The traditional European policy towards Turkey and Greece, since the end of the First World War was a policy of equi-distance or a policy of balanced approach. Although American policy was influenced to certain degree by the weight of the Greek ethnic influence mainly in the US Congress and caused major frictions in 1964, 1973 and 1975, these were short-lived and Turkey’s strategic importance was an important factor for re-establishing a balanced relationship. Europe was at least sympathetic to the sufferings of the Turkish community in Cyprus and Britain as the most interested European power in the affairs of Cyprus was not only instrumental in the establishment of 1959-60 treaties that created the Republic of Cyprus as a functional federation between Turkish and Greek Communities in the island. Nevertheless, when Turks were driven into ghettos as a result of the coup d’etat lead by the President of the Republic Makarios there were no protests from any European country. Europe was gradually changing its policy of equi-distance. When ultimately Turkey had to intervene in the island, because of the failure of the UK to fulfill its obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee for joint intervention, the European countries completely abandoned the policy of balance. Greece was pushed into membership of the European Economy Community in 1981 and this date coincided with the de facto freezing of the association relations between Turkey and the European Union.

The Turkish application for full membership in 1987 and the continued economic and political eventually led EU to de-freeze its relations with Turkey and open the way for the customs union which supposedly was the last phase for the consideration of Turkey’s application for full membership. In order to accept the conclusion of the agreement for the customs union Greece made the beginning of accession negotiations with Cyprus, to be represented only by the Greek Administration a pre-condition. The situation became worse at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, where EU reversed its 1997 decision and changed the Turkish position vis-à-vis EU from ‘eligibility’ to ‘candidacy’ with no date for the beginning of accession negotiations unlike all other candidate states. The price demanded and obtained by Greece was that negotiations with Cyprus would continue and if there was no solution to the conflict in the island EU could accept the present Greek government as a full member. It is a well known fact that Greece threatens EU with blocking the enlargement process if Cyprus is not included among the first group of countries to become members. In effect EU has accepted this Greek demand with the some face saving reservations.

Most European countries are adamant for succumbing to Greek demands which would deal a heavy blow to the relations with Turkey, and they are in favor of delaying the admission of Cyprus until a settlement is reached by the two communities in the island. A clear attitude to be adopted by the EU in this direction would have been most desirable and legally and morally correct one; because in the first place the Cyprus Republic created on the basis of treaties signed by Turkey, Greece, UK and the two communities in the island was a government shared by both Greeks and Turks. The national interests of Turkey, Greece and UK in the island were protected by the same set of treaties. The treaties provided that Cyprus could not enter into an international organization where both Greece and Turkey were not members. The Greek campaign that continued as from 1961 to this day to get rid of their Turkish partners in the island, by violence and international intrigue achieved some success in obtaining the only-Greek Administration in the island as the legitimate government of Cyprus by the international community, that ignored the fact that Cyprus Government in international law should be government of two communities. The Turkish side had no choice but set up its own Government. It is incumbent on EU, not to forget or ignore the fact that if they deal with only one side of the island on behalf of the entire island they would only be supporting the illegal Greek usurpation to power. Furthermore, after deciding an announcing that they can negotiate with Greek administration for the accession of Cyprus they have dealt a death blow to the chances of a successful outcome of the negotiations between the two communities in the island. The only remedy can be a clear declaration by EU supporting the efforts of the Secretary General and specifically his declaration made on September 12, 2000 where he stated: 

"I have concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions". The declaration should further emphasize that as and when a settlement is reached on the basis of the UN Secretary General’s conclusions there would be no Cypriot accession to EU. Only such a statement would convince the Greek Cypriots to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots on the basis of equality to establish a united Cypriot state based on the basis of equal status of both parties. In order to facilitate such a solution the Turkish side has already proposed the formation of a confederation in Cyprus, taking into consideration the Secretary General’s 12 September proposals as a basis.

