|
|
|
 |
 |
 |
Atatürk's Foreign Policy
9 November 2001
Inremembering and discussing Atatürk's foreign policy, we must bear in mind the fact that we deal with the policies and orientationswhich he personally represented, aside from the material structure, humanvalues and realities of the Turkish Republic, a monument mainly of his architecture. Since it would not be wrong in assuming that his approvaland instructions had to be obtained in all important issues during his lifetime as the head of the Turkish state, we might as well define the foreign policywhich the Turkish State maintained at his time as "Atatürk's foreign policy"(1). Although this policy retained a great number of principles filtered through Turkey's history, geopolitical situation and cultural values, itis easy to discern Atatürk's personality in every stage of implementation and to detect even his imprint. He had, at times, some sagacious observations on theworld's future, that turned out to be accurate to the degree of prophecy. It is indeed surprising to see such prophecies to come true after so many years. In examining Atatürk's foreign policy, three separate periods may be taken up without a definite chronological separation:
Wartime Policies
The National Pact, established as the raison d'être and the first objective of the independence war was developed in the Erzurumand Sivas congresses first and imposed to the Ottoman House of Representatives on 28 January1920 afterwards, delineated the fatherland for which the war would be waged.This pact, consisting of six articles, represents a document extremely difficult to be rejected or altered due to the finesse utilized in itspreparation and to the justifications on which it is based. The answer it has offered to the question of the territorial scope and identity which had occupied for quitesome time the Turkish and Ottoman public opinions was resolved by restricting the interests of the new state to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and, consequently,putting an end to all pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist myths and utopias. The national pact, using as its point of departure the Wilsonprinciplesproclaimed during the war, recognizes the self-determination rightsofArabs - just like the said Wilson principles- and states that the areasinhabited predominantly by Moslems are an indivisible entity. We must rememberthat the Wilson principles required the establishment of a Turkish stateinthose parts of the Ottoman states where Moslems constituted the majorıty.The ideas of established an Armenia and a Kurdistan were sold muchlater toPresident Wilson (3). Though the National Pact does not cover Western Thrace, it suggests a referendum to determine fate of this area. Atatürk was rather cautious in thisrespect. In replying a question on 3 February 1920, he usedthese words: «It would not be appropriate for the Ottoman foreign policyto declare that the Eastern and Western Thrace constitute an administrativewhole. The Eastern Thrace is unquestionably a part of the Ottoman possessions,and may at best be an operations basis for the recovery of the Westernone»(4). As Atatürk did not nurture utopic ideas, he neither desired norexpected that the defeat suffered by the Ottoman Empire could be convertedinto a victory. He believed, however, that the conditions set forth intheNational Pact could be attained if the Turks rallied around the cause of anational struggle. The National Pact states that the future of the Straitsshould be determined by all states including also Turkey, Istanbul and Marmarashould nevertheless be protected from all dangers, that minorities shouldhave equal rights with Moslems, and that all measures should bejointly decidedupon for the repayment of Ottoman debts provided that none of the measuresis likely to make an adverse effect on the developmentof justice and financialsystems of the country. In short, the National Pact reflected the nationalaspirations, and contained at the same time several points and concessionsthat would not be objectionable and would even pleasethe Western public opinions(5). The Turkish attitude in the National Pactand Atatürk's opinionson «rights» are in perfect harmony: «The existenceof universal rights cannot be denied, and rights are even stronger thanbrute strength. Yet, a nation which pursues its rights must give the impressionthat it will not hesitate using force to defend its rights if it is compelledto do so». Atatürk also underlines that the «right»is one of the fourteenbasic principles of Wilson and adds, however, thatthe strong, if it is right, must also be civilized. At the end of World War I, at a time when untold injustices were being made to the Turkish nation, it is not for nothing that such concepts as«rights» and «public conscience» are stressed in Atatürk's foreign policy.After four years of fighting, when the warring nations believed that the problems leading to the armed confrontation were settled and that they could relax in peace, they were not too adverse toa Turkish cause basedon «righteousness». One of the reasons compelling a number of leaders of the Anatolian revolt to proposing an American mandate was the fact that the American leaders and public opinion did not expect a material benefit from Turkey and that specific provisions were admitted into the 14-principle Wilson declaration insofar as Turkey was concerned. Yet, despite the pressure put on him during Erzurum congress, Atatürk did not yield before the idea of an American mandate. The matter was also taken up in Sivas congress where it was discussed to depth, but nothing serious was decided upon except a compromise to the effect that a delegation from the United States Congress should be invited toobserve the situation in situ (7). It was indeed difficult to prepare the ground for a new lengthy struggle under the psychology of defeatism following the WorldWar I, to wage this struggle and to design a diplomacy and foreign policyfitting such anational movement. In leading this movement Atatürk hadto use everyfavorable opportunity and to benefit from every occasion which presented itself.There were big powers likely to help him in his endeavors: United States ofAmerica and Soviet Union.
