|
Introduction
General Assessment?
The year 2005 marks a turning point in the history of the Turkish Republic because of its Odyssey that lasted more than a Century to anchor and integrate Turkey within Europe seems to have caught a favourable wind with the beginning of membership negotiations with the European Union on the 3rd of October. This event marks not only a step towards the fulfilment of a long standing aspiration, but also a great political support to Turkey for carrying out further reforms aimed at bringing the Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization, a quest that began with the reforms initiated by Turkey’s revered leader Kemal Ataturk. There seems however a significant difference in public opinions that prevailed then and now. Ataturk reforms coincided with the birth of the new state. Although there were a few die-hard opposition to his reforms, very great majority of the people supported him and absorbed the reforms that were interpreted as the benevolent demands of the saviour of the nation.
Today the approach of the public opinion to second phase of these reforms that would raise the level of our society to the current European level is more hesitant, many Turks either because of the present sentiments of nationalism or with the pride and contentment of Turkey’s progress, or because of the evident double standards demonstrated by many European leaders towards Turkey, are tempted to look on the reforms as perfunctory, simply needed for accession to the EU. Some are even so nationalistic that they would be ready to denounce membership aspirations. Nevertheless, this type of approach, though, highly visible is not representative of the country as a whole.
EU – A One Sided Love Affair?
It is true that membership that is tied to very stringent conditions would frighten any normal candidate country. In order to become a member, when the time of accession comes and Turkey has reached the capacity to carry out the normal requirements of membership and adopt the European acquis, it has nevertheless, to obtain the approval of the current 25 members, possible new arrivals, the European Council and Parliament. In certain cases, namely France, Germany and Austria, the current political leadership is opposed to Turkey’s membership and prefer a special relationship status that would ‘anchor’ Turkey in Europe without granting it full membership. If the negotiations are successfully concluded, France and Austria will put this issue to referenda in their countries. Cyprus does not even have patience to await until the end of negotiations, it wants to compel Turkey to recognize the Greek administration in the Island as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’- a step that would jeopardize all possibilities of a peaceful and fair solution of the Cyprus problem. European Parliament says Turkey should accept so called Armenian ‘genocide’ during the First World War and open Turkey’s borders with Armenia and establish diplomatic relations with that country. EU does not want to see free circulation of Turks in Europe and threaten with permanent safeguards and therefore considers that the negotiation process should be open-ended. An increasing number of Turks are beginning to ask whether under such conditions membership is a desirable and viable option for Turkey. They also begin to feel that Turkey’s desire and ambitions to join Europe is a one sided love-affair. Up to now many Turks believed that since the end of the First World War, Turkey and Western Europe were on friendly terms and Cold War brought a firm and stable alliance and interdependency in economy and security and in many aspects of foreign policy. They thought Europe needed Turkey as much as Turkey needed Europe. Being aware that during the Cold War Turkey’s reform process had faltered because of security dominated agenda of the country, Turks are willing to make every effort to adopt European acquis.
Greek Aspirations and Cyprus
However, solution of political disputes requires a two sided effort and compromise.
The Greek political leadership and many observers argue that the lack of a solution to the Cyprus problem was because of the obstinate attitude of Turks. In reality, however, until 1974 Greeks rejected all Turkish proposals for a solution whereas the worst solution then proposed by the Turks would in the long run prove to give advantage to the Greeks.
Now with the support and membership solidarity of the European Union, Greeks hope their long standing maximalist attitude can now be successful in forcing the Turkish community to accept a minority status. All I can say is that, like in the past, they are mistaken again. The members of the European Union have pursued a policy of appeasement towards their members in carrying out their enlargement policy. In order to achieve their Southern enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, they were forced to pay a substantial compensation to Greece. When time came for their Eastern enlargement, they were threatened with the blocking of the process if they did not include Greek Cypriots as the Republic of Cyprus. This was presented as a concession to the Greeks for the establishment of a Customs Union with Turkey. (While the Customs Union was a natural outcome of the Association process, it was treated as the subject of a separate protocol that in reality made the Association Agreement an almost worthless document as all other provisions of the Agreement such as free movement of persons and services and the financial assistance were shelved.) Now that Greek Cypriots are members of the EU, Athens has become friendly with Turkey in the hope that Turkey’s membership aspirations will soften its stand on the Aegean disputes. Under all conditions, the present dialogue on the issue is much better than recent years’ saber rattling on both sides.