The presence of Greece in EU as the main advocate of Greek Cypriots would make the adoption of such a policy by EU extremely difficult if not impossible. Since the Turkish side would not agree to a solution that would disrupt their equal status with the Greeks (as Turks run their independent state), the present policy of EU with some Greek blackmail might indeed lead to the admission of Greek side into EU as the legitimate state of Cyprus which also includes the Turkish section. 

EU leaders before taking such a step must consider the  possible impact of such step on Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies when “they will take all relevant factors into consideration” as they promised in Helsinki should negotiations under UN auspices fail. It is not difficult to foresee that the Greek side would continue to refuse to accept the principle of “equal status” with the Turks so long as they have the hope that they will enter into EU as the Government of entire Cyprus and that they will be able to use all EU instruments to bear pressure on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to accept a minority status in the island. Since 1955 the resistance to Greek aspirations to be the sole owners of the island of Cyprus has become an issue of vital national cause both for Turkish Community in the island and for the Turks on general one should not expect Turks to give up their legitimate demands for equal status. Therefore, there can only be slight optimism concerning the outcome of the talks under UN auspices. The present trend in the European Parliament is ominous since it assumes, in its recent decision on enlargement, the accession of Cypriot Greek Government as the Government of Cyprus as a given fact and makes threats against Turkey. The simplest interpretation of the EP attitude is that they have allied themselves with the Greeks to have Cypriot Greeks as an EU member State. The Commission and the Council seem to be slightly more cautious but the terms of Helsinki decision need no further clarification.

Certainly, if the policy adopted by EU results in the admission of Southern Cyprus into EU such a development is bound to have very strong reaction of Turkey with deep impacts on Turkish domestic and foreign policies. Although such a step has not yet been taken by the EU the probability and the existence of framework would oblige us to consider what these impacts could be.

While Turkey needs further reforms in its social and political systems in order to enhance its democratic structures in order to become a modern nation and that these reforms are already in progress, the objective of EU membership has been a significant incentive for carrying out these reforms. The admission of Greek Cypriots alone as representing entire Cyprus will increase the objections of extreme right and left to future EU membership and will sharply reduce the zest of pro-European political center, that will be accused of following an integration policy with the European Union in spite of Europe; because of the fact that Turkey’s EU membership will only be mirage due to the existence of two Greek states in the EU as they will demand a political price in Cyprus and the Aegean that Turkey cannot pay for their support.

This will no doubt increase polarity in Turkish domestic politics and reform attempts may be strongly resisted. The eventual strengthening of extreme parties and possibly ethnic elements may disrupt the social order of the country. These domestic disputes will find, as they have done in past, an echo in those European countries where 3.5 million Turkish citizens with Turkish or regional passports, in turn unfavorably  impacting the social order of these countries.

Some of our neighbors who have irredentist aspirations on Turkey and the fundamentalist countries who aspire to win Turkey over to their religious camp will be encouraged.

Turkey may have to react and greater military involvement may not be excluded.

Furthermore, Turkey may have to stop political dialogue with EU on political and security issues, as it was the case after Luxembourg conference in 1997, this time even on soft security issues.

Turkey in its regional policies may eventually pay lesser attention to European interests, and seek greater cooperation with US and/or Russia if the price of such enhancement will not be exorbitant. 

Last but not least will be the future of Northern Cyprus; the possible and probable Turkish reaction both in the island and in Turkey were already declared by the Governments and parliaments of both countries-that is increased rapprochement and integration between Turkey and TRNC, even at the cost of alienating Western Europe.

It may be argued that Turkey cannot economically afford such an alienation from Europe. But let us remember the history of Turkey and remember eras where Turkey and Europe were at odds quite often.

What I have written above may be considered and put aside as bluff or blackmail. I sincerely believe that the Cyprus issue has been such a national cause where rationality that is sine qua non of a successful polity may be put aside and Turkish reactive policies may exceed those usually considered appropriate, contrary to what many observers of Turkey may estimate.