Introduction
The development of the liberal international relations model that found a niche for implementation in Western Europe during the cold war has gradually spread to most parts of Europe. The cardinal institutions that are principal instruments for the implementation of this model such as the Council of Europe (46 members), the European Union soon to enlarge to cover 26 or 27 countries, have in their enlargement process responded to the new international environment.
NATO has not lagged behind, and OSCE, an organization that has been set up only a decade ago to contribute to cooperation and security in Europe, has expanded its frontiers even beyond Europe. The OECD, IMF, World Bank, G7(8), MEDA, constitute the economic pillars of the liberal economic system, and some of the primarily European organizations are also aspiring for global roles. In this vein, NATO, EU, Council of Europe and even OSCE have developed special interests in the Mediterranean and are currently engaged in various forms of dialogue and cooperation schemes.
It is pertinent to ask whether the liberal model that has been remarkably successful in Western Europe in providing conventional security and welfare,[i] is relevant for the entirety of the Mediterranean region. Inescapably, we observe both realist and liberal models co-existing or overlapping to varying degrees in different parts of the Mediterranean because of compounded factors ranging from insecure frontiers to sociopolitical and economic systems.
In this category we can include most countries of North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean. One cannot expect liberal model to flourish between non-democratic countries nor among nations that have not yet completed their transition from autarchic economies to open market economies.
Countries like Turkey and Israel, with market economies and democratic regimes present an anomaly with non-EU Mediterranean countries; on one hand because of their insecure borders or external and internal threats to their national or territorial integrity they have to maintain armed forces of sufficient deterrent capacity to provide a balanced or superior power with those of their neighbors while on the other they develop and maintain liberal relations with countries from which they perceive no threat.
The heterogeneous character of the Mediterranean region finds its reflection also on the typology of the conflicts, disputes, risks and cooperation models in the basin[ii]. The region abounds in various types of internal and international conflicts. Internal conflicts are usually based on the rise of violent Islamic fundamentalism in Maghreb and Mashrek regions of the Arab world, ethnically based terrorism in Spain and Turkey, Palestine are current clashes.
Other disputes having the potential of turning into military conflicts include Gibraltar between Spain and UK, Persil rocks between Spain and Morocco, Cyprus and the Aegean disputes between Turkey and Greece.
The security risks that affect both the region as well as Europe in general cover a wide range of present and potential social, political, cultural, demographic and ecological issues.
From the Turkish viewpoint Turkey’s security concerns in the Western Mediterranean region are no less or no more than its partners in NATO and other European security organizations, the roles and activities of which will be discussed further below.
Clashes, threats and risks in Eastern Mediterranean:
Turkey’s main threat and risk perceptions are primarily those emanating from the Eastern Mediterranean region and its hinterlands, although some of these risks are common Eastern and Western parts of the large Mediterranean basin.
In looking at the major international conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean the most striking ones are the Arab-Israeli conflict over the future of Palestine and Israel, the impact of the impending US attempt to the regime in Iraq if necessary by force and the stale-mated Turkish Greek disputes over the unification of Cyprus and the division of the Aegean Sea rights. These latter disputes unless resolved in a satisfactory manner for both sides have the potential of turning into armed conflicts if the current confidence building measures in place cannot be implemented properly.
Middle East conflict
From a Turkish perspective peace between Arabs and Israelis depend on the right of Israel to be recognized within legitimate borders as called for by numerous UN resolutions and the acceptance of the formation of a state of Palestine also within their secure borders. This perspective stems from Turkey’s friendly relations both with Israel, involving free trade and military cooperation and Turkey’s support for the legitimate rights of people of Palestine and the sympathy of the Turkish people for the current tragedy of the Palestinians living in camps and under military occupation. Naturally, having suffered from violence of terrorism in recent years, including suicide bombings we also have an understanding that Israel should take protective measures. What is difficult for us to understand are the rejection by Israel of the Mitchell Report in the preparation of which the former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel took part, and also the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in West Bank that already looks like the skin of a panther with so many spots representing the settlements. One third factor which cast a doubt about the current and future intentions of Israel is the absence of a national pact in Israel depicting legitimate borders for their state. For these reasons Turkish Government has sharply criticized the unbalanced reprisal measures taken by Israel.
