairs from the very first day they were established.

Leaving the roots of the conflict aside, the attempt of Athens to bind Cyprus to Greece in 1974 with the coup against Makarios seemed to the Turks a deliberately provocative and unjustified attempt to change the *status quo*, established by the 1960 treaties. Turkish leadership, they state, intervened because Turkey could not consent to the attempts to promote the idea of *enosis*, which they thought was the aim that was going to be realized through the coup. The Turks also maintained that since the primary considerations of the Turkish government with respect to Cyprus was the “preservation of peace and stability on the island in general and the protection of safety and well-being of the Turkish Cypriot people in particular,” the intervention was the only alternative to stop ongoing violence and to establish order on the island. Therefore, the Turks concluded, the military intervention in Cyprus was justified; the *Treaty of Guarantee* gave her the right to take military action as a legitimate way of action.

The Greeks, on the other hand, saw the issue differently and argued that Turkey used the military coup against President Makarios as a pretext to intervene in Cyprus it had long sought for. Greek leadership maintained that ‘alleging a right of *intervention* as guarantor of the 1960 Constitution,’ Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974 to restore security and order and to protect the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek officials argued that the coup did not justify Turkey’s military intervention; on the contrary, Turkey’s action contravened the *Treaty of Guarantee*. Their argument was that the *Treaty of Guarantee* recognized the right of the guarantor powers to take action in case of intervention from “outside,” which threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Greeks further argued that the right to take unilateral forceful action in any case was forbidden to member states, except in cases of self-defense. In the view of the Greeks, Turkish military action was aimed at *invasion*, and in the long-term, the partition of the island.<sup>34</sup>

As it should be clear from the discussion above, the events leading to the overthrow of Makarios and the Turkish intervention in Cyprus were rather complex. In a more theoretically oriented analysis below, an attempt is made to *understand* rather than *explain* the why and how questions regarding the events of 1974. The argument is that the decisions of the coup and the military intervention can only be understood after external/systemic factors are analyzed and complemented carefully by domestic factors,

---

<sup>34</sup> Some of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots even subscribed to the notion that the United States conspired to create the conditions that made Turkey’s intervention possible in order to bring about the island’s partition between Greece and Turkey. For a very interesting account on this topic, see O’Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion. I.B. Tauris Publishers: London & New York, 1999

with a special attention paid to the roles played by the 'decision-units,' the ultimate authority of whose decisions could not be changed or reversed.

## PART B

### 1. Greek Decision To Stage The Coup Against Makarios: Domestic Political Explanations

#### 1.1. The Model

In his *Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness* (1994, 1995), Joe D. Hagan<sup>35</sup> juxtaposes two different approaches to foreign policy analysis: the "regime structure approach" and the "statist approach," arguing that the "heart of domestic political explanations of foreign policy is the fact that leaders engage in what Putnam calls 'two-level games' or what Tsebelis refers to as "nested games."<sup>36</sup> According to Hagan, in the face of a foreign policy problem, political leadership has to cope with dual domestic imperatives. The first of these imperatives is to tackle with opposition in multiple arenas, whereas the second imperative refers to the selection of an alternative political strategy as contingent upon the domestic politics. Hagan's suggested framework offers that there are two important games the political leadership can play in handling a foreign policy problem: A) *building policy coalitions* and B) *retaining political power*.<sup>37</sup> Whereas the maintenance of "political power is a more dominant theme than coalition-building," it is important to comprehend both games because both games suggest the fact that domestic politics is a "widespread and nonaberrant influence in foreign policy."<sup>38</sup> Additionally, Joe Hagan maintains, there are three alternative strategies that the political leadership can utilize in order either to build policy coalitions or to retain its power against the political opposition: *mobilization*, *accommodation* and *insulation*.<sup>39</sup> *Mobilization* in foreign policy happens when the presence of domestic opposition predisposes the political leadership to take greater risks and/or overextend the state's power with excessive commitments in order to divert attention from the disturbing domestic issues and retain their power. *Accommodation*, on the other hand, would be pursued when the presence of a viable opposition prevents a leadership to take unnecessary risks and involve in risky foreign policy behaviour. Finally, domestic opposition's influ-

---

<sup>35</sup> Hagan, Joe D. *Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness*, in *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38 (1994); and *Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy*, in *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Neack, Laura et al. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1995

<sup>36</sup>Hagan (b), p. 117

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 121-127

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 126

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p. 128-132

ence might be insulated from any foreign policymaking, having no influence at all. Given these, Hagan suggests, the “games” that the political leadership plays in domestic arena have subtle but “widespread and nonaberrant” impact on foreign policy behaviour.<sup>40</sup>

## **1.2. Application Of Hagan's Model To The Greek Decision To Overthrow Makarios**

### **1.2.1. 1967-1970 Colonels' Rule In Greece: Cohesive Executive And Absence Of A Viable Opposition**

With the coup of 21 April 1967 against the King, General Zoitakis had become the regent and Papadopoulos, who had increasingly emerged as the strong man of the regime, became the Prime Minister in Greece.<sup>41</sup> With the coming to power of the colonels in 1967, civil servants, school and university teachers, whose allegiance was in doubt, were dismissed, while others were required to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime or risked forfeiting their jobs. Lawyers and judges, who showed too much independence during this period, were harassed and dismissed, and additionally, through press censorship and the regime's control of broadcasting the Greek people were subjected to an endless barrage of propaganda in favour of the Revolution of 21 April 1967. The Colonels had met with *little and not a viable opposition* at the time of the coup and the initial reaction of the bulk of the Greek people was one of ignorance occasioned by the inability of the civilian politicians to reconcile their differences before the coup took place in Greece.<sup>42</sup> There were at least two more reasons why the colonels did not meet a very important opposition. First of all, many Greeks were prospering in the early years of the Colonel's dictatorship, which understandably, was an important factor impeding the development of any mass-based opposition. Secondly, the efficiency and brutality of the security and military police in breaking up attempts to organize active resistance served to impede the development of any mass-based opposition.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p. 125.

<sup>41</sup> In a process of gradually concentrating power in his own person, Papadopoulos, in addition to his premiership, subsequently assumed the offices of minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, minister of education, minister of government policy and from the March 1972, regent, a position he combined with premiership. Clogg, Richard. A Short History of Modern Greece. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne. 1979. p. 166-200

<sup>42</sup> Clogg. p. 178

<sup>43</sup> The Colonel's regime was also very careful in fulfilling its obligations under the NATO alliance and although from time to time certain countries within the NATO sought to raise the question of the Greek dictatorship, America

### 1.2.2. 1970-1974 Colonels' Regime In Cyprus: Emergence Of Viable Opposition

Up until the early 1970s, the junta regime's propaganda was replete with populist rhetoric even though their actual economic and financial policies were the antithesis of populism and inequalities in the distribution of income grew steadily. The long-term consequences of the junta's economic policies, not surprisingly, were highly damaging.<sup>44</sup> It is, therefore, probably by no accident that it was in 1973, when the colonels were beginning to pay the price for their profligate economic policies in the form of a rate of inflation over 30%, the first rumbling of mass discontent began to be heard.<sup>45</sup>

While the inflation was steadily increasing, the unemployment rate also rocketed and political instability was at its peak. In order to alleviate this volatile situation caused by socio-economic hardship, the junta leader Papadopoulos proclaimed the creation of a 'presidential parliamentary republic' in 1973 to be ratified by referendum, and stated his intention to hold elections, overseen by a civilian government.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the student demonstrations were increasing; the communist party was raising its voice against the regime more than ever; the university professors and workers were beginning to openly criticize the regime and demanding more liberty and equality. There was also a huge fragmentation within the regime, which suggests that not only a viable opposition to the Colonels' regime that was missing during the first three years of the dictatorship had come into being, but there also appeared a fragmented-and-not-accommodating political authority in Greece. What made things even worse was the fact that within a matter of days, Papadopoulos was ousted by a bloodless coup staged by the army supported by the naval and air force units. Lieutenant-General Phedon Ghizikis was installed as president and a new regime lay in the hands of the prime mover of the coup, Brigadier Dimitros Ioannides of the military police.

The new junta regime, despite contrary rhetoric, showed itself even more incapable of dealing with the pressing problems confronting the country.<sup>47</sup> Inflation continued unchecked, and Greece with few indigenous sources of energy was particularly severely affected by the oil crisis that followed the Yom Kippur War. The considerable disarray within the ranks of the senior members of the military regime grew even stronger and the political leadership had to find ways to retain its power, since it was believed that the with the coming to power the "ruthless" and "conspiracy-loving" Ioannides, compromise, accommodation, and thus coalition building were not even an

---

influence was always sufficiently strong to endure that Greece came under no real pressure from the NATO allies. In return for American support, the regime was careful to avoid giving offence to its NATO allies. Clogg, p. 185

<sup>44</sup> Clogg, p. 172

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> For a further information on the Greek junta during that period, see Schwab, Peter et al. *Greece Under the Junta*. Facts on File Inc, 1970; Poulantzas, Nicos. *The Crisis of Dictatorships*. NLB (translated by David Fernback). 1976.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

option.

