The most significant characteristic of the Turkish foreign policy in the year 2009 has been the high degree of overlapping of the domestic factors with foreign policy activity. The striking examples of this phenomenon can be seen in Turkey's Iraqi and Armenian policies. In Iraq the government initially desired to bypass the Kurdish Administration in the North in order to protect Turcomans and prevent Kirkuk from becoming a Kurdish territory, while maintaining good neighborly relations with Iraq. However, we are faced with absolutely negative attitudes of the United States and both Iraqi administrations (Baghdad and Erbil) to do anything for preventing the PKK's use of Iraqi territory to carry out infiltrations and attacks in Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey was unable to militarily eradicate PKK in Iraq, not because of any lack of military capability but due to adamant attitudes of US and Iraq to see Turkish Forces active in Iraq.

The PKK activities of terror - setting mines and traps - have forced the Turkish government to seek diplomatic and domestic solutions to the problem. Obviously the powers in Iraq (Baghdad, Erbil, US) when willing to negotiate a deal that will terminate PKK presence in Iraq. Yet, Erbil did not want to take any action against PKK as they were “fellow Kurds”; Baghdad had no control in Northern Iraq; US did not want to reengage itself in a military action in Northern Iraq. The solution envisaged by US was to demand from the Turkish government actions to appease the Kurds in Southeast Turkey to declare an amnesty for PKK and find refuge for PKK leaders in another country. The Turkish government announced a program of reforms (“Opening”) for Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin and to begin to implement a “return-home” program for Turkish Kurds in Northern Iraq – PKK et al. However, as the first batch of non-repentant PKK members were given a pompous welcome by Kurdish nationalists, the government's program faced a heavy blow from rising popular protest. This protest demonstrated the impossibility of elaborating an Iraqi (Kurdish) policy without creating a domestic consensus.

The second area where foreign policy is subjugated to domestic affairs was the question of opening Turkey's borders with Armenia and establishing diplomatic relations. Despite the fact that Armenian Airlines fly over Turkish airspace, charter flights from Yerevan to Istanbul and Trabzon are regularly functioning, there is a resident Armenian ambassador as a delegate to BSEC Headquarters in Istanbul and there are thousands of Armenian citizens working in Turkey, Turkey had taken the decision to close its land borders after the occupation of Azeri territories as a result of the war between Armenian and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and the failure of Armenia to take positive steps to solve the problem. The second reason was Armenian government's persistence in pursuing a political campaign, aided by the Diaspora, to describe the deportation of Armenians, in 1915, from Eastern Anatolia to other parts of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing events as genocide. Under Diaspora pressure and political power in many countries, parliaments in a few countries decided to recognize the historic event as genocide, even though many reputable historians said that there was no genocide. Yet, the pressure on Turkey was so much from the United States and EU that the Turkish and Armenian governments, under Swiss auspices, agreed to sign a Protocol and create a committee of historians to look into the events of 1915.

When the protocol was signed, with the expressed pleasure of such organizations as EU and Council of Europe, and in the presence of US Secretary of State, Russian Foreign Minister and other dignitaries, there was a huge protest in Azerbaijan, where a lot of people and the government felt as if they were betrayed by their brethren, as it was customary to describe popularly Turks and Azeris as “one nation with two states”. Turkish Prime Minister, in order to appease the Azeris, went to Baku and promised to the Azerbaijani Parliament that the Protocols will not be executed before Karabakh issue is resolved. Popular reaction in Turkey was a strong one, both for the damage in the Turkish-Azeri relations and, secondly, Armenians had not shown any goodwill for showing any flexibility concerning points of dispute between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has submitted the protocols to the Parliament for ratification, but considering the prevailing atmosphere and the promises made to the people of Azerbaijan, one can hardly expect an early approval of the document by the parliament. To remedy the situation, the Turkish Prime Minister has asked President Obama to exert pressure on Armenia and on the Minsk Group for finding a solution to the Karabakh dispute.

In May 2009, Turkey appointed an academic as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Professor Davutoğlu is a well known personality for his ideas of combining strategic thinking with day-to-day diplomatic activities. In fact, in the post-Cold War era, he described Turkey's geopolitical position as a “center” where Turkey should follow an omni-directional foreign policy. The implementation of this new foreign policy created a significant debate, particularly in the West, about the validity of the main axis of Turkish foreign policy which hitherto was Western-oriented. Ever since the foundation of the Republic, and even before, Turkish policy placed heavy weight on relations with Europe and America; so much so that Turkey not only became a member of NATO and all European institutions, it also applied for membership to EEC soon after its creation.

Turkish social, political, educational and military institutions adopted Western norms and turned Turkey into a European country. However, the democratic opening that began with free elections in1950 also heralded the promise of greater freedom for religion expressions which, was then used for political purposes. Whether this opening was an infringement of the secular characteristics of the Turkish Republic has been a subject of debate within Turkish society. The recent opening of Turkish diplomacy in an intensified manner towards Turkey's Muslim and Arab neighbors has been subject of debate and criticism in the West, bypassing Turkey's claim that this opening reflects Turkey's growing economic power and interests stemming from its geopolitically central position. There is little doubt that Turkey is now considered as a regional leader, but Turkey's foreign policy activism extends to other parts of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Far East, not to mention Central Asia. Certainly, Turkish private sector has had wide interests not only in this neighborhood but also in these far-flung countries where they have business interests and more. It is to enhance and support the activities of the private sector that Turkey has decided to set up many new embassies in such African and Latin American countries, whose names were hardly in the Turkish vocabulary. The question that is being asked in Western media is whether Turkey has adequate power and capability to play a global role that it has assigned to itself.