These highly critical years of 1919 and 1920 may be said to be thosein which Turkey had started its official relations with the Soviets. Thoughlocal skirmishes still continued between Bolsheviks and Allied forces, the withdrawal of the British army from Caucasus in August 1919 and its replacement by independent Armenian, Georgian and Azarbaijan states brought about a totally-new situation, which could be evaluated both from Turkish and Soviet perspectives. As early as 13 September 1919, the Soviet ForeignCommissar Chicherin appealed to Turkish proletariate, attackingthe generals and offered themall the help they needed from theirRussian brethren (9). The internationalist character of the Russian revolution and the designs Turkey of its northern neighbor have always influenced the Soviet policy towards the Turkey existed as a dilemma after the inception of the Bolshevik regime. This dilemma and the necessity of adjacent coexistence with a superpower, have also influenced the Turkish foreign policy. The following assessmentmade by Atatürkin 1920 on Bolsheviks and on the situation in Caucasusis indeed quite interesting: « a) States establishing contact with Bolsheviks either become Bolshevik themselves, or start fighting with them; b) toinstigate a fight between us and Bolsheviks, the Allies would declare thateverything which is not Arab would be ours. Yet they do not do it for thetime being, since they want to strangle us to a slow death, by supportingand strengthening a number of independent states in Caucasus. If we, onour part, facilitate the Bolshevik invasionand establish contacts withthem, all doors of the East would become openfor them and the colonieswould be endangered. Otherwise, our own existencewould be jeopardized.We must seek contact with Bolsheviks» (10). Byfar the greatest fear the Bolsheviks themselves have had was to become encircledby capitalist states.For this reason, the existence of the British powerin the Bosphorus led theSoviet Union to seek friendship with Turkey, particularlyafter 16 March1920 when Istanbul was occupied. However, the Soviets havenot hesitated doing everything in their power to invalidate the agreementssigned betweenTurkey and independent Georgia and Armenia in 1920. The treatyof 1920, prepared after long negotiations, was signed some seven months later and the reason for the delay in the signing of this document is quite interesting.The Soviets were receiving with the treaty of March 21 from Turkey the generalarea of Batoum in Georgia . But Chicherine is reported to have said thefollowingto Bekir Sami Bey, the Chief Turkish Delegate after the initialling of thetreaty: «We are ready to implement this treaty and furnish the assistanceyou require. Yet, just as we have accepted to give land to the Armenians,we expectyou to do the same in Muş and Erzurum districts. Otherwise, thetreatyshall not be of any consequence». The land ceded to Armeniansby the Soviets was the Nahcivan Province of Azerbaidjan. This physically cutTurkey fromadjacency with Azerbaidjan. Mustafa Kemal was definitely againstthis Soviet demand, and maintained that it would not be possible to accuseIstanbul Government for having signed the Sèvres Treaty since such a concession would seriously endanger the principles of the national pact would bemade by Ankara.. The refusal of Mustafa Kemal did not surprise the Soviets, who signed the treaty on 21 March 1921 (11).They explained their change of attitude by the following declaration: «We did not formulate any territorial demands to you. We solely wanted to introduce a propaganda element vis-à-vis the European socialists». One of the reasons behind this change ofattitude is the Soviet desire to end their conflictwith the British before signing a treaty with Turkey. In fact, the British-Russian Trade Agreement, which the Soviets greatly cherished was signed on 16 March1921 (12). Another reason may be the British precondition that the Turkish Delegation invited by the British on 26 January to London Conference would include representatives of Ankara Government also and that Atatürk had used this opportunity to have a de jure recognition of Ankara Governmentby the Allied states. In fact, Bekir Sami Bey was acting as the Presidentof the Turkish Delegation representing both Ankara and Istanbul Governments and this was made him the sole spokesman of Turkey. The London Conference permitted Turkey to advertise better the national pact to Western public opinions and to discern the schisms among theEuropean powers that Turkey could exploit to her advantage. The non-ratification of the agreements signed by Bekir Sami Bey did not yield the results he feared, but facilitated on the contrary the Italian withdrawal from June onward, thesignature with the British of a wider-scale prisoner exchange and the visitin June again of Franklin Bouillon in Turkey. Toward mid-'21, Atatürk had established a Government which had completedits military reorganization, its National Assembly and its diplomatic ties, had reached to an agreement with the Soviet Union whereby the armies inthe Easternfront was released, started the pacification of the French in Southernfront and had only Greece as the real enemy with the British behind them.There was, however, a considerable work yet to be done in the country, atthe battlefront and on diplomatic plane. Nevertheless, the Turkish-French negotiations initiated in Ankara in June 1921 with Franklin Bouillon had a significant impact on both England and Russia and caused major concerns intheir mindsas to the validity of their previous attitudes toward Turkey. It must berecalled that a major part of the Turkish-French negotiations was handledpersonally by Atatürk, who had made a good impression on hisopponent