### 1.2.3. 1974: Makarios As A Domestic Opposition:

During this very same period, the relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus was also very sour, which had begun following the ascent to power of the regime of the colonels on April 21, 1967. The primary reason for this souring relationship was the fact that the new leadership in the Greek government had come to favour partition of the island between its Greek and Turkish communities with the Greek portion to be united with Greece, whereas the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, was in favour of making the whole island belong to the Greek Cypriots only.<sup>48</sup> Even though Athens supported the regime of Makarios and his desire to maintain the independence of Cyprus publicly, the Greek junta tried to maneuver him out of office, with the help of the Greek officers on Cyprus, who headed the Cypriot National Guard. President Makarios's new stand on *enosis*, despite the pressure and demands of the enosists, made him push forward the principle of self-determination and independence of Cyprus, which was understood not only as a foreign affairs issue by the Greek leadership but as a domestic political issue as well, because the Greek junta saw themselves guardians of the *Hellenic Christian Civilization*.

## 2. Foreign Policy Tactics By The Greek Junta Regime:

### 2.1. Unsuccessful Suppression Tactics Against Makarios As Domestic And Foreign Policy Strategy:

The *suppression* of Makarios, i.e., the revival of the concept of "National Centre" by the junta regime, instead of *accommodation* with him or overt mobilization against him, had already started in early 1971. One can even claim that this was not suppression per se but a covert mobilization against the Greek-Cypriot leader.

The newly established Greek regime considered Makarios an obstacle to its attempts to reach an alleged agreement with Turkey.<sup>49</sup> While the junta leaders were in favour of Makarios's resignation from state politics, Makarios was also under continuous pressure from the church and the enosists not to deviate from the cause of enosis or

---

<sup>48</sup> Bahçeli Tözün, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1990.

<sup>49</sup> Even before the overthrow of the Papadopolos regime by a junta led by Brigadier General Dimitri Ioannides on November 25, 1973, Greek Prime Minister Spiros Markezinis indicated that he was in favour of an "imposed" Athens-Ankara solution to Cyprus that would bypass the intercommunal talks. Stern, Laurance *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. Times Books, 1977.

accept any political settlement that is not consistent with their plan. It is even evinced by some scholars that Athens, with the support of General Grivas and the three senior bishops of the Greek Orthodox Church had been pressuring Makarios to comply with its demands or step down as President of Cyprus.<sup>50</sup> Opposition to President Makarios was also supported by the pro-enosis press, EOKA-B, and several other underground organizations.

Junta leaders, moreover, saw Makarios as an opportunist “red priest,” who compromised Hellenic interests by allying with the enemies of the Greek nation. The junta leaders held Makarios responsible for the spread of communist influences among Greek Cypriots. They were suspicious of the electoral support which AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus, gave to Makarios. The Greek military rulers were further aggravated by the anti-junta criticism that was commonplace in the uncensored Greek Cypriot press.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, the junta in Athens was displeased with Makarios for permitting the island to be a good hiding place for dissident Greek activity against them. The Greek Cypriot leader, who did not hide his preference for constitutional monarchy in Greece as opposed to the junta, also began to shelter opponents of the Greek military dictatorship and worked in alliance with leftist parties found objectionable by the Greek government.<sup>52</sup>

### 2.1.1. *Open Mobilization As Strategy In Both Domestic And Foreign Affairs*

The death of General Grivas, the leader of the EOKA-B terrorist organization on January 27, 1974, was a very important event leading to the 1974 coup against Makarios for two reasons: After Grivas's death, President Makarios tried to bring an end to the terrorist campaign against his administration by proclaiming amnesty for all imprisoned Grivas sympathizers whereas it became possible for the Greek junta leader Ioanides to get the reins of the organization in his own hands. According to many ac-

---

<sup>50</sup> In March, 1972, the three senior bishops, with the support of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greece, invoked a canon law forbidding bishops of the church to hold ecclesiastical and state posts simultaneously. The canon law had not been used for approximately one hundred years. The supporters of Makarios rallied around him, in opposition to the bishops. Those three bishops also demanded that Makarios relinquish his temporal duties and devote himself to the church and ethnarchy duties. The bishops threatened to “defrock” Archbishop Makarios if he refused to comply with their demands. Archbishop's refusal to resign from his temporal office, which was charged as being contrary to the church rules, forced the three senior bishops to bring indictments on February 21, 1973. Makarios was asked to appear before their synod to respond to the charges or face being defrocked. The action of the three bishops was rejected by the Archbishop, and attacked them as attempting a “spiritual assassination.” O'Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*. I.B. Tauris Publishers: London & New York, 1999

<sup>51</sup> Bahçeli, Tözün, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1990. p. 81-82

<sup>52</sup> The *enosists*, for example, expressed the opinion that Makarios wished to have his close friend King Constantine of Greece, who was deposed on June 1, 1973, when Greece was declared a republic, and former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis come to Cyprus from Western Europe and set up a “Greek government in exile.”

counts, the plan of Makarios was to undermine the cohesiveness of EOKA-B, but proved to be unsuccessful because the EOKA-B was reactivated with the help of 650 army officers from Greece who were attached to the Greek Cypriot National Guard that got its orders from Athens.<sup>53</sup>

When Makarios sent his audaciously challenging letter to the junta in Athens that made the junta leaders once again aware that not only the legitimacy of their regime was being challenged by Makarios and his regime in Cyprus but loss of Cyprus would be humiliating and would have very disturbing effects domestically, especially at such a volatile time. In other words, the junta leader Ioannides, and his aides hoped not only to remove a troublesome adversary, but also to win a diplomatic victory for his beleaguered regime. On July 15, the Greek Cypriot National Guard ordered by the Ioannides junta entered the grounds of the palace, and in a bloody coup, overthrew President Makarios,<sup>54</sup> appointing in his place Nikos Sampson, a Cypriot known for his anti-Turkish sentiments.

### 3. Conclusion

The framework provided by Joe Hagan has proved to be useful in explaining the decision of the Greek leadership to stage a coup against Makarios in July 1974. As can be seen above, the Greek junta regime tried to use three different types of strategies under specific circumstances. While the regime tried to accommodate or covertly suppress the Makarios regime in the beginning, the increasing fragmentation within the regime and growing challenge from Makarios as a domestic opposition increased the likelihood of an overt mobilization against the Greek regime in the island. Indeed, the coup against Makarios represents this overt mobilization in its clearest form.

---

<sup>53</sup> The Soviet Union and the United States both applied diplomatic pressures on Athens to restrain its pro-ensis Greek officers serving on Cyprus. However, the US, which had no admiration for the military dictatorship in Greece, has been very cautious not to exert excessive diplomatic pressure on Athens because it wanted to protect the US Sixth Fleet base at Piraeus, which the junta had allowed the fleet to make its home port. Because Washington considered the naval base at Piraeus strategically imperative to the NATO alliance in the eastern Mediterranean, it would have jeopardized the accord. The Soviet Union and the Cyprus communist party (AKEL) gave full support to the regime of Makarios because of its change of policy from enosis to independence for Cyprus. O'Malley, Brendan et al.

<sup>54</sup> Halil Ibrahim Salih states that the coup had actually begun on the evening of July 14, when "Athens clandestinely sent to Cyprus about one hundred more army officers on an Olympic Airlines Boeing 727. Besides the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the 950 Greek soldiers based on Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance also took part in the coup." Halil Ibrahim Salih. Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism On A State. The University of Alabama Press, University, Alabama. 1978, p. 88

One could, of course, claim that the Greek leadership should or could have decided to *accommodate* with the Greek-Cypriot leadership rather than to mobilize against Makarios, simply because the fragmentation within the regime was so high and any wrong-doing might have resulted in unexpected failure of the regime, which, in fact, happened only seven days after the coup took place. But as Hagan (1994) has suggested in his framework, retaining political power is more important for political leadership.

## PART C

### 1. Turkish Decision to Intervene: Brecher's INPUT-OUTPUT Model<sup>55</sup>

#### 1.1. The Model

Michael Brecher, in his The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Settings, Images, Processes (1972) describes his foreign policy analysis framework as an "input-output" approach.<sup>56</sup> Brecher discusses about the *operational environment* that may affect a state's external behaviour, and he argues that the elements of the operational environment exist outside the decision-makers' minds.<sup>57</sup> Brecher has identified five internal --- *economic capability, military capability, political structure, interest groups, competing elites* --- and five external --- *global system, subordinate system, subordinate other, bilateral system, dominant bilateral* --- variables, which make up the operational environment.<sup>58</sup> What is, however, much more important in Brecher's framework is that the *operational environment* influences any decision taken only as it is filtered through the *perceptions* of the decision-makers. Brecher calls this perceived environment as the *psychological environment*.<sup>59</sup> According to Brecher, the first element that bridges the *operational environment* and the *psychological environment* is communication whereas the second factor is the identification of the decision-making elite.

Brecher argues that the decision-making elite has an *attitudinal prism* through which they filter the factors in the *operational environment*. This prism, which is both shaped and affected by societal factors and personal qualities, is believed to greatly shape the foreign policy decisions. Therefore, this model argues it is only through a

---

<sup>55</sup> Brecher, Michael. The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Settings, Images, Processes. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p.1

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 2-5

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 1-10

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 11

thorough understanding of this attitudinal prism and the perceived environment one could comprehend the process of decision-making and foreign policy behaviour.

### 1.1.1. *Application Of The Brecher's Model*

Following Brecher's outline, I will now review the various factors which comprised the *operational environment* in which the 1974 Turkish Cyprus decision took place and discuss how each of these factors was *perceived* by the decision-making elite that formed the *psychological environment* of the Turkish decision-making process. I believe that Brecher's model is the most useful framework in the analysis of Turkish decision-making to intervene because the immense amount of data that I have gathered suggest that not only the international conjuncture affected the decision-making process but also the perceptions of the decision-making elite mattered the most.

