European Military Security-Goals, Policies, Practices*

June 16, 2006

A complex set of reasons led members of the European Union to search for a security identity. Such an identity was considered sine qua non if European Union of 25 states, with over 450 million population, was to play a global role. In his European Security Strategy approved by the EU Council Xavier Solana invites Europe to be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

His threat assessment reflects new risks and threats in the absence of a threat of invasion. Therefore, the new threats call for the first line of defense to be established abroad. According to Solana, none of the new threats is purely military and European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations. “European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management….but if we are to make contribution that matches our potential we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable; and we need to work with others.”

He considers that Europe should pursue its objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnership with key actors. He believes that “transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, European Union and United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.”

Common foreign and security policy that led to the creation of ESDP would have become a significant and powerful institution had the constitutional treaty been adopted. ESPD need to be consolidated in the coming years to play peacekeeping roles in the Balkans and Africa and EU will try to strengthen the newly established European Defense Agency. It is clear that the headline goal established for 2010 will be extremely difficult to be attained. In this paper I will try to look at the policies of major EU actors and how far their military and defense structures and policies conform to the ambitions outlined in the European Strategy Paper and in the creation of ESDP.

Now let us see what the military aims of the ESDP are. These aims are to develop a military capability to be developed in full complimentarity and mutual reinforcement with NATO and NATO initiatives as the NATO response force. The EU member states have committed themselves to create 13 battle-groups, each consisting of 1500 troops reinforced with combat support elements. These forces will be formed within national structures or in coalitions. They will be associated with force headquarters and with transport and logistics. Full operational capability is foreseen for 2007. The creation of an EU military and civilian cell is set up in Brussels. The cell is under High Representative Javier Solana. The target for 2010 is to create a task force of 60,000 troops. Actually, in order to maintain a standing force of 60,000 there must an equal number of reserve and rotation forces. This need increases the standing troop number to 180,000 which must also be supported by transport and logistics units.

While there is general agreement on the security and defence program and strategy in EU countries their preparedness and dispositions to reach the commonly agreed goals present substantial variations. While for some countries the military element of ESDP still retains importance of varying degrees, in many others defence aspect is almost inconsequential so long as EU can maintain use of its economic, social and civil power as tools for crisis management and can anyhow help in police operations elsewhere.

For this reason it might be worthwhile to look into the defence and security policies of several EU countries who had significant military capabilities.

Germany

Germany went from a frontline state of the east-west confrontation like many other European countries, to a country no longer facing a threat to its survival.

After the unification, expectations of Germany’s new role proliferated as demonstrated by the dissatisfaction shown during the 1991 Gulf War to Germany’s response consisting of only financial contributions. Germany had to learn that it is a key to European security and to the success of ESDP because it had potential assets and capabilities, in other words, because of the pressure of ESDP, Germany had once again to create an interventionist force. As a result, Germany felt the need to change its defence policy guidelines, which had been written three times in 1972, 1979 and 1992. The need to create a new one was met in May 2003. This new German Defence Policy Guidelines called for a capable territorial defence, collective defence and crisis management missions.

For the first time German security policy had all the intentions of stressing the need for integration into a framework of western institutions within the process of European integration and NATO. As a consequence of this policy, Germany gradually expanded its role in crisis management missions. German troops are deployed in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, forming one of the largest national contributions in terms of man power. The new policy paper states that German armed forces (Bundeswehr) can participate in operations in the world and across the entire mission spectrum, down to high intensity operations. Although, high end spectrum of missions remains undefined, Germany seems, at least in principle, to create high readiness force that can engage in high intensity missions. However, the lack of adequate funding continues to contradict the reform, like in many other countries. ESDP is considered by several writers as an important reference point to obtain domestically unpopular decisions. The relative vagueness of ESDP and a lacking definition of its strategic purpose helped the French government making explicit de rationale concerning the use of the Bundeswehr. However, it is hoped that the new defence and security policy of the EU may help the new German government to create military capabilities that could respond to ESDP requirements.

