Although the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 has given candidate status to Turkey on equal terms with other candidates, the following uncertainties remained. First, the Conclusions did not give Turkey any promise for a date on which accession program could be implemented, whereas other candidates were given date for the commencement of the accession negotiations. Second, Turkey was required to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria like other candidates in addition to fulfilling some political conditions such as resolving the Cyprus question and the Aegean problems, despite the fact that such solutions do not depend only on Turkey. The same Conclusions have promised full accession to the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Government of Cyprus whether or not a solution is found to the existing problem between the two parties on the future status of the State. This position has time and again been reiterated by the Commission President and Commissioners, as well as the term Presidents. Although it is clear that this promise to the Greek Cypriot Administration will not only harden their attitude in the course of negotiations, if materialized it will seriously jeopardize Turkey’s relations with the European Union.

The candidacy status given to Turkey at Helsinki are interpreted by serious European opposition parties as false promises to Turkey because according to them Turkey will never become a member of the EU. Clear evidences are given by the German CDU leaders, consistent with their previous attitudes of denying membership to Turkey in the Conclusions of 1995 Madrid and 1997 Luxembourg Summits. Many other examples of the same attitude are expressed in the European Parliament and the European media.

While most of the Copenhagen Criteria are required for all members of European democracies, implementation of some of them contain significant risks for Turkey if it is going to stay outside the EU for a considerable period of time.

In Turkey, minorities are those defined in the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. Apart from those, there are no other minorities in Turkey. All citizens of Turkey are considered as Turks and are equal citizens. The official language of the country is Turkish. In this respect the Turkish State system is a replica of the French system. The Copenhagen Criteria are interpreted by many European officials and media as demanding minority rights to non-existing minorities in Turkey.

Under the present conditions and historical development of the national structure of the Turkish State, granting any special rights to some sections of the Turkish nation carries the risk of encouraging separation. Such a risk may not exist among the members of the European Union since a new European identity and attachment to a great and prosperous union would eliminate such risks. It would therefore be logical to assume that in case Turkish public opinion see before them a clear path to accession it might be easier for them to develop a new approach to the Copenhagen Criteria.

As is known, the equal status of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots had been accepted as the basis at the creation of the Cyprus Republic. This equality was upset as a result of the Greek Cypriot coup d’état in 1964 and restored after Turkish Military intervention in 1974 when two autonomous administrations were accepted at the Geneva Conference. However, whereas the status of equality of the two communities were recognized by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, somehow the Greek Cypriot administration continued to pose as the sole legal Government of Cyprus. It is not possible for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to accept any solution that does not provide for sovereign equality for the two communities. 1959-1960 Agreements also foresaw most-favoured nation treatment to Turkey as well as Greece. If Cyprus is to be admitted to the EU and Turkey excluded, Turkey may loose these rights. Therefore, if Cyprus is to enter to the EU without a clear path given to Turkey itself, it will be difficult for Turkey also to give away these important rights and the situation will be much more complicated.

Any student of Turkish public opinion would clearly observe that the general perception of EU integration policy towards Turkey is an ambiguous one whereas the EU demands on the two subjects of risk for Turkey are categoric.

Joining destinies with other European countries is a very serious matter for Turkey as it involves sharing and exchanging our national sovereignties. If such a union is to be achieved, both Turkey and the EU countries must give clear signs of their determination. On its part, Turkey has made great strides in bringing its norms to the European standards and is rapidly continuing with the task of implementing them. Since Turkey has been waiting for concrete and engaging steps from EU since 1995 when the Customs Union was achieved, the mere candidacy status with no critical diagram ahead justifies the current perceptions of ambiguity of European policy and dampens enthusiasm.