As Turkey is in a negotiation process for full membership with the European Union, this unilateral Turkish global activity is questioned by some European countries who feel that Turkey should be in consultation with its European partners in embarking in such a large opening, particularly when Turkey removes visa restrictions with non-EU countries and signs free trade agreements. Furthermore, the newly adopted critical attitude towards Israel is considered by some pro-Jewish media as Turkey's departure from its solid, pro-Western traditions. At the end of 2009 one question may legitimately be asked, is Turkey really distancing itself from the West and the new openings to neighbors and beyond signify a major policy shift? To understand the real situation one must ask, despite Turkey's long standing bonds with Europe and its organizations, why is Turkey's official progress towards EU membership is so slow and capricious? Europe's eagerness to have Turkey as a member of the Economic Community began to fade away in 1974 after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus. Up till then European countries appeared to be equidistant to Turkey and Greece. After the Cyprus crisis, EEC changed its attitude to support Greece, to the disadvantage of Turkey, making Greece a member while unofficially freezing relations with Turkey. It was only in 1990's that EU began to remember Turkey and wanted to put Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963, partially, into operation by agreeing to create a Customs Union with Turkey.

The situation today is reflected in EU's Progress Report concerning membership negotiations with Turkey. The report is a collection of views and comments on subjects some of which are related directly to conditions that should prepare Turkey to carry the obligations of a member state. A majority of these are fulfilling the requirements embodied in the European Human Rights Convention and the European Charter of Human Rights. Indeed, the criticisms on Turkey's performance in these fields are basically acceptable and Turkey should do much more to reform itself and its institutions to reach the level of contemporary civilization. While group rights are an unresolved international issue and a universally accepted definition of the term 'minority' still cannot be found, arguing on their behalf is not acceptable to Turkish public opinion.

It is true that when Turkey applied for membership in the EU Turkey had problems with some of its neighbors. Most of these problems have historic and chronic nature. They can only be resolved by good will and understanding to be shown by all parties to the dispute.

It is equally true that by accepting Greece and Cyprus to full membership into EU and all of its institutions, other EU members either individually or as the EU have, in effect, become parties to these disputes. As things stand these two countries have a direct impact on the conditions that affect the progress of negotiations with Turkey and as result EU has become a de facto participant in these disputes. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent EU from becoming an interlocutor with Turkey for the solution of our disputes with Greece and Cyprus. Somehow, EU does not do that while imposing an economic embargo on Turkish Cypriots and asking for concessions and sanctioning of the negotiation process with Turkey, EU turns itself into a champion of Greek Cypriot cases, as if it is ignorant of the nature of the disputes. The chapter on Common Foreign and Security is closed. The only context in which such issues as Greek Turkish disputes or relations with Armenia can be discussed are certainly the relevant chapters of the negotiation process. I do not think that Turkey would shy away from negotiating these issues in the negotiations platform. But it is hardly thinkable for Turkey to accept EU's unjustified unilateral interventions in Turkey's disputes because of membership solidarity with the Greeks.

It is clear that Turkey cannot become a member of the European Union before all members agree to such membership. In other words, Greece and Cyprus together with such countries like France and Germany that have other plans for Turkey must reconcile themselves to be partners with Turkey as member of EU. Under the prevailing conditions this might be considered 'a mission impossible.'

These impediments can only be resolved if all European countries feel that it is in their common interest to have Turkey as partner in building up a united Europe and create a secure Middle East; in which case they may exert enough pressure on Greece and Cyprus to engage in reasonable dialogue with Turkey instead of using EU as a pressure-tool.

Otherwise, in a Community where powers hostile to Turkey, and/or its membership in the Union prevail, Turkey cannot expect to become a member and most probably would not even wish to become a member. Turkey with a population of 72 million and huge economic expectations would not be expected to accept unreasonable Greek demands that aim imposing full control in the Aegean and Cyprus for the sake of being allowed to sit in the ante-chamber of EU.

Under these circumstances, the valid question is, whether the West is pushing Turkey out of its orbit or whether Turkey is seeking new areas of emphasis to replace broken Western bonds. Officially there are denials both in Europe and in Turkey about the breakdown of fidelity and confidence in the historic bonds that tie Turkey with major European countries and the progress of integration. Indeed, whatever is the official picture that is already marred with irresponsible speeches and policies of German and French leaders, there is an ongoing process of integration between EU countries and Turkey. The process covers economic relations, investments, cultural contacts and human elements. This process is going on despite the obstacles created by official policies. About 4 million Turks permanently living in EU countries constitute an unbreakable bond. The fact that the founders of the European Union are reluctant to see Turkey as a member does not affect Turkey's European-ness, as Turkey is an active member of all other European institutions and any deficiencies in its institutional and human rights implementations are being progressively corrected.