France

The French concept of defence, defined as long ago as 1959, sets three goals for France’s defence. The first is to defend France’s vital interests that are defined by the President of the Republic. At the same time, France must also protect its strategic interests at the international level whilst contributing to conflict prevention, keeping and restoring peace and ensuring respect for international law and democratic values around the world. To achieve this purpose, France joined WEU, NATO and OSCE.

France considered that the comprehensive concept of defence is not limited only to military concerns. In this respect, France considers that its security and stability depend not only on its armed forces and police, but also on its social organization, education system and social cohesion. As a result, the French concept of defence “is, de facto, dissociably linked with that of the nation, the civil security, including emergency services, protect the population and maintain public order and thus continuity of the state.” In this respect the French and Turkish comprehensive security concepts are very similar. However, in practice, in participating in international missions France has been extremely choosy and has preferred to use its own forces, particularly for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in Africa, in its former colonies. Its approach to cooperating with NATO is highly negative even though France accepts ESDP defendants on using NATO assets. As France does not participate in the military apparatus of NATO, it’s rather lukewarm to NATO’s missions outside the European area. In fact, only recently, the French Defence Minister urged NATO alliance not to take commitments outside NATO area.

United Kingdom

United Kingdom reviewed its defense policy in 1997 and the review was published in 1998. Its aim was to reshape the British Armed Forces to meet the needs of the 21st century, reflecting a world in which the confrontation of the Cold War had been replaced by a complex mixture of uncertainties and instability. Originally the mission tasks of the UK armed forces would include peacetime security; security of overseas territory; defense diplomacy; support to wider British interests; peace support and humanitarian operations; regional conflict outside the NATO area; regional conflict inside the NATO area and strategic attack on NATO. An amendment was made in 2002 to adept the armed forces to meet the new threats from international terrorism. A new chapter to the 1998 SDR gave its priority to new and upgraded high-tech equipment surveillance and communications, recreation of rapidly deployable forces with light armored vehicles and a new reaction force of some 6000 volunteer reserves to provide military assistance to civil authorities.

In order to fulfill the requirements, UK is attempting both perfect savings in the defense expenditures by canceling out some of the programs in favor of initiating new ones and to respond to the requirements of the war in Iraq. This war has upset all of the defense budget estimates as UK intends to keep its trident missiles, aircraft carriers and purchase Eurofighter aircraft to replace Tornadoes.

UK, following the St. Malo accord with France has given strong support to the creation of an ESDI. However, UK’s priority seems to consider ESDI as a supporting institution for NATO and only in those areas where NATO does not intend to initiate an operation, ESDI could take independent action.

Other European powers:

The bulk of the military forces of EU are maintained by Germany, France and UK.  Other countries provide support to European defense and security in the measure their budgets and defense policies allow. We must not forget that EU includes traditionally neutral countries like Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. For them, while ESDP is a significant tool for contributing to European and world security and peace, it should lay greater emphasis on its economic and diplomatic power in crisis management and contribution to security.

Conclusion:

The major European countries wish to maintain effective armed forces and turn ESDP into an instrument that will reflect a global security and defense role that Europe feels it is entitled because of its economic power and high technological capability. However, attainment of these objectives is highly constrained by the unwillingness of member countries to give priority to this aim while social expenditures are very high and unemployment cannot be checked in most EU countries.

Therefore, ESDP seems to have limited its function to planning, developing a reaction force of a very modest size and acquisition of high-tech systems. One major institution at the disposal of EU, for this purpose, is European Defense Agency. Through this institution it has been possible to initiate joint aircraft and space projects. Eurofighter is a successful example. However, the high costs of such joint projects are sometimes causing concern among contributing countries.

Another handicap in the development of ESDP into a strong and effective institution has been the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Holland, which favored a strong interdependence between ESDP and NATO. It is well known that France favors the growth of the ESDP into a powerful and fully independent European organ and looks at those countries that favor links with NATO and consequently with US with disdain.

* Presented at the Fifth Annual METU Conference on International Relations