There is no doubt that the current Israeli government has taken advantage of the new international anti-terrorist climate particularly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.[iii] In many respects Turkey’s attitude towards the Middle East crisis is similar to that of many European countries, in their incapability for persuading the parties to return to peace process as well as in their inability to persuade the United States to take action as the only country that can usefully intervene.
Naturally, Middle East issue requires also an understanding and agreement between Israel and her other Arab neighbors, and the solution of the Golan Heights question between Israel and Syria will again depend on what will be the Israeli perception of their ultimate frontiers.
Cyprus and Aegean
The current situation in Cyprus is not also conducive to bring about a shift from a mode of tension to a cooperative spirit between the Turkish and Greek populations of the Island. For this reason the good offices of the UN Secretary General has failed to make parties agree on a constitutional arrangement. Since 1995 EU has entered into the picture by accepting the application of the Greek on behalf of the entire island. without consulting the Turkish State of Northern Cyprus. From various official statements made in Ankara it is easy to understand that the admission of Cyprus into EU as already foreseen by the EU Commission and Council may not only perpetuate the division of the island but may also cause a serious crisis between Turkey and EU as well as damaging the current friendly atmosphere in the relations between Turkey and Greece.[iv]
Problems between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea is perceived in Turkey as the result of the upsetting of the balances established between Turkey and Greece as long ago as the 1923 through the Lausanne Peace Treaty. As far as Turkey is concerned there are a variety of problems to be resolved while Greece insists that there is only one problem, i.e. the delimitation of the continental shelf and that should be resolved through the decision of the International Court of Justice.
What makes the situation in the Aegean explosive is the poised status of the armed forces of both countries and the possibility that a small incident may flare up into a major military confrontation despite the existence of a number of military confidence-building measures.
From the Turkish perspective all issues in the Aegean must be discussed constructively in search of a solution and international good offices or even arbitration may be sought on issues that could not be settled in the course of friendly negotiations. So far the negotiation process restarted after four decades of interval in the year 2000 have again failed to develop a common approach to the issues.
Other Dangers
It is because of these international conflicts in addition to the dangers perceived from ethnically based terrorism and fundamentalist threat that Turkey feels it must also follow a realist model of relations towards the countries in Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern neighbors; such a policy is based on military preparedness.
Furthermore, Weapons of Mass Destruction weapons and introduction of missiles for delivery of such weapons is a concern for Turkey who has not developed these weapons because of its membership in NATO. It is known that these weapons and missiles that are capable of hitting targets in Turkey if deployed in near and far locations can only be responded by maintaining a high quality conventional deterrent.
Terrorism
Terrorism, as mentioned earlier, has been prevalent in the Mediterranean region in abundance. Turkey itself has witnessed since 1960s terrorism motivated by various types of ideologies or aspirations. In 1960s and 70s we suffered from domestic terrorism of extreme right and left both against each other and in the form of assassination of leaders. In 1970s our diplomats in different parts of the world from the assassinations of the Armenian ASALA terror organization. In 1980s while extreme left terrorism continued sporadically in major cities in Eastern Turkey the Kurdish terror organization, PKK, raged with remarkable vehemence costing about thirty thousand lives.
Today extreme left and PKK terror are almost finished and the backbone of the eligious terror organization Hizbullah has been crushed. This does not mean that Turkey can consider terrorism totally eradicated. While there are still substantial number of armed PKK (now has changed its name to KADEK) members in Northern Iraq, and most of its leaders enjoy asylum in different countries of Western Europe; some of the leaders of the extreme left terror organizations enjoy the same privileges.[v]
Since the Second World War terror in the Eastern Mediterranean region has been used also as an instrument of wars. Among the leading organizations were various Jewish terror groups such as Haganah, Irgun Zvei Leumi and others, PLO in Palestine, EOKA in Cyprus. After winning their wars the leaders of some of these organizations have become respectable statesmen. Also some of the current dictators in the region have come to power through military means also involving terrorism.