Armenian Claims
It has also become a fashion for European Parliaments to adopt resolutions on the so-called “Armenian genocide” claim of the Armenians during the First World War, and ask Turkey to accept what has happened in the First World War as an act of ‘genocide’.
As many Turkish and other well known historians who have studied Ottoman and other relevant archives insist, what happened was not a genocide. Turkey cannot be expected to join the chorus of politicians who wish to appease the Armenian diaspora or to irk the Turks. Many Turks wonder why we have witnessed so much activism on the part of the diaspora in recent years to obtain rulings, resolutions or laws from European parliaments. Do they expect that the Turks will recognize the so called genocide and pay compensation or give territory to Armenia? The proof of the Turkish position lies in the fact that one of the principal reasons for the beginning of the Cold War for Turkey were Soviet demands of territory in Eastern Turkey on behalf of the Armenians. It true that efforts to make governments accept guilt on behalf of their ancestors leading to compensation demands are fashionable, commercialized imitation of Israel’s genuine demands because of the Holocaust. When will politicians learn they are no historians and that they can never be arbiters on events many authoritarian historians have other views. Why and how can they ask the Turkish people to rewrite their historians accept one of the worst unsubstantiated accusations against them? Does Turkey’s bid for membership give them such a right? Or are they really small time politicians who would agree to even deny history to get votes?
Future of the EU
In the noncommittal attitude of many EU countries towards Turkey lies an uncertainty about the future of the Union. Having rejected the proposed constitution that would be a workable foundation for an enlarged Europe, what lies ahead for the European ‘Union’? Can arguments launched by French political thinkers like Frank Bianchieri demanding a Euroland of high social security of agricultural and other subsidies and composed of Schengen participants only, be a viable option in the face of growing unemployment, aging population, stiff high-tech competition by US and industrial competition by developing countries? The outcome of such a structure will be Europe as an economically, politically and militarily weak Euroland. Some smaller European countries having the size and neutral history like Austria are quite happy with the current European role of second class fiddler in the global political and security arena so long as the economy works well. Most of the EU countries are aware that the system requires major reforms in order to survive. Many things must be changed or reformed: Current agricultural policy can not be maintained; current high social security spending will lead national states to bankruptcy if there are no agricultural or structural reforms; the colossus of bureaucracy in Brussels cannot be efficiently run through consensus if every now and then a country uses his veto right; present welfare state structures cannot be continued with present level of unemployment and migration policies; Europe cannot cope with terror and clandestine immigration with its present security and social policies. Moreover, without developing an effective common foreign and security policy. EU cannot play a role in major global security issues. The recent budget crisis is an indication why a Euroland of 25 countries or more cannot be administered with today’s political and administrative tools.
European Dilemma
Without a common perspective as to the future role and structure for the Union, it would be extremely difficult to overcome the challenges before the European countries through separate and divergent policies and outlooks of individual states. New dangers are also arising in the European landscape. The population explosion in Africa, and comparative poverty in Eastern Europe have become dominant factors for echeloned societies in many advanced EU countries. The down-trodden suburbs of major French cities, strong discrimination in many other European countries, and uncontrolled religion education have created new explosive ghettos around major European cities. The European dilemma which teaches respect to human rights but ignores it for the ‘aliens’ is responsible for this new danger that might be the yet another source of terror and riot in Europe. Leadership in Europe neither has a panacea for unemployment nor does it have a clear anti-discrimination policy.
Lack of Common Vision
This lack of common vision and perspective presents several challenges to achieving a fruitful political and security cooperation between Turkey and the Union. As I mentioned earlier EU is forced to take into account the individual interests and claims of certain countries in its dealings with Turkey; and in the security field, frictions arise on the use of NATO assets by ESDP, because Turkey wants to defend its own security interests. Another challenge is that of public opinion attitudes that Turkey and the leaders of the EU countries must correct, if and when Turkey will join EU. The lack of common foreign policy principles has also led European public susceptible to divergent anti-Turkey propaganda. In many cases, instead of explaining EU interests for the creation of a larger Europe, many European political leaders chose a hybrid attitude by appearing to the public as against the accession of Turkey, while at the same time continuing with the implementation of what has been decided before. This has been a typical attitude of the French government, German Chancellor and Austrian government. This reminds me what Edmund Burke after his election to the parliament told his voters that the fact that he was elected did not mean that he would do everything his electors told him but his first priority would be the interests of the country. Helmut Schmitt once described a statesman as a man of vision with both feet on the ground. If he had only vision he would be an utopist, if he stood only on his feet, but no vision, he could only be a small town politician. Several countries in Europe are in search of real statesmen. Only if the leaders that make up the European Council can define and defend the common European interests, can they build a united Europe not by haggling over the price of cabbage and by defending only their own countries’ interests.