andobtained most of what he had hoped. The Treaty of Ankara, signedon 20 October1921 following the Sakarya battle, is of major significanceas it constitutesa precedent. This significance is described by Atatürkwith the followingwords: «With this document, we have been able tosave the country fromoccupation without making any political, military or other concession.The document likewise may be considered a milestone in our historyin that it constitutesa de jure recognition of the new Turkish stateby a Western power». A seemingly-innocent provision of this documentlies in the recognition of a Turkish existence in Hatay and its acceptance in the grantingof a special administration for this district.This provision constitutedthe basis of the later policy adopted byTurkey to liberate Hatay. The agreementwith France made this country an allyand spokesman of Turkey in Westernplatforms. It did not fail, however,to cause a considerable degree of suspicionamong the Soviets, in thatthey feared that Turkey would enter into a climateof rapprochement with France and distance herself from Moscow. There were even some rumoors that there was a secret protocol to this agreementwhereby Turkey would undertake the occupation of Caucasus area if a conflagrationarose between the Soviet Union and Western Europe (13). This suspicion seemsto be the modus vivendi of the visit of General Frunze, Commander-in-Chiefof Ukrainian Soviet Armies, to Turkey in December 1921. He noticed, however,that Atatürk was greatly interested in furthering collaboration withthe Soviet Union.An agreement was signed during this visit, and arms andammunition began tobe sent to Turkey under this agreement upon returnof General Frunze. It appeared that both France and Soviets had by thenrealized the significance of Turkey from the geopolitical viewpoint. France had done considerable work to remove from the Western public opinion the notion that Mustafa Kemal was following a pro-Soviet policy following the signing of the March 1921 Treaty with the Soviets. On the otherhand Soviets desire Turkey to become stronger as they hoped that a strongTurkey could end Allied presence in the Straits. Although many people in Englandhad conceded that the policy of replacing the Ottoman Empire with Greece hadcome to a blind alley after the Turkish victory in Sakarya, Lloyd George andLord Curzon was still against the National Pact, although he did not failto make some concessions to Turkish cause.The French and Italian, in theirturn, had accepted the National Pact boundariesthough they were tenaciouslyclinging to the Ottoman capitulations. The diplomatic successes marked in 1921 were nevertheless notsatisfactory to Atatürk. He said: «No serious relations wereestablished with the Western powers until August 1922, and this led us tobelieve that illusions must not be nurtured in the diplomatic field untilwe expel the enemy occupying this country or until we prove them that we havethis capability».Despite this, Atatürk continued diplomatic activitieswith the Western countries. Several reasons are suggested to explain thisefforts. The first is reported to be the desire to gain time for the preparationsneeded for the final onslaught against the enemy. In fact, the visits to Europeof Yusuf Kemal and, in 1922, Ali Fethi were designed to produce this result.As the peace overtures of the Allies in March 1922 were essentially not differentfrom the preceding ones, Atatürk did not have the slightest intentionof accepting them, although he did not reject them outright and continuedthe talks within the framework of his procedural and contential objectionsand reserves. In the months immediately preceding the final onslaught, MustafaKemal gathered all the help he could find, continued his contracts with theFrench and Italian Governments and did everything in his powerto exploitthe discontent in British public opinion against Lloyd Georgeand Lord Curzon.In the Eastern front, while obtaining the confidence ofthe Soviets, he didhis utmost to avoid the penetration into Turkey ofthe international communismmovement led by this country. The final counterattack and the ensuing victory had placed inÇanakkaleand İzmit the Turkish and British armies face to face. TheBritish,in the so-called «buffer» zone were highly worried whenthe Turkish bayonets prodding the Greeks into the sea appearedon the borderlineof this «buffer» . Lord Curzon hastily visited Paristoinduce the French Government for a joint defense of Istanbul and Straits againstTurks. But the French maintained, on the strength of GénéralCharpie's report that it was not possible to do so against the Turkisharmiesand opposed to any skirmish with Turks. In the British Governmentmeetingon 15 September, it was decided that a warning should be served on MustafaKemal against an eventual interference to the «buffer» zone.Whenthis message was sent to Ankara, however, Mustafa Kemal replied thatthe Turkishside did not know of the existence of any such zone. The FrenchPresidentPoincaré was definitely against any further fighting in Turkey,whilethe British was suspicious of the possible effects of the Turkishvictoryon the British Imperial possessions and Iran, displeased with theFrench andItalian Governments for having aided Ankara and convinced that the Sovietswould make a large-scale attach in the Balkanic peninsula and Central Europein case of a renewed war between Turkey and Allied powers.Though determinedto save the Thrace and satisfied that the Turkish armedforces was sufficientlystrong to do so, British believed that Turkey could have totaken the risk that I taly, France and England might start a war againstTurkey.For this reason they said that the question of buffer zone could best be settledthrough negotiations.