Currently terror in the region seems to be mostly religiously motivated and it is not only of Islamist origin. Nevertheless in many countries where Islam is the predominant religion Islamic terror is used by certain fundamentalist factions as a political instrument and by others as a weapon in what is called Jihad, the Islamic crusade.
Fundamentalism and Secularism
Islam is generally regarded as both a religion and a legal precept. Sometimes at a certain period, civil leaders have used Islam as a political instrument and in other times the Islamic leaders have directly or indirectly ruled the country. At the present, with the exception of Turkey, in all Moslem countries religion and legal precepts are amalgamated in varying degrees. The exceptional status of Islam in the secular Turkish society is unique and similar to that of the status of religion in many European countries. This is probably because Islam had a dominant role in the Ottoman state and the Turks believed that the main cause of their empire lagging behind European countries was the excessive role of religion in the affairs of state and therefore secularism and democracy was adopted as the best solution. This approach has made Turkey the most advanced country in the Islamic world.
Nevertheless, religious are vying for power all over the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.[vi] In countries where authoritarian regimes suppress them they go underground, or appear as social organizations. Within the democratic political structure of Turkey pro-Islamic parties take part in the elections. Up to now they have not succeeded in persuading enough voters to come to power. Even though they have taken part in various coalition governments during the past forty years they have so far acted like Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, may be because of the legal restrictions aimed at protecting the secular character of the state and solidity of secular institutions in Turkey. Nevertheless, some countries in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East constitute training grounds for all types of Islamic fundamentalists active in Turkey, still Islamic fundamentalism is considered a threat to Turkish social order and Turkey strives to encourage international cooperation against also religiously based terrorism.
Particularly after the September 11, 2001 Arab terrorist attacks in the United States, many writers in Western Europe and the US began to express hostility towards Arabs even though officials agree that not all Moslems are terrorists. [vii]The current debate on these issues have once again reminded us the relevancy of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” book and theory. It is indeed true that as far as social and political structures and behavioral patterns are concerned, larger part of the Middle East still present an anomaly to the recent global trends in their social and political structures and behavior patterns, unless they transform their regimes and practices to attain harmony with the developed world, currently growing asymmetry and divergence of interest may lead to clash scenarios as already being initiated by the United States.
Trafficking
The Mediterranean has become a suitable conduit for the smuggling of refugees and immigrants to Western Europe. It is true that both in Maghreb and Mashrek regions of the Arab world unemployment is very high. If we add to them the many displaced person from other Middle East countries, it would be easy to imagine the magnitude of the number of would be emigrants to Western Europe. Many of these people, in the hands of human smugglers, huddled in containers and decrepit old vessels strive to reach Europe through the Mediterranean and many die on the way. Last year ‘n Turkey only 35, 000 such people were apprehended and sent back to their home countries; but this does not prevent them from trying again.
Against this grim picture demographers are not despondent for the future of population movements in the Mediterranean countries. It is assumed that downward trend in fertility and population increase all over the Mediterranean will stabilize the demographic situation all over the Mediterranean region. In the near future, “the early onset of fertility transition may compel Turkey itself to look towards Central Asia or Arab countries for imported labor” Already, there are thousands of illegal workers in Turkey from Balkans and former Soviet Republics while there is practically very small Turkish worker emigration to Western Europe.
Similarly, drug trafficking follows the same route in both directions. It has proven to be extremely difficult to prevent all types of traffic on land and sea routes around in and around the Mediterranean, in spite of substantial international cooperation.
The roles of international organizations
Since the beginning of its implementation seven years ago the Barcelona process has recorded some success in the economic field in helping particularly Maghreb countries to achieve some progress.[viii] However, the economic challenges in Southern Mediterranean are so big that European Union with its market closed to agricultural competition can hardly provide substantial remedy to the basically agricultural economies of that region. The second economic aim of the MEDA project, i.e. the creation of a large free trade area, has also failed to materialize.