Cyprus Imbroglio
At the end of 2005 Cyprus question shows how lack of statesmanship has turned the problem into an imbroglio almost impossible to untangle. This is how it happened: Cyprus became an independent Greek-Turkish partnership state in 1960. In 1963 Greeks pushed the Turks out of the Government and Turks began to live in ghettos. Negotiations failed because Greeks no longer wanted to share the Island with the Turks. In 1974 they made a coup d’etat to unite the island with Greece. Turkey as a guarantor power intervened. Negotiations were fruitless. Turks wanted their own state as the Greeks did not want to set up once again a common state. For thirty years attempts were made to solve the problem through UN. Finally, UN Secretary General produced a plan approved by UN, EU and major states. In 2004 the plan was accepted by the Turks but rejected by Greeks in separate referenda. What EU did, as mentioned earlier, instead of pressuring Greek Cypriots for a solution and lifting the economic embargo on the Turks, accepted the Greeks as a full member of EU representing the whole of the Island. UN washed its hands, EU, because of Greek veto threats cannot lift the embargo on the North of the Island. Instead EU asks Turkey to recognize Greek Cypriot Government as the sole Government of Cyprus, a demand which means a self-negation for the Turks and hence absolutely unacceptable. Greeks having attained a position of vantage as a member of EU would not accept anything less. Turks while aspiring to become a member of EU which would in the long run require approval of Greece and Greek Cyprus are not in a position to placate the Greeks. Where is a European or American statesman to offer a fair solution for both sides and make it work?
Calls for Reform in the Middle East
It finally seems that the major powers of the world have come realize that there must be something to do to take care of the dangerous decline in the Middle East. Demography, depletion of resources, unaccountability of leaders and resulting unemployment and their inability to cope with the Israeli power have led to calls for reform. Everyone in the Middle East demands reform but who will carry out which reforms remain a question mark. As G-8 launched the Broader Middle East initiative, Europe has been trying carry out so far more than half empty reform program of Euro-Med. Arab League calls for reform, but they say they must carry out their reforms without outside pressure. This has a nationalistic appeal but it may at the same time be an excuse on the part of the authoritarian leaders for not carrying out the reforms. Turkish model of democracy and human rights that are overseen by the European Human Rights Court and other European organs, are sometimes indicated a model for countries with Islamic population. The regime in Turkey is sometimes described as a ‘mildly Islamic regime’.
Turkish Model – Separation of Religion and State
Many people in Turkey strongly believe that Turkey owes the success of its regime as a democratic and progressive system of government to the secular character of its state. They also believe that Islamic states will have great difficulty in choosing between strict orders of ulema who demand full compliance with religious teaching and the requirements of modern age that regards human beings not as ‘kuls’(God’s creatures) but as free and equal individuals in respect of race, gender or freedom of thought. Current Turkish leadership is calling for reform in the Moslem world but avoids to show Turkey as an example. The separation of religion and the state is a very touchy question in the Middle East I personally believe, however, for carrying out genuine reforms this separation is sine qua non, as proven by the Turkish history.
Optimistic Views on Palestine and Iraq
The current situation in the Middle East can be assessed from two opposing perspectives. Looking on the developments through rose coloured spectacles, one can argue that things are not running so badly. Gaza strip has been turned over to the Palestinians; Sharon and Perez have joined forces for the new elections with the declared aim of effecting a two state solution even though how much territory will be left to the Palestinians or what will be the fate of Jerusalem are still unclear. It seems that Mr. Sharon has gained several months with the new elections to decide what to offer to the Palestinians, if at all anything substantial.