The foreign policy based on the strength represented by the Turkish armed forces was successful. In fact, the road was paved without furtherbloodshed for Mudanya armistice talks. In the ensuing peace conference, it was decided that İsmet İnönü as the victorious commanding general of Turkish forces in the Western front would represent Turkey. The armistice witnessed Turkey obtaining most of what she had wanted: The Eastern Thrace would be taken awayfrom Greece and delivered to Turkey as per a time chart, the areas of İstanbul, İzmit and Çanakkale would be returned to Turks subjectto the establishmentof a neutral zone in the Straits. This armistice recognized the Government of the Grand National Assemblythe sole and legal representative of Turkey. 20 days after the armistice, the Sultanate was abolished and the Sèvres period was ended for ever. Consequently, the Turks who were expelled some time ago from Europe were returningthere again. In the mean-while, Lloyd George had resigned ashis anti-TurkGovernment had turned out to be unsuccessful in its Middle-Easternpolicies. The time was now ripe for the peace talks with the former enemies. Inits verbal note sent on 4 October 1922 to the Allied Governments, the Grand National Assembly proposed Izmir as the conference venue, to which theAllied replied with the counterproposal of Lausanne on 27 October and invitedalso the Istanbul Government. This last matter, however, was solved rathereasily by the Grand National Assembly which by then fully established itsauthority over the whole country. With the abolishment of sultanate on1 November 1922, the departure of Sultan Vahdeddin from Istanbul had forall practical intents and purposes terminated the existence of IstanbulGovernment. Turkey's representation in the Lausanne conference was preoccupying Atatürk even before the conference invitations were made. He says the followingin this respect: «I have once more examined, despite the ample informationon my hand, the matter of whether Ismet Pasha could assume the functionsof the head of Turkish delegation at the peace conference, and studied the manner in which he had conducted the Mudanya armistice negotiations.Finally, I have decided that he should be appointed to the position ofMinister ofForeign Affairs in order to become the delegation�s head». Several measures were designed and implemented to facilitate the creationof a climate to better defend the Turkish cause in Lausanne. Atatürk showed to the rest of the world that Turkey was to becoming a contemporary societyby emancipating the women, adopting the western law system, facilitating the entry of foreign capital into the country, introducing stern measures against communism and ensuring the arrest of known communists. All thisaimed at preparing a suitable opinion for Turkey in the conference. The peace conference had started on 21 November 1922, came toa halton 4 February 1923, was resumed on 23 April and had ended on 24 July1923with the signature of the peace treaty. The details of the discussionsin the conference and its resolutions are beyond the scope of this article.Suffice it, however, to make a comparison of what Turkey claimed and whatshe obtained. The Thracian border question was the one that encounteredthegreatest difficulty in the conference where, though failure was markedinthe Western Thrace, the borderline of Eastern one was drawn in accordancewith the Turkish demands and Karaağaç was obtained against the warindemnities requested from Greece. Although the achievements were behind theexpectationsin the Aegean islands, the disarmament of adjacent ones was agreedupon.There was a problem in the Syrian border and the solution of Moussoulquestion was postponed to a later date. The eastern borders had already beensettled.Turkish demands were accepted with regard to capitulations and acompromisewas reached in the Straits (14). It is known that the Turkish delegation headed by Ismet Pashahas considerablybenefited from the inner strife between the development,we had to make sacrifices on this territorial issue which was the only questionremainingto be solved, in order Allied nations and the conflict over theStraitswith Soviet Union. We may at this stage ask ourselves what was theroleof Atatürk in the conduct of Lausanne processes. Ismet Pasha describesthis role with the following words during the ratification negotiationsofthe peace treaty at the Grand National Assembly: «This is not the expressionof a personal gratitude and thanks, but rather the statement of a fact.Wheneverone feels to have entered a blind alley, he falls into the beliefthat thereis no outlet. Yet, the solutions are generally a lot simplerthan is believedeven under the most complicated situations, only if thereis some indicationand guidance which may be deduced from the circumstances.We have receivedthis guidance from Mustafa