As regards the aim of the European Mediterranean Program to create a Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Security, four years of continued dialogue and negotiations have failed to attain the desired goal. [ix]Two major disagreements exist among the MEDA partners. First is the failure in the implementation of the CSCE type of security cooperation foreseen in the Barcelona Declaration. The principal impediment is the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict; while that conflict continues the Arab states are not inclined to enlarge their security. Only after the conflict abates there may be a chance to consider confidence building and subsequently partnership building measures for the entire Mediterranean. As far as Turkey CBM’s are operative between Turkey and Syria and over the Aegean with Greece. Secondly, the demands of North and South are asymmetric, seriously preventing chances of real partnership and security in the Mediterranean region. While EU, countries consider democracy (at least good governance), human rights and globalization as essential conditions for the development of stability and security, South does not agree with the EU’s systemic link between political and economic reform.
Two countries seem to be misfits in the Europe’s Mediterranean Program, namely Turkey and Israel. Unlike other non-EU Mediterranean partner these two countries are industrialized democracies that have completed the globalization of their economies. Furthermore, Turkey having established a customs union with the EU and being a candidate for accession also from the security point of view as member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now in a better position to support the MEDA programs . Turkey supports the Barcelona process because it believes that the establishment of peace and security in the Mediterranean is imperative for the development and progress of the region and also a durable political stability could be established through economic and financial cooperation.
Nevertheless, the inherent weaknesses of the MEDA program may breed a tendency of turning it into a mostly sterile Euro-Arab process.
As regards NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue it aims at contributing to peace and security and eliminating misunderstandings about the aims of the organization by developing common understanding with the countries of the region.[x] Currently; Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Jordan and Algeria take part in this dialogue. One of the reasons behind the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue may be the desire to reduce the risk perceived from fundamentalism. In this respect when conditions are more suitable a dialogue seminar in Turkey might prove to be helpful in demonstrating the virtues of Turkey’s secular model. The dialogue also supports participation on a case by case basis of some Mediterranean countries in some of the NATO’s Partnership for Peace activities.
Conclusion
Given the diverginig character of threat perceptions and security risks in the Mediterranean an all embracing security system or even a stability charter seems to be very difficult to achieve. These difficulties are exacerbated by the current Arab-Israeli conflict, prevailing economic and cultural asymmetry between the expectations of North and South. Turkey is not yet a member of the European Union although it is candidate for membership and takes part in all other European organizations as a full partner. Such a status makes Turkey’ a unique partner in the MEDA program, and encourages her to develop its security and economic relations with other Mediterranean countries on a bilateral basis. So far this relationship pattern has been highly successful and beneficial for both Turkey and its Mediterranean partners.
NOTES
[i] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Publications, 1992
[ii] Gamal A. Gawad Soltan, Security Perceptions in the Arab World and Euro-Med Relations, International Spectator, Rome, volume 36, January-March 2001
[iii] Meliha B. Altunýþýk, the Middle East in the Aftermath of September 11 Attacks, Foreign Policy, no:3-4/2001
[iv] For the details see Reþat Arým, Foreign Policy Concepts: Conjucture, Freedom of Action, Equality, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara 2001
[v] Associated Press Newswires, 26 September 2001
[vi] Abdelwahab Biad, Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Partnership: Challenges and Prospects,The International Spectator, Rome, volume 34, April-June 1999
[vii] Mare Grossman, US Undersecretary of State, Press Briefing, 24 September 2001
[viii] Claire Spencer, Partnership-building in the Mediterranean, International Spectator, Rome, volume:34, October-December 1999
[ix] For further information, please see Report of EuroMeSCo, working group I, First Year Report: Security and Common Ground in the Euro-Med Partnership
[x] Massimo Ambrosetti, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, The International Spectator, Rome, volume 36, January- March 2001
* Published in the Strategic Yearbook 2003 (Euro-Mediterranean Security) of the Swedish National Defence College.