#### 1.1.1.1. Operational Environment --- External Variables

When one tries to comprehend the external variables within the operational environment, it is obvious that in 1974, there was a *loose bipolar system*, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two main competing states. Even though, the relationship between the two superpowers were seen as the most important ones, I take the United Nations (UN) as the main actor in the *global system*,<sup>60</sup> because, not only the UN Peacekeeping Force, UNFICYP, had been installed on Cyprus since 1964 but the UN also provided the main forum for the international debate on the crisis during this period. The Turkish decision makers, however, maintained throughout the crisis the attitude of distrust of the UN policy on Cyprus since they saw the UN as pro-Makarios and incapable of protecting the Turkish-Cypriots, which suggests that the Turkish decision-makers did not see the UN as a viable preventative factor in their decision to intervene.

The most important *subordinate system* was the one that was composed of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. The Turkish decision-making elites were convinced that Greek leadership still wanted to achieve *enosis*. In this respect, the anti-Makarios coup by the Greek junta provided Turkey with what one foreign Ministry official called a "golden opportunity" to intervene and settle the problem. In his own words,

---

<sup>60</sup> Brecher argues that "in the mid-twentieth century three types of interaction at the global level provide the most important parameters for the state behaviour: the relations between the two power-ideology blocs; the behaviour of the universal organization, i.e., the UN, and its affiliated agencies; and the relations between the superpowers and the 'Third World.'" Brecher. p. 5-6

“The golden *opportunity* had finally come ... the Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We could no longer be scared off by threats of the Soviet bogeyman.”<sup>61</sup>

The appointment of Sampson as Makarios’s replacement, especially, was a significant factor in this subordinate system because, as some prominent students of Cyprus conflict have suggested, the selection of Sampson simply guaranteed a Turkish intervention. One can, in other words, claim that the Turkish decision-makers perceived that the subordinate system had been significantly altered by the July 15 coup and this was the primary reason why the Turkish intervention took place. In July 1974, the Turkish officials argued that the annexation of Cyprus by Greece was imminent. In addition to the subordinate system comprised of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, we can see NATO as the *subordinate other system*, although NATO did not play an active role during this crisis. However, according to many accounts, Turkish decision-makers felt that in the context of *détente*, NATO unity was not an issue to be considered due to the *détente*.

The relationship between the two parties, Greece and Turkey, was the most *dominant bilateral*, which was at particularly low ebb in 1974 even before the Cyprus crisis had started. The events in the early 1974 mainly stressed even more the distrust of both countries toward each other, i.e., the Aegean dispute in early March 1974 and the minorities issue in Thrace. There were also two other very important bilateral relations if one looks at the issue from the Turkish perspective. The first one was the Turkish-US relationship and the other was the Turkish-Soviet relationship. Most people in Turkey, and especially the new government, perceived that the US had backed the Sampson regime, and even if they did not, it was argued, that the US failed to denounce the new regime. In fact, the United States reacted to the Greek-inspired coup by receiving the Sampson government’s foreign minister and denying the involvement of the Greek government in the coup.

The US-Turkish relations were especially interesting because from 1964 onwards, Turkey was to formulate a policy, which while never questioning the basic pro-Western and pro-NATO stance of Turkey’s diplomatic orientation, began taking steps towards adopting more independent positions.<sup>62</sup> With the rise to power of Bülent Ecevit --- a

---

<sup>61</sup>Birand, Mehmet A., *30 Sıcak Gün* (30 Hot Days: An Account of Turkey’s Intervention in Cyprus in 1974). Istanbul, Milliyet Publications. 1975. p. 55

<sup>62</sup> After United States President Johnson’s blunt and offensive letter forced the Turks to call off their military intervention in 1964, a consensus had developed in Turkey that the country’s leaders had erred by yielding to American pressures; they had failed to protect a vital national interest. In July 1974, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit told him bluntly:

Social Democrat with a strong admiration for the social and diplomatic orientation of Scandinavian countries --- the traditionally non-aligned approach to foreign policy culminated in a strong desire to diversify Turkish foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> Ecevit's coalition partner Erbakan was also more interested in seeing a diversification in foreign policy, which would have made it possible for Turkey to foster ties with the Muslim world without US pressure.<sup>64</sup>

#### 1.1.1.2. Operational Environment --- Internal Variables

The factor of Turkey's *military capability* figured very prominently in the Turkish decision-makers' calculations when they were deciding whether to intervene or not. It was determined that the Turkish forces were capable of such a landing although accounts of early stages of the decision-making process mention the uncertainty of the civilian leaders felt about the battle capabilities of an army that had not fought for a half century.<sup>65</sup> Whereas economic considerations were not even discussed since for the decision-makers at that time what was important was the maintenance of the state interests and since they thought that the intervention would be short and decisive, there was no need to see the intervention as a very big burden on the Turkish economy although the Turkish economy at the time was also very badly affected by the world oil crisis, the political structure in Turkey at the time of the 1974 Cyprus crisis had a crucial impact on Turkey's policy.<sup>66</sup>

---

Ten years ago ... you committed an error and so did we. Your mistake was to tie our hands and stop us. Our mistake was that we listened to you. We will not commit the same error as ten years ago.

Birand, p. 57

<sup>63</sup> One of the first acts of the government of Bülent Ecevit elected in 1973 was to repeal the ban on growing poppies and to distribute poppy seeds to licensed farmers. Ecevit's repeal of the ban assumed greater significance than it otherwise would have as it was seen in Turkey as a rebuke of American bullying and an assertion of Turkish independence and the protection of Turkish interests.

<sup>64</sup> I argue that the foreign policy programme of the coalition government formed within the RPP and the NSP in January 1974 expressed what were essentially RPP views on foreign policy.

<sup>65</sup> Birand, 55

<sup>66</sup> In the early 1970s, political events in the country at large were unstable, the political agitation and polarization resulted in widespread political violence and disorder. Left-wing elements among students and faculty were particularly unhappy about Turkey's close relations with the US and the government was targeted by many groups. Dissatisfaction increased by a deteriorating economic situation in the late 1960s, which featured spiraling inflation. Finally, in March 1971, with a 'coup by memorandum,' the Generals warned the government to take the necessary steps. The military take-over brought to the head the intra-party conflict of the RPP. Bülent Ecevit, the young Secretary-General, resigned his post in protest when party chairman İnönü accepted to cooperate with the military-backed government. The following year, Ecevit successfully challenged İnönü's leadership of the party and with Ecevit's assumption of the post of Party Chairman, the leadership of the RPP passed from the old guard to the younger; from a more liberal wing of the party to the firm supporters of the 'left-of-centre' ideology.

The Ecevit-Erbakan coalition had been put together with a great deal of difficulty and had not functioned smoothly because of disagreements between the leaders of the two diverse parties. Additionally, neither the West nor the military and most of the secularists in Turkey were happy with the new coalition government, and one can, therefore, easily argue that during this politically troubled period in Turkey, certain foreign policy issues became central within the domestic political arena, and Cyprus case can be seen as an example to that even though, surprisingly with all the competition of other domestic and foreign policy issues during the 1967-1974 period, the Cyprus question had not attracted a great deal of attention in Turkey. Although this was the case, the coalition acted uniformly in the making of the decision to intervene. Both the National Salvation Party of Erbakan and the Republican Peoples' Party of Ecevit were in favour of intervention.

Several interest groups that were the most important in operational environment were comprised of especially the student groups/public and the media. Additionally, the military was also supporting direct involvement in Cyprus. Even Turkish press's attention in early July was mainly focused on the Ecevit government's decision to renew the cultivation of poppies due to the fact that the reaction that this policy prompted in the US Congress was of particular concern, and the political struggle going on in Cyprus during this period between Makarios and the Greek government was mentioned in the Turkish press without too much attention, starting with the first reports of the coup, the events in Cyprus completely dominated the press for the next few weeks. Two and sometimes three editions a day were published by some of the major newspapers and they were devoted almost entirely to the Cyprus crisis. The press was especially preoccupied with the question of what Turkish policy should be. While some newspaper accounts were in favour of non-intervention, i.e., early editions of *Milliyet*, some others were demanding intervention as soon as possible, i.e., *Tercuman*. The last two-three days in Turkey had also witnessed a public cry for intervention in Cyprus. There was a huge public criticism at the delay in making the move whose time had never seemed so opportune. Leftist student demonstrators were carrying signs through the streets of Ankara that said of the Sisco mission: "Sisco-fiasco."<sup>67</sup>

Competing elites, particularly the major political parties, were an important factor as well in the operational environment. From the time the anti-Makarios coup was announced, some of the rival party leaders began to publicly call for a Turkish military intervention.<sup>68</sup> Leaders of the opposition Democratic and Republican Reliance Parties were reported to have requested a meeting of the Parliament to discuss the situation in Cyprus. Kamran Inan, a leading Justice Party foreign policy spokesman accused Ecevit

---

<sup>67</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 19 July 1974

<sup>68</sup> It is suggested, however, the very same political parties who called for intervention raised their reservations in the closed meetings.

government of being caught unprepared and said that it was impossible to consider what had happened in Cyprus an internal matter.<sup>69</sup> In the following days, criticisms like this increased and became even much more critical.