Kemal Pasha in war as wellas during the peacenegotiations. If I have marked any success in the missionwhich was entrustedwith me, it was due to the unfailingly-correct adviceand guidance which havehelped us even at the moments of greatest disappointment»(15). Atatürk, on his part, says the following on what was gained in Lausanne: To give the country a true independence and sovereignty, we had to facethe difficulties entailed by this problem. I did not have the slightest doubt on the final success, and firmly believed that the principles which would govern Turkey for its existence, independence, sovereignty and wellbeing would eventually be accepted by the Western world in the long run. In fact, these principles were already enforced on them by military might, and what we were seeking was their confirmation at the conference table. Our claims were clear and reasonable. Furthermore, we had a trump in our hand: wehad enough military power. Yet, our greatest strength and soundest supportlied in the fact that we had actually turned over to the people the nationalsovereignty so regained and that we had proven that the people consciouslyutilized it.» Peace Time Policies We can classify the main foreign policy problems faced by Turkey atthe peace time period in the following manner:
After the World War I, Turkey had become neighbor to Italy which had annexed the Dodecanese, to France which was granted the mandate over Syriaand to England which had the Iraqi mandate, while in the north was theSoviet Union, heir to the Czarist Russia, still introvert and strivingto enforce the communism within the country. Turkey's relations with the Arab countries, ruled by the wartime enemies of the Ottoman Empire, was a bare minimumand contacts with the remaining Turkish portions of the defunct Empirehad dwindled to routine diplomacy. The issues remaining unsettled after Lausanne concerned the relations with Greece over the Thrace, with England over Mossoul and with Franceover Antioch, not to mention the question of Straits which was not settledto the full satisfaction of Turkey. One of the most important problems in Turkey's relations withGreececoncerned the population exchange. Pursuant to a bilateral agreementsignedon 30 January 1923, the Turkish and Greek populations were to be exchangedexcept the Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in Western Thrace. Considerabledifficultiesarose in the implementation of the agreement, the public opinionsof bothcountries were enflamed and came to the brink of war. But withcommon senseand over the time, all these issues were solved one by one.In his speechon l November 1930 before the Grand National Assembly, Atatürkwas saying: «The national interests of Greece and Turkey are no longer oppositeeach other. It would be highly advantageous to both countries toseek securityand strength for themselves in mutual friendship». It should be indicated here that the great Greek statesman Venizelos of that time shared the same feelings. When we look at the current status of these problems between the two countries, it becomes easy to noticethat they remain far more insignificant as compared to the advantages tobe derived from the mutual security and strength through unity. The failure in the settlement of the question of Mossoul which was withinthe boundaries of the national pact had been a factor causing significant unrest in Turkey and delaying the improvement of the relations with theWest. It will be recalled that this issue which could not be solved inLausannewas made the subject of a Turkish-English conference starting on 19 May 1924and, as a conclusion could not be reached, it was referred to the League ofNations under the provisions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty.Turkey finallylost Mossoul after the reports of ad hoc commissions andinvestigation teamsof the League where all kinds of diplomatic rope-towing were only routine.The reaction of Turkey against this conclusion was tosign on 17 December1925 a Non-aggression and Neutrality Pact with theSoviet Union. One may today think in retrospect and ask himself whether Mossoul could be saved if the matter was left to an armed solution. When, on 5 June 1926,the question was punctuated with a Turkish-English-Iraqi agreement,Dr.Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, wasuttering this opinion before the Grand National Assembly: «As the basicobjective ofthe Turkish Republic representing the main military might inthe Middle-Eastis to become the central factor of order and to contributeto the worldand Middle-East peace, to the independence and welfare of Iraqand to improvementof our relations with the Great Britain». Despitethis sacrifice, the Turkish-British relations did not begin to amelioratebefore 1929 (17). The Lausanne Treaty made it necessary to solve a number of pending questions with France also. In fact, the withdrawal of commercial privileges of the French colony, of prerogatives of French hospitals and schools had encountered difficulties from time to time and the Syrian border questions continued until1926. Although the independence of Hatay was declared in1926, it was agreedin June of the same year that it should remain as anautonomous administration within the Syrian Republic under French mandate. Therefore, all boundariesof Turkey were madedefinitive by 1926. The Soviet support given to Turkey during the Lausanne conference had not totally removed the contradictions in the relations with this country. The Soviet support given to the Turkish thesis on the Straitsaimedat keeping the Western powers away from this area. At the some time,the objectives of Atatürk for establishing an independent state opposedtothe world revolution ideals of the Soviets. It may therefore be contendedthat the divergence of opinions on these two counts has been the constraintof the friendship between Turkey and Soviet Union (18). In the days precedingthe Lausanne Treaty, the arrest of known communist elements in Turkey andthis country�s decision to settle its external debts by bilateral and multilateralagreements were displeasing the Soviet press where violent criticisms werebeing published against Turkey. A rather merciless duel of accusationshadstarted in the presses of both countries, although this situation didnothinder the signature in 1926 of a Trade and Navigation agreement. The rise to power of Mussolini in Italy had resulted in this country's orientation from 1922 onward in Balkans and Mediterranean to a policy independent from those of the Allied nations. The conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia and the former's relations with the revisionist countries was making itnecessary to initiate certain adjustments. It is known that Italy wanteda settlement between Turkey and Greece, in which it would also be involved.But serious changes occurred in these relations after the 30s. In the years following Lausanne, Turkey was beginning to playan activerole in international bodies while establishing diplomatic tieswith all countries of the world and entering into various agreements withthem.She had signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawing war and participated in the InternationalDisarmament Conference. Yet she was refraining from becoming a member intheLeague of Nations. In fact, it was considered inappropriate for Turkey todo so since the League had permitted itself to become the ground forthe Britishruses in the Mossoul conflict. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had not improvedits relations with the Western nations to the point ofentering this internationalorganization. While England was striving to drag Turkey into the League ofNations in order to end the rapprochement between Turkey country and SovietUnion on the other hand, Soviets kept suggesting to Ankara that it would be inappropriateto do so. For all these reasons, Turkey's membership became a reality onlyin 1932, and the Soviet Union followed suit two years later. The 30s havestarted with the replacement of the crises arising from the World War I inEurope by new ones and withthe efforts aiming at eliminating pressure onYugoslavia, while trying to drag the revisionist Bulgaria into its own ranks.The conflicts in the Balkans were causing some preoccupation, particularlyin the Straits area, for Turkey's security. Though the idea had not emanatedfrom Turkey, it was defended most strongly by her, the roving Turkish diplomatsunder thedirect guidance of Atatürk had gradually settled the conflictsamong the Balkan countries and, finally, all Balkan countries save Bulgariawere gathered in the Balkan Pact. It had indeed been difficult, however, to induceItaly and Soviet Union, which continued causing difficulties until thelastmoment, to the advantages offered by such a Pact that had the fullsupportof England and France. In this connection, Atatürk had to make severalpersonal interventions and had once sent the following cable froma countrytrip to Ankara, when the Soviet attitude on some matters was brought to hisattention: « ... I think it is necessary to be careful andextremelywary. If a Balkanic collaboration, considered as a great successin all theworld and basically architectured by Turkey, fails solely becauseof the obstinacyof Tsurich (Soviet Ambassador in Ankara), it would constitutea rather adverseeffect on the present and future prestige of Turkey» (19). Though a pact bringing together a number of weaker nations, the Balkan Pact could act in total unison in the economic sanctions adopted by the League of Nations in 1935 upon the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and fullysupported Turkey in the amendment of the status of Straits establishedin Lausanne.