In Iraq, on December 15, elections have been held with the participation of all ethnicities, sects and denominations and a new government is pending, even though it is unclear when and how US troops will be withdrawn or how the new Government will be able to control the situation of terror. As things stand all parties are committed to the unity of Iraq in a federal system.
And a Pessimistic View of the Middle East
The gloomy perspective is also valid. Reform process may be so slow that it would fail to change the current structure and conditions presently obtaining in the region. Palestinian conflict may not be resolved despite a growing desire for solution by responsible leaders and finally ethnic and sectarian differences may turn Iraq into a three-cornered conflict zone. Iran may persist in its desire to build a nuclear explosive device provoking UN sanctions and US interference, and finally Syria may fall under the control of the Muhaberat. On top of all, US may decide in favour of a rapid withdrawal from Iraq. I believe we should be neither optimist nor pessimist, because Murphy’s law does not usually apply in international relations. Things may not be all bad or all good. On the good side, Syrian leader has listened good advice and evacuated his troops from the Lebanon; but he has done so in a bad taste as demonstrated in the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Mr. Hariri and some of his supporters. His acceptance of cooperating with international investigators is a good side. But his determined close links with Iran and the latter’s nuclear ambitions are worrying attitudes. May be we all need some patience in this region.
Half-hearted Aid Programmes with Many Strings
Broader Middle East initiative of the G8, Euro-Mediterranean Policy of EU seem to be a good start that must be applauded even though it is a dubious venture that may either succeed if used like the Marshall Plan that saved Western Europe from poverty at the end of the Second World War, or it may turn out to be an extension of the Euro-Med program, looked after a half-hearted aid program with too many strings that smacks of colonialism. There is a whole string of contradictions between the aims of the program and the means available for carrying it out. This program in fact is in full conformity with the idealistic aspect of US global strategy and the European post war approach to international issues. As far as US is concerned its chances of success is dependent on the measure of program components with US national interests in areas where they are clearly defined, in cases of discrepancy the national interest always supersedes. For Europe, one can only say that continuation of the process itself may be as valuable as the target envisaged. European Union itself presents a remarkable example of how the efforts towards a closer union fails to bring member countries around a constitution that would unite them. In the countries where reforms are to be carried out the leadership attitude is more European if not fully oriental. While they speak of the need of reform and take a few half-hearted and ineffective measures they publicize them as genuine reform processes. May be we should not be too cynical about the entire effort which has started certainly with good intentions but we should be careful in the expectations for early achievements.
Turkish-US Relations on the Back-Burner
The Turkish-US relations have been more or less on the back-burner of Turkish public opinion interests; yet it should not be so. Since 9/11 US foreign policy has undergone a tremendous change and the notion of security has gained predominance among foreign policy concerns that indeed has surpassed the days of the Cold War. With the major difference in favour of the Cold-War, that in those days the opponent had a clear identity and its effectiveness could be checked with a mere balance of power and through alliance diplomacies. US political system demands rapid and effective reaction to against such acts even though the type and measure of the reaction depends on the US leadership choice. How did the allies of US and US diplomacy behave in those days of trauma and thereafter? As in the case of the Cold War, US expected full sympathy and support from its allies in Europe. Indeed, the European lip-service was perfect, but real help came from a handful of countries. The basic reason for subsequent European lethargy for helping US and even antipathy for the US forcefulness was that the European countries did not really suffer from major scale terror acts in recent years. In the case of Turkey, I believe, this country was torn between the urge to help its ally for more than half a century standing and reticence felt because when 30 thousand people were killed, as the result of terrorist attacks, none of Turkey’s allies moved a finger to help or at least stop aiding terrorists. This dilemma may be the basic responsible for Turkey’s failure to help its ally in the manner and volume the US demanded. A second factor may be US failure to accept to do anything about the major terror organization PKK, except paying lip service to Turkey’s concerns. I believe this episode in Turkish-US relations will not create a long enduring scar in the relations between the two countries. The alliance is bound to take a new shape in the new conjuncture in Europe and the Middle East, where both US and Turkey are indispensable actors. Turkey’s EU membership process will strengthen its effectiveness in the affairs of both regions where Turkish-US solidarity will be a much-needed element for the achievement of a wide range of goals that are of interest to both countries, such as the development of the region, promotion of democracy and human rights and the common defence against all types of threats and terror
|