### 1.1.1.3. Psychological Environment

The *psychological environment* that is comprised of both *societal* and *personality factors* of the Turkish decision-making during the 1974 Cyprus crisis greatly affected the foreign policy decision at that time. In addition to the political and security interests of the two countries, socio-political factors had affected the relations of Turkey and Greece in a populace of both sides for so long that their self-identification was, and still is, very much related to the identity of the 'other.' Popular Turkish images of Greeks reflect past resentments and bitterness; Greek people are not considered trustworthy, and they are accused of bearing an ancient enmity toward the Turks. Thus, Greeks are seen to be liable to hit Turkey at any moment of weakness.<sup>70</sup> Given this, the intervention was seen as the only alternative for the Turkish decision-making elite to take action due to the fact that the situation "supposedly" changed by the military coup against Makarios would have changed the balance in favour of Greece, which would definitely be threatening to the Turkish interests.

Personality factors during this time were also effective to a considerable degree. Perceptions of Ecevit, possibly the *ultimate decision-making unit* in this incident, encouraged the decision to intervene. Ecevit not only expected that a successful intervention would be enormously popular with the Turkish public and thus generate considerable approval for his Republican People's Party but also, if all went well, he could free himself from the restraints of the difficult coalition with the National Salvation Party and be in a strong position to attain his goal of building a Scandinavian-type welfare state in Turkey.

## 1.3. Conclusion

As it should be obvious from the discussion above, almost all elements were in favour of intervention, or at least not opposed to it. When looked from Brecher's "input-output" model, it can be argued that the model has provided a good theoretical framework for the incident despite the fact that it still does not account for how the decision

---

<sup>69</sup> Milliyet, 16 July 1974

<sup>70</sup> Bahçeli, p. 1

was actually taken. The power of the model rests with the fact that it includes almost all the variables that might be helpful in understanding the Turkish foreign policy behaviour. However, one should also take more into account the decision-unit at the time of the decision, in order for a more theoretical understanding of the decision-making at the time of the incident.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> An analysis of how the ultimate decision-unit had affected the decision-making process was presented and published elsewhere. Those who are interested in knowing more about the 'decision-unit' model should refer to International Studies Review, Special Issue, December 2001.

# FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF LITHUANIA\*

*Giedrius ČEKUOLIS\*\**

In Lithuania, as in many other Central European countries, notion “security” is synonymous to that of “NATO membership”. Since back home I myself am called “Mr. NATO”, let me focus on that particular aspect of our security policy.

Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first Turkish President said "Mankind is a single body and each nation is a part of that body. We must never say 'What does it matter to me if some part of the world is ailing?' If there is such an illness, we must concern ourselves with it as though we were having that illness."

That is a very important thought. Indeed, in modern Europe security of one is linked to the security of another. Security of the Baltic sea region could not be full if the Balkans are exposed to the danger; Balkan nations will not be safe until the Caucasus is secure.

## Prague Summit and Beyond

How do we see NATO enlargement process? We expect that at the NATO Summit in Prague there will be decision on robust and comprehensive second round of NATO enlargement. All prepared candidates have to be invited. I would also like to stress that it is difficult to perceive a credible further enlargement of NATO without the Baltic dimension. Needless to say, Lithuania expects an invitation for membership in Prague.

Upon invitation, we seek a short period of intensive accession negotiations, followed by a well-concerted ratification process in NATO national parliaments. Clear modalities of accession process as well as precise timing is crucial to make the second round of enlargement a full success. There should be no foot-dragging – in will serve

---

\* Statement at Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 26 April 2002

\*\* Ambassador; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania

interests of both, NATO current Allies and candidate countries, to proceed with the process of integration speedily.

I would like to note a positive trend of political debate evolving around the enlargement issue. All NATO countries are in favour of going ahead with a big decision. Lithuania, alongside with a number of other candidates, enjoys a good standing as well. Last week Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid official visit to Lithuania voicing strong Turkey's support for our membership in the Alliance. It is a clear acknowledgement of progress Lithuania has been doing in preparing to meet the requirements and obligations stemming from the membership. With no single NATO country being against the enlargement, the dynamics of the process looks encouraging.

### Why NATO Enlargement Is So Vital?

By admitting best-prepared democratic European states NATO will expand the zone of peace, democracy and stability in Europe. By broadening zone of stability and democracy, the second wave of enlargement in 2002 will solidify the achievements of the first round.

Moreover, current candidate nations, being anchored to where they naturally belong to, will further project security eastwards. All European nations will become more secure.

I am convinced that enlargement will strengthen the transatlantic link. On the other hand, it will also help to reinvigorate European Security and Defense Policy. That would be instrumental in aiming at a more balanced and coherent Alliance as well as to a more inclusive and efficient ESDP.

Recent tragic experience of the terrorist attacks against the United States taught us that security of Europe and North America is tightly interwoven. Enlargement will help the Alliance to transform into an organization able efficiently tackle new security challenges and threats. The underpinning principle of our security is solidarity.

We see enlargement of NATO as a natural value-based process of the Euro-Atlantic unity and solidarity. In fact, it is not NATO, which enlarges to the East. It is a free choice of sovereign nations to become again a part of "living European civilization". That is only way to reinstall "Europe whole, free and at peace".

Finally, one should not neglect the moral argument. As President Bush put it almost a year ago in his historic speech in Warsaw: "all nations have a right to enjoy same level of security and democracy". Sad legacy of the twentieth century has to be mitigated once and for all. Any remaining scars have to be healed.

### What Added Value Will Lithuania Bring To The Alliance?

One might fully support the rationale of NATO integration, but still keep wondering what a country like Lithuania will bring to make the Alliance stronger; “wouldn’t they weaken militarily NATO, would they be a credible Allies?” – these are very legitimate questions to ask.

Let me reassure you, that Lithuania wishes to become part of a strong and effective Alliance and is as interested in enhancing and not diluting it, as you are.

In January 1994, then Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas wrote a letter to the former NATO Secretary General M. Woerner expressing Lithuania’s political will to join NATO. Since that time we are steadily working to achieve that goal. Strong political consensus is maintained on Lithuania’s membership in NATO. The political will is embodied in the Defence Agreement 2001-2004, which was signed by all parliamentary parties in May 2001. The Agreement also stipulates the main directions of the development of defence capabilities and pledges allocation of 2 per cent of GDP to the defence needs. Moreover, political consensus and integration policies are backed by the public opinion. 60 per cent of Lithuanian people support the idea of Lithuanian membership in NATO.

Self-defence capabilities, ability to contribute to the NATO-led operations as well as ability to operate with forces of other NATO nations on the Lithuanian territory are the key areas of our efforts. A battalion will be prepared by the end of this year to contribute to possible Article 5 operation for the period of six months. By the end of 2006 Reaction Brigade will be ready to work with NATO forces on the territory of Lithuania on a possible NATO Article 5 operation. By that time a Lithuanian battalion will be prepared to participate in any NATO-led operation.

Lithuania wholeheartedly supports the efforts of European reunification. That was one of the main reasons behind launching two years ago the Vilnius Group process. Candidate countries had to develop same culture of cooperation as it is cultivated in the Alliance. We had to prove being able to cooperate as closely as Allies do. As a founder of Vilnius process, Lithuania is strongly favoring the idea at V10 to work harder in practical preparations for membership and we carry on this message. Today we are confident that Vilnius process is a full success. I would like to stress that after Prague we are keen to keep the V10 cooperation culture alive as well as to continue NATO’s “open door” policy.

Terrorist attacks against the United States proved that the rationale of the enlargement remains valid. Facing uncertain future we have to stay firm, remaining loyal to the fundamental principles of civilized world. I am glad to say that here in Turkey, a staunch NATO Ally. It would be difficult to overestimate the role Turkey plays in the battle against terrorism in the region and beyond. My country has been also acting in the anti-terrorist campaign as a virtual NATO Ally. In January 2002, Lithuanian Gov-

ernment approved the Counter-Terrorism Program. In the framework of the “Enduring Freedom” operation we are ready to send up to 27 servicemen within the Czech and Danish contingents. We will actively participate in dealing with this global menace in future.

I mentioned Balkans earlier. It is yet another example of how our nations, Turkey and Lithuania, can work together and contribute to European security. Today we have 95 Lithuanian soldiers in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 30 Lithuanian soldiers serve as a component of the Polish battalion in the NATO-led KFOR “Joint Guardian” peace operation. A transport aircraft of Lithuanian Air Force with a crew of five soldiers and ground handling personnel of two soldiers is participating in the NATO-led KFOR/SFOR operations. Our commitment to the participation in NATO-led operations remains firm; we will increase our engagement in the future NATO Peace Support Operations as well as possible Article 5 contingencies.

Lithuania is actively strengthening security and stability in the Baltic sea region. We pursue a transparent and constructive good neighborly policies *vis-à-vis* our neighbors. We are actively engaging into various regional cooperation projects. This is an asset we are going to bring to the Alliance.

We actively work on non-military aspects of the membership as well - economic and social reforms, anti-corruption, privatization, legal reform etc. Let me quote the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which in it’s recent report underlined that “significant progress has also been made in the overarching of EU and NATO accession, which are widely supported across the political spectrum”. According to the IMF conclusions, Lithuania is able to undertake all financial burdens and obligations stemming from the membership in NATO and EU.

I would also like to briefly mention our relations with Russia, including its Kaliningrad district.

Neither NATO enlargement process, nor our wish to join NATO is directed against Russia’s legitimate security interests. We appreciate growing Russian understanding of enlargement objectives.

Russia clearly acknowledges sovereign right of all states to choose their own security arrangements. We heard new confirmations of this from Russian President Putin during Lithuanian President Adamkus’ visit to Russia in March last year and from Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov when he visited Lithuania on 7 March 2002.