Turkey had signed a similar pact with Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq on 8 July 1937. This pact, aimed rather at regulating the intraregional relations and determining the methods for the solution of eventual conflicts amongthe signatories, has been hailed as the outcome of the desires of the nations in the region to live in peace and brotherhood. Although it lost much ofits significance after the World War 11, it is technically still in force. As regards the question of Straits, the regime introduced with the LausanneTreaty was far from being satisfactory and the continuation of the freedom of passage principle was becoming a burden for Turkey, in that the demilitarizationof Istanbul and Straits had denied this area of all possibility and means of defense. This was borring Turkey to use its defense right within itsown territories. Furthermore, the League of Nations, the source of the international guarantee, was on decline in mid-30s and the European system based on Versailles Treaty was no longer functional. The step-in into power of Hitler, the abrogation of Locarno Pact and the German occupation ofRhine district have given the necessary opportunity to the Turkish delegate in themeeting of League of Nations Council to press his Government's demandto changethe regime of Straits. The timing and approach were perfect:contrary to Germany,Turkey was desirous to solve its problem in an internationalforum. Amongthe European powers, Italy was the country putting up the greatest resistance to the change of this regime, while France and the Balkan states were not disapproving the Turkish demand, the British opposing «marenostrum» policy of Italy was approaching to Turkey and the Soviets weresupporting this change in order to secure their transit freedom and to keepothers away. It was nevertheless easy to finalize in a satisfactory mannerthe Montreux Conference which had started in a favorable atmosphere. In thefinal analysis, however, the Soviets had been able to obtain nearly all theywanted through the concessions given by Turkey and Great Britain(21). ThisConference is also a milestone for Turkey in that it made theGreat Britaina natural ally of Turkey and Soviet Union. As far as Turkey is concerned,the signature of this document constitutes another source of strength in itsinternational relations. In that connection, Inönü was saying:«Every international agreement is an evolution in itself. It may beclaimed that the new regime for the Straits is the proof of there cognitionof the policies and existence of the new Turkish State sinceits inceptionin 1923. This existence in the result of the powerTurkey had. The prestige and power offered to the Turkish nation by Atatürk's regime in such a short timehave thereby been ratified on the international fori» (22). The Hatay questionis probably one of the last foreign policy issues taken up by Atatürk.The future ofHatay which could not be admitted into the national boundariesunder thenational pact, and which was nevertheless granted a privileged statusinthe Turkish-French agreement of 1921, was endangered by the French-Syriantreaty signed on 9 September 1936, by which France was turning over allitsrights and the mandatory power to the Syrian Government. On 1 November1936,Atatürk had said: «The main issuewhich occupies the minds of nearly all Turks these days is the future of Alexandretta,Antioch and their vicinity which are unquestionably Turkish.We have to dwellon this problem with due interest. In that connection, I would like to indicatethat this represents the sole friction with France of which we treasure thefriendship. Those who know well the background of the problem understand andrespect our interest in the matter». The question was brought to a temporarysolution through the diplomatic contacts carried out under the arbitrationof Great Britain and within the frameworkof the League of Nations. For thissolution, Atatürk remarked: «The Republic of Turkeyis sincerely convinced that it has done the most proper thing and selectedthe most commendable avenue by entrusting the solution of the problem withthe League of Nations that we desire to see the strengthening and becominga forum for the settlement of all internationalconflicts» (23). Atatürkhas not been able to see in his lifetime the finalsolution of the problemand the annexation of Hatay to Turkey. We have tried to describe in this article the orientations which Atatürk gave to the Turkish foreign policy during the independence war, in thetransitional period following it and during the peacetime, the rules which he formally observed in diplomacy and the results he attained. Several characteristics are evident in the foreign policy implementations of Atatürk as will be noted from the above exposé. One of them is the tenacity with which he defended Turkey's cause in its «rightful claims». The constraints taht affected of this tenacity were realism and permissibilityof the current worldconditions. Attempts to gain the sympathy and approvalof the world publicopinion, to observe the formalities and to display a particularconcernin ensuring that the claims formulated were based on just and rationalgrounds.As a successful military commander, the insight he gained in theanalysis of a particular situation was indeed valuable to him vis-à-visthe questionsof international politics. In this respect, mention must be made of the words Atatürk spent duringhis talk with General Douglas D. MacArthur in 1931: «If the European statesmenfail to take up their political problems within a spirit of mutual comprehension devoid of all egotism and chauvinistic feelings, Iam afraid the débâcle will be unavoidable. We should remember that the European problem is nolonger a problem between France, Germany and United Kingdom. There is analtogether new force menacing the humanity. This force, mobilizing allits material and moral strength for a world revolution utilizes methodsand means unknown to Europeans and Americans, and manageexploiting tothe fullest even the least errors committed by its opponents.The victorof a war in Europe shall be neither England, France nor Germany.The victorwill be the Soviet Union. As a