Trade with Russia is picking up, after the downturn of trade volumes caused by the Russian crisis of 1998. Lithuania remains the biggest foreign investor and trade partner and often serves as a catalyst of the EU initiatives with regard to Kaliningrad.

Joining NATO, Lithuania will contribute its positive experience of dealing with Russia to Alliance's strategies *vis-à-vis* Russia. Already now we project our policies towards Russia, including Kaliningrad, as a part of NATO and EU strategies.

We will work on further broadening of political dialogue and practical cooperation with Russia (CSBMS, regional cooperation) and its Kaliningrad region.

We are very interested in the development of the NATO-Russia relationship. I am convinced that NATO-Russia's cooperation taking a new quality could bring but positive results. After joining NATO we will work constructively in a new NATO-Russia mechanism bringing all our bilateral and regional knowledge.

To sum up, Lithuania will bring to NATO its cooperation culture and enthusiasm which will strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance.

# NEIGHBORS SHOULD BE SEEN AS NATURAL PARTNERS\*

---

---

*Arne Olav BRUNDTLAND* \*\*

We are living through highly dramatic times. Sept. 11 has been looked upon as the most profound watershed in history. Many relationships have to be reexamined. In numerous ways there is a new deal in international relations.

But we also have to wonder about what is constant. It was the secretary of defense for U.S. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and subsequently the leader of the World Bank, Robert S. MacNamara who among others, but with the very special background of defense and economic development, have asked the fundamental question: What is history? He chose to give his answer in the form of another, which the vanquished recuperated for a new war?

The point is naturally that the world order over the centuries has been characterized by the use of force and domination. That your neighbor is your natural enemy and that your neighbor's next neighbor is your natural ally because he as well is the enemy of your neighbour, because of his geographical position in the neighborhood. This sort of deadlock should be broken. Neighbors should be seen as natural partners.

But the use of arms does, not seldom, pay off. The use of violence can be cost effective. Although it is always hard to calculate what a war can bring. Many a statesman taking up arms has been frustrated by the consequences and often ended up in a much poorer situation, if in life at all.

All wars stop. At some point they actually do. But there will always be a vanquished leader who dreams of revenge.

Traditional motives of self-defense are strong -- even in the intra-national setting -- and have not lost their values or philosophical respectability.

Self-defense is an honorable proposition in most societies. When the nation is under threat from the outside one stands up to be counted, even with pomp and fanfare.

---

\* The Acceptance Speech Upon having been awarded the Ihsan Doğramacı prize for International Relations for Peace at Bilkent University, Ankara, Wednesday April 3.

\*\* Norwegian Professor, an expert on disarmament.

This holds also in the situation when the state, which should be the guarantor of safety and possess the monopoly of the means of physical coercion implodes or in other ways do not do their job, the instinct of self defense is there and it finds ways to fulfill itself when in need.

A number of motivations for the rightful use of coercion have been there for centuries.

We have experienced different kinds of crusades.

To some, wars of national liberation are both honorable and acceptable.

Now we have humanitarian intervention. The concept was borne for implementation in the vicinity of the country in which we are now.

We should not forget the different versions of holy war in the world today -- here Islam is in focus. Is that a respectable proposition?

War, however, is much more problematic in the nuclear age, since the means for devastation are far outstripping what could be hoped for as a gain. So tell us even the realists, and Henry Kissinger is among them. We must find other means of influence and competition, at least on the plane of global strategy dominated by states with nuclear weapons. And this line of thought did take hold among top policy makers encapsulated in the acknowledgement: A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. And since conventional wars between nuclear armed antagonists will always run the risk of escalation to a nuclear level, even a conventional war is too risky. This is the legacy of The Ronald Reagan-Mikhail Gorbachev understanding that helped end the Cold War between East and West. This problem does not go away from the American-Russian relationship, nor from confrontational settings in other regional contexts.

It leaves us with:

- The need for stable balances of weapons of mass destruction at the lowest possible level -- a complicated triple relationship India-China-Pakistan is a new and very challenging one.

- The need to sort out the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- The need to sort out the problem of possible first use of such weapons.

- You can not easily have it both ways, namely threatening or even using nuclear weapons, and at the same time be successful in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the nuclearization of the arsenals of the countries which can afford them. The "Osirak" type of action by taking out weapons programs on the ground by means of air power, is a risky one, can only buy you some time while you might not be able to muster the support you need for doing it again.

The poor men's weapon of mass destruction are said to be biological and chemical weapons. But it might as well be seen as the nuclear option in view of the revolution in conventional military affairs, in particular in the United States. Accuracy in the means of delivery is the case in point.

Today we still have a number of international flashpoints. India-Pakistan, Korea, Taiwan to mention but a few. These are problems that will not easily go away, and they should not be forgotten. We can add Nagorno Karabakh. Well can add a number of others, while not forgetting the Israel-Palestinian or in particular the other states subsumed in the concept of the "Axis of Evil."

Military balances might be freezing political conflicts. A deterrent however presupposes an ultimate willingness to use arms. A sophisticated inventory of weapons makes for different strategies of escalation.

But military balances also provide for arms races, much to the detriment of civilian development. In more optimistic circumstances, military balances could be a groundwork for arms control.

Is the possession of territory so all-important? Did not the European Great Powers really prosper just after they had given up the notion of keeping their overseas colonies or whatever they called it, by military means? Empires used to be established through conquest. They could only be sustained through the free acceptance of the people. The forces of fragmentation during the last century testify to that. The forces on integration however are based on free and democratic support.

We must realize that we all have actual or potential problems of peace. The power struggle in Western Europe created two world wars during the last century. Struggle between France and Germany created wars through centuries. I remember Helmut Kohl officially visiting Oslo recalling that his family had supplied the German Army with soldiers in three wars within living memory 1870, 1914, 1939. This should be enough. This should be stopped. Among ways to stop it was to join NATO. But more important he saw membership in the European Union as basically a grand peace initiative. Cooperation in the EU runs far deeper than cooperation in NATO. Political and economic integration is both broader and deeper than military cooperation even in an institution like NATO.

But still we have problems. Northern Ireland, Basque separatists,

Entering the European Union means entering a scheme for peace. Entering NATO has many of the same connotations. Being in NATO has been a framework for peace and stability and moderation of conflicts. These processes which have stabilized the relationships in Western Europe is now in for the test of adding to the same in a much broader framework, both in Eastern Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

For hundreds of years the peoples in Northern Europe were happy and gruesome warriors. The Vikings plagued the continentals and the main prayer in the churches was: please Oh Lord save us from the fury of the Normans.

After the Viking age, the Nordics continued to fight among themselves and the power play around the Baltic Sea was dominant for centuries. But eventually things changed to become more peaceful.

Why is there peace between Sweden and Norway?

Why do we not quarrel about territory that previously belonged to the other side? "Normally" secession should lead to war, but not here, perhaps because the center (Sweden) would not be militarily strong enough to dominate the periphery (Norway) by use of military force and would bleed to weakness and lose out in the long run. It took some time in Stockholm in 1905 to sort out the alternatives and to decide for peace. In addition; None of the Great Powers were interested in any war between Sweden and Norway.

Why is there peace between Sweden and Finland -- Why did they come to terms over the Aland Islands?

Why was the bitter enmity between Finland and the Soviet Union after World War II turned into coexistence?

Why did the Finns drop any sort of irredentist longings for lost formerly Finnish territories to the East? As seen from the outside some territories are hardly worth fighting for. This should be checked against the background of different international conflicts. But the concept "not worth fighting for" must take into account a certain balance. If only one of the sides in a conflict hold this concept, it might be free for the other to settle the dispute -- unilaterally.

But a universal application of the right for any group to establish a separate state would lead to global chaos. Although those f.i. in the former Soviet Union did not think in terms of global stability but rather in terms of hatred of the center and a longing for independence. A new world order must be based on the inviolability of borders, but not necessarily the unchangeability. Peaceful changes are not to be ruled out.

On the other hand, the free form of integration makes the borders somewhat less important. Political solutions can be found on different levels. Local entities might even be represented directly at the center and thus in fact surpassing their own capitals -- occasionally.

Conflicts have turned into internal strife. During the forty-odd conflicts of the 1990s, almost all of them were not between states. But the categories are overlapping and the distinction is blurred. It often starts with complains about discrimination and

reports of a lack of respect for human rights. It coincides with the lack of a fair and forceful police and judiciary. Parties have no one, or feel that they have no one to go to with their grievances, or to ask for help in the dispute settlements, and consequently they react in different fashions in self-defense, weapons in hand. The smaller units like the clan, the family and the like become the nucleus.

Outside intervention can be useful in terms of observers, peacekeepers mediators etc. But very so often the stronger party to the conflicts is less inclined to accept outside help.

We have a new world post Sept. 11 -- the just cause of bringing terrorists to justice and even stopping states that harbor terrorists, give them support or even comfort. Not withstanding the problem of the lack of a universal definition of the term "terrorist."

Again MacNamara in one of the first comments made on the BBC stressed on the twin challenge of bringing the perpetrators to justice and taking better care of the challenges of poverty that breeds terrorism.

Let us take the first first. The question of fighting terrorism is not the question of whether to do it, but how to do it cost effectively and with results. You do not talk most terrorists out of their determination. You have physically to stop them. You need military force, you need a good and reliable police force, and an uncorrupt legal system.

Sept. 11 has given a strong boost to the state as an institution. Military power should not be privatized. This is no field for the worlds many NGOs. But the state holding the monopoly of physical power must be legitimate. The rule of law is all-important. But please be aware: there should not be the rule of any sort of law. The democratic press and good governance should be implemented. Democracy however presupposes independent, literate and tolerant citizens. And be aware of those who would like to use the techniques of the democratic process to eventually abolish democratic rule. Democratic leadership is one of service and not any sort of license to pursue private economic or other interests. The democratic state exists for its people and not the other way around. Democratic leadership presupposes transparency and accountability. Democracy is a never ending challenge and is not established forever. It has to be nurtured. It has to produce the political results that demonstrate its superiority.

To build military capabilities is the easy part. What about 84 billion extra on the American Defense budget?

Then comes the question of American superiority in all aspects of military affairs. The world's only superpower. Projecting power, unilaterally if they must, multilaterally they can.

The rest of the world can only perform junior roles. But some have assets better than others, be it Special Forces or even territory. If the strategic value of Turkish terri-

tory mostly has been connected to the straits, new situations with regard to the Gulf War and the operations in Afghanistan have given Turkey a basis for rendering extremely valuable contributions.

Contrary to what has been said by realists, and I can quote even Joseph Stalin, that geography is a constant, the significance of geography changes by development of means for military action and the variations of the political problem on the agenda, to mention but a few of the many relevant factors.

Then comes the need of fighting terrorists by the means of a good and effective police force.

Response to Libya: U.S. used air power and struck targets in Libya. The Europeans mostly looked on the American operations, and gave over flights rights, but relied on their police forces to combat the terrorists not in their homeland, but on European soil if they chose to turn up there.

Current transatlantic discussion: Unilateralism. The U.S. is the only nation that can take on terrorists in faraway countries by means of a superior military, most others might bemoan the American trigger happiness. And so the question is whether the United States and the EU perceive the same terrorists, or whether they mostly see the ones for which they have the means to deal with. In other words: Is the perception of the threat a function of the capability to deal with the threat. There are lots of examples throughout history of governments describing the threat according to their own means with which to deal with it.

There is some confusion about the root causes of terrorism. As so well stated by columnist Thomas L. Friedman of the IHT: Many of the terrorists are not coming from poverty. Many are coming from well-to-do families; they have education and a prosperous future. But still they are willing to under certain circumstances to do what the hijackers of Sept. 11 were willing to do.

We need to do something to weaken the root causes of terrorism. The role of poverty comes along in a different dimension.

Some have better intelligence, but it is also important that some have a better psychological analysis and are in a better position to help the all-important dialogue to avoid the clash of civilizations.

Why did the Bader-Meinhof gang in Western Germany have so much success? It was at least partly because there was a broad group of people who were sympathetic to their cause. In German: Die sympatisanten.

I suggest that this category is very important as well.

Take a look at the speech made by Kofi Annan when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize focussing on the comprehensive needs of the little girl in Afghanistan, but do also take a look at the speech by President Bush a good fortnight ago in which he addresses poverty and terrorism. He was preparing himself for the UN meeting on poverty alleviation in Monterrey in Mexico, for the first time President Bush came out in favor of international economic aid and he announced an increase of \$5 billion, which is an increase of 14 percent in American spending on that score. Gradually the American administration is overcoming its distaste for development aid and this opens for new initiatives and a much broader acceptance around the world of the American leadership in the fight against terrorists. Having said before that they do not concern themselves with the causes, only with the outcome, the American perspective is going to be broader. Because at home Bush fights on the two fronts of chasing terrorists and protecting the American economy against the effects of terrorism. Should the Americans not be able to look for the same combination when they are making their analysis with other countries in focus?

But then what is the economic ramification? Let me take one example, the Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and malaria: Secretary General Kofi Annan has been asking for \$7-10 billion and he has got something in the range of 1.8. Or let us take the report from the "Commission of macro economics and health," led by Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs: A dollar wisely invested in health will give an economic return six times the investment. In order to halve poverty by the year 2015 one should invest 66 billion a year in health and at the same time save 8 million lives. He asks for .01 percent of GDP or a penny out of only every 10 dollars.

Make love -- not war was one of the more well known slogans from the American opposition to the Vietnam War. A similar slogan can be discerned from the practice of Norwegian peace building, be it in the Middle East or in South Africa: Don't make war, make money. The question is how to give broad groups of the society a stake in the peace process. An economic stake might be a good one. trade is better than a demonizing of the adversary. The development of positive images is important as well.

Peace is made between enemies. When Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin on the lawn of the White House in Washington in September 1993 shook the hand of Chairman Yassar Arafat, it was a handshake between enemies.

The Oslo process for peace in the Middle East was a breakthrough, and it was a beginning. The process died out. But a new process based on the Saudi initiative might be fruitful under the new circumstances even if rejected by Israel. The American initiative in the Security Council for the first time asking for a Palestinian state, along with a secure Israel, is a new beginning.

The Oslo process could start because the PLO was weakened during the Gulf war. The Oslo process got under way also because of the will of the leaders on both side

to make a try -- and to some extent the sheer luck that there were some Norwegians who had the imagination to grab the opportunity when they saw it emerging. The Oslo process could have been led to fruition in Camp David. But the parties were too far apart and even the American president could not knock their heads together. The recent American position in favor of a Palestinian state has to be seen in the broader context once again of handling Iraq. But never the less: Use the opportunity when opportunity presents itself.

The secrecy of peace processes is extremely important. The few Norwegians involved in the Oslo process did not even inform the American government before the deal was struck behind closed curtains in Oslo.

The Oslo process was something which further more took place on the top of the political hierarchy. This is political leadership. It was lacking the actual involvement of popular support. It was an affair for leaders only. It was lacking in democratic anchorage.

I am proud to have been in on the initiatives of broadening the process through the Shalom-Shalam effort. On the level of my local Rotary Club back in Oslo, we started a student visitors program for Palestinian and Israeli to the Oslo University Summer School. It has created a forum of communication and discussion of alumnae, which has been active on the Internet all through the current turbulence since the second Intifada started when Ariel Sharon took office in Israel.

The model of pairing students from either side of a conflict has to be done carefully in order to be effective. But it could be used in places where it has not been tried out.

I realize the difficulties for outside facilitators to take over some of the responsibility. And with reverses in the process, people who earlier took a chance for peace might come under acute risk of life. When tensions and emotions are running high, collaborators -- real or imagined ones -- are not seldom hung.

The Norwegian role in the Oslo process was the one of a facilitator. Someone in which the parties had a trust, which was necessary for a beginning. It started by luck through possibilities made at the grassroots level and it was forwarded by chance when political leaders saw the possibilities. A prerequisite was the trust in both parties for Norway earned through a long engagement in the region. You cannot facilitate peace by jumping into the region as a bolt from the blue.

But the process was one for the parties and not for the facilitator. When it showed that they were not willing or not able to carry it through, it stopped. Peace must be made between enemies, and it is the enemies who have to do it!

The truce making in Sri Lanka this winter provides an interesting model. The Norwegian role once again was one of facilitator. The important thing to observe is that the question of peace is a question to be solved by the parties involved. Take Africa in general with all its violent conflicts. You might have a strategic view as to how to make peace, but you have no chance from the outside to make the basic solutions. The devil might be in the details. And the details are for the locals to handle. It is all-important.

The other aspect of the Sri Lankan peace process is that the facilitator has not recently come in from the blue. The Norwegian role has been played over years and the Norwegian engagement has been there for a longer period. The building of trust is necessary. It takes time and sustainability.

I take for granted that neither the Taliban nor the al-Qaeda could be talked into peace and collaboration. And the same goes for some countries suspected of harboring terrorists.

But on the other hand, not all conflicts can be solved through military intervention from the outside. The Norwegian effort in Sri Lanka might be looked upon as an example of facilitating the solving of a conflict by peaceful means. It has gained broad international attention, exactly as a demonstration of that fact.

It is at times possible without airpower, but with "soft power."

The future in which one grabs the possibilities and does what the German statesman Otto von Bismarck said about politics; When you hear the foot steps of the Lord in the garden, use the opportunity to step forward immediately and take a piece of his mantle. Initiatives for peace can be taken by a variety of actors. Only a few are in the position to act often. But time and circumstances change and one has to make use of the right moment for the right setting. But I think a role for peace presupposes an active mental preparation and training.

We should be inspired of a vision of a world in which we have vastly improved possibility to have the common man have health, education, and a meaningful employment and thereby a basis on which to fulfill his and her potential. But please do not come saying that this is too tough an ambition in the developing world, while it is no problem in the industrialized world. It is a challenge all over where there are human beings.

In a situation like that, even Robert S. Macnamara would have to rewrite his notion of history and not talk of short interludes but of long periods in which all human beings could fulfill his or her potential.

# ISTANBUL SPIRIT

## OIC-EU JOINT FORUM OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

*Sencar ÖZSOY\**

### Background

An extraordinary event took place in Istanbul in February, namely the OIC - EU Joint Forum of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.<sup>72</sup>

The September 11 terrorist act showed dramatically that even in learned circles certain prejudices, clichés and enormous lack of understanding of the 'other' exists. Both the politicians and perhaps sadly the academicians of all backgrounds, sometimes unwittingly distort the reality with certain preordained views. Therefore, if one positive outcome of this heinous, terrorist act could be cited it was the shock they caused all the civilized world to revisit the root cause of terrorism.