country which has fought untoldnumbersof times with Russia, we follow the events there very closely andsee thedanger with all its implications. The Bolsheviks, exploiting to bestadvantagethe feelings of the awakening Eastern world, pleasing their egosand incitinghostility, have become a force threatening Europe as well asAsia». The answer to the question of what were the aims of Atatürk's foreignpolicy was given as early as in the years of independence war: «Our foreignpolicy does not involve infringement on the rights of any state... Whenever the country's or the Nation's interests require it, we shall not hesitate establishing ties of friendship with other powers of the world and maintain such relations for the maintenance of world peace. The Grand NationalAssembly and the Government are not belligerent, and they preferpeaceand order. They favour the humanitarian and civilized principles inalltheir endeavours and seek for friendship and co-operation between allthenations of the Eastern as well as Western hemispheres». The establishmentof friendly relations was one of the most important objectives envisagedbyAtatürk who was saying even in the years of war against the Westernstates:«The decline of the Ottoman Empire had started the day it had cutallits ties with the West with the haughtiness of the military victoriesgainedover it. This was a serious error, which will not be repeated. Icannot remembera single nation which wants to enter the ranks of civilized nations and affordsto hold itself apart from the west». Those who want to reappraise themeaning of the concept of «contemporary civilization»of Atatürkmust take into account the state structure which he tailored, the reformswhich he designed, the renaissance which he introduced andthe policies basedon rationalism and totally devoid of dogmas which hehas led. The question of the type of foreign policy which Atatürkwould haveled if he lived today may be asked also in the other aspects ofthe present-day Turkish social life. The answers to these questions will bemany and varied.It will not be impossible to imagine, however, that Turkey'sstand in theworld affairs would not be totally different from what it actuallyis today if we remember that he was a rational and impeccable commander whoknewhow to evaluate the critical aspects of a problem and who could rapidlytake the required precautionary measures. BIBLIOGRAPHY
|
The wartime foreign policies of Atatürk were multi-faceted and flexible : to ensure the acceptance of the legality and legitimity of the Anatolian revolt in orderto gain the results useful for winning the war; to secureforeign aid andto seed suspicion and doubt among the opponents; and to fulfillthe requirementsof the «crisis management» at such times whenextraordinary situations occurred. In all his endeavours, Atatürk wasworking along a single direction:«To establish unconditionally independentstate based on national sovereignty»(2). He maybe said to have initiatedhis efforts by his appeal of 3 June1919 to all local administrators and militaryleaders in which he had criticized the attitude of Istanbul Government inthe peace conference, and rejected the proposals of granting autonomy to Armeniansand of accepting the Britishprotectorate. The foreign policy resolutionsadopted in the Erzurum congress of 23 July to 6 August 1919 and in Sivas congress of 4 to 11 September1919 may be deemed as a nation-wide approval of the views defended by him.Atatürk's views were based on the basic concepts ofthe integrity of fatherland within national boundaries, the readiness to fight for this integrity andthe unconditional refusal of all concessions capable to impair the political sovereignty. The effort spent by Atatürk to carrythese two congresses along the direction of these concepts came from his far-sightednessand convincing power. 
The importance of public opinion is obvious in Atatürk's speeches. Referring to the occupation of Islanbul by Allied forces he saidn: «We submit the evolutionof the full significance of Istanbul�s occupation to the public conscienceof science, culture and education circles of Europe and America, ratherthan to the political and administrative authorities of these two continents» (6). 
Subsequentto the publication of his famous principles during the wartime, the PresidentWilson had changed considerably his opinions on the OttomanEmpire underthe influence of European Allies. In fact, the establishmentof an Armenia,the grantal of land in Anatolia to Greeks and the establishmentof a protectorate over the Ottoman territories were the changes made on theoriginal declaration.The Paris Peace Conference that convened early 1919permitted Atatürkto acquire a good inner picture of the expectationson a number of pointsand to redesign his policies in their light. In thefirst place, he noticed that there was not a solid unity among the Europeans.Secondly, the Ottoman administration in Istanbul had lost all its influenceand power and, consequently,the ground was broken for the creation of a newTurkish state. Therefore, the resistancemovement to be started in Anatoliacould sooner or later reach the strengthlevel needed to save the country.In his relationships with United States,Atatürk expressed the desireto benefit from this country. Shortly after the telegram sent to the UnitedStates Congress from Sivas for the dispatchof a survey team, a memorandumwas given to the American group sent to Anatolia and Caucasia under GeneralHarbord. In this memorandum, Mustafa Kemal as the Head of Representative Groupstates that the «assistance ofan impartial state would be acceptable». But the idea of an American mandateor protectorate came to a sudden end with the change in administration and on policy in the United States and with thereturn to isolation atthe other aide of Atlantic (8). 
Policies in the Transition Period 
The changes in the world political situation did not fail, however, to weaken the importance of this pact in the following years. The acquiescent policies of England and France versus the Nazi Germany and the agreement signed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria may be said the main reasons of this gradualdecay (20).