On the occasion of the OIC Foreign Ministers meeting in Doha (10 October 2001) and New York (15 November 2001), the European Conference (17 October 2001) and Euro-Med Meeting (5 November 2001) in Brussels, Mr. Ismail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey had informed the foreign ministers of the OIC members and Observers as well as the EU Members and Candidates for Accession of his proposal to bring them together at an informal joint forum in Istanbul in 2002.

Secretary Generals of the Council of Europe and the Arab League have expressed promptly their personal interest in such an initiative and their desire to contribute to it.

A preparatory meeting was held in Ankara on 21 December 2001 with the participation of high-level representatives from Qatar, Belgium, Spain, Malaysia, OIC Se-

---

\* Ambassador Sencar Özsoy is Deputy Undersecretary in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for Cultural Affairs and the Overseas Promotion of Turkey. This article represents his personal views and should not be construed as the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>72</sup> More detailed information on the Joint Forum is available at the web site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>). The site includes background note, program of the Forum, list of participants, Press Release and a Photo Album. The proceedings will soon be published in a book and CD ROM format.

cretariat, EU Council, EU Commission and the members of the Turkish Preparatory Committee. The draft program and the themes of the Joint Forum were thoroughly discussed in this meeting.

Consequently, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OIC Member and Observer Countries and the EU Member and Candidate Countries came together, on 12-13 February 2002, for a Joint Forum in Istanbul, at the invitation of the Foreign Minister of Turkey, to share their assessments of the world's present political situation and to promote understanding and harmony among civilizations.

This was a first major encounter in the new century. It was one of an unusual character; the first of its kind, a conference of two representative political organizations of global scope, of different civilization dimensions of multiple cultures.

### The Purpose

We all know that the tragedy of 11 September, besides the deep sorrow that it generated, has shown how vulnerable the basic understanding among different cultures and civilizations is, and how easy it is for deep rooted prejudices to surface. One of the first temptations that developed after 11 September was to identify terrorism on cultural and religious lines, pitting one part of the humanity against 'the other'. Deeper and wider fault-lines of global nature were thus encouraged.

The second result, this time perhaps positive, of 11th of September was an emerging consciousness: A mutual realization of our inadequate knowledge about each other; of the need for forging new relationships, of attaining solidarity through the respect for cultural diversity. Through our mutual efforts, it is now better understood that terrorism does not have a religion, does not have a geography, it cannot be defined on cultural lines and cannot have any justification.

The concept of 'the other' throughout the ages have preoccupied us, it caused in numerous times conflicts and clashes. Yet, when we look back, in both ancient and modern times, history taught us that the way we address the issue of 'the other' determines the dynamics of stability and peace. We have witnessed that the trends to ignore or to snub the other, to dominate politically, economically and culturally, 'the other', can only result in confrontation and hostility. The world witnessed as well that harmony, knowledge and welfare are nurtured when different nations communicate with each other, when they feel respect for other's culture. Political understanding and dialogue provide the platform which generates this web of relationships.

In fact, by knowing others better, the definition of 'the other' would acquire new references. Whereas in the past, confrontational lines were driven between military pacts, political ideologies, geographic entities, we actually witness the containment of this concrete framework. Unfortunate cases still prevail, they are as dangerous as ever,

but the trend seems to be moving towards a 'conceptual definition' one based on 'values': 'The other', now defined as being the one who infringes upon values by resorting to force, to terrorism, to occupation, to injustice, and to the negation of universal human rights.

Turkey hosted this forum with the understanding that she has a particular responsibility and mission. We are attached to both that we are all committed to the harmony of civilization, the OIC and the EU; we are a country, which is both European and Asian, having a culture which has both Eastern and Western dimensions.

The OIC-EU Forum did display a strong belief that cultures, in their diversity, compliment and enhance each other. That we are all committed to the harmony of civilization and its attainability.

The Joint Forum was a historic meeting also for both its timing and content. This stems from the fact that a number of prominent civilizations have had their cradle as well as their zenith in the regions that are home to those countries which make up the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union.

Historic experiences of these nations show that harmony, peace and prosperity are on the rise during periods when mutual understanding, dialogue and cooperation can be established among them. Our past experiences teach us that discriminatory tendencies that cause peoples to exclude one another, not only fuel conflicts but also deprive them of the opportunity of having mutually enriching contributions.

And let me repeat what I have said above : Turkey, being one of the countries who suffered most from terrorism over the years, has always argued that terror does not have a religion, a geography or a nationality, it cant be justified by any argument and this threat must be fought without resorting to double standards, in cooperation and solidarity at the international level.

Terrorism should not be attributed to any religion or ethnic group. In order to solve this problem it is of prime importance that the sociological, political and economic reasons of terror are well defined and that joint action can be taken at the global level. We believe that terrorist organizations should not be defined as one finds it convenient but according to objective criteria and that the fight against terrorism should be conducted in this light.

### Results and the Future Work

In short, the most timely event, which brought together 75 countries, including more that 51 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, was the first high-level meeting devoted to the need to intensify multicultural dialogue. It allowed for frank and open-minded dis-

cussions on this topic, which focused on the need for enhancing mutual knowledge and respect among civilizations. The 'spirit of Istanbul' was mentioned several times on this occasion, referring to the readiness of all participants to share their views and explore together possible means for intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The world media certainly paid serious attention to the event.

During its deliberations, the OIC-EU Joint Forum has acknowledged the various activities, resolutions, recommendations and reports of international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the UNESCO, the OIC, the EU, the Council of Europe the OSCE, the Arab League,- the Organization of African Unity and other for a as the Barcelona Process, including the Global Agenda on Dialogue Among Civilizations adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21 November 2001, which are designed to protect and improve the common heritage of mankind and the shared values of different cultures, and to enhance tolerance, dialogue and cooperation within and among nations and peoples.

The forum reaffirmed that its strong belief that cultures, in their diversity, complement and enhance one another. The forum also confirmed its belief in the harmony among civilizations and its attainability.

The OIC - EU Forum, having listened to the exchange of ideas and to participants' views, has concluded that there is a need for further cooperation. The forum proposes that existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks continue to be used for general debate on the issues raised during this meeting.

Joint Forum of Istanbul which is defined as the 'Spirit of Istanbul' will be nurtured. There is still an enormous amount of work to be done.

Consequently, the forum noted with appreciation the invitation of his Highness the Emir of the State of Qatar in his capacity as current Chairman of the OIC to host a OIC-EU Troika meeting in the second half of the current year, in Doha.

The coming meeting and the other meetings of the Joint Forum will certainly take this process further.

# TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA

*Solmaz ÜNAYDIN\**

Syria is a country with which Turkey has its longest borderline (877 km). Turkish and Syrian people have lived together for centuries within the Ottoman Empire, thus enjoying religious, cultural and social ties based on common history. These deep rooted relations are the solid basis for a promising future.

However, relations between the two countries have been strained for a long time. Within the global context, during the Cold War era, Turkey and Syria have taken sides on opposite ideological camps, one being a member of NATO and the other, the closest ally of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

But it has been Syria's support to the terrorist organization PKK which has constituted the main strain in relations, causing serious tensions especially during the period 1992-1998. In fact, due to this reason, Turkish-Syrian relations had almost come to a standstill during those years.

In October 1998, Turkey made it clear that Syria's support to PKK was no longer tolerable. Syria's failure to heed Turkey's calls led to a crisis that lasted for two weeks. At the end of this period, however, Ocalan was expelled from Syria and the Adana Agreement on security cooperation was signed between the two countries on 19th October, 1998.

The signing of the Adana Agreement was a milestone event that opened a new era in Turkish-Syrian relations. A previously unimaginable process of rapprochement got underway. For instance, President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Damascus on 13 June 2000 to attend the funeral of president Hafiz Al Assad. This visit of the President was perceived as a very important gesture by the Syrians and had a positive impact on relations.

Turkey has adopted a policy of improving relations with Syria, establishing good neighbourliness and resolving current disputes on the basis of mutual respect, thus opening a new chapter in relations.

---

\* Ambassador Solmaz Ünaydın is the Director General of Policy Planning Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Within this framework, positive developments in almost every field of bilateral relations, 17 reciprocal visits at Ministerial level and numerous other mutual visits have taken place at all levels. The visit of Vice President Abdulhalim Haddam in November 2001 to Turkey has so far been the highest level visit from Syria.

Yet another very clear sign of developing relations has been the increasing contacts between the military authorities of the two countries. Several high level reciprocal visits have taken place and a "Military Training and Technical Cooperation Framework Agreement" is expected to be signed soon.

Turkey wishes to crown the success achieved in developing bilateral relations with visits at the highest levels. In this context, during the official visit of Syrian Vice President Haddam to Turkey in November 2000, President Sezer has expressed his desire to host President Bashar Assad in Turkey.

The planned visit of the Syrian Prime Minister Muhammed Mustafa Miro to Turkey on 28-29 May 2002 has had to be postponed due to the health problems of Prime Minister Ecevit. The last visit at the level of Prime of Minister from Syria to Turkey was realized in 1986.

Economic relations between the two countries are very promising. Both countries have potentials to be utilized to the mutual benefit of their two peoples. Turkey is Syria's gateway to Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia and Syria is Turkey's gateway to the Middle East. The trade volume of Turkey and Syria is around 1 billion US Dollars. Turkey is the 5th largest exporter of goods to Syria.

Tourism and culture are other fields with promising potentials. There have been significant positive steps in those areas, where both countries are working to establish meaningful cooperation.

On the other side, there still are some issues on which the two countries have differing views. But, Turkey is prepared to work to overcome these differences on the basis of mutual respect and good neighbourly relations.

One such issue is Hatay. This province of Turkey bordering Syria is still being shown within the boundaries of Syria in Syrian maps. That is certainly a dark stain in the new page that has been opened in bilateral ties and Turkey wishes Syria to take the necessary steps to eliminate this relic of the former era.

Water is another issue that has caused a problem between the two countries. Turkey perceives "water" as a bridge of cooperation and not a subject of dispute. Turkey does its best with good faith to meet the requirements stemming from the relevant provisions of 1987 Protocol. The potential for cooperation in the field of water was best demonstrated when a delegation headed by the Chairman of the South-East Anatolian Project (GAP) Olcay Unver paid a visit to Syria in July 2001. the Syrian Minister of Irrigation Mr. Atras visited Turkey on 21-26 August 2001 upon the invitation of Mr. Mustafa Yilmaz, State Minister Responsible from the GAP Affairs. At the end of this

visit, a protocol on cooperation between the GAP Administration and the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation Land Improvement Institute was signed.

In conclusion, the confrontational relations have now been replaced by an atmosphere of cooperation based on good neighbourly relations and mutual respect. Turkey will be working to widen and deepen the areas of cooperation and to solve any problems that still exist with Syria. No doubt, this is a two way street and Turkey hopes that Syria will continue to act accordingly.

# THE ADVANTAGES OF GREATER CLARITY TO TURKEY'S PATH FOR FULL ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION\*

## FPI Working Group

Although the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 has given candidate status to Turkey on equal terms with other candidates, the following uncertainties remained. First, the Conclusions did not give Turkey any promise for a date on which accession program could be implemented, whereas other candidates were given date for the commencement of the accession negotiations. Second, Turkey was required to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria like other candidates in addition to fulfilling some political conditions such as resolving the Cyprus question and the Aegean problems, despite the fact that such solutions do not depend only on Turkey. The same Conclusions have promised full accession to the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Government of Cyprus whether or not a solution is found to the existing problem between the two parties on the future status of the State. This position has time and again been reiterated by the Commission President and Commissioners, as well as the term Presidents. Although it is clear that this promise to the Greek Cypriot Administration will not only harden their attitude in the course of negotiations, if materialized it will seriously jeopardize Turkey's relations with the European Union.

The candidacy status given to Turkey at Helsinki are interpreted by serious European opposition parties as false promises to Turkey because according to them Turkey will never become a member of the EU. Clear evidences are given by the German CDU leaders, consistent with their previous attitudes of denying membership to Turkey in the Conclusions of 1995 Madrid and 1997 Luxembourg Summits. Many other examples of the same attitude are expressed in the European Parliament and the European media.

While most of the Copenhagen Criteria are required for all members of European democracies, implementation of some of them contain significant risks for Turkey if it is going to stay outside the EU for a considerable period of time.

---

\* Conclusions from a session of a FPI Working Group on EU matters.

In Turkey, minorities are those defined in the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. Apart from those, there are no other minorities in Turkey. All citizens of Turkey are considered as Turks and are equal citizens. The official language of the country is Turkish. In this respect the Turkish State system is a replica of the French system. The Copenhagen Criteria are interpreted by many European officials and media as demanding minority rights to non-existing minorities in Turkey.

Under the present conditions and historical development of the national structure of the Turkish State, granting any special rights to some sections of the Turkish nation carries the risk of encouraging separation. Such a risk may not exist among the members of the European Union since a new European identity and attachment to a great and prosperous union would eliminate such risks. It would therefore be logical to assume that in case Turkish public opinion see before them a clear path to accession it might be easier for them to develop a new approach to the Copenhagen Criteria.

As is known, the equal status of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots had been accepted as the basis at the creation of the Cyprus Republic. This equality was upset as a result of the Greek Cypriot coup d'état in 1964 and restored after Turkish Military intervention in 1974 when two autonomous administrations were accepted at the Geneva Conference. However, whereas the status of equality of the two communities were recognized by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, somehow the Greek Cypriot administration continued to pose as the sole legal Government of Cyprus. It is not possible for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to accept any solution that does not provide for sovereign equality for the two communities. 1959-1960 Agreements also foresaw most-favoured nation treatment to Turkey as well as Greece. If Cyprus is to be admitted to the EU and Turkey excluded, Turkey may lose these rights. Therefore, if Cyprus is to enter to the EU without a clear path given to Turkey itself, it will be difficult for Turkey also to give away these important rights and the situation will be much more complicated.

Any student of Turkish public opinion would clearly observe that the general perception of EU integration policy towards Turkey is an ambiguous one whereas the EU demands on the two subjects of risk for Turkey are categorical.

Joining destinies with other European countries is a very serious matter for Turkey as it involves sharing and exchanging our national sovereignties. If such a union is to be achieved, both Turkey and the EU countries must give clear signs of their determination. On its part, Turkey has made great strides in bringing its norms to the European standards and is rapidly continuing with the task of implementing them. Since Turkey has been waiting for concrete and engaging steps from EU since 1995 when the Customs Union was achieved, the mere candidacy status with no critical diagram ahead

justifies the current perceptions of ambiguity of European policy and dampens enthusiasm.

# AEGEAN RENEWED

## TURKISH-GREEK DIALOGUE

*Seyfi TASHAN\**

After many years of refusal to talk with Turkey on the Aegean issues, the first encounter on these issues took place yesterday between Turkish and Greek diplomats in Ankara and will continue next month in Athens . Certainly this development is an achievement of the foreign ministers of the two countries whose policy of rapprochement brought the Greek diplomats who refused to talk nothing about the Aegean except taking the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean to International Court of Justice. Until 1997 Turkey categorically rejected going to international arbitration on the continental shelf unless there were negotiations on all the contentious issues in the Aegean Sea. Basically, these issues were Greek initiatives taken over many decades upsetting the balance established between the two countries with the peace treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923.

It is true that in 1960s and 1970s these problems were discussed between the two sides under the shadow of the major Cyprus dispute that concerned not only the Turkish and Greek Communities in the island but also the two mainland. After 1980s with advent to power in Greece of the father Papandreu, all dialogue between the two countries were terminated, and people of Greece were led to believe that there was a Turkish military threat against Greece. Two points of view were advanced in the Greek public opinion. One the view argued that Cyprus formed the crux of the dispute between the two countries and before its shadow was removed Greece could not discuss anything in the Aegean. The second was even more chauvinistic and defiant in simply refusing to discuss anything on Aegean which they considered was Greek.

---

\* Director of Turkish Foreign Policy Institute

The dialogue and contacts that began between the two countries several years ago and the initiation of direct talks between the two communities in Cyprus may have created the necessary atmosphere for renewed dialogue on the Aegean. Yet, it might be too soon to expect speedy solutions to all the problems on which the two countries and public opinions have hardened views and attitudes.

Let us take the continental shelf which the Greeks still consider as the only contentious issue that could be solved through resort to the International Court of Justice. Had the only problem in the Aegean been only the continental shelf delimitation it could have been possible to accept immediate joint recourse to international arbitration. However from the Turkish point of view other issues of dispute are directly or indirectly related and inter-linked with the continental shelf issue. Take for example, the question of territorial waters in the Aegean, a semi-closed sea dotted with many islands. Currently, territorial waters are limited to six miles. This breadth of sovereign area leaves a substantial part of the Aegean as international waters (see map). Under the Law of the Seas Convention of which Turkey is *not* a signatory, the territorial waters of the islands may be extended up to 12 miles. If Greece decides to use this right generally applicable in open seas it will take most of the Aegean under its sovereignty and Turkish and other flag ships will have to pass through Greek waters to cross the Aegean. In case of Turkey passage from one Turkish port to the other will also have to pass also through Greek waters. Greece currently reserves the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles. If she chooses to do so before or after arbitration on the continental shelf there will be no case to go bring to arbitration because there will be no international continental shelf to be divided. It is for this reason that Turkey declared the possible extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean a "causus belli" in order to assert the vital importance of this issue and to demonstrate that he such a move could prejudice other issues of contention in the Aegean. Among other issues such as the current air space of 10 miles is an odd Greek practice recognized by no one. The fate of the rocks and uninhabited islets in the international waters is also an issue linked with the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the territorial waters. The sheer violations by Greece of the Lausanne Treaty that demilitarized the Greek islands in the proximity of the Turkish coast and of the Italian Peace Treaty that transferred the Dodacanese islands Greece but kept them disarmed are also very important security concerns for both Turkey's coastal regions and also for the safety of the sea traffic and cannot be ignored on the basis of the Greek claim that this is a matter that concerns only the Greek sovereignty.

Since the dialogue has begun several years ago between the two governments and the civil sectors of both countries, many statesmen as well as significant portions of public opinion in Greece have come to the conclusion that Turkey can no longer be considered a threat to Greece, and that the two countries have significant interest in bilateral cooperation not mention their common interests in the Balkans, the Black Sea region and in the Mediterranean.

If we recall that in 1930 the treaty of alliance and friendship between the two countries gave the right to each party in international conferences to represent the other if he could not attend that meeting, it would not be terribly difficult both for the Turks and the Greeks to adopt the liberal European integrative approach in their bilateral relation.

The international conditions are quite suitable for the success of this newly begun dialogue on the Aegean and we have practically no reason to be pessimist for the eventual outcome.